Concerning the Nature of Good, Against the…

 St. AUGUSTIN:

 Concerning the Nature of Good,

 Chapter 1.—God the Highest and Unchangeable Good, from Whom are All Other Good Things, Spiritual and Corporeal.

 Chapter 2.—How This May Suffice for Correcting the Manichæans.

 Chapter 3.—Measure, Form, and Order, Generic Goods in Things Made by God.

 Chapter 4.—Evil is Corruption of Measure, Form, or Order.

 Chapter 5.—The Corrupted Nature of a More Excellent Order Sometimes Better Than an Inferior Nature Even Uncorrupted.

 Chapter 6.—Nature Which Cannot Be Corrupted is the Highest Good That Which Can, is Some Good.

 Chapter 7.—The Corruption of Rational Spirits is on the One Hand Voluntary, on the Other Penal.

 Chapter 8.—From the Corruption and Destruction of Inferior Things is the Beauty of the Universe.

 Chapter 9.—Punishment is Constituted for the Sinning Nature that It May Be Rightly Ordered.

 Chapter 10.—Natures Corruptible, Because Made of Nothing.

 Chapter 11.—God Cannot Suffer Harm, Nor Can Any Other Nature Except by His Permission.

 Chapter 12.—All Good Things are from God Alone.

 Chapter 13.—Individual Good Things, Whether Small or Great, are from God.

 Chapter 14.—Small Good Things in Comparison with Greater are Called by Contrary Names.

 Chapter 15.—In the Body of the Ape the Good of Beauty is Present, Though in a Less Degree.

 Chapter 16.—Privations in Things are Fittingly Ordered by God.

 Chapter 17.—Nature, in as Far as It is Nature, No Evil.

 Chapter 18.—Hyle, Which Was Called by the Ancients the Formless Material of Things, is Not an Evil.

 Chapter 19.—To Have True Existence is an Exclusive Prerogative of God.

 Chapter 20.—Pain Only in Good Natures.

 Therefore now by common usage things small and mean are said to have measure, because some measure remains in them, without which they would no longer

 Chapter 22.—Measure in Some Sense is Suitable to God Himself.

 Chapter 23.—Whence a Bad Measure, a Bad Form, a Bad Order May Sometimes Be Spoken of.

 Chapter 24.—It is Proved by the Testimonies of Scripture that God is Unchangeable. The Son of God Begotten, Not Made.

 Chapter 25.—This Last Expression Misunderstood by Some.

 Chapter 26.—That Creatures are Made of Nothing.

 Chapter 27.—From Him And Of Him Do Not Mean The Same Thing.

 Chapter 28.—Sin Not From God, But From The Will of Those Sinning.

 Chapter 29.—That God is Not Defiled by Our Sins.

 Chapter 30.—That Good Things, Even the Least, and Those that are Earthly, are by God.

 Chapter 31.—To Punish and to Forgive Sins Belong Equally to God.

 Chapter 32.—From God Also is the Very Power to Be Hurtful.

 Chapter 33.—That Evil Angels Have Been Made Evil, Not by God, But by Sinning.

 Chapter 34.—That Sin is Not the Striving for an Evil Nature, But the Desertion of a Better.

 Chapter 35.—The Tree Was Forbidden to Adam Not Because It Was Evil, But Because It Was Good for Man to Be Subject to God.

 Chapter 36.—No Creature of God is Evil, But to Abuse a Creature of God is Evil.

 Chapter 37.—God Makes Good Use of the Evil Deeds of Sinners.

 Chapter 38.—Eternal Fire Torturing the Wicked, Not Evil.

 Chapter 39.—Fire is Called Eternal, Not as God Is, But Because Without End.

 Chapter 40.—Neither Can God Suffer Hurt, Nor Any Other, Save by the Just Ordination of God.

 Chapter 41.—How Great Good Things the Manichæans Put in the Nature of Evil, and How Great Evil Things in the Nature of Good.

 Chapter 42.—Manichæan Blasphemies Concerning the Nature of God.

 Chapter 43.—Many Evils Before His Commingling with Evil are Attributed to the Nature of God by the Manichæans.

 Chapter 44.—Incredible Turpitudes in God Imagined by Manichæus.

 Chapter 45.—Certain Unspeakable Turpitudes Believed, Not Without Reason, Concerning the Manichæans Themselves.

 Chapter 46.—The Unspeakable Doctrine of the Fundamental Epistle.

 Chapter 47.—He Compels to the Perpetration of Horrible Turpitudes.

 Chapter 48.—Augustin Prays that the Manichæans May Be Restored to Their Senses.

Chapter 43.—Many Evils Before His Commingling with Evil are Attributed to the Nature of God by the Manichæans.

What if we should also show that before the commingling of evil, which stupid fable they have most madly believed, great evils were in what they call the nature of light? what will it seem possible to add to these blasphemies? For before the conflict, there was the hard and inevitable necessity of fighting: here is truly a great evil, before evil is commingled with good. Let them say whence this is, when as yet no commingling had taken place? But if there was no necessity, there was therefore free will: whence also this so great evil, that God himself should wish to hurt his own nature, which could not be hurt by the enemy, by sending it to be cruelly commingled, to be basely purged, to be unjustly damned? Behold, the great evil of a pernicious, noxious, and savage will, before any evil from the contrary nature was mingled with it! Or perchance he did not know that this would happen to his members, that they should love darkness and become hostile to holy light, as Manichæus says, that is, not only to their own God, but also to the Father from whom they had their being? Whence therefore this so great evil of ignorance, before any evil from the nature of darkness was mingled with it? But if he knew that this would happen, either there was in him everlasting cruelty, if he did not grieve over the contamination and damnation of his own nature that was to take place, or everlasting misery, if he did so grieve: whence also this so great evil of your supreme good before any commingling with your supreme evil? Assuredly that part of the nature itself which was fettered in the eternal chain of that sphere, if it knew not that this fate awaited it, even so was there everlasting ignorance in the nature of God, but if it knew, then everlasting misery: whence this so great evil before any evil from the contrary nature was commingled? Or perchance did it, in the greatness of its love (charity), rejoice that through its punishment perpetual rest was prepared for the residue of the inhabitants of light? Let him who sees how abominable it is to say this, pronounce an anathema. But if this should be done so that at least the good nature itself should not become hostile to the light, it might be possible, perchance, not for the nature of God indeed, but for some man, as it were, to be regarded as praiseworthy, who for the sake of his country should be willing to suffer something of evil, which evil indeed could be only for a time, and not forever: but now also they speak of that fettering in the sphere of darkness as eternal, and not indeed of a certain thing but of the nature of God; and assuredly it were a most unrighteous, and execrable, and ineffably sacrilegious joy, if the nature of God rejoiced that it should love darkness, and should become hostile to holy light. Whence this so monstrous and abominable evil before any evil from the contrary nature was commingled? Who can endure insanity so perverse and so impious, as to attribute so great good things to supreme evil, and so great evils to supreme good, which is God?