Letter CLXVI.

(a.d. 415.)

A Treatise on the Origin of the Human Soul, Addressed to Jerome.1277    The following passage from the Retractations of Augustin (Book ii. ch. xlv.) is quoted by the Benedictine Fathers as a preface to this letter and the one immediately succeeding:—“I wrote also two books to Presbyter Jerome, the recluse of Bethlehem [sedentem in Bethlehem]; the one on the origin of the human soul, the other on the sentence of the Apostle James, ‘Whosoever shall keep the whole law and offend in one point, he is guilty of all’ (Jas. ii. 10), asking his opinion on both subjects. In the former letter I did not give any answer of my own to the question which I proposed; in the latter I did not keep back what seemed to me the best way to solve the question, but asked whether the same solution commended itself to his judgment. He wrote in return, expressing approbation of my submitting the questions to him, but saying that he had not leisure to send me a reply. So long as he lived, therefore, I refused to give these books to the world, lest he should perhaps at any time reply to them, in which case I would have rather published them along with his answer. After his decease, however, I published them,—the former, in order to admonish any who read it, either to forbear altogether from inquiring into the manner in which a soul is given to infants at the time of birth, or, at all events, in a matter so involved in obscurity, to accept only such a solution of the question as does not contradict the clearest truths which the Catholic faith confesses in regard to original sin in infants, as undoubtedly doomed to perdition unless they be regenerated in Christ; the latter in order that what seemed to us the true answer to the question therein discussed might be known. The work begins with the words, ‘Deum nostrum qui nos vocavit.’ ”

Chap. I.

1. Unto our God, who hath called us unto His kingdom and glory,1278    1 Thess. ii. 12. I have prayed, and pray now, that what I write to you, holy brother Jerome, asking your opinion in regard to things of which I am ignorant, may by His good pleasure be profitable to us both. For although in addressing you I consult one much older than myself, nevertheless I also am becoming old; but I cannot think that it is at anytime of life too late to learn what we need to know, because, although it is more fitting that old men should be teachers than learners, it is nevertheless more fitting for them to learn than to continue ignorant of that which they should teach to others. I assure you that, amid the many disadvantages which I have to submit to in studying very difficult questions, there is none which grieves me more than the circumstance of separation from your Charity by a distance so great that I can scarcely send a letter to you, and scarcely receive one from you, even at intervals, not of days nor of months, but of several years; whereas my desire would be, if it were possible, to have you daily beside me, as one with whom I could converse on any theme. Nevertheless, although I have not been able to do all that I wished, I am not the less bound to do all that I can.

2. Behold, a religious young man has come to me, by name Orosius, who is in the bond of Catholic peace a brother, in point of age a son, and in honour a fellow presbyter,—a man, of quick understanding, ready speech, and burning zeal, desiring to be in the Lord’s house a vessel rendering useful service in refuting those false and pernicious doctrines, through which the souls of men in Spain have suffered much more grievous wounds than have been inflicted on their bodies by the sword of barbarians. For from the remote western coast of Spain he has come with eager haste to us, having been prompted to do this by the report that from me he could learn whatever he wished on the subjects on which he desired information. Nor has his coming been altogether in vain. In the first place, he has learned not to believe all that report affirmed of me: in the next place, I have taught him all that I could, and, as for the things in which I could not teach him, I have told him from whom he may learn them, and have exhorted him to go on to you. As he received this counsel or rather injunction of mine with pleasure, and with intention to comply with it, I asked him to visit us on his way home to his own country when he comes from you. On receiving his promise to this effect, I believed that the Lord had granted me an opportunity of writing to you regarding certain things which I wish through you to learn. For I was seeking some one whom I might send to you, and it was not easy to fall in with one qualified both by trustworthiness in performing and by alacrity in undertaking the work, as well as by experience in travelling. Therefore, when I became acquainted with this young man, I could not doubt that he was exactly such a person as I was asking from the Lord.

Chap. II.

3. Allow me, therefore, to bring before you a subject which I beseech you not to refuse to open up and discuss with me. Many are perplexed by questions concerning the soul, and I confess that I myself am of this number. I shall in this letter, in the first place, state explicitly the things regarding the soul which I most assuredly believe, and shall, in the next place, bring forward the things regarding which I am still desirous of explanation.

The soul of man is in a sense proper to itself immortal. It is not absolutely immortal, as God is, of whom it is written that He “alone hath immortality,”1279    1 Tim. vi. 16. for Holy Scripture makes mention of deaths to which the soul is liable—as in the saying, “Let the dead bury their dead;”1280    Matt. viii. 22. but because when alienated from the life of God it so dies as not wholly to cease from living in its own nature, it is found to be from a certain cause mortal, yet so as to be not without reason called at the same time immortal.

The soul is not a part of God. For if it were, it would be absolutely immutable and incorruptible, in which case it could neither go downward to be worse, nor go onward to be better; nor could it either begin to have anything in itself which it had not before, or cease to have anything which it had within the sphere of its own experience. But how different the actual facts of the case are is a point requiring no evidence from without, it is acknowledged by every one who consults his own consciousness. In vain, moreover, is it pleaded by those who affirm that the soul is a part of God, that the corruption and baseness which we see in the worst of men, and the weakness and blemishes which we see in all men, come to it not from the soul itself, but from the body; for what matters it whence the infirmity originates in that which, if it were indeed immutable, could not, from any quarter whatever, be made infirm? For that which is truly immutable and incorruptible is not liable to mutation or corruption by any influence whatever from without, else the invulnerability which the fable ascribed to the flesh of Achilles would be nothing peculiar to him, but the property of every man, so long as no accident befell him. That which is liable to be changed in any manner, by any cause, or in any part whatever, is therefore not by nature immutable; but it were impiety to think of God as otherwise than truly and supremely immutable: therefore the soul is not a part of God.

4. That the soul is immaterial is a fact of which I avow myself to be fully persuaded, although men of slow understanding are hard to be convinced that it is so. To secure myself, however, from either unnecessarily causing to others or unreasonably bringing upon myself a controversy about an expression, let me say that, since the thing itself is beyond question, it is needless to contend about mere terms. If matter be used as a term denoting everything which in any form has a separate existence, whether it be called an essence, or a substance, or by another name, the soul is material. Again, if you choose to apply the epithet immaterial only to that nature which is supremely immutable and is everywhere present in its entirety, the soul is material, for it is not at all endowed with such qualities. But if matter be used to designate nothing but that which, whether at rest or in motion, has some length, breadth, and height, so that with a greater part of itself it occupies a greater part of space, and with a smaller part a smaller space, and is in every part of it less than the whole, then the soul is not material. For it pervades the whole body which it animates, not by a local distribution of parts, but by a certain vital influence, being at the same moment present in its entirety in all parts of the body, and not less in smaller parts and greater in larger parts, but here with more energy and there with less energy, it is in its entirety present both in the whole body and in every part of it. For even that which the mind perceives in only a part of the body is nevertheless not otherwise perceived than by the whole mind; for when any part of the living flesh is touched by a fine pointed instrument, although the place affected is not only not the whole body, but scarcely discernible in its surface, the contact does not escape the entire mind, and yet the contact is felt not over the whole body, but only at the one point where it takes place. How comes it, then, that what takes place in only a part of the body is immediately known to the whole mind, unless the whole mind is present at that part, and at the same time not deserting all the other parts of the body in order to be present in its entirety at this one? For all the other parts of the body in which no such contact takes place are still living by the soul being present with them. And if a similar contact takes place in the other parts, and the contact occur in both parts simultaneously, it would in both cases alike be known at the same moment, to the whole mind. Now this presence of the mind in all parts of the body at the same moment, so that in every part of the body the whole mind is at the same moment present, would be impossible if it were distributed over these parts in the same way as we see matter distributed in space, occupying less space with a smaller portion of itself, and greater space with a greater portion. If, therefore, mind is to be called material, it is not material in the same sense as earth, water, air, and ether are material. For all things composed of these elements are larger in larger places, or smaller in smaller places, and none of them is in its entirety present at any part of itself, but the dimensions of the material substances are according to the dimensions of the space occupied. Whence it is perceived that the soul, whether it be termed material or immaterial, has a certain nature of its own, created from a substance superior to the elements of this world,—a substance which cannot be truly conceived of by any representation of the material images perceived by the bodily senses, but which is apprehended by the understanding and discovered to our consciousness by its living energy. These things I am stating, not with the view of teaching you what you already know, but in order that I may declare explicitly what I hold as indisputably certain concerning the soul, lest any one should think, when I come to state the questions to which I desire answers, that I hold none of the doctrines which we have learned from science or from revelation concerning the soul.

5. I am, moreover, fully persuaded that the soul has fallen into sin, not through the fault of God, nor through any necessity either in the divine nature or in its own, but by its own free will; and that it can be delivered from the body of this death neither by the strength of its own will, as if that were in itself sufficient to achieve this, nor by the death of the body itself, but only by the grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ;1281    Rom. vii. 24, 25. and that there is not one soul in the human family to whose salvation the one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, is not absolutely necessary. Every soul, moreover, which may at any age whatsoever depart from this life without the grace of the Mediator and the sacrament of this grace, departs to future punishment, and shall receive again its own body at the last judgment as a partner in punishment. But if the soul after its natural generation, which was derived from Adam, be regenerated in Christ, it belongs to His fellowship,1282    We read pertinere, not pertinens. and shall not only have rest after the death of the body, but also receive again its own body as a partner in glory. These are truths concerning the soul which I hold most firmly.

Chap. III.

6. Permit me now, therefore, to bring before you the question which I desire to have solved, and do not reject me; so may He not reject you who condescended to be rejected for our sakes!

I ask where can the soul, even of an infant snatched away by death, have contracted the guilt which, unless the grace of Christ has come to the rescue by that sacrament of baptism which is administered even to infants, involves it in condemnation? I know you are not one of those who have begun of late to utter certain new and absurd opinions, alleging that there is no guilt derived from Adam which is removed by baptism in the case of infants. If I knew that you held this view, or, rather, if I did not know that you reject it, I would certainly neither address this question to you, nor think that it ought to be put to you at all. Since, however, we hold on this subject the opinion consonant with the immoveable Catholic faith, which you have yourself expressed when, refuting the absurd sayings of Jovinian, you have quoted this sentence from the book of Job: “In thy sight, no one is clean, not even the infant, whose time of life on earth is a single day,”1283    Job xiv. 4, 5, according to LXX. adding, “for we are held guilty in the similitude of Adam’s transgression,”1284    Jerome against Jovinian, Book ii.—an opinion which your book on Jonah’s prophecy declares in a notable and lucid manner, where you affirm that the little children of Nineveh were justly compelled to fast along with the people, because merely of their original sin,1285    Jerome On Jonah, ch. iii.—it is not unsuitable that I should address to you the question—where has the soul contracted the guilt from which, even at that age, it must be delivered by the sacrament of Christian grace?

7. Some years ago, when I wrote certain books concerning Free Will, which have gone forth into the hands of many, and are now in the possession of very many readers, after referring to these four opinions as to the manner of the soul’s incarnation,—(1) that all other souls are derived from the one which was given to the first man; (2) that for each individual a new soul is made; (3) that souls already in existence somewhere are sent by divine act into the bodies; or (4) glide into them of their own accord, I thought that it was necessary to treat them in such a way that, whichever of them might be true, the decision should not hinder the object which I had in view when contending with all my might against those who attempt to lay upon God the blame of a nature endowed with its own principle of evil, namely, the Manichæans;1286    De Libero Arbitro, iii. 21. for at that time I had not heard of the Priscillianists, who utter blasphemies not very dissimilar to these. As to the fifth opinion, namely, that the soul is a part of God,—an opinion which, in order to omit none, you have mentioned along with the rest in your letter to Marcellinus (a man of pious memory and very dear to us in the grace of Christ), who had consulted you on this question,1287    Letter CLXV.—I did not add it to the others for two reasons, first,—because, in examining this opinion, we discuss not the incarnation of the soul, but its nature; secondly, because this is the view held by those against whom I was arguing, and the main design of my argument was to prove that the blameless and inviolable nature of the Creator has nothing to do with the faults and blemishes of the creature, while they, on their part, maintained that the substance of the good God itself is, in so far as it is led captive, corrupted and oppressed and brought under a necessity of sinning by the substance of evil, to which they ascribe a proper dominion and principalities. Leaving, therefore, out of the question this heretical error, I desire to know which of the other four opinions we ought to choose. For whichever of them may justly claim our preference, far be it from us to assail this article of faith, about which we have no uncertainty, that every soul, even the soul of an infant, requires to be delivered from the binding guilt of sin, and that there is no deliverance except through Jesus Christ and Him crucified.

Chap. IV.

8. To avoid prolixity, therefore, let me refer to the opinion which you, I believe, entertain, viz. that God even now makes each soul for each individual at the time of birth. To meet the objection to this view which might be taken from the fact that God finished the whole work of creation on the sixth day and rested on the seventh day, you quote the testimony of the words in the gospel, “My Father worketh hitherto, and I work.”1288    John v. 17. This you have written in your letter to Marcellinus, in which letter, moreover, you have most kindly condescended to mention my name, saying that he had me here in Africa, who could more easily explain to him the opinion held by you.1289    See Letter CLXV., p. 522. But had I been able to do this, he would not have applied for instruction to you, who were so remote from him, though perhaps he did not write from Africa to you. For I know not when he wrote it; I only know that he knew well my hesitation to embrace any definite view on this subject, for which reason he preferred to write to you without consulting me. Yet, even if he had consulted me, I would rather have encouraged him to write to you, and would have expressed my gratitude for the benefit which might have been conferred on us all, had you not preferred to send a brief note, instead of a full reply, doing this, I suppose, to save yourself from unnecessary expenditure of effort in a place where I, whom you supposed to be thoroughly acquainted with the subject of his inquiries, was at hand. Behold, I am willing that the opinion which you hold should be also mine; but I assure you that as yet I have not embraced it.

9. You have sent to me scholars, to whom you wish me to impart what I have not yet learned myself. Teach me, therefore, what I am to teach them; for many urge me vehemently to be a teacher on this subject, and to them I confess that of this, as well as of many other things, I am ignorant, and perhaps, though they maintain a respectful demeanour in my presence, they say among themselves: “Art thou a master in Israel, and knowest not these things?”1290    John iii. 10. a rebuke which the Lord gave to one who belonged to the class of men who delighted in being called Rabbi; which was also the reason of his coming by night to the true Teacher, because perchance he, who had been accustomed to teach, blushed to take the learner’s place. But, for my own part, it gives me much more pleasure to hear instruction from another, than to be myself listened to as a teacher. For I remember what He said to those whom, above all men, He had chosen: “But be not ye called Rabbi, for one is your master, even Christ.”1291    Matt. xxiii. 8. Nor was it any other teacher who taught Moses by Jethro,1292    Ex. xviii. 14–25. Cornelius by Peter the earlier apostle,1293    Acts x. 25–48. and Peter himself by Paul the later apostle;1294    Gal. ii. 11–21. for by whomsoever truth is spoken, it is spoken by the gift of Him who is the Truth. What if the reason of our still being ignorant of these things, and of our having failed to discover them, even after praying, reading, thinking, and reasoning, be this: that full proof may be made not only of the love with which we give instruction to the ignorant, but also of the humility with which we receive instruction from the learned?

10. Teach me, therefore, I beseech you, what I may teach to others; teach me what I ought to hold as my own opinion; and tell me this: if souls are from day to day made for each individual separately at birth, where, in the case of infant children, is sin committed by these souls, so that they require the remission of sin in the sacrament of Christ, because of sinning in Adam from whom the sinful flesh has been derived? or if they do not sin, how is it compatible with the justice of the Creator, that, because of their being united to mortal members derived from another, they are so brought under the bond of the sin of that other, that unless they be rescued by the Church, perdition overtakes them, although it is not in their own power to secure that they be rescued by the grace of baptism? Where, therefore, is the justice of the condemnation of so many thousands of souls, which in the deaths of infant children leave this world without the benefit of the Christian sacrament, if being newly created they have, not through any preceding sin of their own, but by the will of the Creator, become severally united to the individual bodies to animate which they were created and bestowed by Him, who certainly knew that every one of them was destined, not through any fault of its own, to leave the body without receiving the baptism of Christ? Seeing, therefore, that we may not say concerning God either that He compels them to become sinners, or that He punishes innocent souls and seeing that, on the other hand, it is not lawful for us to deny that nothing else than perdition is the doom of the souls, even of little children, which have departed from the body without the sacrament of Christ, tell me, I implore you, where anything can be found to support the opinion that souls are not all derived from that one soul of the first man, but are each created separately for each individual, as Adam’s soul was made for him.

Chap. V.

11. As for some other objections which are advanced against this opinion, I think that I could easily dispose of them. For example, some think that they urge a conclusive argument against this opinion when they ask, how God finished all His works an the sixth day and rested on the seventh day,1295    Gen. ii. 2. if He is still creating new souls. If we meet them with the quotation from the gospel (given by you in the letter to Marcellinus already mentioned), “My Father worketh hitherto,” they answer that He “worketh” in maintaining those natures which He has created, not in creating new natures; otherwise, this statement would contradict the words of Scripture in Genesis, where it is most plainly declared that God finished all His works. Moreover, the words of Scripture, that He rested, are unquestionably to be understood of His resting from creating new creatures, not from governing those which He had created; for at that time He made things which previously did not exist, and from making these He rested because He had finished all the creatures which before they existed He saw necessary to be created, so that thenceforward He did not create and make things which previously did not exist, but made and fashioned out of things already existing whatever He did make. Thus the statements, “He rested from His works,” and, “He worketh hitherto,” are both true, for the gospel could not contradict Genesis.

12. When, however, these things are brought forward by persons who advance them as conclusive against the opinion that God now creates new souls as He created the soul of the first man, and who hold either that He forms them from that one soul which existed before He rested from creation, or that He now sends them forth into bodies from some reservoir or storehouse of souls which He then created, it is easy to turn aside their argument by answering, that even in the six days God formed many things out of those natures which He had already created, as, for example, the birds and fishes were formed from the waters, and the trees, the grass, and the animals from the earth, and yet it is undeniable that He was then making things which did not exist before. For there existed previously no bird, no fish, no tree, no animal, and it is clearly understood that He rested from creating those things which previously were not, and were then created, that is to say, He ceased in this sense, that, after that, nothing was made by Him which did not already exist. But if, rejecting the opinions of all who believe either that God sends forth into men souls existing already in some incomprehensible reservoir, or that He makes souls emanate like drops of dew from Himself as particles of His own substance, or that He brings them forth from that one soul of the first man, or that He binds them in the fetters of the bodily members because of sins committed in a prior state of existence, if, I say, rejecting these, we affirm that for each individual He creates separately a new soul when he is born, we do not herein affirm that He makes anything which he had not already made. For He had already made man after His own image on the sixth day; and this work of His is unquestionably to be understood with reference to the rational soul of man. The same work He still does, not in creating what did not exist, but in multiplying what already existed. Wherefore it is true, on the one hand, that He rested from creating things which previously did not exist, and equally true, on the other hand, that He continues still to work, not only in governing what He has made, but also in making (not anything which did not previously exist, but) a larger number of those creatures which He had already made. Wherefore, either by such an explanation, or by any other which may seem better, we escape from the objection advanced by those who would make the fact that God rested from His works a conclusive argument against our believing that new souls are still being daily created, not from the first soul, but in the same manner as it was made.

13. Again, as for another objection, stated in the question, “Wherefore does He create souls for those whom He knows to be destined to an early death?” we may reply, that by the death of the children the sins of the parents are either reproved or chastised. We may, moreover, with all propriety, leave these things to the disposal of the Lord of all, for we know that he appoints to the succession of events in time, and therefore to the births and deaths of living creatures as included in these, a course which is consummate in beauty and perfect in the arrangement of all its parts; whereas we are not capable of perceiving those things by the perception of which, if it were attainable, we should be soothed with an ineffable, tranquil joy. For not in vain has the prophet, taught by divine inspiration, declared concerning God, “He bringeth forth in measured harmonies the course of time.”1296    Isa. xl. 26; translated by Augustin, “Qui profert numerose sæculam.” For which reason music, the science or capacity of correct harmony, has been given also by the kindness of God to mortals having reasonable souls, with a view to keep them in mind of this great truth. For if a man, when composing a song which is to suit a particular melody, knows how to distribute the length of time allowed to each word so as to make the song flow and pass on in most beautiful adaptation to the ever-changing notes of the melody, how much more shall God, whose wisdom is to be esteemed as infinitely transcending human arts, make infallible provision that not one of the spaces of time alloted to natures that are born and die—spaces which are like the words and syllables of the successive epochs of the course of time—shall have, in what we may call the sublime psalm of the vicissitudes of this world, a duration either more brief or more protracted than the foreknown and predetermined harmony requires! For when I may speak thus with reference even to the leaves of every tree, and the number of the hairs upon our heads, how much more may I say it regarding the birth and death of men, seeing that every man’s life on earth continues for a time, which is neither longer nor shorter than God knows to be in harmony with the plan according to which He rules the universe.

14. As to the assertion that everything which has begun to exist in time is incapable of immortality, because all things which are born die, and all things which have grown decay through age, and the opinion which they affirm to follow necessarily from this, viz. that the soul of man must owe its immortality to its having been created before time began, this does not disturb my faith; for, passing over other examples, which conclusively dispose of this assertion, I need only refer to the body of Christ, which now “dieth no more; death shall have no more dominion over it.”1297    Rom. vi. 9.

15. Moreover, as to your remark in your book against Ruffinus, that some bring forward as against this opinion that souls are created for each individual separately at birth the objection that it seems worthy of God that He should give souls to the offspring of adulterers, and who accordingly attempt to build on this a theory that souls may possibly be incarcerated, as it were, in such bodies, to suffer for the deeds of a life spent in some prior state of being,1298    Hieron. Adv. Ruffin. lib. iii.—this objection does not disturb me, as many things by which it may be answered occur to me when I consider it. The answer which you yourself have given, saying, that in the case of stolen wheat, there is no fault in the grain, but only in him who stole it, and that the earth is not under obligation to refuse to cherish the seed because the sower may have cast it in with a hand defiled by dishonesty, is a most felicitous illustration. But even before I had read it, I felt that to me the objection drawn from the offspring of adulterers caused no serious difficulty when I took a general view of the fact that God brings many good things to light, even out of our evils and our sins. Now, the creation of any living creature compels every one who considers it with piety and wisdom to give to the Creator praise which words cannot express; and if this praise is called forth by the creation of any living creature whatsoever, how much more is it called forth by the creation of a man! If, therefore, the cause of any act of creative power be sought for, no shorter or better reply can be given than that every creature of God is good. And [so far from such an act being unworthy of God] what is more worthy of Him than that He, being good, should make those good things which, no one else than God alone can make?

Chap. VI.

16. These things, and others which I can advance, I am accustomed to state, as well as I can, against those who attempt to overthrow by such objections the opinion that souls are made for each individual, as the first man’s soul was made for him.

But when we come to the penal sufferings of infants, I am embarrassed, believe me, by great difficulties, and am wholly at a loss to find an answer by which they are solved; and I speak here not only of those punishments in the life to come, which are involved in that perdition to which they must be drawn down if they depart from the body without the sacrament of Christian grace, but also of the sufferings which are to our sorrow endured by them before our eyes in this present life, and which are so various, that time rather than examples would fail me if I were to attempt to enumerate them. They are liable to wasting disease, to racking pain, to the agonies of thirst and hunger, to feebleness of limbs, to privation of bodily senses, and to vexing assaults of unclean spirits. Surely it is incumbent on us to show how it is compatible with justice that infants suffer all these things without any evil of their own as the procuring cause. For it would be impious to say, either that these things take place without God’s knowledge, or that He cannot resist those who cause them, or that He unrighteously does these things, or permits them to be done. We are warranted in saying that irrational animals are given by God to serve creatures possessing a higher nature, even though they be wicked, as we see most plainly in the gospel that the swine of the Gadarenes were given to the legion of devils at their request; but could we ever be warranted in saying this of men? Certainly not. Man is, indeed, an animal, but an animal endowed with reason, though mortal. In his members dwells a reasonable soul, which in these severe afflictions is enduring a penalty. Now God is good, God is just, God is omnipotent—none but a madman would doubt that he is so; let the great sufferings, therefore, which infant children experience be accounted for by some reason compatible with justice. When older people suffer such trials, we are accustomed, certainly, to say, either that their worth is being proved, as in Job’s case, or that their wickedness is being punished, as in Herod’s; and from some examples, which it has pleased God to make perfectly clear, men are enabled to conjecture the nature of others which are more obscure; but this is in regard to persons of mature age. Tell me, therefore, what we must answer in regard to infant children; is it true that, although they suffer so great punishments, there are no sins in them deserving to be punished? for, of course, there is not in them at that age any righteousness requiring to be put to the proof.

17. What shall I say, moreover, as to the [difficulty which besets the theory of the creation of each soul separately at the birth of the individual in connection with the] diversity of talent in different souls, and especially the absolute privation of reason in some? This is, indeed, not apparent in the first stages of infancy, but being developed continuously from the beginning of life, it becomes manifest in children, of whom some are so slow and defective in memory that they cannot learn even the letters of the alphabet, and some (commonly called idiots) so imbecile that they differ very little from the beasts of the field. Perhaps I am told, in answer to this, that the bodies are the cause of these imperfections. But surely the opinion which we wish to see vindicated from objection does not require us to affirm that the soul chose for itself the body which so impairs it, and, being deceived in the choice, committed a blunder; or that the soul, when it was compelled, as a necessary consequence of being born, to enter into some body, was hindered from finding another by crowds of souls occupying the other bodies before it came, so that, like a man who takes whatever seat may remain vacant for him in a theatre, the soul was guided in taking possession of the imperfect body not by its choice, but by its circumstances. We, of course, cannot say and ought not to believe such things. Tell us, therefore, what we ought to believe and to say in order to vindicate from this difficulty the theory that for each individual body a new soul is specially created.

Chap. VII.

18. In my books on Free Will, already referred to, I have said something, not in regard to the variety of capacities in different souls, but, at least, in regard to the pains which infant children suffer in this life. The nature of the opinion which I there expressed, and the reason why it is insufficient for the purposes of our present inquiry, I will now submit to you, and will put into this letter a copy of the passage in the third book to which I refer. It is as follows:—“In connection with the bodily sufferings experienced by the little children who, by reason of their tender age, have no sins—if the souls which animate them did not exist before they were born into the human family—a more grievous and, as it were, compassionate complaint is very commonly made in the remark, ‘What evil have they done that they should suffer these things?’ as if there could be a meritorious innocence in any one before the time at which it is possible for him to do anything wrong! Moreover, if God accomplishes, in any measure, the correction of the parents when they are chastised by the sufferings or by the death of the children that are dear to them, is there any reason why these things should not take place, seeing that, after they are passed, they will be, to those who experienced them, as if they had never been, while the persons on whose account they were inflicted will either become better, being moved by the rod of temporal afflictions to choose a better mode of life, or be left without excuse under the punishment awarded at the coming judgment, if, notwithstanding the sorrows of this life, they have refused to turn their desires towards eternal life? Morever, who knows what may be given to the little children by means of whose sufferings the parents have their obdurate hearts subdued, or their faith exercised, or their compassion proved? Who knows what good recompense God may, in the secret of his judgments, reserve for these little ones? For although they have done no righteous action, nevertheless, being free from any transgression of their own, they have suffered these trials. It is certainly not without reason that the Church exalts to the honourable rank of martyrs those children who were slain when Herod sought our Lord Jesus Christ to put Him to death.”1299    De libero Arbitrio, lib. iii. ch. 23. n. 67.

19. These things I wrote at that time when I was endeavouring to defend the opinion which is now under discussion. For, as I mentioned shortly before, I was labouring to prove that whichever of these four opinions regarding the soul’s incarnation may be found true, the substance of the Creator is absolutely free from blame, and is completely removed from all share in our sins. And, therefore, whichever of these opinions might come to be established or demolished by the truth, this had no bearing on the object aimed at in the work which I was then attempting, seeing that whichever opinion might win the victory over all the rest, after they had been examined in a more thorough discussion, this would take place without causing me any disquietude, because my object then was to prove that, even admitting all these opinions, the doctrine maintained by me remained unshaken. But now my object is, by the force of sound reasoning, to select, if possible, one opinion out of the four; and, therefore, when I carefully consider the words now quoted from that book, I do not see that the arguments there used in defending the opinion which we are now discussing are valid and conclusive.

20. For what may be called the chief prop of my defence is in the sentence, “Moreover, who knows what may be given to the little children, by means of whose sufferings the parents have their obdurate hearts subdued, or their faith exercised, or their compassion proved? Who knows what good recompense God may, in the secret of His judgments, reserve for these little ones?” I see that this is not an unwarranted conjecture in the case of infants who, in any way, suffer (though they know it not) for the sake of Christ and in the cause of true religion, and of infants who have already been made partakers of the sacrament of Christ; because, apart from union to the one Mediator, they cannot be delivered from condemnation, and so put in a position in which it is even possible that a recompense could be made to them for the evils which, in diverse afflictions, they have endured in this world. But since the question cannot be fully solved, unless the answer include also the case of those who, without having received the sacrament of Christian fellowship, die in infancy after enduring the most painful sufferings, what recompense can be conceived of in their case, seeing that, besides all that they suffer in this life, perdition awaits them in the life to come? As to the baptism of infants, I have, in the same book, given an answer, not, indeed, fully, but so far as seemed necessary for the work which then occupied me, proving that it profits children, even though they do not know what it is, and have, as yet, no faith of their own; but on the subject of the perdition of those infants who depart from this life without baptism, I did not think it necessary to say anything then, because the question under discussion was different from that with which we are now engaged.

21. If, however, we pass over and make no account of those sufferings which are of brief continuance, and which, when endured, are not to be repeated, we certainly cannot, in like manner, make no account of the fact that “by one man death came, and by one man came also the resurrection of the dead; for as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive.”1300    1 Cor. xv. 21, 22. For, according to this apostolical, divine, and perspicuous declaration, it is sufficiently plain that no one goes to death otherwise than through Adam, and that no one goes to life eternal otherwise than through Christ. For this is the force of all in the two parts of the sentence; as all men, by their first, that is, their natural birth, belong to Adam, even so all men, whoever they be, who come to Christ come to the second, that is, the spiritual birth. For this reason, therefore, the word all is used in both clauses, because as all who die do not die otherwise than in Adam, so all who shall be made alive shall not be made alive otherwise than in Christ. Wherefore whosoever tells us that any man can be made alive in the resurrection of the dead otherwise than in Christ, he is to be detested as a pestilent enemy to the common faith. Likewise, whosoever says that those children who depart out of this life without partaking of that sacrament shall be made alive in Christ, certainly contradicts the apostolic declaration, and condemns the universal Church, in which it is the practice to lose no time and run in haste to administer baptism to infant children, because it is believed, as an indubitable truth, that otherwise they cannot be made alive in Christ. Now he that is not made alive in Christ must necessarily remain under the condemnation, of which the apostle says, that “by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation.”1301    Rom. v. 18. That infants are born under the guilt of this offence is believed by the whole Church. It is also a doctrine which you have most faithfully set forth, both in your treatise against Jovinian and your exposition of Jonah, as I mentioned above, and, if I am not mistaken, in other parts of your works which I have not read or have at present forgotten. I therefore ask, what is the ground of this condemnation of unbaptized infants? For if new souls are made for men, individually, at their birth, I do not see, on the one hand, that they could have any sin while yet in infancy, nor do I believe, on the other hand, that God condemns any soul which He sees to have no sin.

Chap. VIII.

22. Are we perchance to say, in answer to this, that in the infant the body alone is the cause of sin; but that for each body a new soul is made, and that if this soul live according to the precepts of God, by the help of the grace of Christ, the reward of being made incorruptible may be secured for the body itself, when subdued and kept under the yoke; and that inasmuch as the soul of an infant cannot yet do this, unless it receive the sacrament of Christ, that which could not yet be obtained for the body by the holiness of the soul is obtained for it by the grace of this sacrament; but if the soul of an infant depart without the sacrament, it shall itself dwell in life eternal, from which it could not be separated, as it had no sin, while, however, the body which it occupied shall not rise again in Christ, because the sacrament had not been received before its death?

23. This opinion I have never heard or read anywhere. I have, however, certainly heard and believed the statement which led me to speak thus, namely, “The hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear His voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life,”—the resurrection, namely, of which it is said that “by one man came the resurrection of the dead,” and in which “all shall be made alive in Christ,”—“and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation.”1302    John v. 29. Now, what is to be understood regarding infants which, before they could do good or evil, have quitted the body without baptism? Nothing is said here concerning them. But if the bodies of these infants shall not rise again, because they have never done either good or evil, the bodies of the infants that have died after receiving the grace of baptism shall also have no resurrection, because they also were not in this life able to do good or evil. If, however, these are to rise among the saints, i.e. among those who have done good, among whom shall the others rise again but among those who have done evil—unless we are to believe that some human souls shall not receive, either in the resurrection of life, or in the resurrection of damnation, the bodies which they lost in death? This opinion, however, is condemned, even before it is formally refuted, by its absolute novelty; and besides this, who could bear to think that those who run with their infant children to have them baptized, are prompted to do so by a regard for their bodies, not for their souls? The blessed Cyprian, indeed, said, in order to correct those who thought that an infant should not be baptized before the eighth day, that it was not the body but the soul which behoved to be saved from perdition—in which statement he was not inventing any new doctrine, but preserving the firmly established faith of the Church; and he, along with some of his colleagues in the episcopal office, held that a child may be properly baptized immediately after its birth.1303    Cyprian’s Letters (LIX., Ad Fidum).

24. Let every man, however, believe anything which commends itself to his own judgment, even though it run counter to some opinion of Cyprian, who may not have seen in the matter what should have been seen. But let no man believe anything which runs counter to the perfectly unambiguous apostolical declaration, that by the offence of one all are brought into condemnation, and that from this condemnation nothing sets men free but the grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ, in whom alone life is given to all who are made alive. And let no man believe anything which runs counter to the firmly grounded practice of the Church, in which, if the sole reason for hastening the administration of baptism were to save the children, the dead as well as the living would be brought to be baptized.

25. These things being so, it is necessary still to investigate and to make known the reason why, if souls are created new for every individual at his birth, those who die in infancy without the sacrament of Christ are doomed to perdition; for that they are doomed to this if they so depart from the body is testified both by Holy Scripture and by the holy Church. Wherefore, as to that opinion of yours concerning the creation of new souls, if it does not contradict this firmly grounded article of faith, let it be mine also; but if it does, let it be no longer yours.

26. Let it not be said to me that we ought to receive as supporting this opinion the words of Scripture in Zechariah, “He formeth the spirit of man within him,”1304    Zech. xii. 1. and in the book of Psalms, “He formeth their hearts severally.”1305    Ps. xxxiii. 15 (LXX.). We must seek for the strongest and most indisputable proof, that we may not be compelled to believe that God is a judge who condemns any soul which has no fault. For to create signifies either as much or, probably, more than to form [fingere]; nevertheless it is written, “Create in me a clean heart, O God,”1306    Ps. li. 10. and yet it cannot be supposed that a soul here expresses a desire to be made before it has begun to exist. Therefore, as it is a soul already existing which is created by being renewed in righteousness, so it is a soul already existing which is formed by the moulding power of doctrine. Nor is your opinion, which I would willingly make my own, supported by that sentence in Ecclesiastes, “Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was: and the spirit shall return to God who gave it.”1307    Eccles. xii. 7. Nay, it rather favours those who think that all souls are derived from one; for they say that, as the dust returns to the earth as it was, and yet the body of which this is said returns not to the man from whom it was derived, but to the earth from which the first man was made, the spirit in like manner, though derived from the spirit of the first man, does not return to him but to the Lord, by whom it was given to our first parent. Since, however, the testimony of this passage in their favour is not so decisive as to make it appear altogether opposed to the opinion which I shall gladly see vindicated, I thought proper to submit these remarks on it to your judgment, to prevent you from endeavouring to deliver me from my perplexities by quoting passages such as these. For although no man’s wishes can make that true which is not true, nevertheless, were this possible, I would wish that this opinion should be true, as I do wish that, if it is true, it should be most clearly and unanswerably vindicated by you.

Chap. IX.

27. The same difficulty attends those also who hold that souls already existing elsewhere, and prepared from the beginning of the works of God, are sent by Him into bodies. For to these persons also the same question may be put: If these souls, being without any fault, go obediently to the bodies to which they are sent, why are they subjected to punishment in the case of infants, if they come without being baptized to the end of this life? The same difficulty unquestionably attaches to both opinions. Those who affirm that each soul is, according to the deserts of its actions in an earlier state of being, united to the body alloted to it in this life, imagine that they escape more easily from this difficulty. For they think that to “die in Adam” means to suffer punishment in that flesh which is derived from Adam, from which condition of guilt the grace of Christ, they say, delivers the young as well as the old. So far, indeed, they teach what is right, and true, and excellent, when they say that the grace of Christ delivers the young as well as the old from the guilt of sins. But that souls sin in another earlier life, and that for their sins in that state of being they are cast down into bodies as prisons, I do not believe: I reject and protest against such an opinion. I do this, in the first place, because they affirm that this is accomplished by means of some incomprehensible revolutions, so that after I know not how many cycles the soul must return again to the same burden of corruptible flesh and to the endurance of punishment,—than which opinion I do not know that anything more horrible could be conceived. In the next place, who is the righteous man gone from the earth about whom we should not (if what they say is true) feel afraid lest, sinning in Abraham’s bosom, he should be cast down into the flames which tormented the rich man in the parable?1308    Luke xvi. 22, 23. For why may the soul not sin after leaving the body, if it can sin before entering it? Finally, to have sinned in Adam (in regard to which the apostle says that in him all have sinned) is one thing, but it is a wholly different thing to have sinned, I know not where, outside of Adam, and then because of this to be thrust into Adam—that is, into the body, which is derived from Adam, as into a prison-house. As to the other opinion mentioned above, that all souls are derived from one, I will not begin to discuss it unless I am under necessity to do so; and my desire is, that if the opinion which we are now discussing is true, it may be so vindicated by you that there shall be no longer any necessity for examining the other.

28. Although, however, I desire and ask, and with fervent prayers wish and hope, that by you the Lord may remove my ignorance on this subject, if, after all, I am found unworthy to obtain this, I will beg the grace of patience from the Lord our God, in whom we have such faith, that even if there be some things which He does not open to us when we knock, we know it would be wrong to murmur in the least against Him. I remember what He said to the apostles themselves: “I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now.”1309    John xvi. 12. Among these things, so far at least as I am concerned, let me still reckon this, and let me guard against being angry that I am deemed unworthy to possess this knowledge, lest by such anger I be all the more clearly proved to be unworthy. I am equally ignorant of many other things, yea, of more than I could name or even number; and of this I would be more patiently ignorant, were it not that I fear lest some one of these opinions, involving the contradiction of truth which we most assuredly believe, should insinuate itself into the minds of the unwary. Meanwhile, though I do not yet know which of these opinions is to be preferred, this one thing I profess as my deliberate conviction, that the opinion which is true does not conflict with that most firm and well grounded article in the faith of the Church of Christ, that infant children, even when they are newly born, can be delivered from perdition in no other way than through the grace of Christ’s name, which He has given in His sacraments.

DE ORIGINE ANIMAE HOMINIS LIBER, SEU EPISTOLA CLXVI .

Augustinus Hieronymo, recensens varias de animae origine sententias, cupit doceri quae potissimum tenenda sit; et quomodo adversus Pelagianorum dogma defendi possit ea quam ille in superiore epistola suam esse fere insinuavit, Singulas animas novas nascentibus fieri.

CAPUT PRIMUM.

1. Deum nostrum qui nos vocavit in suum regnum et gloriam (I Thess. II, 12), et rogavi et rogo ut hoc quod ad te scribo, sancte frater Hieronyme, consulens te de his quae nescio, fructuosum esse nobis velit . Quanquam enim te multo quam ego sum aetate majorem, tamen etiam ipse jam senex consulo: sed ad discendum quod opus est, nulla mihi aetas sera videri potest; quia etsi senes magis decet docere quam discere, magis tamen discere quam quid doceant ignorare. Nihil equidem molestius fero in omnibus angustiis meis quas patior in difficillimis quaestionibus, quam in tam longinquo tuae Charitatis absentiam, ut vix possim meas dare, vix recipere litteras tuas, per intervalla, non dierum, non mensium, sed aliquot annorum; cum, si fieri posset, quotidie praesentem te habere vellem, cum quo loquerer quidquid vellem. Nec ideo tamen non debui facere quod potui, si non potui totum quod volui.

2. Ecce venit ad me religiosus juvenis, catholica pace frater, aetate filius, honore compresbyter noster Orosius, vigil ingenio, promptus eloquio, flagrans studio, utile vas in domo Domini esse desiderans, ad 0721 refellendas falsas perniciosasque doctrinas, quae animas Hispanorum multo infelicius, quam corpora barbaricus gladius, trucidarunt. Nam inde ad nos usque ab oceani littore properavit, fama excitus quod a me posset de his quae scire vellet, quidquid vellet audire. Neque nullum cepit adventus sui fructum. Primo, ne de me multum famae crederet: deinde docui hominem quod potui; quod autem non potui, unde discere posset, admonui, atque ut ad te iret hortatus sum. Qua in re consilium vel praeceptum meum cum libenter et obedienter acciperet, rogavi eum ut abs te veniens, per nos ad propria remearet. Quam ejus pollicitationem tenens, occasionem mihi credidi a Domino esse concessam, qua tibi scriberem de his quae per te scire cupio. Quaerebam enim quem ad te mitterem, nec mihi facile occurrebat idonens, et fide agendi, et alacritate obediendi, et exercitatione peregrinandi. Ubi ergo istum juvenem expertus sum, eum ipsum esse qualem a Domino petebam, dubitare non potui.

CAPUT II.

3. Accipe igitur quae mihi, peto, aperire ac disserere non graveris. Quaestio de anima multos movet, in quibus et me esse confiteor. Nam quid de anima firmissime teneam, non tacebo: deinde subjungam quid mihi adhuc expediri velim. Anima hominis immortalis est, secundum quemdam modum suum. Non enim omni modo sicut Deus, de quo dictum est quia solus habet immortalitatem (I Tim VI, 16). Nam de animae mortibus sancta Scriptura multa commemorat; unde illud est, Sine mortuos sepelire mortuos suos (Matth. VIII, 22): sed quod ita moritur alienata a vita Dei, ut tamen in natura sua vivere non omnino desistat; ita mortalis ex aliqua causa invenitur, ut etiam immortalis non sine ratione dicatur. Non est pars Dei anima. Si enim hoc esset, omni modo incommutabilis atque incorruptibilis esset. Quod si esset, nec deficeret in deterius, nec proficeret in melius; nec aliquid in semetipsa vel inciperet habere quod non habebat, vel desineret habere quod habebat, quantum ad ejus ipsius affectiones pertinet: quam vero aliter se habeat, non opus est extrinsecus testimonio; quisquis seipsum advertit, agnoscit. Frustra autem dicitur ab eis qui animam Dei partem esse volunt, hanc ejus labem ac turpitudinem quam videmus in nequissimis hominibus, hanc denique infirmitatem et aegritudinem quam sentimus in omnibus hominibus, non ex ipsa illi esse, sed ex corpore: quid interest unde aegrotet, quae si esset incommutabilis, undelibet aegrotare non posset? Nam quod vere incommutabile et incorruptibile est, nullius rei accessu commutari vel corrumpi potest: alioquin non Achillea tantum, sicut fabulae ferunt, sed omnis caro esset invulnerabilis, si nullus ei casus accideret. Non est itaque natura incommutabilis, quae aliquo modo, aliqua causa, aliqua parte mutabilis est: Deum autem nefas est, nisi vere summeque incommutabilem credere. Non est igitur anima pars Dei.

4. Incorpoream quoque esse animam, etsi difficile tardioribus persuaderi potest, mihi tamen fateor esse persuasum. Sed ne verbi controversiam vel superfluo 0722 faciam, vel merito patiar, quoniam cum de re constat, non est opus certare de nomine: si corpus est omnis substantia, vel essentia, vel si quid aptius nuncupatur id quod aliquo modo est in seipso, corpus est anima. Item si eam sclam incorpoream placet appellare naturam quae summe incommutabilis et ubique tota est, corpus est anima; quoniam tale aliquid ipsa non est. Porro si corpus non est, nisi quod per loci spatium aliqua longitudine, latitudine, altitudine ita sistitur vel movetur, ut majore sui parte majorem locum occupet, et breviore breviorem, minusque sit in parte quam in toto, non est corpus anima. Per totum quippe corpus quod animat, non locali diffusione, sed quadam vitali intentione porrigitur: nam per omnes ejus particulas tota simul adest, nec minor in minoribus, et in majoribus major; sed alicubi intentius, alicubi remissius, et in omnibus tota, et in singulis tota est. Neque enim aliter, quod in corpore etiam non toto sentit , tamen tota sentit: nam cum exiguo puncto in carne viva aliquid tangitur, quamvis locus ille non solum totius corporis non sit, sed vix in corpore videatur, animam tamen totam non latet; neque id quod sentitur, per corporis cuncta discurrit, sed ibi tantum sentitur ubi fit. Unde ergo ad totam mox pervenit quod non in toto fit, nisi quia et ibi tota est ubi fit, nec ut tota ibi sit, caetera deserit? Vivunt enim et illa ea praesente, ubi nihil tale factum est. Quod si fieret, et utrumque simul fieret, simul utrumque totam pariter non lateret. Proinde et in omnibus simul, et in singulis particulis corporis sui, tota simul esse non posset, si per illas ita diffunderetur, ut videmus corpora diffusa per spatia locorum, minoribus suis partibus minora occupare, et amplioribus ampliora. Quapropter si anima corpus esse dicenda est, non est certe corpus quale terrenum est, nec quale humidum, aut aerium, aut aetherium. Omnia quippe talia majora sunt in majoribus locis, et minora in minoribus, et nihil eorum in aliqua sui parte totum adest; sed ut sunt partes locorum, ita occupantur partibus corporum. Unde intelligitur anima, sive corpus, sive incorporea dicenda sit, propriam quamdam habere naturam, omnibus his mundanae molis elementis excellentiore substantia creatam, quae veraciter non possit in aliqua phantasia corporalium imaginum, quas per carnis sensus percipimus, cogitari, sed mente intelligi, vitaque sentiri. Neque haec proinde loquor, ut te quae tibi nota sunt doceam: sed ut aperiam quid firmissime de anima teneam, ne me quisquam, cum ad ea venero quae requiro, nihil de anima vel scientia vel fide tenere arbitretur.

5. Certus etiam sum animam nulla Dei culpa, nulla Dei necessitate vel sua, sed propria voluntate in peccatum esse collapsam: nec liberari posse de corpore mortis hujus vel suae voluntatis virtute, tanquam sibi ad hoc sufficiente, vel ipsius corporis morte, sed gratia Dei per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum (Rom. VII, 24, 25); nec omnino esse animam ullam in genere humano, cui non sit necessarius ad liberationem 0723 mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus Jesus. Quaecumque autem sine gratia Mediatoris et Sacramento ejus, in qualibet corporis aetate, de corpore exierit, et in poenam futuram, et in ultimo judicio recepturam corpus ad poenam. Si autem post generationem humanam, quae facta est ex Adam, regeneretur in Christo ad ejus pertinens societatem, et requiem post mortem corporis habituram, et corpus ad gloriam recepturam. Haec sunt quae de anima firmissime teneo.

CAPUT III.

6. Nunc accipe, quaeso, quid requiram, et noli me spernere; sic non te spernat qui pro nobis dignatus est sperni. Quaero ubi contraxerit anima reatum quo trahitur in condemnationem, etiam infantis morte praeventi, si ei per Sacramentum quo etiam parvuli baptizantur, Christi gratia non subvenerit. Non enim es ex illis qui modo nova quaedam garrire coeperunt, dicentes nullum reatum esse ex Adam tractum, qui per Baptismum in infante solvatur. Quod te sapere si scirem, imo nisi te id non sapere scirem, nequaquam hoc abs te quaererem aut quaerendum putarem. Sed quia tenemus de hac re sententiam tuam concinentem catholicae fundatissimae fidei, qua et Joviniani vaniloquia redarguens, adhibuisti testimonium ex libro Job. Nemo mundus in conspectu tuo, nec infans cujus est diei unius vita super terram (Job XV, 4, sec. LXX), deinde adjunxisti, Tenemurque rei in similitudine praevaricationis Adae (Hieron. lib. 2 adversus Jovin.); et liber tuus in Jonam prophetam satis hoc insigniter dilucideque declarat, ubi jejunare parvulos propter ipsum originale peccatum, merito coactos esse dixisti (Id. in Jonam): non inconvenienter abs te quaero, hunc reatum anima ubi contraxerit, unde oporteat eam etiam in illa aetate per Sacramentum christianae gratiae liberari.

7. Ego quidem ante aliquot annos, cum libros quosdam scriberem de Libero Arbitrio, qui in multorum manus exierunt, et nunc habentur a plurimis, quatuor opiniones de animae incarnatione, Utrum ex illa una quae primo homini data est, caeterae propagentur: an singulis quibusque novae etiam modo fiant: an alicubi jam existentes, vel mittantur divinitus, vel sponte labantur in corpora; ita putavi esse tractandas, ut quaelibet earum vera esset, non impediret intentionem meam, qua tunc adversus eos quantis poteram viribus agebam, qui naturam mali suo principio praeditam , adversus Deum conantur inducere, id est contra Manichaeos (De Libero Arbitrio, lib. 3 c. 21): nam de Priscillianistis adhuc nihil audieram, qui non multum ab istis dissimiles blasphemias fabulantur. Ideo quintam opinionem non addidi, quam in tua epistola inter caeteras commemorasti, ne aliquam praeterires, ubi de hac quaestione interroganti rescripsisti religiosae memoriae viro, nobisque in Christi charitate gratissimo Marcellino, quod anima sit pars 0724 Dei: primo, quia non de incarnatione ejus, sed de natura quaeritur, cum hoc quaeritur; deinde, quia hoc sentiunt illi contra quos agebam, et id maxime agebam ut Creatoris inculpabilem inviolabilemque naturam a creaturae vitiis et labe secernerem, cum illi a substantia mali, cui proprium principium principesque tribuunt, ipsam boni Dei substantiam ex parte qua capta est, corruptam et oppressam, et ad peccandi necessitatem perductam esse contendant. Hoc itaque excepto haereticae opinionis errore, ex quatuor reliquis opinionibus quaenam sit eligenda scire desidero. Quaecumque enim eligenda est, absit ut impugnet hanc fidem de qua certi sumus, omni animae etiam parvuli infantis necessariam esse liberationem ex obligatione peccati, eamque nullam esse nisi per Jesum Christum, et hunc crucifixum.

CAPUT IV.

8. Proinde ne longum faciamus, hoc certe sentis quod singulas animas singulis nascentibus etiam modo Deus faciat. Cui sententiae ac objiciatur quod omnes creaturas sexto die consummaverit Deus et septimo die requieverit, adhibes testimonium ex Evangelio, Pater meus usque nunc operatur (Joan. V, 17). Sic enim ad Marcellinum scripsisti: in qua epistola etiam mei commemorationem benevolentissime facere dignatus es, quod hic me haberet in Africa, qui ei ipsam facilius possem explicare sententiam (Sap., epist. 165). Quod si potuissem, non ille hoc abs te tam longe posito inquireret; si tamen id tibi ex Africa scripsit. Nam quando scripserit nescio; lantum scio quod de hoc bene cognoverit cunctationem meam: unde me inconsulto facere voluit. Quanquam etiam si consuleret, magis hortarer, et gratias agerem quod nobis omnibus conferri posset, nisi tu breviter rescribere, quam respondere maluisses: credo ne superfluo laborares, ubi ego essem, quem putabas id optime scire quod ille quaesiverat. Ecce volo ut illa sententia etiam mea sit, sed nondum esse confirmo.

9. Misisti ad me discipulos ut ea doceam quae nondum ipse didici. Doce ergo quod doceam: nam ut doceam multi a me flagitant, eisque me sicut alia multa, et hoc ignorare confiteor: et fortasse quamvis in os meum verecundentur, tamen apud se dicunt, Tu es magister in Israel, et haec ignoras (Joan. III, 10)! quod quidem Dominus ei dixit, qui erat unus illorum quos delectabat vocari Rabbi: unde etiam ad verum magistrum nocte venerat, quia fortassis erubescebat discere, qui docere consueverat. Me autem potius magistrum audire, quam velut magistrum delectat audiri. Recolo enim quid dixerit eis quos prae caeteris elegit: Vos autem, inquit, nolite vocari ab hominibus Rabbi; unus est enim magister vester, Christus (Matth. XXIII, 8). Nec alius docuit Moysen etiam per Jetro (Exod. XVIII, 14-23), nec alius Cornelium etiam per priorem Petrum (Act. X, 25-48), nec alius Petrum etiam per posteriorem Paulum (Galat. II, 11-21): a quocumque enim verum dicitur, illo donante dicitur, qui est ipsa Veritas. 0725 Quid si ideo adhuc ista nescimus, et ea neque orando, neque legendo, neque cogitando et ratiocinando invenire potuimus, ut probemur non solum indoctos quanta charitate doceamus, verum a doctis etiam quanta humilitate discamus?

10. Doce ergo, quaeso, quod doceam, doce quod teneam, et dic mihi, si animae singillatim singulis hodieque nascentibus fiunt, ubi in parvulis peccent, ut indigeant in Sacramento Christi remissione peccati, peccantes in Adam ex quo caro est propagata peccati: aut si non peccant, qua justitia Creatoris ita peccato obligantur alieno, cum exinde propagatis membris mortalibus inseruntur, ut eas, nisi per Ecclesiam subventum fuerit, damnatio consequatur; cum in earum potestate non sit, ut eis possit gratia Baptismi subveniri. Tot igitur animarum millia, quae in mortibus parvulorum sine indulgentia christiani Sacramenti de corporibus exeunt, qua aequitate damnantur, si novae creatae , nullo suo praecedente peccato, sed voluntate Creatoris singulae singulis nascentibus adhaeserunt, quibus eas animandis ille creavit et dedit; qui utique noverat quod unaquaeque carum nulla sua culpa sine baptismo Christi de corpore fuerat exitura? Quoniam igitur neque de Deo possumus dicere quod vel cogat animas fieri peccatrices, vel puniat innocentes; neque negare fas nobis est, eas quae sine Christi Sacramento de corporibus exierint, etiam parvulorum, non nisi in damnationem trahi: obsecre te, quomodo haec opinio defenditur, qua creduntur animae non ex illa una primi hominis fieri omnes, sed sicut illa una uni, ita singulis singulae?

CAPUT V.

11. Ea vero quae dicuntur alia contra hanc opinionem, facile puto me posse refellere; sicuti est illud, quo eam sibi quidam videntur urgere, quomodo consummaverit Deus omnia opera sua sexto die, et septimo requieverit (Gen. II, 2), si novas adhuc animas creat? Quibus si dixerimus quod ex Evangelio in supradicta epistola posuisti, Pater meus usque nunc operatur; respondent, operatur dictum est, institutas administrando, non novas instituendo naturas, ne Scripturae Geneseos contradicatur, ubi apertissime legitur consummasse Deum omnia opera sua. Nam et quod eum scriptum est requievisse, utique a creandis novis creaturis intelligendum est, non a gubernandis; quia tunc ea quae non erant fecit, a quibus faciendis requievit: quia consummaverat omnia quae antequam essent, vidit esse facienda, ut deinceps non ea quae non erant, sed ex his quae jam erant, crearet et faceret quidquid faceret. Ita utrumque verum esse monstratur, et quod dictum est, requievit ab operibus suis; et quod dictum est, usque nunc operatur: quoniam Genesi non potest Evangelium esse contrarium.

12. Verum his qui haec ideo dicunt ne credatur modo Deus, sicut illam unam novas animas quae non erant, facere; sed ex illa una quae jam erat, eas creare, vel ex fonte aliquo sive thesauro quodam quem tunc fecit, eas mittere, facile respondetur etiam illis sex diebus multa Deum creasse ex his naturis quas jam 0726 creaverat, sicut ex aquis alites et pisces; ex terra autem arbores, fenum, animalia: sed quod ea quae non erant, tunc fecerit, manifestum est. Nulla enim erat avis, nullus piscis, nulla arbor, nullum animal: et bene intelligitur ab his creatis requievisse, quae non erant, et creata sunt, id est cessasse, ne ultra quae non erant, crearentur. Sed nunc quod dicitur animas non in nescio quo fonte jam existentes mittere, nec de seipso tanquam suas particulas irrorare, nec de illa una originaliter trahere, nec pro delictis ante carnem commissis carneis vinculis compedire, sed novas creare singulas singulis suam cuique nascenti, non aliquid facere dicitur, quod ante non fecerat. Jam enim sexto die fecerat hominem ad imaginem suam; quod utique secundum animam rationalem fecisse intelligitur . Hoc et nunc facit, non instituendo quod non erat, sed multiplicando quod erat. Unde et illud verum est, quod a rebus, quae non erant, instituendis requievit: et hoc verum est, quod non solum gubernando quae fecit, verum etiam aliquid non quod nondum, sed quod jam creaverat, numerosius creando usque nunc operatur. Vel sic ergo, vel alio modo quolibet eximus ab eo quod nobis objicitur de requie Dei ab operibus suis, ne propterea non credamus nunc usque fieri animas novas, non ex illa una, sed sicut illam unam.

13. Nam quod dicitur. Quare facit animas eis quos novit cito morituros? possumus respondere, parentum hinc peccata vel convinci, vel flagellari. Possumus etiam recte illius moderationi ista relinquere, quem scimus omnibus temporaliter transeuntibus rebus, ubi sunt etiam animalium ortus et obitus, cursum ornatissimum atque ordinatissimum dare; sed nos ista sentire non posse, quae si sentiremus, delectatione ineffabili mulceremur. Non enim frustra per prophetam, qui haec divinitus inspirata didicerat, dictum est de Deo: Qui profert numerose saeculum . Unde musica, id est scientia sensusve bene modulandi, ad admonitionem magnae rei, etiam mortalibus rationales habentibus animas Dei largitate concessa est. Unde si homo faciendi carminis artifex novit quas quibus moras vocibus tribuat, ut illud quod canitur decedentibus ac succedentibus sonis pulcherrime currat ac transeat; quanto magis Deus, cujus sapientia, per quam fecit omnia, longe omnibus artibus praeferenda est, nulla in naturis nascentibus et occidentibus temporum spatia, quae tanquam syllabae ac verba ad particulas hujus saeculi pertinent, in hoc labentium rerum tanquam mirabili cantico, vel brevius, vel productius, quam modulatio praecognita et praefinita deposcit, praeterire permittit! Hoc cum etiam de arboris folio dixerim, et de nostrorum numero capillorum; quanto magis de hominis ortu et occasu, cujus temporalis vita brevius productiusve non tenditur, quam Deus dispositor temporum novit universitatis moderamini consonare!

14. Id etiam quod aiunt, omne quod in tempore 0727 coepit esse, immortale esse non posse; quia omnia orta occidunt, et aucta senescunt, ut eo modo credi cogant, animum humanum ideo esse immortalem, quod ante omnia tempora sit creatus, non movet fidem nostram: ut enim alia taceam, coepit esse in tempore immortalitas carnis Christi, quae tamen jam non moritur, et mors ei ultra non dominabitur (Rom. VI, 9).

15. Illud vero quod in libro adversus Ruffinum posuisti, quosdam huic sententiae calumniari, quod Deum dare animas adulterinis conceptibus videatur indignum, unde conantur astruere meritis gestae ante carnem vitae, animas quasi ad ergastula hujusmodi juste posse perduci (Adv. Ruffinum, lib. 3); non me movet multa cogitantem quibus haec possit calumnia refutari. Et quod ipse respondisti, non esse vitium sementis in tritico quod furto dicitur esse sublatum, sed in eo qui frumenta furatus est; nec idcirco terram non debuisse gremio suo semina confovere, quia sator immunda ea projecerit manu; elegantissima similitudo est. Quam et antequam legerem, nullas mihi objectio ista de adulterinis fetibus in hac quaestione faciebat angustias, generaliter intuenti multa bona Deum facere, etiam de nostris malis nostrisque peccatis. Animalis autem cujuscumque creatio, si habeat pium prudentemque consideratorem, ineffabilem laudem Creatori excitat; quanto magis creatio non cujuslibet animalis, sed hominis! Si autem causa creandi quaeritur, nulla citius et melius respondetur, nisi quia omnis creatura Dei bona est. Et quid dignius quam ut bona faciat bonus Deus, quae nemo potest facere nisi Deus?

CAPUT VI.

16. Haec et alia quae possum, sicut possum, dico adversus eos qui hanc opinionem qua creduntur animae sicut illa una singulis fieri, labefactare conantur. Sed cum ad poenas ventum est parvulorum, magnis, mihi crede, coarctor angustiis, nec quid respondeam prorsus invenio: non solum eas poenas dico, quas habet post hanc vitam illa damnatio, quo necesse est trahantur, si de corpore exierint sine christianae gratiae Sacramento; sed eas ipsas quae in hac vita dolentibus nobis versantur ante oculos, quas enumerare si velim, prius tempus quam exempla deficient. Languescunt aegritudinibus, torquentur doloribus, fame et siti cruciantur, debilitantur membris, privantur sensibus, vexantur ab immundis spiritibus. Demonstrandum est utique, quomodo ista sine ulla sua mala causa juste patiantur. Non enim dici fas est, aut ista ignorante Deo fieri, aut eum non posse resistere facientibus, aut injuste ista vel facere vel permittere. Numquidnam sicut animalia irrationabilia recte dicimus in usus dari naturis excellentioribus, etsi vitiosis, sicut apertissime in Evangelio videmus porcos ad usum desideratum concessos esse daemonibus (Matth. VIII, 32); hoc et de homine recte possumus dicere? Animal est enim, sed rationale, etsi mortale. Anima est rationalis in illis membris, quae tantis afflictionibus poenas luit; Deus bonus est, Deus justus est, Deus omnipotens est: hoc dubitare omnino dementis est. Tantorum ergo malorum quae fiunt in parvulis, causa justa dicatur. Nempe cum majores 0728 ista patiuntur, solemus dicere aut sicut in Job merita examinari, aut sicut in Herode peccata puniri: et de quibusdam exemplis quae Deus manifesta esse voluit, alia quae obscura sunt homini conjectare conceditur; sed hoc in majoribus. De parvulis autem quid respondeamus edissere, si poenis tantis nulla in eis sunt punienda peccata: nam utique nulla est in illis aetatibus examinanda justitia.

17. De ingeniorum vero diversitate, imo absurditate , quid dicam? quae quidem in parvulis latet, sed ab ipsis exordiis naturalibus ducta, apparet in grandibus, quorum nonnulli tam tardi et obliviosi sunt, ut ne prima quidem discere litterarum elementa potuerint: quidam vero tantae sunt fatuitatis, ut non multum a pecoribus differant; quos moriones vulgo vocant. Respondetur fortasse, Corpora hoc faciunt. Sed numquid secundum hanc sententiam quam defendi volumus, anima sibi corpus elegit, et in eligendo cum falleretur, erravit? aut cum in corpus cogeretur intrare necessitate nascendi, alia corpora praeoccupantibus animarum turbis, ipsa aliud non invenit, et sicut in spectaculo aliquo locum, ita carnem non quam voluit, sed quam valuit, occupavit? Numquid haec et talia vel dicere possumus, vel sentire debemus? Doce igitur quid sentire, quid dicere debeamus, ut constet nobis ratio novarum animarum singillatimque factarum singulis corporibus.

CAPUT VII.

18. Ego quidem non de ingeniis, sed saltem de poenis parvulorum, quas in hac vita patiuntur, dixi aliquid in libris illis de Libero Arbitrio. Quod quale sit, et cur mihi in ista quam habemus in manibus quaestione non sufficiat, intimabo, et eum ipsum de tertio libro locum excerptum his litteris inseram. Nam ita se habet: De cruciatibus autem corporis quibus affliguntur parvuli, quorum per aetatem nulla peccata sunt, si animae quibus animantur, non priusquam ipsi homines esse coeperunt, major querela et quasi misericors deponi solet, cum dicitur, Quid mali fecerunt, ut ista paterentur? quasi possit esse meritum innocentiae, antequam quisque nocere aliquid possit! Cum autem boni aliquid operatur Deus in emendatione majorum, cum parvulorum suorum qui eis chari sunt, doloribus ac mortibus flagellantur, cur ista non fiant, quando cum transierint, pro non factis erunt, in quibus facta sunt: propter quos autem facta sunt, aut meliores erunt, si temporalibus incommodis emendati, rectius elegerint vivere; aut excusationem in futuri judicii supplicio non habebunt, si vitae hujus angoribus, ad aeternam vitam desiderium convertere noluerint? Quis autem novit quid parvulis, de quorum cruciatibus duritia majorum contunditur, aut exercetur fides, aut misericordia probatur: quis ergo novit quid ipsis parvulis in secreto judiciorum suorum bonae compensationis reservet Deus? Quoniam quanquam nihil recte fecerint, tamen nec peccantes aliquid ista perpessi sunt. Non enim frustra etiam infantes illos, qui cum Dominus noster Jesus Christus necandus ab Herode quaereretur, occisi sunt, in honorem martyrum 0729 receptos commendat Ecclesia (De Libero Arbitrio, lib. 3, c. 23, n. 67).

19. Haec tunc dixi, cum hanc ipsam de qua nunc agitur vellem communire sententiam. Sicut enim paulo ante commemoravi, quaecumque illarum de animae incarnatione quatuor opinionum vera esset, inculpatam substantiam Creatoris, et a nostrorum peccatorum societate remotissimam nitebar ostendere. Et ideo quaecumque illarum veritate posset convinci et repudiari, ad curam intentionis meae, quam tunc habebam, non pertinebat; quandoquidem cunctis diligentiore disputatione discussis, quaecumque illarum recte vinceret caeteras, me securissimo fieret, quando etiam secundum omnes id quod agebam, invictum persistere demonstrabam. Nunc vero unam volo, si possum, ratione recta eligere ex omnibus; et propterea hujus ipsius de qua nunc agimus defensionem, in his quae commemoravi de illo libro, verbis meis attentius intuens, validam firmamque non video.

20. Nam velut firmamentum ejus illud est, quod ibi dixi: Quis autem novit quid parvulis, de quorum cruciatibus duritia majorum contunditur, aut exercetur fides, aut misericordia probatur: quis ergo novit quid ipsis parvulis in secreto judiciorum suorum bonae compensationis reservet Deus? Sed hoc non immerito dici video de his qui vel pro Christi nomine ac vera religione tale aliquid etiam nescientes patiuntur, vel Sacramento Christi jam imbuti sunt; quia sine societate unius Mediatoris liberari a damnatione non possunt, ut possit eis, etiam pro illis malis quae hic in diversis afflictionibus pertulerunt, compensatio ista praestari. Nunc autem cum ista quaestio non possit absolvi, nisi etiam de his parvulis respondeatur, qui post gravissimos cruciatus sine Sacramento christianae societatis exspirant; quae circa eos compensatio cogitanda est, quibus insuper et damnatio praeparata est? Nam et de baptismo parvulorum in eodem libro, non quidem sufficienter, sed quantum illi operi satis esse videbatur, utcumque respondi, quod etiam nescientibus, et fidem suam nondum habentibus prodest: non tamen de damnatione eorum parvulorum, qui sine illo ex hac vita emigrant, tunc aliquid dicendum putavi, quia non quod nunc agitur, agebatur.

21. Sed ut omittamus et contemnamus ea quae brevi tempore patiuntur, nec transacta revocantur, numquid similiter contemnere possumus quod per unum hominem mors, et per unum hominem resurrectio mortuorum. Sicut enim in Adam omnes moriuntur, sic et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur (I Cor. XV, 21 et 22)? Per hanc enim apostolicam, divinam, claramque sententiam, satis evidenter elucet, neminem ire in mortem nisi per Adam; neminem ire in vitam aeternam, nisi per Christum. Hoc est quippe omnes, et omnes, quia sicut omnes homines per primam, hoc est per carnalem generationem pertinent ad Adam; sic omnes homines ad secundam, id est spiritualem generationem veniunt, quicumque ad Christum perveniunt. Ideo ergo dictum est, et hic omnes, et ibi omnes: quia sicut omnes qui moriuntur, nonnisi in Adam moriuntur: 0730 ita omnes qui vivificabuntur, nonnisi in Christo vivificabuntur. Ac per hoc, quisquis nobis dixerit quemquam in resurrectione mortuorum vivificari posse nisi in Christo; tanquam pestis communis fidei detestandus est. Item quisquis dixerit quod in Christo vivificabuntur etiam parvuli qui sine Sacramenti ejus participatione de vita exeunt, hic profecto et contra apostolicam praedicationem venit, et totam condemnat Ecclesiam, ubi propterea cum baptizandis parvulis festinatur et curritur, quia sine dubio creditur aliter eos in Christo vivificari omnino non posse. Qui autem non vivificatur in Christo, restat ut in ea condemnatione maneat de qua dicit Apostolus: Per unius delictum in omnes homines ad condemnationem (Rom. V, 18). Cui delicto obnoxios parvulos nasci, et omnis credit Ecclesia, et ipse jam contra Jovinianum disputans, et exponens Jonam prophetam, sicut paulo ante commemoravi, fide veracissima definisti; credo et in aliis locis opusculorum tuorum quae vel non legi, vel in praesentia non recordor. Hujus igitur damnationis in parvulis causam requiro; quia neque animarum, si novae fiunt singulis singulae, video esse ullum in illa aetate peccatum, nec a Deo damnari aliquam credo, quam videt nullum habere peccatum.

CAPUT VIII.

22. An forte dicendum est, in parvulo carnem solam causam esse peccati; novam vero illi animam fieri, qua secundum Dei praecepta vivente, in adjutorio gratiae Christi, et ipsi carni edomitae ac subjugatae possit incorruptionis meritum comparari: sed quia in parvulo anima nondum id agere potest, nisi Christi acceperit Sacramentum, per hanc gratiam carni ejus acquiritur quod illius moribus nondum potuit; si autem sine illo Sacramento anima parvuli exierit, ipsa quidem in aeterna vita erit, unde eam nullum peccatum potuit separare, caro vero ejus non resurget in Christo, non percepto ante mortem illius Sacramento?

23. Hanc opinionem nunquam audivi, nunquam legi. Sed plane audivi et credidi, propter quod et locutus sum, Quia venit hora, quando omnes qui in monumentis sunt, audient vocem ejus; et procedent qui bene fecerunt, in resurrectionem vitae (Joan. V, 28, 29): ipsa est de qua dicitur, et per unum hominem resurrectio mortuorum; ipsa est qua in Christo omnes vivificabuntur: qui autem male egerunt, in resurrectionem judicii. Quid hic ergo de illis infantibus intelligendum est, qui priusquam possent agere vel bene vel male, sine Baptismo corpore exuti sunt? nihil hic de talibus dictum est. Sed si caro eorum ideo non resurget, quia nec boni aliquid fecerunt, nec mali; nec illorum resurrectura est, qui percepta Baptismi gratia, in illa aetate defuncti sunt, in qua nihil bene vel male agere potuerunt. Si autem illi inter sanctos resurgent, id est inter eos qui bene egerunt; inter quos et illi resurrecturi sunt, nisi inter eos qui male egerunt, ne aliquas humanas animas credamus corpora sua non recepturas, sive in resurrectionem vitae, sive in resurrectionem judicii? Quae sententia priusquam refellatur, ipsa novitate 0731 jam displicet: deinde quis ferat, si credant se illi qui ad Baptismum cum suis parvulis currunt, propter carnes eorum, non propter animas currere? Beatus quidem Cyprianus non aliquod decretum condens novum, sed Ecclesiae fidem firmissimam servans, ad corrigendum eos qui putabant ante octavum diem nativitatis non esse parvulum baptizandum, non carnem, sed animam dixit non esse perdendam; et mox natum rite baptizari posse, cum suis quibusdam coepiscopis tensuit (Cypr. epist. 59, ad Fidum).

24. Sed contra Cypriani aliquam opinionem, ubi quod videndum fuit, fortasse non vidit, sentiat quisque quod libet; tantum contra apostolicam manifestissimam fidem nemo sentiat, quae ex unius delicto omnes in condemnationem duci praedicat: ex qua condemnatione non liberat, nisi gratia Dei per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum, in quo uno omnes vivificantur quicumque vivificantur. Contra Ecclesiae fundatissimum morem nemo sentiat, ubi ad Baptismum, si propter sola parvulorum corpora curreretur, baptizandi offerrentur et mortui.

25. Quae cum ita sint, quaerenda causa est atque reddenda, quare damnentur animae quae novae creantur singulis quibusque nascentibus, si praeter Christi Sacramentum parvuli moriantur: damnari enim eas, si sic de corpore exierint, et sancta Scriptura, et sancta est testis Ecclesia. Unde illa de animarum novarum creatione sententia, si hanc fidem fundatissimam non oppugnat, sit et mea; si oppugnat, non sit et tua.

26. Nolo mihi dicatur, pro hac sententia debere accipi quod scriptum est, Qui finxit spiritum hominis in ipso (Zach. XII, 1) et, Qui finxit singillatim corda eorum (Psal. XXXII, 15). Aliquid fortissimum atque invictissimum requirendum est, quod nos non cogat Deum credere ullarum animarum sine culpa aliqua damnatorem. Nam vel tantumdem valet, vel plus est forsitan creare, quam fingere; et tamen scriptum est, Cor mundum crea in me, Deus (Psal. L, 12): nec ideo putari potest, animam hoc loco optare se fieri, priusquam aliquid esset. Sicut ergo jam existens creatur innovatione justitiae, sic jam existens fingitur conformatione doctrinae. Nec illud quod in Ecclesiaste scriptum est, Tunc convertetur in terram pulvis sicut fuit, et spiritus revertetur ad Dominum qui dedit illum (Eccle. XII, 7); istam confirmat sententiam, quam volumus esse nostram: plus enim hoc suffragatur eis qui ex una putant omnes esse animas. Nam sicut convertitur, inquiunt, pulvis in terram, sicut fuit; et tamen caro, de qua hoc dictum est, ad hominem non revertitur, ex quo propagata est, sed ad terram, unde primus homo factus est: sic et spiritus ex illius unius spiritu propagatus, non tamen ad eum revertitur, sed ad Dominum a quo illi datus est. Verum quia hoc testimonium ita pro istis sonat, ut non omni modo huic opinioni quam defendi volo, videatur esse contrarium, admonendam tantum credidi prudentiam tuam, ne talibus testimoniis ex his angustiis me coneris eruere. Nam licet nemo faciat optando, ut verum sit quod verum non est: tamen si fieri posset, optarem 0732 ut haec sententia vera esset; sicut opto ut, si vera est, abs te liquidissime atque invictissime defendatur.

CAPUT IX.

27. Haec autem difficultas etiam illos sequitur, qui jam existentes alibi animas, et ab initio divinorum operum praeparatas, a Deo mitti opinantur in corpora. Nam et ab his hoc idem quaeritur: si animae inculpatae obedienter veniunt, quo mittuntur; cur in parvulis, si non baptizati vitam istam finierint, puniuntur? Eadem prorsus in utraque sententia difficultas est. Illi sibi videntur de hac facilius exire quaestione, qui animas asseverant pro meritis vitae prioris singulas singulis corporibus implicari. Hoc enim putant esse in Adam mori, in carne scilicet quae propagata est ex Adam, supplicia pendere: a quo reatu, inquiunt, gratia Christi liberat pusillos cum magnis. Hoc quidem recte, veraciter, optimeque, quod gratia Christi liberat a reatu peccatorum pusillos cum magnis. Sed in alia superiore vita peccare animas, et inde praecipitari in carceres carneos, non credo, non acquiesco, non consentio. Primum, quoniam per nescio quos fieri circumitus id aiunt isti , ut post nescio quanta volumina saeculorum iterum ad istam sarcinam corruptibilis carnis et supplicia pendenda redeundum sit: qua opinione quid horribilius cogitari possit, ignoro. Deinde, quis tandem justus defunctus est, de quo non (si isti vera dicunt) solliciti esse debeamus, ne in sinu Abrahae peccans, in flammas illius divitis dejiciatur (Luc. XVI, 22, 23)? cur enim non et post hoc corpus peccare possit, si et ante potuit? Postremo, longe aliud est in Adam peccasse, unde dicit Apostolus, in quo omnes peccaverunt; et aliud est extra Adam nescio ubi peccasse, et ideo in Adam, id est in carnem quae ex Adam propagata est tanquam in carcerem trudi. Illam vero opinionem, quod ex una fiant omnes animae, nec discutere volo, nisi necesse sit; atque utinam ista, de qua nunc agimus, si vera est, sic abs te defendatur, ut hoc necesse jam non sit.

28. Quamvis autem desiderem, rogem, votis ardentibus exoptem et exspectem ut perte mihi Dominus hujus rei auferat ignorantiam: tamen si, quod absit, minime meruero, patientiam mihi petam a Domino Deo nostro; in quem sic credimus, ut si aliqua nobis non aperiat etiam pulsantibus, nullo modo adversus eum murmurare debeamus. Memini prius ipsis Apostolis dictum, Multa habeo vobis dicere; sed non potestis illa portare modo (Joan. XVI, 12). In his, quantum ad me attinet, etiam hoc deputem: neque qui hoc sciam me indigner indignum, ne hoc ipso etiam convincar indignior. Multa enim alia similiter nescio, quae commemorare vel enumerare non possum: et hoc tolerabiliter ignorarem, nisi metuerem ne aliqua istarum opinionum contra illud quod firmissima retinemus fide, incautis obreperet mentibus. Sed antequam sciam quaenam earum potius eligenda sit, hoc me non temere sentire profiteor, eam quae vera est non adversari robustissimae ac fundatissimae fidei, qua Christi Ecclesia 0733 nec parvulos homines recentissime natos a damnatione credit, nisi per gratiam nominis Christi, quam in suis Sacramentis commendavit, posse liberari.