S. AURELII AUGUSTINI HIPPONENSIS EPISCOPI DE TRINITATE Libri quindecim .

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 LIBER SECUNDUS. Rursum defendit Augustinus aequalitatem Trinitatis, et de Filii missione ac Spiritus sancti agens, variisque Dei apparitionibus, demon

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 LIBER TERTIUS. In quo quaeritur, an in illis de quibus superiore libro dictum est, Dei apparitionibus, per corporeas species factis, tantummodo creatu

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 LIBER QUARTUS. Explicat ad quid missus sit Filius Dei: Christo videlicet pro peccatoribus moriente persuadendum nobis fuisse imprimis et quantum nos d

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 LIBER QUINTUS. Venit ad haereticorum argumenta illa quae non ex divinis Libris, sed ex rationibus suis proferunt: et eos refellit, quibus ideo videtur

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 LIBER SEXTUS. In quo proposita quaestione, quomodo dictus sit Christus ore apostolico, Dei virtus et Dei sapientia,

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 LIBER SEPTIMUS. In quo superioris libri quaestio, quae dilata fuerat, explicatur quod videlicet Deus Pater qui genuit Filium virtutem et sapientiam,

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 LIBER OCTAVUS. In quo ratione reddita monstrat, non solum Patrem Filio non esse majorem, sed nec ambos simul aliquid majus esse quam Spiritum sanctum,

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 LIBER NONUS. Trinitatem in homine, qui imago Dei est, quamdam inesse mentem scilicet, et notitiam qua se novit, et amorem quo se notitiamque suam dil

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 LIBER DECIMUS, In quo trinitatem aliam in hominis mente inesse ostenditur, eamque longe evidentiorem apparere in memoria, intelligentia et voluntate.

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 LIBER UNDECIMUS. Trinitatis imago quaedam monstratur etiam in exteriore homine: primo quidem in his quae cernuntur extrinsecus ex corpore scilicet qu

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 LIBER DUODECIMUS. In quo praemissa distinctione sapientiae a scientia, in ea quae proprie scientia nuncupatur, quaeve inferior est, prius quaedam sui

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 LIBER TERTIUS DECIMUS. Prosequitur de scientia, in qua videlicet, etiam ut a sapientia distinguitur, trinitatem quamdam inquirere libro superiore coep

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 LIBER QUARTUS DECIMUS. De sapientia hominis vera dicit, ostendens imaginem Dei, quod est homo secundum mentem, non proprie in transeuntibus, veluti in

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 LIBER QUINTUS DECIMUS. Principio, quid in singulis quatuordecim superioribus libris dictum sit, exponit breviter ac summatim, eoque demum pervenisse d

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Chapter 9.—Species is Produced by Species in Succession.

16. In this arrangement, then, while we begin from the bodily species and arrive finally at the species which comes to be in the intuition (contuitu) of the concipient, we find four species born, as it were, step by step one from the other, the second from the first, the third from the second, the fourth from the third: since from the species of the body itself, there arises that which comes to be in the sense of the percipient; and from this, that which comes to be in the memory; and from this, that which comes to be in the mind’s eye of the concipient. And the will, therefore, thrice combines as it were parent with offspring: first the species of the body with that to which it gives birth in the sense of the body; and that again with that which from it comes to be in the memory; and this also, thirdly, with that which is born from it in the intuition of the concipient’s mind. But the intermediate combination which is the second, although it is nearer to the first, is yet not so like the first as the third is. For there are two kinds of vision, the one of [sensuous] perception (sentientis), the other of conception (cogitantis). But in order that the vision of conception may come to be, there is wrought for the purpose, in the memory, from the vision of [sensuous] perception something like it, to which the eye of the mind may turn itself in conceiving, as the glance (acies) of the eyes turns itself in [sensuously] perceiving to the bodily object. I have, therefore, chosen to put forward two trinities in this kind: one when the vision of [sensuous] perception is formed from the bodily object, the other when the vision of conception is formed from the memory. But I have refrained from commending an intermediate one; because we do not commonly call it vision, when the form which comes to be in the sense of him who perceives, is entrusted to the memory. Yet in all cases the will does not appear unless as the combiner as it were of parent and offspring; and so, proceed from whence it may, it can be called neither parent nor offspring.733    [Augustin’s map of consciousness is as follows: (1). The corporeal species=the external object (outward appearance). (2). The sensible species=the sensation (appearance for the sense). (3). The mental species in its first form=present perception. (4). The mental species in its second form=remembered perception. These three “species” or appearances of the object: namely, corporeal, sensible, and mental, according to him, are combined in one synthesis with the object by the operation of the will. By “will,” he does not mean distinct and separate volitions: but the spontaneity of the ego—what Kant denominates the mechanism of the understanding, seen in the spontaneous employment of the categories of thought, as the mind ascends from empirical sensation to rational conception.   The English translator has failed to make clear the sharply defined psychology of these chapters, by loosely rendering “sentire,” “to perceive,” and “cogitare” to think.—W.G.T.S.]

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16. Species a specie vicissim gignitur. In hac igitur distributione cum incipimus a specie corporis, et pervenimus usque ad speciem quae fit in contuitu cogitantis, quatuor species reperiuntur quasi gradatim natae altera ex altera: secunda, de prima; tertia, de secunda; quarta, de tertia. A specie quippe corporis quod cernitur, exoritur ea quae fit in sensu cernentis; et ab hac, ea quae fit in memoria; et ab hac, ea quae fit in acie cogitantis. Quapropter voluntas quasi parentem cum prole ter copulat: primo speciem corporis cum ea quam gignit in corporis sensu; et ipsam rursus cum ea quae fit ex illa in memoria; atque istam quoque tertio cum ea quae ex illa paritur in cogitantis intuitu. Sed media copula quae secunda est, cum sit vicinior, non tam similis est primae quam tertia . Visiones enim duae sunt; una, sentientis; altera, cogitantis: ut autem possit esse visio cogitantis, ideo fit in memoria de visione sentientis simile aliquid, quo se ita convertat in cogitando acies animi, sicut se in cernendo convertit 0997 ad corpus acies oculorum. Propterea duas in hoc genere trinitates volui commendare: unam, cum visio sentientis formatur ex corpore; aliam, cum visio cogitantis formatur ex memoria. Mediam vero nolui, quia ibi non solet visio dici, cum memoriae commendatur forma, quae fit in sensu cernentis. Ubique tamen voluntas non apparet, nisi copulatrix quasi parentis et prolis. Et ideo undecumque procedat, nec parens nec proles dici potest.