Chapter 12.—There is a Kind of Hidden Wedlock in the Inner Man. Unlawful Pleasures of the Thoughts.

17. Let us now complete, so far as the Lord helps us, the discussion which we have undertaken, respecting that part of reason to which knowledge belongs, that is, the cognizance of things temporal and changeable, which is necessary for managing the affairs of this life. For as in the case of that visible wedlock of the two human beings who were made first, the serpent did not eat of the forbidden tree, but only persuaded them to eat of it; and the woman did not eat alone, but gave to her husband, and they eat together; although she alone spoke with the serpent, and she alone was led away by him:767    Gen. iii. 1–6 so also in the case of that hidden and secret kind of wedlock, which is transacted and discerned in a single human being, the carnal, or as I may say, since it is directed to the senses of the body, the sensuous movement of the soul, which is common to us with beasts, is shut off from the reason of wisdom. For certainly bodily things are perceived by the sense of the body; but spiritual things, which are eternal and unchangeable, are understood by the reason of wisdom. But the reason of knowledge has appetite very near to it: seeing that what is called the science or knowledge of actions reasons concerning the bodily things which are perceived by the bodily sense; if well, in order that it may refer that knowledge to the end of the chief good; but if ill, in order that it may enjoy them as being such good things as those wherein it reposes with a false blessedness. Whenever, then, that carnal or animal sense introduces into this purpose of the mind which is conversant about things temporal and corporeal, with a view to the offices of a man’s actions, by the living force of reason, some inducement to enjoy itself, that is, to enjoy itself as if it were some private good of its own, not as the public and common, which is the unchangeable, good; then, as it were, the serpent discourses with the woman. And to consent to this allurement, is to eat of the forbidden tree. But if that consent is satisfied by the pleasure of thought alone, but the members are so restrained by the authority of higher counsel that they are not yielded as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin;768    Rom. vi. 13 this, I think, is to be considered as if the woman alone should have eaten the forbidden food. But if, in this consent to use wickedly the things which are perceived through the senses of the body, any sin at all is so determined upon, that if there is the power it is also fulfilled by the body; then that woman must be understood to have given the unlawful food to her husband with her, to be eaten together. For it is not possible for the mind to determine that a sin is not only to be thought of with pleasure, but also to be effectually committed, unless also that intention of the mind yields, and serves the bad action, with which rests the chief power of applying the members to an outward act, or of restraining them from one.

18. And yet, certainly, when the mind is pleased in thought alone with unlawful things, while not indeed determining that they are to be done, but yet holding and pondering gladly things which ought to have been rejected the very moment they touched the mind, it cannot be denied to be a sin, but far less than if it were also determined to accomplished it in outward act. And therefore pardon must be sought for such thoughts too, and the breast must be smitten, and it must be said, “Forgive us our debts;” and what follows must be done, and must be joined in our prayer, “As we also forgive our debtors.”769    Matt. vi. 12 For it is not as it was with those two first human beings, of which each one bare his own person; and so, if the woman alone had eaten the forbidden food, she certainly alone would have been smitten with the punishment of death: it cannot, I say, be so said also in the case of a single human being now, that if the thought, remaining alone, be gladly fed with unlawful pleasures, from which it ought to turn away directly, while yet there is no determination that the bad actions are to be done, but only that they are retained with pleasure in remembrance, the woman as it were can be condemned without the man. Far be it from us to believe this. For here is one person, one human being, and he as a whole will be condemned, unless those things which, as lacking the will to do, and yet having the will to please the mind with them, are perceived to be sins of thought alone, are pardoned through the grace of the Mediator.770    [Augustin here teaches that the inward lust is guilt as well as the outward action prompted by it. This is in accordance with Matt. v. 28; Acts viii. 21–22; Rom. vii. 7; James i. 14.—W.G.T.S.]

19. This reasoning, then, whereby we have sought in the mind of each several human being a certain rational wedlock of contemplation and action, with functions distributed through each severally, yet with the unity of the mind preserved in both; saving meanwhile the truth of that history which divine testimony hands down respecting the first two human beings, that is, the man and his wife, from whom the human species is propagated;771    [Augustin means, that while he has given an allegorical and mystical interpretation to the narrative of the fall, in Genesis, he also holds to its historical sense.—W.G.T.S.]—this reasoning, I say, must be listened to only thus far, that the apostle may be understood to have intended to signify something to be sought in one individual man, by assigning the image of God to the man only, and not also to the woman, although in the merely different sex of two human beings.

CAPUT XII.

17. In interiore homine quoddam secretum conjugium. Cogitationum delectationes illicitae. Nunc de illa parte rationis ad quam pertinet scientia, id est, cognitio rerum temporalium atque mutabilium navandis vitae hujus actionibus necessaria, susceptam considerationem, quantum Dominus adjuvat, peragamus. Sicut enim in illo manifesto conjugio duorum hominum qui primi facti sunt, non manducavit serpens de arbore vetita, sed tantummodo manducandum persuasit: mulier autem non manducavit sola, sed viro suo dedit, et simul manducaverunt; quamvis cum serpente sola locuta, et ab eo sola seducta sit (Gen. III, 1-6): ita et in hoc quod etiam in homine uno geritur et dignoscitur, occulto quodam secretoque conjugio carnalis, vel, ut ita dicam, qui in corporis sensus intenditur, sensualis animae motus, qui nobis pecoribusque communis est, seclusus est a ratione sapientiae. Sensu quippe corporis corporalia sentiuntur: aeterna vero et incommutabilia spiritualia ratione sapientiae intelliguntur. Rationi autem scientiae appetitus vicinus est: quandoquidem de ipsis corporalibus quae sensu corporis sentiuntur, ratiocinatur ea quae scientia dicitur actionis; si bene, ut eam notitiam referat ad finem summi boni; si autem male, ut eis fruatur tanquam bonis talibus in quibus falsa beatitudine conquiescat. Cum ergo huic intentioni mentis, quae in rebus temporalibus et corporalibus propter actionis officium ratiocinandi vivacitate versatur, carnalis ille sensus vel animalis ingerit quamdam illecebram fruendi se, id est tanquam bono quodam privato et proprio, non tanquam publico atque communi quod est incommutabile bonum, tunc velut serpens alloquitur feminam. Huic autem illecebrae consentire, de ligno prohibito manducare est. Sed iste consensus si sola cogitationis delectatione contentus est, superioris vero auctoritate consilii ita membra retinentur, ut non exhibeantur 1008 iniquitatis arma peccato (Rom. VI, 13); sic habendum existimo velut cibum vetitum mulier sola comederit. Si autem in consensione male utendi rebus quae per sensum corporis sentiuntur, ita decernitur quodcumque peccatum, ut si potestas sit, etiam corpore compleatur; intelligenda est illa mulier dedisse viro suo secum simul edendum illicitum cibum. Neque enim potest peccatum non solum cogitandum suaviter, verum etiam efficaciter perpetrandum mente decerni, nisi et illa mentis intentio, penes quam summa potestas est membra in opus movendi, vel ab opere cohibendi, malae actioni cedat et serviat.

18. Nec sane, cum sola cogitatione mens oblectatur illicitis, non quidem decernens esse facienda, tenens tamen et volvens libenter quae statim ut attigerunt animum respui debuerunt, negandum est esse peccatum, sed longe minus quam si et opere statuatur implendum. Et ideo de talibus quoque cogitationibus venia petenda est, pectusque percutiendum, atque dicendum, Dimitte nobis debita nostra: faciendumque quod sequitur, atque in oratione jungendum, sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris (Matth. VI, 12). Neque enim sicut in illis duobus primis hominibus personam suam quisque portabat, et ideo si sola mulier cibum edisset illicitum, sola utique mortis supplicio plecteretur; ita dici potest in homine uno, si delectationibus illicitis, a quibus se continuo deberet avertere cogitatio, libenter sola pascatur, nec facienda decernantur mala, sed tantum suaviter in recordatione teneantur, quasi mulierem sine viro posse damnari: absit hoc credere. Haec quippe una persona est, unus homo est, totusque damnabitur, nisi haec quae sine voluntate operandi, sed tamen cum voluntate animum talibus oblectandi, solius cogitationis sentiuntur esse peccata per Mediatoris gratiam remittantur.

19. Haec itaque disputatio qua in mente uniuscujusque hominis quaesivimus quoddam rationale conjugium contemplationis et actionis, officiis per quaedam singula distributis, tamen in utroque mentis unitate servata, salva illius veritatis historia, quam de duobus primis hominibus, viro scilicet ejusque muliere, de quibus propagatum est genus humanum, divina tradit auctoritas, ad hoc tantummodo audienda est, ut intelligatur Apostolus imaginem Dei viro tantum tribuendo, non etiam feminae, quamvis in diverso sexu duorum hominum, aliquid tamen significare voluisse quod in uno homine quaereretur.