S. AURELII AUGUSTINI HIPPONENSIS EPISCOPI DE TRINITATE Libri quindecim .

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 LIBER SECUNDUS. Rursum defendit Augustinus aequalitatem Trinitatis, et de Filii missione ac Spiritus sancti agens, variisque Dei apparitionibus, demon

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 LIBER TERTIUS. In quo quaeritur, an in illis de quibus superiore libro dictum est, Dei apparitionibus, per corporeas species factis, tantummodo creatu

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 LIBER QUARTUS. Explicat ad quid missus sit Filius Dei: Christo videlicet pro peccatoribus moriente persuadendum nobis fuisse imprimis et quantum nos d

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 LIBER QUINTUS. Venit ad haereticorum argumenta illa quae non ex divinis Libris, sed ex rationibus suis proferunt: et eos refellit, quibus ideo videtur

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 LIBER SEXTUS. In quo proposita quaestione, quomodo dictus sit Christus ore apostolico, Dei virtus et Dei sapientia,

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 LIBER SEPTIMUS. In quo superioris libri quaestio, quae dilata fuerat, explicatur quod videlicet Deus Pater qui genuit Filium virtutem et sapientiam,

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 LIBER OCTAVUS. In quo ratione reddita monstrat, non solum Patrem Filio non esse majorem, sed nec ambos simul aliquid majus esse quam Spiritum sanctum,

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 LIBER NONUS. Trinitatem in homine, qui imago Dei est, quamdam inesse mentem scilicet, et notitiam qua se novit, et amorem quo se notitiamque suam dil

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 LIBER DECIMUS, In quo trinitatem aliam in hominis mente inesse ostenditur, eamque longe evidentiorem apparere in memoria, intelligentia et voluntate.

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 LIBER UNDECIMUS. Trinitatis imago quaedam monstratur etiam in exteriore homine: primo quidem in his quae cernuntur extrinsecus ex corpore scilicet qu

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 LIBER DUODECIMUS. In quo praemissa distinctione sapientiae a scientia, in ea quae proprie scientia nuncupatur, quaeve inferior est, prius quaedam sui

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 LIBER TERTIUS DECIMUS. Prosequitur de scientia, in qua videlicet, etiam ut a sapientia distinguitur, trinitatem quamdam inquirere libro superiore coep

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 LIBER QUARTUS DECIMUS. De sapientia hominis vera dicit, ostendens imaginem Dei, quod est homo secundum mentem, non proprie in transeuntibus, veluti in

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 LIBER QUINTUS DECIMUS. Principio, quid in singulis quatuordecim superioribus libris dictum sit, exponit breviter ac summatim, eoque demum pervenisse d

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Chapter 3.—Some Desires Being the Same in All, are Known to Each. The Poet Ennius.

6. There is, indeed, so closely conspiring a harmony in the same nature living and using reason, that although one knows not what the other wills, yet there are some wills of all which are also known to each; and although each man does not know what any other one man wills, yet in some things he may know what all will. And hence comes that story of the comic actor’s witty joke, who promised that he would say in the theatre, in some other play, what all had in their minds, and what all willed; and when a still greater crowd had come together on the day appointed, with great expectation, all being in suspense and silent, is affirmed to have said: You will to buy cheap, and sell dear. And mean actor though he was, yet all in his words recognized what themselves were conscious of, and applauded him with wonderful goodwill, for saying before the eyes of all what was confessedly true, yet what no one looked for. And why was so great expectation raised by his promising that he would say what was the will of all, unless because no man knows the wills of other men? But did not he know that will? Is there any one who does not know it? Yet why, unless because there are some things which not unfitly each conjectures from himself to be in others, through sympathy or agreement either in vice or virtue? But it is one thing to see one’s own will; another to conjecture, however certainly, what is another’s. For, in human affairs, I am as certain that Rome was built as that Constantinople was, although I have seen Rome with my eyes, but know nothing of the other city, except what I have believed on the testimony of others. And truly that comic actor believed it to be common to all to will to buy cheap and sell dear, either by observing himself or by making experiment also of others. But since such a will is in truth a fault, every one can attain the counter virtue, or run into the mischief of some other fault which is contrary to it, whereby to resist and conquer it. For I myself know a case where a manuscript was offered to a man for purchase, who perceived that the vendor was ignorant of its value, and was therefore asking something very small, and who thereupon gave him, though not expecting it, the just price, which was much more. Suppose even the case of a man possessed with wickedness so great as to sell cheap what his parents left to him, and to buy dear, in order to waste it on his own lusts? Such wanton extravagance, I fancy, is not incredible; and if such men are sought, they may be found, or even fall in one’s way although not sought; who, by a wickedness more than that of the theatre, make a mock of the theatrical proposition or declaration, by buying dishonor at a great price, while selling lands at a small one. We have heard, too, of persons that, for the sake of distribution, have bought corn at a higher price, and sold it to their fellow-citizens at a lower one. And note also what the old poet Ennius has said: that “all mortals wish themselves to be praised;” wherein, doubtless, he conjectured what was in others, both by himself, and by those whom he knew by experience; and so seems to have declared what it is that all men will. Lastly, if that comic actor himself, too, had said, You all will to be praised, no one of you wills to be abused; he would have seemed in like manner to have expressed what all will. Yet there are some who hate their own faults, and do not desire to be praised by others for that for which they are displeased with themselves; and who thank the kindness of those who rebuke them, when the purpose of that rebuke is their own amendment. But if he had said, You all will to be blessed, you do not will to be wretched; he would have said something which there is no one that would not recognize in his own will. For whatever else a man may will secretly, he does not withdraw from that will, which is well known to all men, and well known to be in all men.

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6. Voluntates quaedam eaedem omnium singulis notae. Ennius poeta. Est quaedam sane ejusdem naturae viventis et ratione utentis tanta conspiratio, ut cum lateat alterum quid alter velit, nonnullae tamen sint voluntates omnium etiam singulis notae: et cum quisque homo nesciat quid homo alius unus velit, in quibusdam rebus possit scire quid omnes velint. Unde illa cujusdam mimi facetissima praedicatur urbanitas, qui cum se promisisset in theatro quid in animo haberent, et quid vellent omnes, aliis ludis esse dicturum, atque ad diem constitutum ingenti exspectatione major multitudo conflueret, suspensis et silentibus omnibus, dixisse perhibetur: Vili vultis emere, et caro vendere. In quo dicto levissimi scenici, omnes tamen conscientias invenerunt suas, eique vera ante oculos omnium constituta, et tamen improvisa dicenti, admirabili favore plauserunt. Cur autem tam magna exspectatio facta est illo promittente omnium voluntatem se esse dicturum, nisi quia latent hominem aliorum hominum voluntates? Sed numquid ista latuit istum? Numquid quemquam latet? Qua tandem causa, nisi quia sunt quaedam quae non inconvenienter in aliis de se quisque conjiciat, compatiente vel conspirante vitio seu natura? Sed aliud est videre voluntatem suam, aliud, quamvis certissima conjectura, conjicere alienam. Nam conditam Romam tam certum habeo in rebus humanis quam Constantinopolim, cum Romam viderim oculis meis, de illa vero nihil noverim, nisi quod aliis testibus credidi. Et mimus quidem ille vel se ipsum intuendo, vel alios quoque experiendo, vili velle emere, et caro vendere, omnibus id credidit esse commune. Sed quoniam revera vitium est, potest quisque adipisci ejusmodi justitiam, vel alicujus alterius vitii quod huic contrarium est incurrere pestilentiam, qua huic resistat et vincat. 1018 Nam scio ipse hominem, cum venalis codex ei fuisset oblatus, pretiique ejus ignarum et ideo quiddam exiguum poscentem cerneret venditorem, justum pretium quod multo amplius erat, nec opinanti dedisse. Quid, si etiam sit quisquam nequitia tanta possessus, ut vili vendat quae dimiserunt parentes, et caro emat quae consumant libidines? Non est, ut opinor, incredibilis ista luxuries: et si quaerantur tales, reperiantur, aut etiam non quaesiti fortassis occurrant, qui nequitia majore quam theatrica, propositioni vel pronuntiationi theatricae insultent, magno pretio stupra emendo, parvo autem rura vendendo. Largitionis etiam gratia novimus quosdam emisse frumenta carius, et vilius vendidisse suis civibus. Illud etiam quod vetus poeta dixit Ennius, Omnes mortales sese laudarier optant ;profecto et de se ipso et de iis quos expertus fuerat, conjecit in aliis, et videtur pronuntiasse hominum omnium voluntates. Denique si et mimus ille dixisset, Laudari omnes vultis, nemo vestrum vult vituperari; similiter quod esset omnium voluntatis dixisse videretur. Sunt tamen qui vitia sua oderint, et in quibus sibi displicent ipsi, nec ab aliis se laudari velint, gratiasque agant objurgantium benevolentiae, cum ideo vituperantur ut corrigantur. At si dixisset, Omnes beati esse vultis, miseri esse non vultis; dixisset aliquid quod nullus in sua non agnosceret voluntate. Quidquid enim aliud quisquam latenter velit, ab hac voluntate quae omnibus et in omnibus hominibus satis nota est, non recedit.