Augustine of Hippo, On the Trinity

7. It is wonderful, however, since the will to obtain and retain blessedness is one in all, whence comes, on the other hand, such a variety and diversity of wills concerning that blessedness itself; not that any one is unwilling to have it, but that all do not know it. For if all knew it, it would not be thought by some to be in goodness of mind; by others, in pleasure of body; by others, in both; and by some in one thing, by others in another. For as men find special delight in this thing or that, so have they placed in it their idea of a blessed life. How, then, do all love so warmly what not all know? Who can love what he does not know?—a subject which I have already discussed in the preceding books.792 Bks. viii. c. 4, etc., x. c. 1. [This occurred in the the case of Edward Irving. Oliphant’s Life of Irving.—W.G.T.S.] Why, therefore, is blessedness loved by all, when it is not known by all? Is it perhaps that all know what it is itself, but all do not know where it is to be found, and that the dispute arises from this?—as if, forsooth, the business was about some place in this world, where every one ought to will to live who wills to live blessedly; and as if the question where blessedness is were not implied in the question what it is. For certainly, if it is in the pleasure of the body, he is blessed who enjoys the pleasure of the body; if in goodness of mind, he has it who enjoys this; if in both, he who enjoys both. When, therefore, one says, to live blessedly is to enjoy the pleasure of the body; but another, to live blessedly is to enjoy goodness of mind; is it not, that either both know, or both do not know, what a blessed life is? How, then, do both love it, if no one can love what he does not know? Or is that perhaps false which we have assumed to be most true and most certain, viz. that all men will to live blessedly? For if to live blessedly is, for argument’s sake, to live according to goodness of mind, how does he will to live blessedly who does not will this? Should we not say more truly, That man does not will to live blessedly, because he does not wish to live according to goodness, which alone is to live blessedly? Therefore all men do not will to live blessedly; on the contrary, few wish it; if to live blessedly is nothing else but to live according to goodness of mind, which many do not will to do. Shall we, then, hold that to be false of which the Academic Cicero himself did not doubt (although Academics doubt every thing), who, when he wanted in the dialogue Hortensius to find some certain thing, of which no one doubted, from which to start his argument, says, We certainly all will to be blessed? Far be it from me to say this is false. But what then? Are we to say that, although there is no other way of living blessedly than living according to goodness of mind, yet even he who does not will this, wills to live blessedly? This, indeed, seems too absurd. For it is much as if we should say, Even he who does not will to live blessedly, wills to live blessedly. Who could listen to, who could endure, such a contradiction? And yet necessity thrusts us into this strait, if it is both true that all will to live blessedly, and yet all do not will to live in that way in which alone one can live blessedly.

CAPUT IV.

7. Beatitudinis habendae voluntas una omnium, sed de ipsa beatitudine varietas magna voluntatum. Mirum est autem cum capessendae atque retinendae beatitudinis voluntas una sit omnium, unde tanta existat de ipsa beatitudine rursus varietas atque diversitas voluntatum, non quod aliquis eam nolit, sed quod non omnes eam norint. Si enim omnes eam nossent, non ab aliis putaretur esse in virtute animi; aliis, in corporis voluptate; aliis, in utraque; et aliis atque aliis, alibi atque alibi. Ut enim eos quaeque res maxime delectavit, ita in ea constituerunt vitam beatam. Quomodo igitur ferventissime amant omnes, quod non omnes sciunt? Quis potest amare quod nescit? sicut jam de hac re in libris superioribus disputavi (Lib. 8, capp. 4 et seqq., et lib. 10, cap. 1, etc.). Cur ergo beatitudo amatur ab omnibus, nec tamen scitur ab omnibus? An forte sciunt omnes ipsa quae sit, sed non omnes sciunt ubi sit, et inde contentio est? Quasi vero de aliquo mundi hujus agatur loco, ubi debeat quisque velle vivere, qui vult beate vivere, ac non ita quaeratur ubi sit beatitudo, sicut quaeritur quae sit. Nam utique si in corporis voluptate est, ille beatus est qui fruitur corporis voluptate: si in virtute animi, ille qui hac fruitur: si in utraque, ille qui fruitur utraque. Cum itaque alius dicit, Beate vivere est voluptate corporis frui; alius autem, Beate vivere est virtute animi frui: nonne aut ambo nesciunt 1019 quae sit beata vita, aut non ambo sciunt? Quomodo ergo ambo amant eam, si nemo potest amare quod nescit? An forte falsum est quod pro verissimo certissimoque posuimus, beate vivere omnes homines velle? Si enim beate vivere est, verbi gratia, secundum animi virtutem vivere; quomodo beate vivere vult, qui hoc non vult? Nonne verius dixerimus: Homo iste non vult beate vivere, quia non vult secundum virtutem vivere, quod solum est beate vivere? Non igitur omnes beate vivere volunt, imo pauci hoc volunt, si non est beate vivere, nisi secundum virtutem animi vivere, quod multi nolunt. Itane falsum erit, unde nec ipse (cum Academicis omnia dubia sint) Academicus ille Cicero dubitavit, qui cum vellet in Hortensio dialogo ab aliqua re certa, de qua nullus ambigeret, sumere suae disputationis exordium, Beati certe, inquit, omnes esse volumus? Absit ut hoc falsum esse dicamus. Quid igitur? an dicendum est etiamsi nihil sit aliud beate vivere, quam secundum virtutem animi vivere, tamen et qui hoc non vult, beate vult vivere? Nimis quidem hoc videtur absurdum. Tale est enim ac si dicamus: Et qui non vult beate vivere, beate vult vivere. Istam repugnantiam quis audiat, quis ferat? Et tamen ad hanc contrudit necessitas, si et omnes beate velle vivere verum est, et non omnes sic volunt vivere, quomodo solum beate vivitur.