S. AURELII AUGUSTINI HIPPONENSIS EPISCOPI DE TRINITATE Libri quindecim .

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 LIBER SECUNDUS. Rursum defendit Augustinus aequalitatem Trinitatis, et de Filii missione ac Spiritus sancti agens, variisque Dei apparitionibus, demon

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 LIBER TERTIUS. In quo quaeritur, an in illis de quibus superiore libro dictum est, Dei apparitionibus, per corporeas species factis, tantummodo creatu

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 LIBER QUARTUS. Explicat ad quid missus sit Filius Dei: Christo videlicet pro peccatoribus moriente persuadendum nobis fuisse imprimis et quantum nos d

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 LIBER QUINTUS. Venit ad haereticorum argumenta illa quae non ex divinis Libris, sed ex rationibus suis proferunt: et eos refellit, quibus ideo videtur

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 LIBER SEXTUS. In quo proposita quaestione, quomodo dictus sit Christus ore apostolico, Dei virtus et Dei sapientia,

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 LIBER SEPTIMUS. In quo superioris libri quaestio, quae dilata fuerat, explicatur quod videlicet Deus Pater qui genuit Filium virtutem et sapientiam,

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 LIBER OCTAVUS. In quo ratione reddita monstrat, non solum Patrem Filio non esse majorem, sed nec ambos simul aliquid majus esse quam Spiritum sanctum,

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 LIBER NONUS. Trinitatem in homine, qui imago Dei est, quamdam inesse mentem scilicet, et notitiam qua se novit, et amorem quo se notitiamque suam dil

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 LIBER DECIMUS, In quo trinitatem aliam in hominis mente inesse ostenditur, eamque longe evidentiorem apparere in memoria, intelligentia et voluntate.

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 LIBER UNDECIMUS. Trinitatis imago quaedam monstratur etiam in exteriore homine: primo quidem in his quae cernuntur extrinsecus ex corpore scilicet qu

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 LIBER DUODECIMUS. In quo praemissa distinctione sapientiae a scientia, in ea quae proprie scientia nuncupatur, quaeve inferior est, prius quaedam sui

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 LIBER TERTIUS DECIMUS. Prosequitur de scientia, in qua videlicet, etiam ut a sapientia distinguitur, trinitatem quamdam inquirere libro superiore coep

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 LIBER QUARTUS DECIMUS. De sapientia hominis vera dicit, ostendens imaginem Dei, quod est homo secundum mentem, non proprie in transeuntibus, veluti in

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 LIBER QUINTUS DECIMUS. Principio, quid in singulis quatuordecim superioribus libris dictum sit, exponit breviter ac summatim, eoque demum pervenisse d

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Chapter 7.—Faith is Necessary, that Man May at Some Time Be Blessed, Which He Will Only Attain in the Future Life. The Blessedness of Proud Philosophers Ridiculous and Pitiable.

10. And on this account, faith, by which men believe in God, is above all things necessary in this mortal life, most full as it is of errors and hardships. For there are no good things whatever, and above all, not those by which any one is made good, or those by which he will become blessed, of which any other source can be found whence they come to man, and are added to man, unless it be from God. But when he who is good and faithful in these miseries shall have come from this life to the blessed life, then will truly come to pass what now is absolutely impossible,—namely, that a man may live as he will.794    [The prophet Nathan enunciates the same truth, in his words to David, “Go do all that is in thine heart; for the Lord is with thee.” 2 Sam. vii. 3.—W.G.T.S.] For he will not will to live badly in the midst of that felicity, nor will he will anything that will be wanting, nor will there be wanting anything which he shall have willed. Whatever shall be loved, will be present; nor will that be longed for, which shall not be present. Everything which will be there will be good, and the supreme God will be the supreme good and will be present for those to enjoy who love Him; and what altogether is most blessed, it will be certain that it will be so forever. But now, indeed, philosophers have made for themselves, according to the pleasure of each, their own ideals of a blessed life; that they might be able, as it were by their own power, to do that, which by the common conditions of mortals they were not able to do,—namely, to live as they would. For they felt that no one could be blessed otherwise than by having what he would, and by suffering nothing which he would not. And who would not will, that the life whatsoever it be, with which he is delighted, and which he therefore calls blessed, were so in his own power, that he could have it continually? And yet who is in this condition? Who wills to suffer troubles in order that he may endure them manfully, although he both wills and is able to endure them if he does suffer them? Who would will to live in torments, even although he is able to live laudably by holding fast to righteousness in the midst of them through patience? They who have endured these evils, either in wishing to have or in fearing to lose what they loved, whether wickedly or laudably, have thought of them as transitory. For many have stretched boldly through transitory evils to good things which will last. And these, doubtless, are blessed through hope, even while actually suffering such transitory evils, through which they arrive at good things which will not be transitory. But he who is blessed through hope is not yet blessed: for he expects, through patience, a blessedness which he does not yet grasp. Whereas he, on the other hand, who is tormented without any such hope, without any such reward, let him use as much endurance as he pleases, is not truly blessed, but bravely miserable. For he is not on that account not miserable, because he would be more so if he also bore misery impatiently. Further, even if he does not suffer those things which he would not will to suffer in his own body, not even then is he to be esteemed blessed, inasmuch as he does not live as he wills. For to omit other things, which, while the body remains unhurt, belong to those annoyances of the mind, without which we should will to live, and which are innumerable; he would will, at any rate, if he were able, so to have his body safe and sound, and so to suffer no inconveniences from it, as to have it within his own control, or even to have it with an imperishableness of the body itself; and because he does not possess this, and hangs in doubt about it, he certainly does not live as he wills. For although he may be ready from fortitude to accept, and bear with an equal mind, whatever adversities may happen to him, yet he had rather they should not happen, and prevents them if he is able; and he is in such way ready for both alternatives, that, as much as is in him, he wishes for the one and shuns the other; and if he have fallen into that which he shuns, he therefore bears it willingly, because that could not happen which he willed. He bears it, therefore, in order that he may not be crushed; but he would not willingly be even burdened. How, then, does he live as he wills? Is it because he is willingly strong to bear what he would not will to be put upon him? Then he only wills what he can, because he cannot have what he wills. And here is the sum-total of the blessedness of proud mortals, I know not whether to be laughed at, or not rather to be pitied, who boast that they live as they will, because they willingly bear patiently what they are unwilling should happen to them. For this, they say, is like Terence’s wise saying,—

“Since that cannot be which you will, will that which thou canst.”795    Andreia, Act ii. Scene i, v. 5, 6.

That this is aptly said, who denies? But it is advice given to the miserable man, that he may not be more miserable. And it is not rightly or truly said to the blessed man, such as all wish themselves to be, That cannot be which you will. For if he is blessed, whatever he wills can be; since he does not will that which cannot be. But such a life is not for this mortal state, neither will it come to pass unless when immortality also shall come to pass. And if this could not be given at all to man, blessedness too would be sought in vain, since it cannot be without immortality.

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10. Fides necessaria, ut aliquando sit homo beatus, quod nonnisi in futura vita consequetur. Philosophorum superborum ridenda et miseranda beatitudo. Ac per hoc in ista mortali vita erroribus aerumnisque plenissima, praecipue fides est necessaria, qua in Deum creditur. Non enim quaecumque bona, maximeque illa quibus quisque fit bonus, et illa quibus fiet beatus, unde nisi a Deo in hominem veniant, et homini accedant, inveniri potest. Cum autem ex hac vita ab eo qui in his miseriis fidelis et bonus est, ventum fuerit ad beatam, tunc erit vere quod nunc esse nullo modo potest, ut sic homo vivat quomodo vult. Non enim volet male vivere in illa felicitate, aut volet aliquid quod deerit, aut deerit quod voluerit. Quidquid amabitur, aderit: nec desiderabitur quod 1021 non aderit. Omne quod ibi erit, bonum erit, et summus Deus summum bonum erit, atque ad fruendum amantibus praesto erit; et quod est omnino beatissimum, ita semper fore certum erit. Nunc vero fecerunt quidem sibi philosophi, sicut eorum cuique placuit, vitas beatas suas, ut quasi propria virtute possent, quod communi mortalium conditione non poterant, sic scilicet vivere ut vellent. Sentiebant enim aliter beatum esse neminem posse, nisi habendo quod vellet, et nihil patiendo quod nollet. Quis autem non qualemcumque vitam qua delectatur, et ideo beatam vocat, vellet sic esse in sua potestate, ut eam posset habere perpetuam? Et tamen quis ita est? Quis vult pati molestias quas fortiter toleret, quamvis eas velit possitque tolerare si patitur? Quis velit in tormentis vivere, etiam qui potest in eis per patientiam tenendo justitiam laudabiliter vivere? Transitura cogitaverunt haec mala, qui ea pertulerunt, vel cupiendo habere, vel timendo amittere quod amabant, sive nequiter sive laudabiliter. Nam multi per transitoria mala, ad bona permansura fortiter tetenderunt. Qui profecto spe beati sunt, etiam cum sunt in transitoriis malis, per quae ad bona non transitura perveniunt. Sed qui spe beatus est, nondum beatus est: exspectat namque per patientiam beatitudinem quam nondum tenet. Qui vero sine ulla spe tali, sine ulla tali mercede cruciatur, quantamlibet adhibeat tolerantiam, non est beatus veraciter, sed miser fortiter. Neque enim propterea miser non est, quia miserior esset, si etiam impatienter miseriam sustineret. Porro si ista non patitur, quae nollet pati in suo corpore, nec tunc quidem beatus habendus est, quoniam non vivit ut vult. Ut enim alia omittam, quae corpore illaeso ad animi pertinent offensiones, sine quibus vivere vellemus, et sunt innumerabilia; vellet utique si posset ita salvum atque incolume habere corpus, et nullas ex eo pati molestias, ut id haberet in potestate, aut in ipsius incorruptione corporis: quod quia non habet, ac pendet in incerto , profecto non vivit ut vult. Quamvis enim per fortitudinem sit paratus excipere, et aequo ferre animo quidquid adversitatis acciderit; mavult tamen ut non accidat, et si possit facit; atque ita paratus est in utrumque, ut quantum in ipso est alterum optet, alterum vitet, et si quod vitat, incurrerit, ideo volens ferat, quia fieri non potuit quod volebat. Ne opprimatur ergo sustinet: sed premi nollet. Quomodo ergo vivit ut vult? An quia volens fortis est ad ferenda quae nollet illata? Ideo igitur id vult quod potest, quoniam quod vult non potest. Haec est tota, utrum ridenda, an potius miseranda, superborum beatitudo mortalium, gloriantium se vivere ut volunt, quia volentes patienter ferunt quae accidere sibi nolunt. Hoc est enim, aiunt, quod sapienter dixit Terentius, Quoniam non potest id fieri quod vis, Id velis quod possis . (In Andreia, act. 2, scen. 1, vers. 5, 6.)1022 Commode hoc dictum esse, quis negat? Sed consilium est datum misero, ne esset miserior. Beato autem, quales se esse omnes volunt, non recte nec vere dicitur, Non potest fieri quod vis. Si enim beatus est, quidquid vult fieri potest; quia non vult quod fieri non potest. Sed non est mortalitatis hujus haec vita, nec erit nisi quando et immortalitas erit. Quae si nullo modo dari homini posset, frustra etiam beatitudo quaereretur; quia sine immortalitate non potest esse.