18. It does indeed make very much difference, for what cause, with what end, with what intention a thing be done: but those things which are clearly sins, are upon no plea of a good cause, with no seeming good end, no alleged good intention, to be done. Those works, namely of men, which are not in themselves sins, are now good, now evil, according as their causes are good or evil; as, to give food to a poor man is a good work, if it be done because of pity, with right faith; as to lie with a wife, when it is done for the sake of generation, if it be done with faith to beget subjects for regeneration. These and the like works according to their causes are good or evil, because the self-same, if they have evil causes, are turned into sins: as, if for boasting sake a poor man is fed; or for lasciviousness a man lies with his wife; or children are begotten, not that they may be nurtured for God, but for the devil. When, however, the works in themselves are evil, such as thefts, fornications, blasphemies, or other such; who is there that will say, that upon good causes they may be done, so as either to be no sins, or, what is more absurd, just sins? Who is there that would say, That we may have to give to the poor, let us commit thefts upon the rich: or, Let us sell false witness, especially if innocent men are not hurt thereby, but rather guilty men are rescued from the judges who would condemn them? For two good things are done by selling of this lie, that money may be taken wherewith a poor man may be fed, and a judge deceived that a man be not punished. Even in the matter of wills, if we can, why not suppress the true, and forge false wills that inheritances or legacies may not come to unworthy persons, who do no good with them; but rather to those by whom the hungry are fed, the naked clothed, strangers entertained, captives redeemed, Churches builded? For why should not those evil things be done for the sake of these good things, if, for the sake of these good things, those are not evil at all? Nay, further, if lewd and rich women are likely to enrich moreover their lovers and paramours, why should not even these parts and arts be undertaken by a man of merciful heart, to use them for so good a cause as that he may have whence to bestow upon the needy; and not hear the Apostle saying, “Let him that stole steal no more, but rather let him labor, working with his hands that which is good, that he may have to give to him that needeth?”23    Eph. iv. 28 If indeed not only theft itself, but also false witness and adultery and every evil work will be not evil but good, if it be done for the sake of being the means of doing good. Who can say these things, except one who endeavors to subvert human affairs and all manners and laws? For of what most heinous deed, what most foul crime, what most impious sacrilege, may it not be said that it is possible for it to be done rightly and justly; and not only with impunity, but even gloriously, that in perpetrating thereof not only no punishments should be feared, but there should be hope even of rewards: if once we shall concede in all evil works of men, that not what is done, but wherefore done, must be the question; and this, to the end that whatever are found to have been done for good causes, not even they should be judged to be evil? But if justice deservedly punisheth a thief, albeit he shall say and shew that he therefore withdrew superfluities from a rich that he might afford necessaries to a poor man; if deservedly she punisheth a forger, albeit he prove that he therefore corrupted another’s will, that he might be heir, who should thence make large alms, not he who should make none; if deservedly she punisheth an adulterer yea, though he shall demonstrate that of mercy he did commit adultery, that through her with whom he did it he might deliver a man from death; lastly, to draw nearer to the matter in question, if deservedly she punishment him who hath with that intent mixed in adulterous embrace with some woman, privy to the turpitude of the Priscillianists, that he might enter into their concealments; I pray thee, when the Apostle saith, “Neither yield ye your members instruments of unrighteousness unto sin;”24    Rom. vi. 13 and therefore neither hands, nor members of generation, nor other members, can it be right to yield unto flagitious deeds with intent that we may be able to find out Priscillanists; what hath our tongue, what our whole mouth, what the organ of the voice, offended us, that we should yield these as instruments to sin, and to so great a sin, in which, that we may apprehend and rescue Priscillianists from blaspheming in ignorance, we, without excuse of ignorance, are to blaspheme our God?

18. Interest quidem plurimum, qua causa, quo fine, qua intentione quid fiat: sed ea quae constat esse peccata, nullo bonae causae obtentu, nullo quasi bono fine, nulla velut bona intentione facienda sunt. Ea quippe opera hominum, sicut causas habuerint bonas, seu malas, nunc sunt bona, nunc mala, quae non sunt per se ipsa peccata: sicut victum praebere pauperibus, bonum opus est, si fit causa misericordiae cum recta fide; sicut concubitus conjugalis, quando fit causa generandi, si ea fide fiat ut gignantur regenerandi. Haec atque hujusmodi secundum suas causas opera sunt bona vel mala; quia eadem ipsa si habeant malas causas, in peccata vertuntur: velut si jactantiae causa pauper pascitur; aut lasciviae causa cum uxore concumbitur; aut filii generantur, non ut Deo, sed ut diabolo nutriantur. Cum vero jam opera ipsa peccata sunt, sicut furta, stupra, blasphemiae, vel caetera talia; quis est qui dicat causis bonis esse facienda, ut vel peccata non sint, vel, quod est absurdius, justa peccata sint? Quis est qui dicat: Ut habeamus quod demus pauperibus, faciamus furta divitibus; aut, testimonia falsa vendamus, maxime si non inde innocentes laeduntur, sed nocentes potius damnaturis judicibus eruuntur? Duo enim bona fiunt hujus venditione mendacii, ut et pecunia sumatur unde inops alatur, et judex fallatur ne homo puniatur. Testamenta etiam si possimus, cur non vera supprimimus, et falsa supponimus, ut haereditates vel legata non habeant indigni, qui nihil ex eis operantur boni; sed hi potius 0529 a quibus esurientes pascuntur, nudi vestiuntur, peregrini suscipiuntur, captivi redimuntur, ecclesiae construuntur? Cur enim non fiant illa mala propter haec bona, si propter haec bona nec illa sunt mala? Jamvero si aliquae immundae et divites feminae videantur amatores et stupratores suos insuper ditaturae; cur non et has partes atque artes suscipiat vir misericors, quibus pro tam bona causa utatur, ut habeat unde indigentibus largiatur; nec audiat Apostolum dicentem, Qui furabatur, jam non furetur; magis autem laboret operans manibus suis bonum, ut habeat unde tribuere cui opus est (Ephes. IV, 28)? Si quidem non solum ipsum furtum, verum etiam falsum testimonium, et adulterium, et omne opus malum non erit malum, sed bonum, si ea causa perpetretur, ut sit unde fiat bonum. Quis ista dicat, nisi qui res humanas omnesque conatur mores legesque subvertere? Quod enim sceleratissimum facinus, quod turpissimum flagitium, quod impiissimum sacrilegium non dicatur posse fieri recte atque juste; nec impune tantum, verum etiam gloriose, ut in eo perpetrando, non solum supplicia nulla timeantur, sed sperentur et praemia: si semel concesserimus in omnibus malis operibus hominum ideo non quid fiat, sed quare fiat esse quaerendum; ut quaecumque propter bonas causas facta inveniuntur, nec ipsa mala esse judicentur? At si justitia merito punit furem, etiam qui dixerit et ostenderit ideo se subtraxisse superflua diviti, ut praeberet necessaria pauperi; si merito punit falsarium, etiam qui se ideo testamentum alienum corrupisse docuerit, ut ille haeres esset qui facturus inde fuerat eleemosynas largas, non ille qui nullas; si merito punit adulterum, etiam qui demonstraverit misericordia se fecisse adulterium, ut per illam cum qua fecit, de morte hominem liberaret; postremo, ut ad rem de qua quaestio est propius accedamus, si merito punit eum qui feminae alicui Priscillianistarum turpitudinis consciae, propterea se adulterino concubitu miscuit, ut ad eorum latebras perveniret: obsecro te, cum dicat Apostolus, Nec exhibeatis membra vestra arma iniquitatis peccato (Rom. VI, 13); et ideo nec manus, nec corporis genitalia, nec alia membra flagitiis exhibere debeamus, ut Priscillianistas invenire possimus; quid nos lingua, quid totum os nostrum, quid organum vocis offendit, ut haec exhibeamus arma peccato, tantoque peccato, ubi Deum nostrum, ut Priscillianistas apprehensos ab ignorantiae blasphemiis eruamus , sine excusatione ignorantiae blasphememus?