31. But he who says that some lies are just, must be judged to say no other than that some sins are just, and therefore some things are just which are unjust: than which what can be more absurd? For whence is a thing a sin, but for that it is contrary to justice? Be it said then that some sins are great, some small, because it is true; and let us not listen to the Stoics who maintain all to be equal: but to say that some sins are unjust, some just, what else is it than to say that there be some unjust, some just iniquities? When the Apostle John saith, “Every man who doeth sin, doeth also iniquity and sin is iniquity.”58    1 John iii. 4. [See R.V.] It is impossible therefore that a sin should be just, unless when we put the name of sin upon another thing in which one doth not sin, but either doeth or suffereth aught for sin. Namely, both sacrifices for sins are named “sins,” and the punishments of sins are sometimes called sins. These doubtless can be understood to be just sins, when just sacrifices are spoken of, or just punishments. But those things which are done against God’s law cannot be just. It is said unto God, “Thy law is truth:”59    Ps. cxix. 142 and consequently, what is against truth cannot be just. Now who can doubt that every lie is against truth? Therefore there can be no just lie. Again, what man doth not see clearly that every thing which is just is of the truth? And John crieth out, “No lie is of the truth.”60    1 John. ii. 21 No lie therefore is just. Wherefore, when from holy Scriptures are proposed to us examples of lying, either they are not lies, but are thought to be so while they are not understood; or, if lies they be, they are not meet to be imitated, because they cannot be just.

CAPUT XV.

31. Mendacium semper esse injustum, cum sit peccatum et veritati contrarium. In Hebraeis obstetricibus et in Raab non remunerata fallacia, sed benevolentia. Nihil autem judicandus est dicere, qui dicit aliqua justa esse mendacia, nisi aliqua justa esse peccata, ac per hoc aliqua justa esse quae injusta sunt: quo quid absurdius dici potest? Unde enim est peccatum, nisi quia justitiae contrarium est? Dicantur ergo alia magna, alia parva esse peccata; quia verum est, nec auscultandum Stoicis qui omnia paria esse contendunt: dicere autem quaedam injusta, quaedam justa esse peccata, quid est aliud quam dicere quasdam esse injustas, quasdam justas iniquitates? 0540 cum dicat apostolus Joannes, Omnis qui facit peccatum, facit et iniquitatem; et peccatum iniquitas est (I Joan. III, 4)? Non ergo potest justum esse peccatum, nisi cum peccati nomen in alia re ponimus, in qua quisque non peccat, sed aut facit aliquid aut patitur pro peccato. Nam et sacrificia pro peccatis peccata appellata sunt, et poenae peccatorum dicuntur aliquando peccata. Haec plane possunt intelligi justa peccata, cum justa dicuntur sacrificia, vel justa supplicia. Ea vero quae contra legem Dei fiunt, justa esse non possunt. Dictum est autem Deo, Lex tua veritas (Psal. CXVIII, 142). Ac per hoc quod est contra veritatem, justum esse non potest. Quis autem dubitet contra veritatem esse mendacium omne? Nullum ergo justum esse potest mendacium. Item cui non clareat ex veritate esse omne quod justum est? Clamat autem Joannes, Omne mendacium non est ex veritate (I Joan. II, 21). Omne ergo mendacium non est justum. Quapropter quando nobis de Scripturis sanctis mentiendi proponuntur exempla, aut mendacia non sunt, sed putantur esse dum non intelliguntur; aut si mendacia sunt, imitanda non sunt, quia justa esse non possunt.