18. [XVII.]—He Discovers the Reason of Pelagius’ Hesitation So to Say.

For, when wishing to point out why this lies within our own competency, he says: “Because we are able to turn all these actions into evil.” This, then, was the reason why he was afraid to admit that such an action proceeds “both from ourselves and from God,” lest it should be objected to him in reply: “If the fact of our doing, speaking, thinking anything good, is owing both to ourselves and to God, because He has endowed us with this ability, then it follows that our doing, thinking, speaking evil things, is due to ourselves and to God, because He has here also endowed us with ability of indifferency; the conclusion from this being—and God forbid that we should admit any such—that just as God is associated with ourselves in the praise of good actions, so must He share with us the blame of evil actions.” For that “capacity” with which He has endowed us makes us capable alike of good actions and of evil ones.

CAPUT XVII.

18. Cum enim vellet ostendere quare nostrum sit: «Quia haec,» inquit, «omnia vertere etiam in malum possumus.» Illud ergo timuit, ut non diceret, et nostrum est et Dei, ne sibi responderetur, Si quod bene agimus, loquimur, cogitamus, ideo est et nostrum et Dei, quia ille nobis hoc posse donavit; ergo et quod malum agimus, loquimur, cogitamus, et nostrum est et Dei, quia illud posse ad utrumque donavit, atque ita, quod absit, quemadmodum cum Deo laudamur in operibus bonis, sic cum illo culpamur in malis. Possibilitas quippe illa, quam dedit, tam nos facit bona posse quam mala.