Augustine of Hippo, A Treatise On the Grace of Christ, And On Original Sin

Let Pelagius, therefore, cease at last to deceive both himself and others by his disputations against the grace of God. It is not on account of only one of these three65 See above, ch. 4.—that is to say, of the “capacity” of a good will and work—that the grace of God towards us ought to be proclaimed; but also on account of the good “will” and “work” themselves. This “capacity,” indeed, according to his definition, avails for both directions; and yet our sins must not also be attributed to God in consequence, as our good actions, according to his view, are attributed to Him owing to the same capacity. It is not only, therefore, on this account that the help of God’s grace is maintained, because it assists our natural capacity. He must cease to say, “That we are able to do, say, think any good, is from Him who has given us this ability, and who also assists this ability; whereas that we really do a good thing, or speak a good word, or think a good thought, proceeds from our own selves.” He must, I repeat, cease to say this. For God has not only given us the ability and aids it, but He further works in us “to will and to do.” 66 Phil. ii. 13. It is not because we do not will, or do not do, that we will and do nothing good, but because we are without His help. How can he say, “That we are able to do good is of God, but that we actually do it is of ourselves,” when the apostle tells us that he “prays to God” in behalf of those to whom he was writing, “that they should do no evil, but that they should do that which is good?”67 See 2 Cor. xiii. 7. His words are not, “We pray that ye be able to do nothing evil;” but, “that ye do no evil.” Neither does he say, “that ye be able to do good;” but, “that ye do good.” Forasmuch as it is written, “As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God,”68 Rom. viii. 14. it follows that, in order that they may do that which is good, they must be led by Him who is good. How can Pelagius say, “That we are able to make a good use of speech comes from God; but that we do actually make this good use of speech proceeds from ourselves,” when the Lord declares, “It is the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you”?69 Matt. x. 20. He does not say, “It is not you who have given to yourselves the power of speaking well;” but His words are, “It is not ye that speak.”70 Matt. x. 20. Nor does He say, “It is the Spirit of your Father which giveth, or hath given, you the power to speak well;” but He says, “which speaketh in you.” He does not allude to the motion71 See ch. 15 at the end. of “the capacity,” but He asserts the effect of the co-operation. How can this arrogant asserter of free will say, “That we are able to think a good thought comes from God, but that we actually think a good thought proceeds from ourselves”? He has his answer from the humble preacher of grace, who says, “Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God.”72 2 Cor. iii. 5. Observe he does not say, “to be able to think anything;” but, “to think anything.”

CAPUT XXV.

26. Desinat itaque jam Pelagius, et se ipsum et alios fallere, contra Dei gratiam disputando. Non propter illorum trium unum, id est, propter possibilitatem bonae voluntatis atque operis, sed etiam propter voluntatem et operationem bonam erga nos gratia Dei praedicanda est. Nam illam possibilitatem ad utrumque valere definit: et tamen non ideo tribuenda sunt Deo etiam nostra peccata, sicut et propter eamdem possibilitatem vult tribuere bona opera nostra. Non ideo tantum adjutorium divinae gratiae commendetur, quia possibilitatem adjuvat naturalem. Desinat dicere, «Quod possumus omne bonum facere, dicere, cogitare, illius est qui hoc posse donavit, qui hoc posse adjuvat: quod vero bene vel agimus, vel loquimur, vel cogitamus, nostrum est.» Desinat, inquam, ista dicere. Non solum enim Deus posse nostrum donavit atque adjuvat, sed etiam velle et operari operatur in nobis (Philipp. II, 13). Non quia nos non volumus, aut nos non agimus: sed quia sine ipsius adjutorio nec volumus aliquid boni, nec agimus. Quomodo enim dicitur, «Quod possumus bene agere, Dei est; quod autem agimus, nostrum est;» cum dicat Apostolus, orare se ad Deum pro eis, ad quos scribebat, ne quid mali faciant, et ut quod bonum est faciant? Non enim ait, Oramus ut possitis nihil mali facere; sed, ne quid faciatis mali: nec, Ut possitis bonum facere; sed, ut bonum faciatis (II Cor. XIII, 7). Quoniam de quibus scriptum est, Quotquot enim Spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii sunt Dei (Rom. VIII, 14); profecto ut agant quod bonum est, ab illo aguntur qui bonus est. Quomodo dicit Pelagius, «Quod bene loqui possumus, Dei est: quod bene loquimur, nostrum est;» cum dicat Dominus, Spiritus Patris vestri est qui loquitur in vobis? Neque enim ait, Non vos estis qui dedistis vobis bene posse loqui: sed ait, Non vos estis qui loquimini (Matth. X, 20). Nec ait, Spiritus Patris vestri est qui vobis dat, vel dedit posse bene loqui; sed ait, qui loquitur in vobis: non significans possibilitatis profectum , sed exprimens cooperationis effectum. Quomodo dicit liberi arbitrii elatus assertor, «Quod possumus bene cogitare, Dei est; quod autem bene cogitamus nostrum 0374 est?» Cui respondet humilis gratiae praedicator: Non quia idonei sumus cogitare alicuid a nobis, quasi ex nobismetipsis; sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est (II Cor. III, 5). Non enim ait, Posse cogitare; sed, cogitare.