52. [XLVII.]—If Pelagius Agrees with Ambrose, Augustin Has No Controversy with Him.

Inasmuch, however, as the discussion about free will and God’s grace has such difficulty in its distinctions, that when free will is maintained, God’s grace is apparently denied; whilst when God’s grace is asserted, free will is supposed to be done away with,—Pelagius can so involve himself in the shades of this obscurity as to profess agreement with all that we have quoted from St. Ambrose, and declare that such is, and always has been, his opinion also; and endeavour so to explain each, that men may suppose his opinion, to be in fair accord with Ambrose’s. So far therefore, as concerns the questions of God’s help and grace, you are requested to observe the three things which he has distinguished so very plainly, under the terms “ability,” “will,” and “actuality,” that is, “capacity,” “volition,” and “action.”129    See above, ch. 4. If, then, he has come round to an agreement with us, then not the “capacity” alone in man, even if he neither wills nor performs the good, but the volition and the action also,—in other words, our willing well and doing well,—things which have no existence in man, except when he has a good will and acts rightly:—if, I repeat, he thus consents to hold with us that even the volition and the action are assisted by God, and so assisted that we can neither will nor do any good thing without such help; if, too, he believes that this is that very grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ which makes us righteous through His righteousness, and not our own, so that our true righteousness is that which we have of Him,—then, so far as I can judge, there will remain no further controversy between us concerning the assistance we have from the grace of God.

CAPUT XLVII.

52. Sed quia ista quaestio, ubi de arbitrio voluntatis et Dei gratia disputatur, ita est ad discernendum difficilis, ut quando defenditur liberum arbitrium, negari Dei gratia videatur; quando autem asseritur Dei gratia, liberum arbitrium putetur auferri: potest Pelagius ita se latebris obscuritatis hujus involvere, ut etiam iis quae a sancto Ambrosio conscripta posuimus, consentire se dicat; et ea se quoque sentire proclamet, semperque sensisse; atque ita singula conetur exponere, ut etiam ejus sententiae convenire credantur. Quapropter quantum attinet ad istam de divina gratia et adjutorio quaestionem, tria illa quae apertissime distinxit attendite: posse, velle, esse ; id est, possibilitatem, voluntatem, actionem. Si ergo consenserit nobis, non solam possibilitatem in homine, etiamsi nec velit, nec agat bene, sed ipsam quoque voluntatem et actionem, id est, ut bene velimus et bene agamus, quae non sunt in homine, nisi 0384 quando bene vult et bene agit: si, ut dixi, consenserit, etiam ipsam voluntatem et actionem divinitus adjuvari, et sic adjuvari, ut sine illo adjutorio nihil bene velimus et agamus, eamque esse gratiam Dei per Jesum Christum Dominum nostrum, in qua nos sua non nostra justitia justos facit, ut ea sit vera nostra justitia quae nobis ab illo est; nihil de adjutorio gratiae Dei, quantum arbitror, inter nos controversiae relinquetur.