22. [XX.]—Another Instance of Pelagius’ Ambiguity.

Then, again, observe what he subjoins to the last remark: “Can any one,” says he, “forbid a second birth to an eternal and certain life, to him who has been born to this present uncertain life?” In other words: “Who is so impious as to forbid his being born again to the life which is sure and eternal, who has been born to this life of uncertainty?” When we first read these words, we supposed that by the phrase “uncertain life” he meant to designate this present temporal life; although it appeared to us that he ought rather to have called it “mortal” than “uncertain,” because it is brought to a close by certain death. But for all this, we thought that he had only shown a preference for calling this mortal life an uncertain one, because of the general view which men take that there is undoubtedly not a moment in our lives when we are free from this uncertainty. And so it happened that our anxiety about him was allayed to some extent by the following consideration, which rose almost to a proof, notwithstanding the fact of his unwillingness openly to confess that infants incur eternal death who depart this life without the sacrament of baptism. We argued: “If, as he seems to admit, eternal life can only accrue to them who have been baptized, it follows of course that they who die unbaptized incur everlasting death. This destiny, however, cannot by any means justly befall those who never in this life committed any sins of their own, unless on account of original sin.”

CAPUT XX.

22. Sed quid deinde iste subjungat, advertite: «Et in perpetuam,» inquit, «certamque vitam renasci vetet eum qui natus sit ad incertam?» id est, Quis tam impius est, ut vetet renasci ad perpetuam certamque vitam eum qui natus sit ad incertam? Haec verba quando primitus legimus, credidimus eum incertam vitam istam voluisse dicere temporalem: quamvis nobis videretur magis eam mortalem dicere debuisse, quam incertam, eo quod certa morte finiatur. Tamen quamdiu ducitur, quoniam momentis omnibus esse non dubitatur incerta; nihil aliud eum putavimus, quam istam mortalem vitam maluisse dicere incertam. Ac per hoc, quamvis aeternam mortem parvulorum sine Baptismatis sacramento ex hac vita migrantium aperte noluerit confiteri; tamen de illo sollicitudinem nostram quasi certa ratiocinatio solabatur. Dicebamus enim: Si perpetua vita, sicut confiteri videtur, nisi eorum qui baptizati sunt non potest esse; profecto eos qui non baptizati moriuntur, mors perpetua consequetur. Quod nulla justitia potest accidere his, a quibus in hac vita nulla peccata commissa sunt, nisi originale peccatum.