Chapter XVI.

43. Here there arises a second question, when the Lord allows a wife to be put away for the cause of fornication, in what latitude of meaning fornication is to be understood in this passage,—whether in the sense understood by all, viz. that we are to understand that fornication to be meant which is committed in acts of uncleanness; or whether, in accordance with the usage of Scripture in speaking of fornication (as has been mentioned above), as meaning all unlawful corruption, such as idolatry or covetousness, and therefore, of course, every transgression of the law on account of the unlawful lust [involved in it].140    Augustin expresses himself (Retract. I. xix. 6) as having misgivings about his own explanation of this matter here. He advises readers to go to his other writings on the subject of marriage and divorce, or to the works of other writers. He says all sin is not fornication (omne peccatum fornicatio non est); and to determine which sins are fornication, and when a wife may be dismissed, is a most broad (latebrosissima) question. He calls the question a most difficult (difficillimam) one, and says, “But verily I feel that I have not come to the perfect conclusion of this matter (imo non me pervenisse ad hujus rei perfectionem sentio.” Retract. ii. 57). Some of his treatises on the marriage relation: De Bono Conjugali; De Conjugiis Adulterinis; De Nuptiis et Concupiscientia. But let us consult the apostle, that we may not say rashly. “And unto the married I command,” says he, “yet not I, but the Lord, Let not the wife depart from her husband: but and if she depart, let her remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband.” For it may happen that she departs for that cause for which the Lord gives permission to do so. Or, if a woman is at liberty to put away her husband for other causes besides that of fornication, and the husband is not at liberty, what answer shall we give respecting this statement which he has made afterwards, “And let not the husband put away his wife”? Wherefore did he not add, saving for the cause of fornication, which the Lord permits, unless because he wishes a similar rule to be understood, that if he shall put away his wife (which he is permitted to do for the cause of fornication), he is to remain without a wife, or be reconciled to his wife? For it would not be a bad thing for a husband to be reconciled to such a woman as that to whom, when nobody had dared to stone her, the Lord said, “Go, and sin no more.”141    John viii. 11. Vide deinceps ne pecces; Vulgate, jam amplius noli peccare. And for this reason also, because He who says, It is not lawful to put away one’s wife saving for the cause of fornication, forces him to retain his wife, if there should be no cause of fornication: but if there should be, He does not force him to put her away, but permits him, just as when it is said, Let it not be lawful for a woman to marry another, unless her husband be dead; if she shall marry before the death of her husband, she is guilty; if she shall not marry after the death of her husband, she is not guilty, for she is not commanded to marry, but merely permitted. If, therefore, there is a like rule in the said law of marriage between man and woman, to such an extent that not merely of the woman has the same apostle said, “The wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband;” but he has not been silent respecting him, saying, “And likewise also the husband hath not power of his own body, but the wife;”—if, then, the rule is similar, there is no necessity for understanding that it is lawful for a woman to put away her husband, saving for the cause of fornication, as is the case also with the husband.

44. It is therefore to be considered in what latitude of meaning we ought to understand the word fornication, and the apostle is to be consulted, as we were beginning to do. For he goes on to say, “But to the rest speak I, not the Lord.” Here, first, we must see who are “the rest,” for he was speaking before on the part of the Lord to those who are married, but now, as from himself, he speaks to “the rest:” hence perhaps to the unmarried, but this does not follow. For thus he continues: “If any brother hath a wife that believeth not, and she be pleased to dwell with him, let him not put her away.” Hence, even now he is speaking to those who are married. What, then, is his object in saying “to the rest,” unless that he was speaking before to those who were so united, that they were alike as to their faith in Christ; but that now he is speaking to “the rest,” i.e. to those who are so united, that they are not both believers? But what does he say to them? “If any brother hath a wife that believeth not, and she be pleased to dwell with him, let him not put her away. And the woman which hath an husband that believeth not, and if he be pleased to dwell with her, let her not put him away.” If, therefore, he does not give a command as from the Lord, but advises as from himself, then this good result springs from it, that if any one act otherwise, he is not a transgressor of a command, just as he says a little after respecting virgins, that he has no command of the Lord, but that he gives his advice; and he so praises virginity, that whoever will may avail himself of it; yet if he shall not do so, he may not be judged to have acted contrary to a command. For there is one thing which is commanded, another respecting which advice is given, another still which is allowed.142    Ignoscitur, lit. “is pardoned.” A wife is commanded not to depart from her husband; and if she depart, to remain unmarried, or to be reconciled to her husband: therefore it is not allowable for her to act otherwise. But a believing husband is advised, if he has an unbelieving wife who is pleased to dwell with him, not to put her away: therefore it is allowable also to put her away, because it is no command of the Lord that he should not put her away, but an advice of the apostle: just as a virgin is advised not to marry; but if she shall marry, she will not indeed adhere to the advice, but she will not act in opposition to a command. Allowance is given143    Lit. “it is pardoned.” when it is said, “But I speak this by permission, and not of commandment.” And therefore, if it is allowable that an unbelieving wife should be put away, although it is better not to put her away, and yet not allowable, according to the commandment of the Lord, that a wife should be put away, saving for the cause of fornication, [then] unbelief itself also is fornication.

45. For what sayest thou, O apostle? Surely, that a believing husband who has an unbelieving wife pleased to dwell with him is not to put her away? Just so, says he. When, therefore, the Lord also gives this command, that a man should not put away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, why dost thou say here, “I speak, not the Lord”? For this reason, viz. that the idolatry which unbelievers follow, and every other noxious superstition, is fornication. Now, the Lord permitted a wife to be put away for the cause of fornication; but in permitting, He did not command it: He gave opportunity to the apostle for advising that whoever wished should not put away an unbelieving wife, in order that, perchance, in this way she might become a believer. “For,” says he, “the unbelieving husband is sanctified in the wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified in the brother.”144    1 Cor. vii. 14. Augustin conforms to the approved reading in the Greek text: in uxore…in fratre. Vulgate, per mulierem,…per virum. (See Revised Version.) I suppose it had already occurred that some wives were embracing the faith by means of their believing husbands, and husbands by means of their believing wives; and although not mentioning names, he yet urged his case by examples, in order to strengthen his counsel. Then he goes on to say, “Else were your children unclean; but now are they holy.” For now the children were Christians, who were sanctified at the instance of one of the parents, or with the consent of both; which would not take place unless the marriage were broken up by one of the parties becoming a believer, and unless the unbelief of the spouse were borne with so far as to give an opportunity of believing. This, therefore, is the counsel of Him whom I regard as having spoken the words, “Whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again, I will repay thee.”145    Luke x. 35.

46. Moreover, if unbelief is fornication, and idolatry unbelief, and covetousness idolatry, it is not to be doubted that covetousness also is fornication. Who, then, in that case can rightly separate any unlawful lust whatever from the category of fornication, if covetousness is fornication? And from this we perceive, that because of unlawful lusts, not only those of which one is guilty in acts of uncleanness with another’s husband or wife, but any unlawful lusts whatever, which cause the soul making a bad use of the body to wander from the law of God, and to be ruinously and basely corrupted, a man may, without crime, put away his wife, and a wife her husband, because the Lord makes the cause of fornication an exception; which fornication, in accordance with the above considerations, we are compelled to understand as being general and universal.

47. But when He says, “saving for the cause of fornication,” He has not said of which of them, whether the man or the woman.146    Modern commentators do not spring this question, agreeing that the fornication referred to is of the wife. Paulus, Döllinger (in Christ. u. Kirche, to which Professor Conington replied in Cont. Rev., May, 1869) think the fornication of the woman was committed before her marriage. Plumptre also prefers the reference to ante-nuptial sin. For not only is it allowed to put away a wife who commits fornication; but whoever puts away that wife even by whom he is himself compelled to commit fornication, puts her away undoubtedly for the cause of fornication. As, for instance, if a wife should compel one to sacrifice to idols, the man who puts away such an one puts her away for the cause of fornication, not only on her part, but on his own also: on her part, because she commits fornication; on his own, that he may not commit fornication. Nothing, however, is more unjust than for a man to put away his wife because of fornication, if he himself also is convicted of committing fornication. For that passage occurs to one: “For wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself; for thou that judgest doest the same things.”147    Rom. ii. 1. And for this reason, whosoever wishes to put away his wife because of fornication, ought first to be cleared of fornication; and a like remark I would make respecting the woman also.

48. But in reference to what He says, “Whosoever shall marry her that is divorced148    ‡ἀολελυμένην; that is, one divorced unlawfully who has not been guilty of fornication (so Meyer very positively, Stier et. al., Alford hesitatingly). This explanation might seem to limit re-marriage to such an one, inasmuch as the essence of the marriage bond has not been touched (So Alford et. al.). committeth adultery,” it may be asked whether she also who is married commits adultery in the same way as he does who marries her. For she also is commanded to remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband; but this in the case of her departing from her husband. There is, however, a great difference whether she put away or be put away. For if she put away her husband, and marry another, she seems to have left her former husband from a desire of changing her marriage connection, which is, without doubt, an adulterous thought. But if she be put away by the husband, with whom she desired to be, he indeed who marries her commits adultery, according to the Lord’s declaration; but whether she also be involved in a like crime is uncertain,—although it is much less easy to discover how, when a man and woman have intercourse one with another with equal consent, one of them should be an adulterer, and the other not. To this is to be added the consideration, that if he commits adultery by marrying her who is divorced from her husband (although she does not put away, but is put away), she causes him to commit adultery, which nevertheless the Lord forbids. And hence we infer that, whether she has been put away, or has put away her husband, it is necessary for her to remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband.149    That is, innocent or guilty, she cannot marry without committing adultery. The Roman-Catholic Church forbids divorces, but permits an indefinite separation a mensa et toro (“from table and bed”).

49. Again, it is asked whether, if, with a wife’s permission, either a barren one, or one who does not wish to submit to intercourse, a man shall take to himself another woman, not another man’s wife, nor one separated from her husband, he can do so without being chargeable with fornication? And an example is found in the Old Testament history;150    Abraham taking Hagar with Sarah’s consent. but now there are greater precepts which the human race has reached after having passed that stage; and those matters are to be investigated for the purpose of distinguishing the ages of the dispensation of that divine providence which assists the human race in the most orderly way; but not for the purpose of making use of the rules of living. But yet it may be asked whether what the apostle says, “The wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband; and likewise also the husband hath not power of his own body, but the wife,” can be carried so far, that, with the permission of a wife, who possesses the power over her husband’s body, a man can have intercourse with another woman, who is neither another man’s wife nor divorced from her husband; but such an opinion is not to be entertained, lest it should seem that a woman also, with her husband’s permission, could do such a thing, which the instinctive feeling of every one prevents.

50. And yet some occasions may arise, where a wife also, with the consent of her husband, may seem under obligation to do this for the sake of that husband himself; as, for instance, is said to have happened at Antioch about fifty years ago,151    About the year 343; for Augustin wrote this treatise about the year 393. in the times of Constantius. For Acyndinus, at that time prefect and at one time also consul, when he demanded of a certain public debtor the payment of a poundweight of gold, impelled by I know not what motive, did a thing which is often dangerous in the case of those magistrates to whom anything whatever is lawful, or rather is thought to be lawful, viz. threatened with an oath and with a vehement affirmation, that if he did not pay the foresaid gold on a certain day which he had fixed, he would be put to death. Accordingly, while he was being kept in cruel confinement, and was unable to rid himself of that debt, the dread day began to impend and to draw near. He happened, however, to have a very beautiful wife, but one who had no money wherewith to come to the relief of her husband; and when a certain rich man had had his desires inflamed by the beauty of this woman, and had learned that her husband was placed in that critical situation, he sent to her, promising in return for a single night, if she would consent to hold intercourse with him, that he would give her the pound of gold. Then she, knowing that she herself had not power over her body, but her husband, conveyed the intelligence to him, telling him that she was prepared to do it for the sake of her husband, but only if he himself, the lord by marriage of her body, to whom all that chastity was due, should wish it to be done, as if disposing of his own property for the sake of his life. He thanked her, and commanded that it should be done, in no wise judging that it was an adulterous embrace, because it was no lust, but great love for her husband, that demanded it, at his own bidding and will. The woman came to the villa of that rich man, did what the lewd man wished; but she gave her body only to her husband, who desired not, as was usual, his marriage rights, but life. She received the gold; but he who gave it took away stealthily what he had given, and substituted a similar bag with earth in it. When the woman, however, on reaching her home, discovered it, she rushed forth in public in order to proclaim the deed she had done, animated by the same tender affection for her husband by which she had been forced to do it; she goes to the prefect, confesses everything, shows the fraud that had been practised upon her. Then indeed the prefect first pronounces himself guilty, because the matter had come to this by means of his threats, and, as if pronouncing sentence upon another, decided that a pound of gold should be brought into the treasury from the property of Acyndinus; but that she (the woman) be installed as mistress of that piece of land whence she had received the earth instead of the gold. I offer no opinion either way from this story: let each one form a judgment as he pleases, for the history is not drawn from divinely authoritative sources; but yet, when the story is related, man’s instinctive sense does not so revolt against what was done in the case of this woman, at her husband’s bidding, as we formerly shuddered when the thing itself was set forth without any example. But in this section of the Gospel nothing is to be more steadily kept in view, than that so great is the evil of fornication, that, while married people are bound to one another by so strong a bond, this one cause of divorce is excepted; but as to what fornication is, that we have already discussed. 152    The law permitted divorce for “some uncleanness” (Deut. xxiv. 1). In the time of Christ divorce was allowed on trivial grounds. While Schammai interpreted the Deuteronomic prescription of moral uncleanness or adultery, Hillel interpreted it to include physical uncleanness or unattractiveness. A wife’s cooking her husband’s food unpalatably he declared to be a legitimate cause for dissolution of the marriage bond. Opposing the loose views current, Christ declared that it was on account of the “hardness of their hearts” that Moses had suffered them to put away their wives, and asserted adultery to be the only allowable reason for divorce. The question whether the innocent party may marry, is beset with great difficulties in view of this passage and Matt. xix. 9. The answer turns somewhat upon the construction of the passage. Augustin here, the Council of Trent (and so the Roman-Catholic Church), Weiss, Mansel, and others hold that all marriage of a divorced person is declared illegal. In another place (De Conj. Adult. i. 9) Augustin says, “Why, I say, did the Lord interject ‘the cause of fornication,’ and not say rather, in a general way, ‘Whosoever shall put away his wife and marry another commits adultery’?…I think, because the Lord wishes to mention that which is greater. For who will deny that it is a greater adultery to marry another when the divorced wife has not committed fornication than when any one divorces his wife and then marries another? Not because this is not adultery, but because it is a lesser sort.” The Apost. Constitutions (vii. 2) say, “Thou shalt not commit adultery, for thou dividest one flesh into two,” etc. Weiss: “Jesus everywhere takes it for granted that in the sight of God there is no such thing as a dissolution of the marriage bond” (Leben Jesu, i. 529). President Woolsey, on the other hand, unhesitatingly declares, that, by Christ’s precepts, marriage is dissolved by adultery, so that the innocent party may marry again. According to this passage, the woman divorced on other grounds than adultery seems to be declared adulterous if she marry. According to Matt. xix. 9 the man who puts away his wife for adultery, seems to be permitted to marry without becoming adulterous himself. According to Mark x. 12 the woman had the privilege in that day of putting away her husband, but “there is no evidence in the Hebrew Scriptures that the woman could get herself divorced from her husband.” To the able treatment of Augustin, which might seem either exceedingly fearless or mawkish at the present day, according to the stand-point of the critic, the reader would do well to read Alford and Lange on this passage; Stanley on 1 Cor. vii. 11; and Woolsey, art. “Divorce” in Schaff-Herzog Encycl. Whatever may be the exact meaning of our Lord concerning the marriage of the innocent party, it is evident that He regards the marriage bond as profoundly sacred, and warrants the celebrant in binding the parties to marriage to be faithful one to the other “till death do you part.” He Himself said, “What, therefore, God hath joined together, let not man put asunder” (Mark x. 9).

CAPUT XVI.---43. Exoritur hic altera quaestio, cum Dominus causa fornicationis permittat dimitti uxorem, quatenus hoc loco intelligenda sit fornicatio: utrum quousque intelligunt omnes, id est, ut eam fornicationem credamus dictam quae in stupris committitur; an quemadmodum Scripturae solent fornicationem vocare, sicut supra dictum est, omnem illicitam corruptionem, sicut est idololatria vel avaritia, et ex eo jam omnis transgressio legis propter illicitam concupiscentiam . Sed consulamus Apostolum, ne aliquid temere dicamus: His qui sunt in conjugio, inquit, praecipio, non ego, sed Dominus, uxorem a viro non discedere; quod si discesserit, manere innuptam, aut viro suo reconciliari. Potest enim fieri ut discedat ea causa qua Dominus permittit. Aut si feminae licet virum dimittere etiam praeter causam fornicationis, et non licet viro; quid respondebimus de hoc quod dixit posterius, Et vir uxorem ne dimittat? Quare non addidit, excepta causa fornicationis, quod Dominus permittit; nisi quia similem formam vult intelligi, ut si dimiserit (quod causa fornicationis permittitur), maneat sine uxore, aut reconcilietur uxori? Non enim male reconciliaretur vir illi mulieri, quam cum lapidare nemo ausus esset, dixit ei Dominus: Vade, et vide deinceps ne pecces (Id. VIII, 11). Quia et qui dicit, Non licet dimittere uxorem, nisi causa fornicationis; cogit retinere uxorem, si causa fornicationis non fuerit; si autem fuerit, non cogit dimittere, sed permittit: sicut dicitur, Non liceat mulieri nubere alteri, nisi mortuo viro; si ante viri mortem nupserit, rea est: si post viri mortem non nupserit, non est rea; non enim jussa est nubere, sed permissa. Si ergo par forma est in isto jure conjugii inter virum et mulierem, usque adeo ut non tantum de femina, idem Apostolus dixerit, Mulier non habet potestatem sui corporis, sed vir; sed etiam de illo non tacuerit dicens, Similiter et vir sui corporis potestatem non habet, sed mulier; si ergo similis forma est, non oportet intelligi licere mulieri virum dimittere, nisi causa fornicationis, sicut et viro.

44. Considerandum est itaque quatenus fornicationem intelligere debeamus, et consulendus, ut coeperamus, Apostolus. Sequitur enim et dicit, Caeteris autem ego dico, non Dominus. Hic primo videndum est quibus caeteris; dicebat enim superius ex Domini persona iis qui sunt in conjugio, nunc vero ex sua persona caeteris dicit: ergo fortasse iis qui non sunt in conjugio: sed non hoc sequitur. Ita enim subjungit: Si quis frater habet uxorem infidelem, et haec consentit habitare cum illo, non dimittat illam. Ergo etiam nunc iis dicit qui sunt in conjugio. Quid sibi ergo vult quod ait, caeteris: nisi quia superius eis loquebatur, qui sic copulati erant, ut pariter in fide Christi essent; caeteris vero nunc dicit, id est eis qui sic copulati sunt, 1252 ut non ambo fideles sint? Sed quid eis dicit? Si quis frater habet uxorem infidelem, et haec consentit habitare cum illo, non dimittat illam: et si qua mulier habet virum infidelem, et hic consentit habitare cum illa, non dimittat virum. Si ergo non praecipit ex Domini persona, sed ex sua persona monet, ita est hoc bonum, ut si quis aliter fecerit, non sit praecepti transgressor: sicut de virginibus paulo post dicit, praeceptum Domini se non habere, consilium autem dare; atque ita laudat virginitatem, ut arripiat eam qui voluerit, non tamen ut si non fecerit, contra praeceptum fecisse judicetur. Aliud enim est quod jubetur, aliud quod monetur, aliud quod ignoscitur. Jubetur mulier a viro non discedere; quod si discesserit, manere innuptam aut viro suo reconciliari: aliter ergo non licet facere. Monetur autem vir fidelis, si habet uxorem infidelem consentientem secum habitare, non eam dimittere: licet ergo et dimittere; quia non est praeceptum Domini, ne dimittat, sed consilium Apostoli: sicut monetur virgo non nubere; sed si nupserit, consilium quidem non tenebit, sed contra praeceptum non faciet. Ignoscitur cum dicitur, Hoc autem dico secundum veniam, non secundum imperium. Quapropter, si licet ut dimittatur conjux infidelis, quamvis melius sit non dimittere, et tamen non licet secundum praeceptum Domini ut dimittatur conjux nisi causa fornicationis, fornicatio est etiam ipsa infidelitas.

45. Quid enim tu dicis, Apostole? Certe ut vir fidelis consentientem secum habitare mulierem infidelem non dimittat. Ita, inquit. Cum ergo hoc et Dominus praecipiat, ne dimittat vir uxorem, nisi causa fornicationis, quare hic dicis, Ego dico, non Dominus? Quia scilicet idololatria quam sequuntur infideles, et quaelibet noxia superstitio, fornicatio est. Dominus autem permisit causa fornicationis uxorem dimitti: sed quia permisit, non jussit, dedit locum Apostolo monendi, ut qui voluerit non dimittat uxorem infidelem, quo sic fortasse possit fieri fidelis. Sanctificatus est enim, inquit, vir infidelis in uxore ; et sanctificata est mulier infidelis in fratre. Credo, jam provenerat ut nonnullae feminae per viros fideles, et viri per uxores fideles in fidem venirent; et quamvis non dicens nomina, exemplis tamen hortatus est, ad confirmandum consilium suum. Deinde sequitur: Alioquin filii vestri immundi essent; nunc autem sancti sunt (I Cor. VII). Jam enim erant parvuli christiani, qui sive auctore uno ex parentibus, sive utroque consentiente sanctificati erant: quod non fieret, nisi uno credente dissociaretur conjugium, et non toleraretur infidelitas conjugis usque ad opportunitatem credendi. Hoc est ergo consilium ejus, cui credo dictum esse, Si quid supererogaveris, rediens reddam tibi (Luc. X, 35).

46. Porro si infidelitas fornicatio est, et idololatria infidelitas, et avaritia idololatria, non est dubitandum et avaritiam fornicationem esse. Quis ergo jam quamlibet 1253 illicitam concupiscentiam potest recte a fornicationis genere separare, si avaritia fornicatio est? Ex quo intelligitur, quod propter illicitas concupiscentias, non tantum quae in stupris cum alienis viris aut feminis committuntur, sed omnino quaslibet, quae animam corpore male utentem a lege Dei aberrare faciunt, et perniciose turpiterque corrumpi, possit sine crimine et vir uxorem dimittere, et uxor virum: quia exceptam facit Dominus causam fornicationis; quam fornicationem, sicut supra consideratum est, generalem et universalem intelligere cogimur.

47. Cum autem ait, excepta causa fornicationis; non dixit cujus ipsorum, viri, an feminae. Non enim tantum fornicantem uxorem dimittere conceditur, sed quisquis eam quoque uxorem dimittit, a qua ipse cogitur fornicari, causa fornicationis utique dimittit. Velut si aliquem cogat uxor sacrificare idolis, qui talem dimittit, causa fornicationis dimittit, non tantum illius, sed et suae: illius, quia fornicatur; suae, ne fornicetur. Nihil autem iniquius, quam fornicationis causa dimittere uxorem, si et ipse convincitur fornicari. Occurrit enim illud, In quo enim alterum judicas, temetipsum condemnas: eadem enim agis quae judicas (Rom. II, 1). Quapropter, quisquis fornicationis causa vult abjicere uxorem, prior debet esse a fornicatione purgatus: quod similiter etiam de femina dixerim.

48. Quod autem dicit, Quisquis solutam a viro duxerit, moechatur; quaeri potest utrum quomodo moechatur ille qui ducit, sic et illa quam ducit. Jubetur enim et illa manere innupta, aut viro reconciliari: sed si discesserit, inquit, a viro. Multum autem interest utrum dimittat, an dimittatur. Si enim ipsa virum dimiserit, et alteri nupserit; videtur cupiditate mutandi conjugii virum priorem reliquisse, quae sine dubio adulterina cogitatio est. Si autem dimittatur a viro, cum quo esse cupiebat; moechatur quidem qui eam duxerit, secundum Domini sententiam, sed utrum et ipsa tali crimine teneatur, incertum est. Quamvis multo minus inveniri possit quomodo cum vir et mulier pari consensu sibi misceantur, unus eorum moechus sit, et non sit alter. Huc accedit, quia si moechatur ille ducendo eam quae soluta est a viro, quanquam non dimiserit, sed dimissa sit, ipsa eum facit moechari, quod nihilominus Dominus vetat. Ex quo colligitur, sive dimissa fuerit, sive dimiserit, oportere illam manere innuptam, aut viro reconciliari.

49. Rursum quaeritur utrum si uxoris permissu, sive sterilis, sive quae concubitum pati non vult, adhibuerit sibi alteram vir, non alienam, neque a viro sejunctam, possit esse sine crimine fornicationis? Et in historia quidem Veteris Testamenti invenitur exemplum; sed nunc praecepta majora sunt, in quae per illum gradum generatio humana pervenit: tractanda illa sunt ad distinguendas aetates dispensationis divinae providentiae, quae humano generi ordinatissime subvenit; non autem ad vivendi regulas usurpandas . Sed tamen utrum quod ait Apostolus, Mulier non habet 1254 potestatem sui corporis, sed vir; similiter et vir non habet potestatem sui corporis, sed mulier; possit in tantum valere, ut permittente uxore, quae maritalis corporis potestatem habet, possit vir cum altera, quae nec aliena uxor sit, nec a viro disjuncta, concumbere: sed non ita est existimandum, ne hoc etiam femina, viro permittente, facere posse videatur, quod omnium sensus excludit.

50. Quanquam nonnullae causae possint existere, ubi et uxor, mariti consensu, pro ipso marito hoc facere debere videatur: sicut Antiochiae factum esse perhibetur ante quinquaginta ferme annos, Constantii temporibus . Nam Acyndinus tunc praefectus, qui etiam consul fuit, cum quemdam librae auri debitorem fisci exigeret, nescio unde commotus, quod plerumque in istis potestatibus periculosum est, quibus quodlibet licet, aut potius putatur licere, comminatus est jurans et vehementer affirmans, quod si certo die quem constituerat, memoratum aurum non exsolveret, occideretur. Itaque cum ille teneretur immani custodia, nec se posset debito illo expedire, dies metuendus imminere et propinquare coepit. Et forte habebat uxorem pulcherrimam, sed nullius pecuniae qua subveniret viro: cujus mulieris pulchritudine cum quidam dives esset accensus, et cognovisset maritum ejus in illo discrimine constitutum, misit ad eam pollicens pro una nocte, si ei misceri vellet, se auri libram daturum. Tum illa quae se sciret non habere sui corporis potestatem, sed virum suum, pertulit ad eum dicens paratam se esse pro marito id facere, si tamen ipse conjugalis corporis dominus, cui tota illa castitas deberetur, tanquam de re sua pro vita sua vellet id fieri. Egit ille gratias, et ut id fieret imperavit, nullo modo judicans adulterinum esse concubitum, quod et libido nulla et magna mariti charitas se jubente et volente flagitaret. Venit mulier ad villam illius divitis, fecit quod voluit impudicus: sed illa corpus nonnisi marito dedit, non concumbere, ut solet, sed vivere cupienti. Accepit aurum: sed ille qui dedit, fraude subtraxit quod dederat, et supposuit simile ligamentum cum terra. Quod ubi mulier jam domi suae posita invenit, prosiluit in publicum eadem mariti charitate clamatura quod fecerat, qua facere coacta est: interpellat praefectum, fatetur omnia, quam fraudem passa esset ostendit. Tum vero praefectus primo se reum, quod suis minis ad id ventum esset, pronuntiat, tanquam in alium sententiam dicens, de Acyndini bonis auri libram fisco inferendam; illam vero mulierem dominam in eam terram, unde pro auro terram accepisset, induci. Nihil hinc in aliquam partem disputo; liceat cuique aestimare quod velit: non enim de divinis auctoritatibus deprompta historia est: sed tamen narrato facto, non ita respuit hoc sensus humanus, quod in illa muliere viro jubente commissum est, quemadmodum antea, cum sine ullo exemplo res ipsa poneretur, horruimus. Sed in hoc Evangelii capitulo nihil fortius considerandum est, quam tantum malum 1255 esse fornicationis, ut cum tanto vinculo sibi conjugia constringantur, haec una causa solutionis excepta sit: quae sit autem fornicatio, jam tractatum est.