29. R. Is Truth then so called for any other reason than as being that by which everything is true which is true? A. For no other reason. R. Is it rightly called true for any ground than that it is not false? A. To doubt this were madness. R. Is that not false which is accommodated to the similitude of anything, yet is not that the likeness of which it appears? A. Nothing indeed do I see which I would more willingly call false. But yet that is commonly called false, which is far removed from the similitude of the true. R. Who denies it? But yet because it implies some imitation of the true. A. How? For when it is said, that Medea flew away with winged snakes harnessed to her car, that thing on no side imitates truth; inasmuch as the thing is naught, nor can that thing imitate aught, when itself is absolutely nothing. R. You say right; but you do not note that that thing which is absolutely nothing, cannot even be called false. For if it is false, it is: if it is not, it is not false. A. Shall we not then say that monstrous story of Medea is false? R. Assuredly not; for if it is false, how is it a monstrous story? A. Admirable! Then when I say

“The mighty winged snakes I fasten to my car,”

do I not say false? R. You do, assuredly: for that is which you say to be false. A. What, I pray? R. That sentence, forsooth, which is contained in the verse itself. A. And pray what imitation of truth has that? R. Because it would bear the same tenor, even if Medea had truly done that thing. Therefore in its very terms a false sentence imitates true sentences. Which, if it is not believed, in this alone does it imitate true ones, that it is expressed as they, and it is only false, it is not also misleading. But if it obtains faith, it imitates also those sentences which, being true, are believed true. A. Now I perceive that there is a great difference between those things which we say and those things concerning which we say aught; wherefore I now assent: for this proposition alone held me back, that whatever we call false is not rightly so called, unless it have an imitation of something true. For who, calling a stone false silver, would not be justly derided? Yet if any one should declare a stone to be silver, we say that he speaks falsely, that is, that he utters a false sentence. But it is not, I think, unreasonable that we should call tin or lead false silver, because the thing itself, as it were, imitates that: nor is our sentence declaring this therefore false, but that very thing concerning which it is pronounced.

29. R. Numquidnam ergo dicitur veritas, nisi qua verum est quidquid verum est? A. Nullo modo. R. Numquidnam recte dicitur verum, nisi quod non est falsum? A. Hinc vero dubitare dementia est. R. Num falsum non est quod ad similitudinem alicujus accommodatum est, neque id tamen est cujus simile apparet? A. Nihil quidem aliud video quod libentius falsum vocem. Sed tamen solet falsum dici, etiam quod a veri similitudine longe abest. R. Quis negat? sed tamen quod habeat ad verum nonnullam imitationem. A. Quomodo? Non enim cum dicitur, junctis alitibus anguibus Medeam volasse, ulla ex parte res ista verum imitatur; quippe quae nulla sit, nec imitari aliquid 0899 possit ea res quae omnino non sit. R. Recte dicis; sed non attendis eam rem quae omnino nulla sit, ne falsum quidem posse dici. Si enim falsum est, est: si non est, non est falsum . A. Non ergo dicemus illud de Medea, nescio quod monstrum, falsum esse? R. Non utique; nam si falsum est, quomodo monstrum est ? A. Miram rem video: itane tandem cum audio, Angues ingentes alites junctos jugo. (Poeta apud Cic., de Invent. I, 19.)non dico falsum? R. Dicis plane: est enim quod falsum esse dicas. A. Quid, quaeso? R. Illam scilicet sententiam quae ipso versu enuntiatur. A. Et quam tandem habet ista imitationem veri? R. Quia similiter enuntiaretur, etiamsi vere illud Medea fecisset. Imitatur ergo ipsa enuntiatione veras sententias falsa sententia. Quae si non creditur, eo solo imitatur veras quod ita dicitur, estque tantum falsa, non etiam fallens. Si autem fidem impetrat, imitatur etiam creditas veras. A. Jam intelligo multum interesse inter illa quae dicimus, et illa de quibus dicimus aliquid; quare jam assentior: nam hoc solo revocabar, quidquid falsum dicimus non recte dici, nisi habeat veri alicujus imitationem. Quis enim lapidem falsum argentum esse dicens non jure rideatur? tamen si quisquam lapidem argentum esse dicat, dicimus falsum eum dicere, id est falsam proferre sententiam. Stannum autem vel plumbum non absurde, ut opinor, falsum argentum vocamus, quod id res ipsa velut imitatur: neque ex eo falsa est nostra sententia, sed illud ipsum de quo enuntiatur.