Chapter 19 [XIII.]—Whether the Soul is a Spirit.

But again, why you would have the soul to be a body, and refuse to deem it a spirit, I cannot see. For if it is not a spirit, on the ground that the apostle named it with distinction from the spirit, when he said, “I pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and body be preserved,”138    1 Thess. v. 23. the same is a good reason why it is not a body, inasmuch as he named the body, too, as distinct from it. If you affirm that the soul is a body, although they are both distinctly named; you should allow it to be a spirit, although these are also distinctly named. Indeed, the soul has a much greater claim to be regarded by you as a spirit than a body; because you acknowledge the spirit and the soul to be of one substance, but deny the soul and the body to be of one substance. On what principle, then, is the soul a body, when its nature is different from that of a body; and not a spirit, although its nature and a spirit’s is one and the same? Why, according to your argument, must you not confess that even the spirit is a body? For otherwise, if the spirit is not a body, and the soul is a body, the soul and the spirit are not of one and the same substance. You, however, allow them both (although believing them to be two separate things) to have one substance. Therefore, if the soul is a body, the spirit is a body also; for under no other condition can they be regarded as being of one and the same nature. On your own principles, therefore, the statement of the apostle, who mentions, “Your spirit, and soul, and body,” must imply three bodies; yet the body, which has likewise the name of flesh, is of a different nature. And of these three bodies, as you would call them, of which one is of a different, and the other two of one and the same substance, the entire human being is composed—one thing and one existence. Now, although you assert this, yet you will not allow that the two which are of one and the same substance, that is, the soul and the spirit, should have the one designation of spirit; whilst the two things which are not of one and the same substance ought, as you suppose, to have the one name of body.

CAPUT XIII.

19. Cur autem animam nolis esse spiritum, sed corpus eam velis esse, non video. Si enim propterea spiritus non est, quia distincte Apostolus nominavit spiritum dicens, Et integer spiritus vester, et anima, et corpus (I Thess. V, 23); eadem causa est, cur ea non sit corpus, quia distincte nominavit et corpus. Si autem affirmas quod et anima corpus sit, quamvis distincte corpore nominato, permitte ut etiam spiritus sit, quamvis distincte spiritu nominato. Multo enim magis tibi debet videri anima spiritus esse quam corpus; quia spiritum et animam unius fateris esse substantiae, unius autem substantiae animam corpusque esse non dicis. Quo igitur pacto corpus est anima, cum ejus et corporis sit diversa natura; et spiritus non est anima, cum ejus et spiritus sit una eademqne natura? Quid, quod ista tua ratione etiam spiritum corpus esse cogeris dicere? Alioquin si spiritus corpus non est, et anima corpus est; non sunt spiritus et anima unius ejusdemque substantiae. Tu autem utrumque, quamvis duo quaedam sentias, unam fateris habere substantiam. Ergo et spiritus corpus est, si anima corpus est: neque enim aliter possunt unius ejusdemque esse naturae. Proinde secundum te, illud quod ait Apostolus, Spiritus vester, et anima, et corpus: tria sunt corpora; sed ex his duo, anima et spiritus unius naturae sunt corpora; corpus autem illud, quod etiam caro dicitur, diversae naturae est . Et ex his tribus, ut opinaris, corporibus, quorum unum diversae, duo vero sunt unius ejusdemque substantiae, constat totus homo, una quaedam res atque una substantia. Ista cum asseras, non vis tamen ut duae res unius ejusdemque substantiae, id est, anima et spiritus habeant unum spiritus nomen: cum duae res non unius ejusdemque, sed imparis diversaeque substantiae, id est, anima et corpus habeant unum, sicut 0536 putas, corporis nomen.