§6. Thereafter he expounds the appellation of “Son,” and of “product of generation,” and very many varieties of “sons,” of God, of men, of rams, of perdition, of light, and of day.

But our discourse has diverged too far from the subject before us, in following out the questions which arise from time to time by way of inference. Let us therefore once more resume its sequence, as I imagine that the phrase under examination has been sufficiently shown, by what we have said, to be contradictory not only to the truth, but also to itself. For if, according to their view, the natural relation to the Father is established by the appellation of “the Son,” and so with that of the “product of generation” to Him Who has begotten Him (as these men’s wisdom falsely models the terms significant of the Divine nature into a verbal arrangement, according to some grammatical frivolity), no one could longer doubt that the mutual relation of the names which is established by nature is a proof of their kindred, or rather of their identity of essence. But let not our discourse merely turn about our adversaries’ words, that the orthodox doctrine may not seem to gain the victory only by the weakness of those who fight against it, but appear to have an abundant supply of strength in itself. Let the adverse argument, therefore, be strengthened as much as may be by us ourselves with more energetic advocacy, that the superiority of our force may be recognized with full confidence, as we bring to the unerring test of truth those arguments also which our adversaries have omitted. He who contends on behalf of our adversaries will perhaps say that the name of “Son,” or “product of generation,” does not by any means establish the fact of kindred in nature. For in Scripture the term “child of wrath539    Cf. Eph. ii. 3” is used, and “son of perdition540    S. John xvii. 12.,” and “product of a viper541    Cf. S. Matt. iii. 7;” and in such names surely no community of nature is apparent. For Judas, who is called “the son of perdition,” is not in his substance the same with perdition, according to what we understand by the word542    Reading κατὰ τὸ νοούμενον, for κατὰ τὸν νοούμενον as the words stand in the text of Oehler, who cites no mss. in favour of the change which he has made.. For the signification of the “man” in Judas is one thing, and that of “perdition” is another. And the argument may be established equally from an opposite instance. For those who are called in a certain sense “children of light,” and “children of the day543    Cf. 1 Thess. v. 5.,” are not the same with light and day in respect of the definition of their nature, and the stones are made Abraham’s children544    Cf. S. Matt. iii. 9 when they claim their kindred with him by faith and works; and those who are “led by the Spirit of God,” as the Apostle says, are called “Sons of God545    Rom. viii. 14.,” without being the same with God in respect of nature; and one may collect many such instances from the inspired Scripture, by means of which deceit, like some image decked with the testimonies of Scripture, masquerades in the likeness of truth.

Well, what do we say to this? The divine Scripture knows how to use the word “Son” in both senses, so that in some cases such an appellation is derived from nature, in others it is adventitious and artificial. For when it speaks of “sons of men,” or “sons of rams546    Ps. xxix. 1 (LXX.).,” it marks the essential relation of that which is begotten to that from which it has its being: but when it speaks of “sons of power,” or “children of God,” it presents to us that kinship which is the result of choice. And, moreover, in the opposite sense, too, the same persons are called “sons of Eli,” and “sons of Belial547    1 Sam. ii. 12. The phrase is υἱοὶ λοιμοί, or “pestilent sons,” as in the LXX. Gregory’s argument would seem to require the reading υἱοὶ λοιμοῦ.,” the appellation of “sons” being easily adapted to either idea. For when they are called “sons of Eli,” they are declared to have natural relationship to him, but in being called “sons of Belial,” they are reproved for the wickedness of their choice, as no longer emulating their father in their life, but addicting their own purpose to sin. In the case, then, of this lower nature of ours, and of the things with which we are concerned, by reason of human nature being equally inclined to either side (I mean, to vice and to virtue), it is in our power to become sons either of night or of day, while our nature yet remains, so far as the chief part of it is concerned, within its proper limits. For neither is he who by sin becomes a child of wrath alienated from his human generation, nor does he who by choice addicts himself to good reject his human origin by the refinement of his habits, but, while their nature in each case remains the same, the differences of their purpose assume the names of their relationship, according as they become either children of God by virtue, or of the opposite by vice.

But how does Eunomius, in the case of the divine doctrines at least—he who “preserves the natural order” (for I will use our author’s very words), “and abides by those things which are known to us from the beginning, and does not refuse to call Him that is begotten by the name of ‘product of generation,’ since the generated essence itself” (as he says) “and the appellation of ‘Son’ makes such a relation of words appropriate”,—how does he alienate the Begotten from essential kindred with Him that begat Him? For in the case of those who are called “sons” or “products” by way of reproach, or again where some praise accompanies such names, we cannot say that any one is called “a child of wrath,” being at the same time actually begotten by wrath; nor again had any one the day for his mother, in a corporeal sense, that he should be called its son; but it is the difference of their will which gives occasion for names of such relationship. Here, however, Eunomius says, “we do not refuse to call the Son, seeing He is begotten, by the name of ‘product of generation,’ since the generated essence,” he tells us, “and the appellation of ‘Son,’ makes such a relation of words appropriate.” If, then, he confesses that such a relation of words is made appropriate by the fact that the Son is really a “product of generation,” how is it opportune to assign such a rationale of names, alike to those which are used inexactly by way of metaphor, and to those where the natural relation, as Eunomius tells us, makes such a use of names appropriate? Surely such an account is true only in the case of those whose nature is a border-land between virtue and vice, where one often shares in turn opposite classes of names, becoming a child, now of light, then again of darkness, by reason of affinity to the good or to its opposite. But where contraries have no place, one could no longer say that the word “Son” is applied metaphorically, in like manner as in the case of those who by choice appropriate the title to themselves. For one could not arrive at this view, that, as a man casting off the works of darkness becomes, by his decent life, a child of light, so too the Only-begotten God received the more honourable name as the result of a change from the inferior state. For one who is a man becomes a son of God by being joined to Christ by spiritual generation: but He Who by Himself makes the man to be a son of God does not need another Son to bestow on Him the adoption of a son, but has the name also of that which He is by nature. A man himself changes himself, exchanging the old man for the new; but to what shall God be changed, so that He may receive what He has not? A man puts off himself, and puts on the Divine nature; but what does He put off, or in what does He array Himself, Who is always the same? A man becomes a son of God, receiving what he has not, and laying aside what he has; but He Who has never been in the state of vice has neither anything to receive nor anything to relinquish. Again, the man may be on the one hand truly called some one’s son, when one speaks with reference to his nature; and, on the other hand, he may be so called inexactly, when the choice of his life imposes the name. But God, being One Good, in a single and uncompounded nature, looks ever the same way, and is never changed by the impulse of choice, but always wishes what He is, and is, assuredly, what He wishes: so that He is in both respects properly and truly called Son of God, since His nature contains the good, and His choice also is never severed from that which is more excellent, so that this word is employed, without inexactness, as His name. Thus there is no room for these arguments (which, in the person of our adversaries, we have been opposing to ourselves), to be brought forward by our adversaries as a demurrer to the affinity in respect of nature.

Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλέον παρηνέχθη τῶν προκειμένων ὁ λόγος, τοῖς ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐφευρισκομένοις ἑπόμενος. οὐκοῦν πάλιν τὴν ἀκολουθίαν ἐπαναλάβωμεν, ἐπειδὴ τὴν προτεθεῖσαν αὐτοῦ ῥῆσιν ἀποχρώντως οἶμαι διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων πεφανερῶσθαι οὐ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἔχουσαν ἐναντίως. εἰ γὰρ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἡ φυσικὴ σχέσις τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίᾳ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα συνίσταται καὶ πρὸς τὸν γεγεννηκότα ἡ τοῦ γεννήματος, κατά τινα γραμματικὴν φλυαρίαν τὰς σημαντικὰς τῆς θείας φύσεως λέξεις τῆς σοφίας τούτων εἰς ὀνομάτων σχῆμα παρατυπούσης, οὐκέτ' ἄν τις ἀμφιβάλλοι τὴν ἐκ φύσεως συνισταμένην τῶν ὀνομάτων πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσιν ἀπόδειξιν τῆς κατ' οὐσίαν αὐτῶν οἰκειότητος, μᾶλλον δὲ ταὐτότητος γίνεσθαι. ἀλλά μοι μεταλαβέτω τὴν ἐναντίαν φωνὴν ὁ ἡμέτερος λόγος, ὡς ἂν μὴ δοκοίη τῇ ἀσθενείᾳ μόνῃ τῶν ἀντιμαχομένων τὸ δόγμα τῆς εὐσεβείας κρατύνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἑαυτῷ μάλιστα τὴν ἰσχὺν ἔχειν. ὡς οὖν ἐστι δυνατόν, δι' εὐτονωτέρας τῆς συνηγορίας βεβαιωθήτω παρ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ὁ ἀντικείμενος λόγος, ὡς ἂν τὸ ὑπερβάλλον τῆς δυνάμεως διαγνωσθείη κατὰ πολλὴν πεποίθησιν, καὶ τὰ παρειμένα παρὰ τῶν ἐναντίων εἰς ἀκριβῆ βάσανον τῆς ἀληθείας ἡμῶν προφερόντων. ἐρεῖ γὰρ ἴσως ὁ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἰσχυριζόμενος, ὅτι οὐ πάντως ἡ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ γεννήματος κλῆσις τὸ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν οἰκεῖον παρίστησι. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τέκνον τις ὀργῆς ἐν τῇ γραφῇ λέγεται καὶ ἀπωλείας υἱὸς καὶ γέννημα ἐχίδνης, καὶ οὐ δήπου κοινότης τις φύσεως τοῖς τοιούτοις ὀνόμασι συνανεφάνη. οὐ γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ Ἰούδας, ὁ τῆς ἀπωλείας υἱὸς ὠνομασμένος, καὶ αὐτὴ κατὰ τὸ νοούμενον ἡ ἀπώλεια. ἄλλο γὰρ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν Ἰούδαν ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἕτερον τῆς ἀπωλείας τὸ σημαινόμενον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὴν ἴσην κατασκευὴν ὁ λόγος ἔχει. υἱοὶ γὰρ φωτός τινες καὶ υἱοὶ ἡμέρας λεγόμενοι οὐ ταὐτόν εἰσι τῷ φωτὶ καὶ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς φύσεως, καὶ τέκνα τοῦ Ἀβραὰμ οἱ λίθοι γίνονται, ὅταν διὰ τῆς πίστεως καὶ τῶν ἔργων τὴν συγγένειαν τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν οἰκειώσωνται, καὶ οἱ τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ θεοῦ ἀγόμενοι, καθώς φησιν ὁ ἀπόστολος, υἱοὶ θεοῦ λέγονται, οὐ ταὐτὸν ὄντες τῷ θεῷ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν, καὶ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα παρὰ τῆς θεοπνεύστου γραφῆς ἔστιν ἀναλέξασθαι, δι' ὧν ἡ ἀπάτη καθάπερ εἰκών τις ἐπηνθισμένη ταῖς γραφικαῖς μαρτυρίαις τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας εἴδωλον ὑποκρίνεται.
Τί οὖν ἡμεῖς πρὸς τοῦτό φαμεν; οἶδεν ἡ θεία γραφὴ κατ' ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἐννοιῶν κεχρῆσθαι τοῦ υἱοῦ τῇ φωνῇ, ὥστε τισὶ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως, τισὶ δὲ ἐπισκευαστὴν καὶ ἐπίκτητον εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην προσηγορίαν. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ υἱοὺς ἀνθρώπων καὶ υἱοὺς λέγῃ κριῶν, τὴν κατ' οὐσίαν τοῦ γεννηθέντος πρὸς τὸν ἐξ οὗ γέγονε σχέσιν ἀποσημαίνει: ὅταν δὲ υἱοὺς δυνάμεως ἢ τέκνα λέγῃ θεοῦ, τὴν ἐκ προαιρέσεως γινομένην ἀγχιστείαν παρίστησι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐναντίαν διάνοιαν οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ υἱοὶ Ἠλεὶ καὶ υἱοὶ λοιμοὶ ὠνομάσθησαν, πρὸς ἑκάτερον νόημα τῆς τῶν υἱῶν προσηγορίας εὐαρμόστως ἐχούσης. τῷ μὲν γὰρ υἱοὶ τοῦ Ἠλεὶ κληθῆναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν συγγενὲς πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἔχειν ἐμαρτυρήθησαν, λοιμοὶ δὲ υἱοὶ κατονομασθέντες ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς προαιρέσεως μοχθηρίᾳ κατηγορήθησαν, ὡς οὐχὶ τὸν πατέρα ζηλοῦντες τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλὰ τῇ κακίᾳ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἑαυτῶν οἰκειώσαντες. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς κάτω φύσεως καὶ τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς πραγμάτων διὰ τὸ πρὸς ἑκάτερον ἐπιρρεπῶς τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἔχειν, πρὸς κακίαν λέγω καὶ ἀρετήν, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστιν ἢ νυκτὸς ἢ ἡμέρας υἱοὺς γενέσθαι, μενούσης κατὰ τὸ προηγούμενον ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις ὅροις τῆς φύσεως. οὔτε γὰρ ὁ διὰ κακίαν ὀργῆς τέκνον γενόμενος τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἠλλοτριώθη γεννήσεως, οὔτε ὁ τῷ ἀγαθῷ διὰ προαιρέσεως ἑαυτὸν οἰκειώσας τὸ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων φῦναι διὰ τῆς ἀστειότητος τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἀπώσατο, ἀλλὰ τῆς φύσεως ὁμοίως ἐφ' ἑκατέρων ἑστώσης αἱ κατὰ τὰς προαιρέσεις διαφοραὶ τὰ ὀνόματα τῆς οἰκειότητος ὑποδύονται, ἢ θεοῦ τέκνα δι' ἀρετῆς ἢ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου διὰ κακίας γινόμεναι.
Ἐπὶ δέ γε τῶν θείων δογμάτων « ὁ τὴν φυσικὴν διασῴζων τάξιν » Εὐνόμιος (αὐτοῖς γὰρ χρήσομαι τοῦ λογογράφου τοῖς ῥήμασι) « καὶ τοῖς ἄνωθεν ἐγνωσμένοις ἐμμένων καὶ γεννητὸν ὄντα γέννημα λέγειν οὐ παραιτούμενος, τῆς γεννηθείσης αὐτῆς », ὥς φησιν, « οὐσίας καὶ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίας τὴν τοιαύτην τῶν ὀνομάτων οἰκειουμένης σχέσιν », πῶς ἀλλοτριοῖ τῆς κατ' οὐσίαν οἰκειότητος τὸ γεννηθὲν τοῦ γεννήσαντος; ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐπὶ διαβολῇ λεγομένων υἱῶν ἢ γεννημάτων ἢ πάλιν ἐφ' ὧν ἔπαινός τις παρομαρτεῖ τοῖς τοιούτοις ὀνόμασιν οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἀληθῶς τις παρὰ τῆς ὀργῆς γεννηθεὶς τέκνον ὀργῆς προσηγόρευται, οὐδ' αὖ πάλιν ἡμέραν τις σωματικῶς ἔσχεν ἑαυτοῦ μητέρα, ὥστε υἱὸς ταύτης ὀνομασθῆναι, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν προαιρέσεων διαφορὰ ποιεῖται τὰ τῆς τοιαύτης συγγενείας ὀνόματα. ἐνταῦθα δέ φησιν ὁ Εὐνόμιος ὅτι « γεννητὸν ὄντα τὸν υἱὸν γέννημα λέγειν οὐ παραιτούμεθα, τῆς γεννηθείσης », φησίν, « οὐσίας καὶ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίας τὴν τοιαύτην τῶν ὀνομάτων σχέσιν οἰκειουμένης ». εἰ οὖν διὰ τὸ ἀληθῶς « γέννημα » εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν ὁμολογεῖ « τὴν τοιαύτην τῶν ὀνομάτων οἰκειοῦσθαι σχέσιν », πῶς ἔχει καιρὸν ἐφαρμόζειν τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν τῶν ὀνομάτων τοῖς τε κατὰ μεταφορὰν ἐκ καταχρήσεως λεγομένοις καὶ οἷς ἡ φυσικὴ σχέσις, καθώς φησιν ὁ Εὐνόμιος, τὴν τοιαύτην οἰκειοῦται κλῆσιν; οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ μόνων ἀληθὲς τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν οἷς μεθόριος πρὸς ἀρετήν τε καὶ κακίαν ἡ φύσις, ἐφ' ὧν πολλάκις τὰ ἐναντία τις ἀντιμεταλαμβάνει τῶν ὀνομάτων, νῦν μὲν φωτός, πάλιν δὲ σκότους διὰ τῆς πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον προσκλίσεως τέκνον γινόμενος. ὅπου δὲ τὸ ἐναντίον χώραν οὐκ ἔχει, οὐκέτ' ἄν τις τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν φωνὴν ἐκ μεταφορᾶς ἐπιφημίζεσθαι λέγοι καθ' ὁμοιότητα τῶν διὰ προαιρέσεως οἰκειουμένων τὴν κλῆσιν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰς τοῦτον ἔλθοι τὸν λόγον, ὅτι ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος ἀποθέμενος τὰ ἔργα τοῦ σκότους διὰ τῆς εὐσχήμονος ζωῆς φωτὸς γίνεται τέκνον, οὕτω καὶ ὁ μονογενὴς θεὸς ἐκ μεταβολῆς ἐκ τοῦ χείρονος ἀντιλαμβάνει τὸ προτιμότερον. ἄνθρωπος μὲν γάρ τις ὢν υἱὸς θεοῦ γίνεται διὰ τῆς πνευματικῆς γεννήσεως Χριστῷ συναπτόμενος: ὁ δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον δι' ἑαυτοῦ θεοῦ υἱὸν ποιῶν αὐτὸς ἄλλου υἱοῦ τοῦ χαριζομένου αὐτῷ τὴν υἱοθεσίαν οὐκ ἐπιδέεται, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ὀνομάζεται. ἄνθρωπος μὲν αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀμείβει, τοῦ παλαιοῦ τὸν νέον ἀνταλλασσόμενος: θεὸς δὲ εἰς τί ἀλλαγήσεται, ὥστε ὃ μὴ ἔχει προσκτήσασθαι; ἄνθρωπος μὲν ἑαυτὸν ἀπεκδυσάμενος τὴν θείαν ἐπενδύεται φύσιν: ὁ δὲ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχων τί ἀποτίθεται ἢ τί περιβάλλεται; ἄνθρωπος μὲν υἱὸς θεοῦ γίνεται προσλαβὼν ἃ οὐκ ἔχει καὶ ἀποβαλὼν ἃ ἔχει: ὁ δὲ μηδέποτε γεγονὼς ἐν κακίᾳ οὔτε ὃ λάβῃ οὔτε ὃ καταλίπῃ ἔχει. πάλιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος δύναται πῆ μὲν ἀληθῶς υἱός τινος λέγεσθαι, ὅταν πρὸς τὴν φύσιν βλέπων τις λέγῃ, πῆ δὲ ἐκ καταχρήσεως, ὅταν ἡ τοῦ βίου προαίρεσις ἐπιβάλῃ τὸ ὄνομα. ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἓν ὢν ἀγαθὸν ἐν ἁπλῇ τε καὶ ἀσυνθέτῳ τῇ φύσει πάντοτε πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ βλέπει καὶ οὐδέποτε ταῖς τῆς προαιρέσεως ὁρμαῖς μεταβάλλεται, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ καὶ βούλεται ὅπερ ἐστὶν καὶ ἐστὶ πάντως ὃ καὶ βούλεται, ὥστε δι' ἀμφοτέρων υἱὸς θεοῦ κυρίως καὶ ἀληθῶς ὀνομάζεσθαι, τῆς τε φύσεως ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐχούσης τῆς τε προαιρέσεως οὐκ ἀπερρωγυίας τοῦ κρείττονος, ὡς μὴ ἂν ἐκ καταχρήσεως αὐτῷ τὴν φωνὴν ταύτην ἐπικληθῆναι. οὐκοῦν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει χώραν, ἅπερ ἐκ προσώπου τῶν ἐναντίων ἑαυτοῖς ἀντεθήκαμεν, ταῦτα ἐπὶ παραγραφῇ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν οἰκειότητος παρὰ τῶν ἐναντίων προφέρεσθαι.