But it is time to examine the argument that leads to this profanity, and see how, as regards itself, it is logically connected with his whole discourse. For after saying that it is absurd to compare God with corn and with Christ, he says of God that He is not, like them, subject to change; but in respect to the Only-begotten, keeping silence on the question whether He too is not subject to change, and thereby clearly suggesting that He is of lower dignity, in that we cannot compare Him, any more than we can compare corn, with God, he breaks off his discourse without using any argument to prove that the Son of God cannot be compared with the Father, as though our knowledge of the grain were sufficient to establish the inferiority of the Son in comparison with the Father. But he discourses of the indestructibility of the Father, as not in actuality attaching to the Son. But if the True Life is an actuality, actuating itself, and if to live everlastingly means the same thing as never to be dissolved in destruction, I for myself do not as yet assent to his argument, but will reserve myself for a more proper occasion. That, however, there is but one single notion in indestructibility99    Indestructibility. Such terms (“not-composite,” “indivisible,” “imperishable”) were the inheritance which Christian controversy received from the former struggle with Stoicism. In the hands of Origen, they had been aimed at the Stoic doctrine of the Deity as that of corporeal Spirit, which does not perish, only because there is no cause sufficient. “If one does not see the consequences of such an assertion, one ought to blush” (in Johann. xiii. 21). The consequences of course are that God, the Word, and our souls, made in His image, are all perishable; for all body, in that it is matter, is by the Stoic assumption, liable to change., considered in reference to the Father and to the Son alike, and that the indestructibility of the Father differs in no respect from that of the Son, no difference as to indestructibility being observable either in remission and intension, or in any other phase of the process of destruction, this, I say, it is seasonable both now and at all times to assert, so as to preclude the doctrine that in respect of indestructibility the Son has no communion with the Father. For as this indestructibility is understood in respect of the Father, so also it is not to be disputed in respect of the Son. For to be incapable of dissolution means nearly, or rather precisely, the same thing in regard to whatever subject it is attributed to. What, then, induces him to assert, that only to the Ungenerate Deity does it belong to have this indestructibility not attaching to Him by reason of any energy, as though he would thereby show a difference between the Father and the Son? For if he supposes his own created God destructible, he well shows the essential divergence of natures by the difference between the destructible and the indestructible. But if neither is subject to destruction,—and no degrees are to be found in pure indestructibility,—how does he show that the Father cannot be compared with the Only-begotten Son, or what is meant by saying that indestructibility is not witnessed in the Father by reason of any energy? But he reveals his purpose in what follows. It is not because of His operations or energies, he says, that He is ungenerate and indestructible, but because He is Father and Creator. And here I must ask my hearers to give me their closest attention. How can he think the creative power of God and His Fatherhood identical in meaning? For he defines each alike as an energy, plainly and expressly affirming, “God is not indestructible by reason of His energy, though He is called Father and Creator by reason of energies.” If, then, it is the same thing to call Him Father and Creator of the world because either name is due to an energy as its cause, the results of His energies must be homogeneous, inasmuch as it is through an energy, that they both exist. But to what blasphemy this logically tends is clear to every one who can draw a conclusion. For myself, I should like to add my own deductions to my disquisition. It is impossible that an energy or operation productive of a result should subsist of itself without there being something to set the energy in motion; as we say that a smith operates or works, but that the material on which his art is exercised is operated upon, or wrought. These faculties, therefore, that of operating, and that of being operated upon, must needs stand in a certain relation to each other, so that if one be removed, the remaining one cannot subsist of itself. For where there is nothing operated upon there can be nothing operating. What, then, does this prove? If the energy which is productive of anything does not subsist of itself, there being nothing for it to operate upon, and if the Father, as they affirm, is nothing but an energy, the Only-begotten Son is thereby shown to be capable of being acted upon, in other words, moulded in accordance with the motive energy that gives Him His subsistence. For as we say that the Creator of the world, by laying down some yielding material, capable of being acted upon, gave His creative being a field for its exercise, in the case of things sensible skilfully investing the subject with various and multiform qualities for production, but in the case of intellectual essences giving shape to the subject in another way, not by qualities, but by impulses of choice, so, if any one define the Fatherhood of God as an energy, he cannot otherwise indicate the subsistence of the Son than by comparing it with some material acted upon and wrought to completion. For if it could not be operated upon, it would of necessity offer resistance to the operator: whose energy being thus hindered, no result would be produced. Either, then, they must make the essence of the Only-begotten subject to be acted upon, that the energy may have something to work upon, or, if they shrink from this conclusion, on account of its manifest impiety, they are driven to the conclusion that it has no existence at all. For what is naturally incapable of being acted upon, cannot itself admit the creative energy. He, then, who defines the Son as the effect of an energy, defines Him as one of those things which are subject to be acted upon, and which are produced by an energy. Or, if he deny such susceptibility, he must at the same time deny His existence. But since impiety is involved in either alternative of the dilemma, that of asserting His non-existence, and that of regarding Him as capable of being acted upon, the truth is made manifest, being brought to light by the removal of these absurdities. For if He verily exists, and is not subject to be acted upon, it is plain that He is not the result of an energy, but is proved to be very God of very God the Father, without liability to be acted upon, beaming from Him and shining forth from everlasting.

Ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἀσέβεια τοῦ λόγου τοσαύτη. καιρὸς δ' ἂν εἴη καὶ αὐτὴν ἐξετάσαι τὴν εἰς τὴν βλασφημίαν κατασκευήν, ἐν τίνι πρὸς ἑαυτὴν τῷ λόγῳ δι' ἀκολουθίας συνήρτηται. εἰπὼν γὰρ ἄτοπον εἶναι τῷ σίτῳ καὶ τῷ Χριστῷ τὸν θεὸν παραβάλλειν περὶ τοῦ σίτου φησὶν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς καθ' ὁμοιότητα τούτων πρὸς μεταβολὴν ἐπιτήδειος, περὶ δὲ τοῦ μονογενοῦς τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸν πρὸς μεταβολὴν ἐπιτήδειον σιωπήσας καὶ διὰ τούτου σαφῶς ἐνδειξάμενος τὸ ταπεινὸν τῆς ἀξίας, ἐν τῷ μὴ δεῖν αὐτὸν ὡς καὶ τὸν σῖτον τῷ θεῷ συγκρίνειν ἀφῆκε τὸν λόγον μετέωρον, οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ λογισμῷ κατασκευάσας ἐν τῷ μέρει τούτῳ τὸ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα τοῦ υἱοῦ ἀπαράθετον, ὡς ἱκανῶν ὄντων τῶν περὶ τὸν κόκκον θεωρηθέντων καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα κατὰ τὸ ταπεινότερον παραλλαγὴν συνενδείξασθαι. ἀλλὰ « περὶ τῆς ἀφθαρσίας τοῦ πατρὸς » διαλέγεται ὡς « οὐκ ἐξ ἐνεργείας προσούσης αὐτῷ ». ἐγὼ δὲ εἰ μὲν ἐνέργειά τίς ἐστιν ἡ ὄντως ζωὴ ἑαυτὴν ἐνεργοῦσα καὶ εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ σημαινομένῳ τό τε ἀεὶ ζῆν καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε εἰς φθορὰν διαλύεσθαι οὔπω τῷ λόγῳ προστίθημι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἰδίοις ταμιεύσομαι τόποις. ὅτι μέντοι μία « ἡ » τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἐστὶ διάνοια ὡσαύτως ἐπί τε τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ νοουμένη καὶ κατ' οὐδὲν τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἄφθαρτον τῆς ἀφθαρσίας τοῦ υἱοῦ παραλλάσσει, οὔτε ὑφέσει τινὶ καὶ ἐπιτάσει οὔτε τινὶ ἄλλῳ διαφορᾶς τρόπῳ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν παραλλαγῆς εὑρισκομένης, τοῦτο καὶ νῦν φημι εὔκαιρον εἶναι καὶ ἀεὶ λέγειν, ὡς ἂν μηδεμίαν ἔχοι διὰ τούτου χώραν ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν ἐννοίᾳ τῷ πατρὶ προσμαρτυρῶν τὸ πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἀκοινώνητον. ὡς γὰρ περὶ τὸν πατέρα ἡ ἀφθαρσία καταλαμβάνεται, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς εἶναι οὐκ ἀμφιβάλλεται. τὸ γὰρ τῆς φθορᾶς ἀπαράδεκτον, ὅπερ ἀφθαρσία καὶ ἔστι καὶ λέγεται, ἴσον μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει λόγον ἐφ' οὗπερ ἂν λέγηται. τί οὖν μαθὼν μόνῳ προσμαρτυρεῖ τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ θεῷ τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἐνεργείας εἶναι τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν αὐτῷ, ὡς διὰ τούτου τὴν κατὰ τοῦ μονογενοῦς παραλλαγὴν τοῦ πατρὸς δεικνύων; εἰ μὲν γὰρ φθαρτὸν ὑποτίθεται τὸν κτιστὸν ἑαυτοῦ θεόν, καλῶς τῇ τοῦ φθαρτοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἄφθαρτον διαφορᾷ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν παραλλαγὴν ἀποδείκνυσιν: εἰ δὲ ἀνεπίδεκτος φθορᾶς ὡσαύτως ἑκάτερος καὶ οὔτε τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτε τὸ ἧττον ἐν τῇ κατὰ φύσιν ἀφθαρσίᾳ καταλαμβάνεται, πῶς δείκνυσι τοῦ πατρὸς πρὸς τὸν μονογενῆ υἱὸν τὸ ἀσύγκριτον; ἢ τί βούλεται τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἐνεργείας προσμαρτυρεῖσθαι τῷ πατρὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον;
Ἀλλ' ἐκκαλύπτει τὸν σκοπὸν τῷ μετὰ ταῦτα λόγῳ. « οὐκ ἐξ ἐνεργειῶν », φησίν, « ἄφθαρτός ἐστιν καὶ ἀγέννητος ὡς πατήρ τε καὶ δημιουργός ». τούτῳ μοι προσέχειν μάλιστα τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἀξιῶ. πῶς ταὐτὸν οἴεται τῶν δύο τούτων ὀνομάτων τὸ σημαινόμενον, τῆς δημιουργίας λέγω καὶ τῆς πατρότητος; ἐνέργειαν γὰρ εἶναι τούτων ἑκάτερον ἐπίσης ὁρίζεται σαφῶς οὕτω διαγορεύων τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι ἄφθαρτος μὲν οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστί, πατὴρ δὲ καὶ δημιουργὸς ἐξ ἐνεργειῶν ὀνομάζεται. εἰ τοίνυν ταὐτόν ἐστι πατέρα τε καὶ δημιουργὸν αὐτὸν λέγεσθαι, τῷ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀμφοτέρων αὐτῷ γίνεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων αἰτίαν, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἀποτελέσματα ὁμογενῶς ἔχειν ἀλλήλοις κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἐξ ἐνεργείας ὁμοίως εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ποῖον βλασφημίας πέρας διὰ τῆς ἀκολουθίας ἐκφέρεται, παντὶ δῆλόν ἐστι τῷ ἐπισταμένῳ βλέπειν πρὸς τὸ ἀκόλουθον. ἐγὼ δ' ὅσα περὶ τούτων λογίζομαι, βούλομαι προσθεῖναι τῇ συνεξετάσει τῶν λόγων. οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνέργειαν ἀπεργαστικήν τινος πράγματος αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς συστῆναι, μή τινος ὑποδεχομένου τῆς ἐνεργείας τὴν κίνησιν, οἷον ἐνεργεῖν τί φαμεν τὸν χαλκεύοντα, ἐνεργεῖσθαι δὲ τὴν ἐκκειμένην ὕλην τῇ τέχνῃ. οὐκοῦν ἀναγκαίως ἔχει σχέσιν τινὰ ταῦτα πρὸς ἄλληλα, ἡ ἐνεργητικὴ καὶ ἡ παθητικὴ δύναμις, ὧν εἰ χωρισθείη τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ἕτερον, οὐκ ἂν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ συσταίη καὶ τὸ λειπόμενον. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τὸ πάσχον εἴη, τὸ ἐνεργοῦν οὐκ ἔσται. τί οὖν ἐκ τούτου κατασκευάζεται; εἰ οὐ συνίσταται καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ ἀποτελεστική τινος πράγματος, μὴ ὑποκειμένου τοῦ πάσχοντος, ὁ πατὴρ δέ, καθὼς οὗτοί φασιν, οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ ἐνέργεια, παθητὸς ἄρα διὰ τούτων ὁ μονογενὴς υἱὸς ἀποδείκνυται πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν τῆς ὑφιστώσης αὐτὸν ἐνεργείας τυπούμενος. ὡς γὰρ τὸν τοῦ παντὸς δημιουργόν φαμεν παθητικήν τινα καὶ εὔεικτον ὕλην ὑποβαλόμενον ἐνεργὸν ἑαυτοῦ τὴν δημιουργικὴν οὐσίαν ποιῆσαι, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὰς ποικίλας τε καὶ πολυειδεῖς τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ποιότητας πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου τῶν γινομένων ἀπεργασίαν τεχνικῶς ἐπιβάλλοντα, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν νοητῶν ἕτερον τρόπον οὐχὶ ποιότησιν, ἀλλὰ προαιρετικαῖς ὁρμαῖς διαμορφοῦντα τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οὕτως ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἰ ἐνέργειάν τις ὁρίζοιτο τὴν πατρότητα, οὐκ ἄλλως ἀποδείξει τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, μὴ κατά τινα παθητικὴν πάντως ἀπεργασθεῖσαν ὕλην. εἰ γὰρ ἀπαθὴς νομισθείη, ἀντίτυπος πάντως ἡ ἀπάθεια τῷ ἐνεργοῦντι γενήσεται, κωλυομένης δὲ τῆς ἐνεργείας οὐκ ἔσται πάντως τὸ ἐνεργούμενον. ὡς δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ παθητὴν διὰ τούτων τοῦ μονογενοῦς τὴν οὐσίαν ποιήσουσιν, ἵνα τὴν ἐνέργειαν δέξηται, ἢ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ προφανὲς τῆς ἀσεβείας ὀκνοῦντες τὸ μηδὲ ὅλως αὐτὴν εἶναι κατασκευάσουσιν. ὃ γὰρ παθεῖν ἀποπέφυκεν, οὐδὲ τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐνέργειαν ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ πάντως προσίεται. ὁ τοίνυν ἐνεργείας τινὸς ἀποτέλεσμα τὸν υἱὸν ὀνομάζων ἕν τι καὶ τοῦτον τῶν παθητῶν διορίζεται ὅσα δι' ἐνεργείας ἔσχε τὴν πρόοδον, ἢ εἴπερ ἀρνοῖτο τὸ πάθος, καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν αὐτοῦ μετὰ τοῦ πάθους ἀρνήσεται. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καθ' ἑκάτερον τῶν κατὰ τὸ διλήμματον προφαινομένων σαφὴς ἡ ἀσέβεια καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι λέγειν καὶ τὸ παθητὸν αὐτὸν οἴεσθαι, πρόδηλος ἡ ἀλήθεια διὰ τῆς τῶν ἀτόπων ἀναιρέσεως ἀναφαινομένη. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἀληθῶς ἔστι καὶ παθητὸς οὐκ ἔστι, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἐξ ἐνεργείας ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰκὸς ἀληθινὸν εἶναι θεὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀπαθῶς ἐξ ἀϊδίου ἀπαυγασθέντα τε καὶ ἐκλάμψαντα.