But I think we must pass over this and all that follows. For it is the mere trifling of children who amuse themselves with beginning to build houses in sand. For having composed a portion of a paragraph, and not yet brought it to a conclusion, he shows that the same life is without beginning and without end, thus in his eagerness working out our own conclusion. For this is just what we say; that the Divine life is one and continuous in itself, infinite and eternal, in no wise bounded by any limit to its infinity. Thus far our opponent devotes his labours and exertions to the truth as we represent it, showing that the same life is on no side limited, whether we look at that part of it which was before the ages, or at that which succeeds them. But in his next remarks he returns to his old confusion. For after saying that the same life is without beginning and without end, leaving the subject of life, and ranging all the ideas we entertain about the Divine life under one head, he unifies everything. If, says he, the life is without beginning and without end, ungenerate and indestructible, then indestructibility and ungeneracy will be the same thing, as will also the being without beginning and without end. And to this he adds the aid of arguments. It is not possible, he says, for the life to be one, unless indestructibility and ungeneracy are identical terms. An admirable “addition” on the part of our friend. It would seem, then, that we may hold the same language in regard to righteousness, wisdom, power, goodness, and all such attributes of God. Let, then, no word have a meaning peculiar to itself, but let one signification underlie every word in a list, and one form of description serve for the definition of all. If you are asked to define the word judge, answer with the interpretation of “ungeneracy”; if to define justice, be ready with “the incorporeal” as your answer. If asked to define incorruptibility, say that it has the same meaning as mercy or judgment. Thus let all God’s attributes be convertible terms, there being no special signification to distinguish one from another. But if Eunomius thus prescribes, why do the Scriptures vainly assign various names to the Divine nature, calling God a Judge, righteous, powerful, long-suffering, true, merciful and so on? For if none of these titles is to be understood in any special or peculiar sense, but, owing to this confusion in their meaning, they are all mixed up together, it would be useless to employ so many words for the same thing, there being no difference of meaning to distinguish them from one another. But who is so much out of his wits as not to know that, while the Divine nature, whatever it is in its essence, is simple, uniform, and incomposite, and that it cannot be viewed under any form of complex formation, the human mind, grovelling on earth, and buried in this life on earth, in its inability to behold clearly the object of its search, feels after the unutterable Being in divers and many-sided ways, and never chases the mystery in the light of one idea alone. Our grasping of Him would indeed be easy, if there lay before us one single assigned path to the knowledge of God: but as it is, from the skill apparent in the Universe, we get the idea of skill in the Ruler of that Universe, from the large scale of the wonders worked we get the impression of His Power; and from our belief that this Universe depends on Him, we get an indication that there is no cause whatever of His existence; and again, when we see the execrable character of evil, we grasp His own unalterable pureness as regards this: when we consider death’s dissolution to be the worst of ills, we give the name of Immortal and Indissoluble at once to Him Who is removed from every conception of that kind: not that we split up the subject of such attributes along with them, but believing that this thing we think of, whatever it be in substance, is One, we still conceive that it has something in common with all these ideas. For these terms are not set against each other in the way of opposites, as if, the one existing there, the other could not co-exist in the same subject (as, for instance, it is impossible that life and death should be thought of in the same subject); but the force of each of the terms used in connection with the Divine Being is such that, even though it has a peculiar significance of its own, it implies no opposition to the term associated with it. What opposition, for instance, is there between “incorporeal” and “just,” even though the words do not coincide in meaning: and what hostility is there between goodness and invisibility? So, too, the eternity of the Divine Life, though represented under the double name and idea of “the unending” and “the unbeginning,” is not cut in two by this difference of name; nor yet is the one name the same in meaning as the other; the one points to the absence of beginning, the other to the absence of end, and yet there is no division produced in the subject by this difference in the actual terms applied to it.

Ἀλλὰ παραδραμεῖν οἶμαι χρῆναι καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ὅσα τούτων κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἔχεται. παιδίων γὰρ ἄντικρύς ἐστιν ἀθύρματα κατασκευάς τινας οἰκοδομημάτων ἐν ψάμμῳ διατιθέντων. συνθεὶς γάρ τινα κώλου περίοδον καὶ μόλις ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας διεξελθὼν « τὴν αὐτὴν ζωὴν » ἀποδείκνυσιν « ἄναρχόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἀτελεύτητον », ἡμετέραν πληρῶν εὐχὴν ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ σπουδῇ. οὐδὲ γὰρ παρ' ἡμῶν ἄλλο τι λέγεται ἢ ὅτι μία ἐστὶ καὶ συνεχὴς αὐτὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἡ θεία ζωή, ἄπειρός τε καὶ ἀΐδιος καὶ οὐδαμόθεν οὐδενὶ πέρατι κωλυομένη πρὸς τὸ ἀόριστον. μέχρι τούτων ὁ λογογράφος τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ πόνους καὶ τοὺς ἱδρῶτας τῇ ἀληθείᾳ χαρίζεται, δεικνὺς τὴν αὐτὴν ζωὴν κατ' οὐδέτερον μέρος περατουμένην, οὔτε εἰ τὸ πρὸ αἰώνων τις ἐξετάζοι οὔτε εἰ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο λογίζοιτο. ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς πάλιν πρὸς τὴν ἰδίαν ἐπανέρχεται σύγχυσιν. εἰπὼν γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι ζωὴν ἄναρχόν τε καὶ ἀτελεύτητον, ἀφεὶς τὸν περὶ τῆς ζωῆς λόγον καὶ τὰς ἐπιθεωρουμένας ὑπολήψεις τῇ θείᾳ ζωῇ εἰς μίαν τὰς πάσας ἔννοιαν συντάξας ἓν τὰ πάντα ἐποίησεν. « εἰ γὰρ ἡ ζωή », φησίν, « ἄναρχός τε καὶ ἀτελεύτητος καὶ ἄφθαρτός ἐστι καὶ ἀγέννητος, ταὐτὸν ἂν εἴη τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ ἡ ἀφθαρσία καὶ τῷ ἀτελευτήτῳ τὸ ἄναρχον ». καὶ προστίθησι τούτοις τὴν ἐκ τῶν λογισμῶν συμμαχίαν: « οὐ γὰρ δυνατόν », φησί, « τὴν μὲν ζωὴν εἶναι μίαν, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἀφθάρτου λόγον μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τῷ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου λόγῳ ». καλῶς ὁ γενναῖος προστίθησι. δοκεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τὸν τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγον ἕτερον παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα τυγχάνειν μηδὲ τὸν τῆς σοφίας καὶ τὸν τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τὸν τῆς ἀγαθότητος καὶ ἑκάστου τῶν θεοπρεπῶν ὀνομάτων, καὶ μηδεὶς ἔστω λόγος κατὰ τὸ ἰδιάζον νοούμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παντὶ τῷ καταλόγῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἓν ὑποκείσθω τὸ σημαινόμενον, καὶ εἷς ὑπογραφῆς λόγος τὸν περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν λεγομένων ὅρον ἀποπληρούτω: κἂν ἐρωτηθῇς τὸ τοῦ κριτοῦ σημαινόμενον, τὴν τῆς ἀγεννησίας ἑρμηνείαν ἀπόκριναι, κἂν τῆς δικαιοσύνης δέῃ τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἀποδοῦναι, τὸ ἀσώματόν σοι πρόχειρον εἰς τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἔστω, τί δὲ σημαίνει ἡ ἀφθαρσία, ὅπερ ἡ τοῦ ἐλέου πάντως ἐρεῖς ἢ ἡ τῆς κρίσεως σημασία παρίστησιν. οὕτω καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα πάντα πρὸς ἄλληλα μεταχωρείτω, μηδεμιᾶς ἰδιαζούσης ἐμφάσεως τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου διαστελλούσης. καὶ εἰ ταῦτα νομοθετεῖ ὁ Εὐνόμιος, τί μάτην αἱ γραφαὶ πολυωνύμως τὴν θείαν φύσιν ἀνακαλοῦσιν, θεὸν κριτὴν δίκαιον ἰσχυρὸν μακρόθυμον ἀληθινὸν ἐλεήμονα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα κατονομάζουσαι; εἰ γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπί τινος ἰδιαζούσης ἐννοίας καταλαμβάνεται, πάντα δὲ ἀλλήλοις διὰ τῆς κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον συγχύσεως ἀναπέφυρται, μάταιον ἂν εἴη πολλαῖς ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ταῖς ἐπωνυμίαις κεχρῆσθαι, μηδεμιᾶς τῆς κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον διαφορᾶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὰ ὀνόματα διαστελλούσης. ἀλλὰ τίς οὕτως ἀπόπληκτος ὡς ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν θεία φύσις, ὅ τι ποτὲ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐστί, μία ἐστὶν ἁπλῆ τις καὶ μονοειδὴς καὶ ἀσύνθετος καὶ κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον ἐν ποικίλῃ τινὶ συνθέσει θεωρουμένη, ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ χαμαὶ κειμένη καὶ ἐν τῷ γηίνῳ τούτῳ βίῳ κατορωρυγμένη διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τηλαυγῶς κατιδεῖν τὸ ζητούμενον πολλαῖς ἐννοίαις τῆς ἀφράστου φύσεως πολυτρόπως καὶ πολυμερῶς ἐπορέγεται, οὐ κατὰ μίαν τινὰ διάνοιαν τὸ κεκρυμμένον θηρεύουσα; ἦ γὰρ ἂν εὔκολος ἦν ἡ κατάληψις, εἰ μία τις ἡμῖν ἔφοδος πρὸς τὴν θείαν ἀποκέκριτο γνῶσιν: νυνὶ δὲ διὰ μὲν τῆς ἐμφαινομένης τῷ παντὶ σοφίας σοφὸν εἶναι τὸ τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιστατοῦν ἐνοήσαμεν, διὰ δὲ τῆς τῶν θαυμάτων μεγαλουργίας δυνάμεως ἔμφασιν ἐδεξάμεθα, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἐκείνου πᾶν ἐξῆφθαι πιστεύειν τοῦ μηδεμίαν αὐτοῦ τῆς ὑπάρξεως αἰτίαν εἶναι τεκμήριον γίνεται.
Πάλιν τὸ βδελυκτὸν τῆς κακίας νοήσαντες τὸ ἀναλλοίωτον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀμιγὲς πρὸς κακίαν καταλαμβάνομεν τήν τε τοῦ θανάτου διαφθορὰν κακῶν ἔσχατον εἶναι νομίσαντες ἀθάνατόν τε καὶ ἄφθαρτον τὸν ἀλλότριον παντὸς τοιούτου νοήματος ὠνομάσαμεν, οὐ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ταῖς ἐννοίαις ταύταις συνδιασχίζοντες, ἀλλ' ὅ τι ποτὲ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐστίν, ἓν εἶναι πεπιστευκότες πρὸς πάσας τὰς τοιαύτας ὑπολήψεις οἰκείως ἔχειν τὸ νοηθὲν ὑπειλήφαμεν. οὐ γὰρ μάχεται πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ὀνόματα κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἀντιθέτων φύσιν, ὡς εἰ τὸ ἓν ὑπάρχοι, μὴ ἂν αὐτῷ συνθεωρηθῆναι τὸ ἕτερον, ὡς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ζωὴν ἅμα καὶ θάνατον περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν νοηθῆναι, ἀλλὰ τοιαύτη ἐστὶν ἑκάστου τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς θείας φύσεως λεγομένων ἡ ἔμφασις, ὥστε κἂν ἰδιάζῃ τῷ σημαινομένῳ, μηδεμίαν ἴσχειν πρὸς τὸ συνονομαζόμενον ἐναντίωσιν. τί γὰρ ἐναντιοῦται τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ τὸ δίκαιον, κἂν μὴ συμβαίνῃ κατὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἀλλήλοις τὰ ῥήματα; ποίαν δὲ μάχην ἡ ἀγαθότης ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἀόρατον; οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ ἀΐδιον τῆς θείας ζωῆς διπλοῖς ὀνόμασί τε καὶ νοήμασι γνωριζόμενον, τῷ ἀτελευτήτῳ καὶ τῷ ἀνάρχῳ, τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν ὀνομάτων συνδιατέμνεται: καὶ οὔτε ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ ἑτέρῳ κατὰ τὴν σημασίαν τὸ ἕτερον (τὸ μὲν γὰρ τὴν τῆς ἀρχῆς τὸ δὲ τὴν τοῦ τέλους ἀλλοτρίωσιν ἔδειξεν) οὔτε μερισμόν τινα τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἡ τῶν ἐπιθεωρουμένων αὐτῷ νοημάτων διαφορὰ παρεσκεύασε.