You are quite justified, she replied, in raising this question, and it has ere this been discussed by many elsewhere; namely, what we are to think of the principle of desire and the principle of anger within us. Are they consubstantial with the soul, inherent in the soul’s very self from her first organization38    παρὰ τὴν πρώτην (i.e. ὥραν understood). This is the reading of all the Codd. for the faulty παρὰ τὴν αὐτὴν of the Editions., or are they something different, accruing to us afterwards? In fact, while all equally allow that these principles are to be detected in the soul, investigation has not yet discovered exactly what we are to think of them so as to gain some fixed belief with regard to them. The generality of men still fluctuate in their opinions about this, which are as erroneous as they are numerous. As for ourselves, if the Gentile philosophy, which deals methodically with all these points, were really adequate for a demonstration, it would certainly be superfluous to add39    προστιθέναι. Sifanus translates “illorum commentationi de animâ adjicere sermonem,” which Krabinger wonders at. The Greek could certainly bear this meaning: but perhaps the other reading is better, i.e. προτιθέναι, “to propose for consideration.” a discussion on the soul to those speculations. But while the latter proceeded, on the subject of the soul, as far in the direction of supposed consequences as the thinker pleased, we are not entitled to such licence, I mean that of affirming what we please; we make the Holy Scriptures the rule and the measure of every tenet; we necessarily fix our eyes upon that, and approve that alone which may be made to harmonize with the intention of those writings. We must therefore neglect the Platonic chariot and the pair of horses of dissimilar forces yoked to it, and their driver, whereby the philosopher allegorizes these facts about the soul; we must neglect also all that is said by the philosopher who succeeded him and who followed out probabilities by rules of art40    i.e.the syllogism., and diligently investigated the very question now before us, declaring that the soul was mortal41    that the soul was mortal. Aristotle, guided only by probabilities as discoverable by the syllogism, does indeed define the soul, “the first entelechy of a physical, potentially living, and organic body.” Entelechy is more than mere potentiality: it is “developed force” (“dormant activity;” see W. Archer Butler’s Lectures, ii. p. 393), capable of manifestation. The human soul, uniting in itself all the faculties of the other orders of animate existence, is a Microcosm. The other parts of the soul are inseparable from the body, and are hence perishable (De Animâ, ii. 2); but the νοῦς exists before the body, into which it enters from without as something divine and immortal (De Gen. Animal. ii. 3). But he makes a distinction between the form-receiving, and the form-giving νοῦς: substantial eternal existence belongs only to the latter (De Animâ, iii. 5). The secret of the difference between him and Plato, with whom “all the soul is immortal” (Phædrus, p. 245 C), lies in this; that Plato regarded the soul as always in motion, while Aristotle denied it, in itself, any motion at all. “It is one of the things that are impossible that motion should exist in it” (De Animâ, i. 4). It cannot be moved at all; therefore it cannot move itself. Plotinus and Porphyry, as well as Nemesius the Platonizing Bishop of Emesa (whose treatise De Animâ is wrongly attributed to Gregory), attacked this teaching of an “entelechy.” Cf. also Justin Martyr (ad Græc. cohort, c. 6, p. 12); “Plato declares that all the soul is immortal; Aristotle calls her an ‘entelechy,’ and not immortal. The one says she is ever-moving, the other that she is never-moving, but prior to all motion.” Also Gregory Naz., Orat. xxvii. “Away with Aristotle’s calculating Providence, and his art of logic, and his dead reasonings about the soul, and purely human doctrine!” by reason of these two principles; we must neglect all before and since their time, whether they philosophized in prose or in verse, and we will adopt, as the guide of our reasoning, the Scripture, which lays it down as an axiom that there is no excellence in the soul which is not a property as well of the Divine nature. For he who declares the soul to be God’s likeness asserts that anything foreign to Him is outside the limits of the soul; similarity cannot be retained in those qualities which are diverse from the original. Since, then, nothing of the kind we are considering is included in the conception of the Divine nature, one would be reasonable in surmising that such things are not consubstantial with the soul either. Now to seek to build up our doctrine by rule of dialectic and the science which draws and destroys conclusions, involves a species of discussion which we shall ask to be excused from, as being a weak and questionable way of demonstrating truth. Indeed, it is clear to every one that that subtle dialectic possesses a force that may be turned both ways, as well for the overthrow of truth42    for the overthrow of the truth. So c. Eunom. iii. (ii. 500). as for the detection of falsehood; and so we begin to suspect even truth itself when it is advanced in company with such a kind of artifice, and to think that the very ingenuity of it is trying to bias our judgment and to upset the truth. If on the other hand any one will accept a discussion which is in a naked unsyllogistic form, we will speak upon these points by making our study of them so far as we can follow the chain43    εἰρμόν. of Scriptural tradition. What is it, then, that we assert? We say that the fact of the reasoning animal man being capable of understanding and knowing is most surely44    most surely, ἦ. This is the common reading: but the Codd. have mostly καὶ. attested by those outside our faith; and that this definition would never have sketched our nature so, if it had viewed anger and desire and all such-like emotions as consubstantial with that nature. In any other case, one would not give a definition of the subject in hand by putting a generic instead of a specific quality; and so, as the principle of desire and the principle of anger are observed equally in rational and irrational natures, one could not rightly mark the specific quality by means of this generic one. But how can that which, in defining a nature, is superfluous and worthy of exclusion be treated as a part of that nature, and, so, available for falsifying the definition? Every definition of an essence looks to the specific quality of the subject in hand; and whatever is outside that speciality is set aside as having nothing to do with the required definition. Yet, beyond question, these faculties of anger and desire are allowed to be common to all reasoning and brute natures; anything common is not identical with that which is peculiar; it is imperative therefore that we should not range these faculties amongst those whereby humanity is exclusively meant: but just as one may perceive the principle45    Aristotle, Ethic. i. 13, dwells upon these principles. Of the last he says, i.e. the common vegetative, the principle of nutrition and growth: “One would assume such a power of the soul in everything that grows, even in the embryo, and just this very same power in the perfect creatures; for this is more likely than that it should be a different one.” Sleep, in which this power almost alone is active, levels all. of sensation, and that of nutrition and growth in man, and yet not shake thereby the given definition of his soul (for the quality A being in the soul does not prevent the quality B being in it too), so, when one detects in humanity these emotions of anger and desire, one cannot on that account fairly quarrel with this definition, as if it fell short of a full indication of man’s nature.

Μ. Ἡ δὲ Πολλοῖς φησὶν, ἤδη καὶ ἄλλοις ἐζητημένον τὸν λόγον τοῦτον ἀκολούθως καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιζητεῖς, ὅ, τι ποτὲ χρὴ ταῦτα νομίζειν εἶναι τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς, εἴτε συνουσιωμένα τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ παρὰ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθὺς τῇ κατασκευῇ συνυπάρχοντα, εἴτε τι ἄλλο παρ' αὐτὴν ὄντα καὶ ὕστερον ἡμῖν ἐπιγινόμενα. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐνορᾶσθαι τῇ ψυχῇ ταῦτα, παρὰ πάντων ἐπίσης ὁμολογεῖται: τὸ δὲ ὅ, τι χρὴ περὶ αὐτῶν οἴεσθαι, οὔπω δι' ἀκριβείας εὗρεν ὁ λόγος. ὥστε βεβαίαν τὴν περὶ τούτων ὑπόληψιν ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἔτι πεπλανημέναις οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ διαφόροις ταῖς περὶ τούτων δόξαις ἐπιδιστάζουσιν. Ἡμῖν δὲ εἰ μὲν ἱκανὴ πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν ἀληθῶς ἦν ἡ ἔξω φιλοσοφία, ἡ τεχνικῶς περὶ τούτων διαλαβοῦσα, περιττὸν ἂν ἦν ἴσως τὸν περὶ ψυχῆς λόγον προτιθέναι τῷ σκέμματι. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῖς μὲν κατὰ τὸ φανὲν ἀκόλουθον κατ' ἐξουσίαν προῆλθεν ἡ περὶ ψυχῆς θεωρία: ἡμεῖς δὲ τῆς ἐξουσίας ἄμοιροι ταύτης ἐσμὲν, τῆς λέγειν φημὶ ἅπερ βουλόμεθα, κανόνι παντὸς δόγματος καὶ νόμῳ κεχρημένοι τῇ ἁγίᾳ Γραφῇ: ἀναγκαίως πρὸς ταύτην βλέποντες, τοῦτο δεχόμεθα μόνον, ὅ, τι περ ἂν ᾖ συμφωνοῦν τῷ τῶν γεγραμμένων σκοπῷ. Οὐκοῦν παρέντες τὸ Πλατωνικὸν ἅρμα, καὶ τὴν ὑπεζευγμένην αὐτῷ ξυνωρίδα τῶν πώλων, οὐχ ὁμοίως ταῖς ὁρμαῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐχόντων, καὶ τὸν ὑπὲρ τούτων ἡνίοχον, δι' ὧν ἁπάντων τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ ψυχῆς φιλοσοφεῖ δι' αἰνίγματος: ὅσα θ' ὁ μετ' ἐκεῖνον φιλόσοφος ὁ τεχνικῶς τοῖς φαινομένοις ἀκολουθῶν, καὶ τὰ νῦν ἡμῖν προκείμενα δι' ἐπιμελείας κατεξετάζων, θνητὴν εἶναι διὰ τούτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπεφήνατο, καὶ πάντας τούς τε πρὸ τούτων, καὶ τοὺς ἐφεξῆς, τούς τε καταλογάδην καὶ τοὺς ἐν ῥυθμῷ τινι καὶ μέτρῳ φιλοσοφήσαντας καταλιπόντες, σκοπὸν τοῦ λόγου τὴν θεόπνευστον Γραφὴν ποιησώμεθα, ἣ ψυχῆς ἐξαίρετον μηδὲν νομίζειν εἶναι νομοθετεῖ, ὃ μὴ καὶ τῆς θείας φύσεώς ἐστιν ἴδιον. Ὁ γὰρ ὁμοίωμα Θεοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι φήσας, πᾶν ὃ ἀλλότριόν ἐστι Θεοῦ, ἐκτὸς εἶναι τοῦ ὅρου τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπεφήνατο. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἐν τοῖς παρηλλαγμένοις διασωθείη τὸ ὅμοιον. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ τοιοῦτον οὐδὲ τῇ θείᾳ συνθεωρεῖται φύσει, οὐδὲ τῇ ψυχῇ συνουσιοῦσθαι ταῦτα κατὰ λόγον ἄν τις ὑπονοήσειε.
Τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν τέχνην διὰ συλλογιστικῆς τε καὶ ἀναλυτικῆς ἐπιστήμης βεβαιοῦσθαι καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα δόγματα, ὡς σαθρόν τε καὶ ὕποπτον εἰς ἀπόδειξιν ἀληθείας τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος τοῦ λόγου παραιτησόμεθα. Πᾶσι γάρ ἐστι πρόδηλον τὸ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν περιεργίαν ἴσην ἐφ' ἑκάτερα τὴν ἰσχὺν ἔχειν, πρός τε τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας ἀνατροπὴν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ψεύδους κατηγορίαν. Ὅθεν καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὅταν μετά τινος τοιαύτης τέχνης προάγηται, δι' ὑποψίας πολλάκις ποιούμεθα, ὡς τῆς περὶ ταύτης δεινότητος παρακρουομένης ἡμῶν τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀποσφαλείσης. Εἰ δέ τις τὸν ἀκατάσκευόν τε καὶ γυμνὸν πάσης περιβολῆς προσίοιτο λόγον, ἐροῦμεν ὡς ἂν οἷόν τε ᾖ κατὰ τὸν εἱρμὸν τῆς γραφικῆς ὑφηγήσεως τὴν περὶ τούτων θεωρίαν προσάγοντες. Τί οὖν ἐστιν ὅ φαμεν; Τὸ λογικὸν τοῦτο ζῶον ὁ ἄνθρωπος νοῦ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν εἶναι, ἢ παρὰ τῶν ἔξω τοῦ λόγου τοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς μεμαρτύρηται, οὐκ ἂν οὕτω τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἡμῶν ὑπογράφοντος, εἴπερ ἐνεώρα θυμόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα συνουσιωμένα τῇ φύσει. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπ' ἄλλου τινὸς ὅρον ἄν τις ἀποδοίη τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, τὸ κοινὸν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἰδίου λέγων.
Ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν τε καὶ θυμοειδὲς κατὰ τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀλόγου τε καὶ λογικῆς φύσεως καθορᾶται, οὐκ ἄν τις εὐλόγως ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ χαρακτηρίζει τὸ ἴδιον. Ὃ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τῆς φύσεως ὑπογραφὴν περιττόν τε καὶ ἀπόβλητον, πῶς ἔνεστιν ὡς μέρος τῆς φύσεως, ἐπ' ἀνατροπῇ τοῦ ὅρου τὴν ἰσχὺν ἔχειν; Πᾶς γὰρ ὁρισμὸς οὐσίας πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον τοῦ ὑποκειμένου βλέπει. Ὅ, τι δ' ἂν ἔξω τοῦ ἰδιάζοντος ᾖ, ὡς ἀλλότριον παρορᾶται τοῦ ὅρου. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ κατὰ θυμόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἐνέργεια κοινὴ πάσης εἶναι τῆς λογικῆς τε καὶ ἀλόγου φύσεως ὁμολογεῖται. Πᾶν δὲ τὸ κοινὸν, οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ ἰδιάζοντι. Ἀνάγκη ἄρα διὰ τούτων ἐστὶ, μὴ ἐν τούτοις εἶναι ταῦτα λογίζεσθαι, ἐν οἷς κατεξαίρετον ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη χαρακτηρίζεται φύσις. Ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τὸ θρεπτικὸν καὶ αὐξητικὸν ἐν ἡμῖν τις ἰδὼν οὐκ ἀναλύει διὰ τούτων τὸν ἀποδοθέντα τῆς ψυχῆς ὅρον (οὐ γὰρ ἐπειδὴ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἐκεῖνο οὐκ ἔστιν), οὕτω καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν θυμὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν κατανοήσας τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν κινήματα, οὐκ ἂν εὐλόγως τῷ ὅρῳ μάχοιτο, ὡς ἐλλειπῶς ἐνδειξαμένῳ τὴν φύσιν.