But that, said I, was not the point in question. Most of your hearers will assent to the fact that there will some day be a Resurrection, and that man will be brought before the incorruptible tribunal160    the incorruptible tribunal. The Judgment comes after the Resurrection (cf. 250 A, 254 A, 258 D), and after the purifying and chastising detailed above. The latter is represented by Gregory as a necessary process of nature: but not till the Judgment will the moral value of each life be revealed. There is no contradiction, such as Möller tries to find, between this Dialogue and Gregory’s Oratio Catechetica. There too he is speaking of chastisement after the Resurrection and before the Judgment. “For not everything that is granted in the resurrection a return to existence will return to the same kind of life. There is a wide interval between those who have been purified (i.e. by baptism) and those who still need purification.”…“But as for those whose weaknesses have become inveterate, and to whom no purgation of their defilement has been applied, no mystic water, no invocation of the Divine power, no amendment by repentance, it is absolutely necessary that they should be submitted to something proper to their case,” i.e. to compensate for Baptism, which they have never received (c. 35).; on account both of the Scripture proofs, and also of our previous examination of the question. But still the question remains161    φήσιν should probably be struck out (as the insertion of a copyist encouraged by εἶπον below): five of Krabinger’s Codd. omit it.: Is the state which we are to expect to be like the present state of the body? Because if so, then, as I was saying162    εἶπον. Cf. 243 C: καὶ ἅμα λεγειν ἐπεχείρουν ὅσα πρὸς ἀνατροπὴν τῆς ἀναστάσεως παρὰ τῶν ἐριστικῶν ἐφευρίσκεται. So that this is not the first occasion on which objections to the Resurrection have been started by Gregory, and there is no occasion to adopt the conjecture of Augentius and Sifanus, ἂν εἴποιμι, “dixerim”, especially as εἶπον is found in all Codd. without exception., men had better avoid hoping for any Resurrection at all. For if our bodies are to be restored to life again in the same sort of condition as they are in when they cease to breathe, then all that man can look forward to in the Resurrection is an unending calamity. For what spectacle is more piteous than when in extreme old age our bodies shrivel up163    Reading καταῤ& 191·ικνωθέντα and change into something repulsive and hideous, with the flesh all wasted in the length of years, the skin dried up about the bones till it is all in wrinkles, the muscles in a spasmodic state from being no longer enriched with their natural moisture, and the whole body consequently shrunk, the hands on either side powerless to perform their natural work, shaken with an involuntary trembling? What a sight again are the bodies of persons in a long consumption! They differ from bare bones only in giving the appearance of being covered with a worn-out veil of skin. What a sight too are those of persons swollen with the disease of dropsy! What words could describe the unsightly disfigurement of sufferers from leprosy164    ἱερᾷ νόσῳ. That these words can mean leprosy, as well as epilepsy, seems clear from Eusebius.? Gradually over all their limbs and organs of sensation rottenness spreads and devours them. What words could describe that of persons who have been mutilated in earthquake, battle, or by any other visitation, and live on in such a plight for a long time before their natural deaths? Or of those who from an injury have grown up from infancy with their limbs awry! What can one say of them? What is one to think about the bodies of newborn infants who have been either exposed, or strangled, or died a natural death, if they are to be brought to life again just such as they were? Are they to continue in that infantine state? What condition could be more miserable than that? Or are they to come to the flower of their age? Well, but what sort of milk has Nature got to suckle them again with? It comes then to this: that, if our bodies are to live again in every respect the same as before, this thing that we are expecting is simply a calamity; whereas if they are not the same, the person raised up will be another than he who died. If, for instance, a little boy was buried, but a grown man rises again, or reversely, how can we say that the dead in his very self is raised up, when he has had some one substituted for him by virtue of this difference in age? Instead of the child, one sees a grown-up man. Instead of the old man, one sees a person in his prime. In fact, instead of the one person another entirely. The cripple is changed into the able-bodied man; the consumptive sufferer into a man whose flesh is firm; and so on of all possible cases, not to enumerate them for fear of being prolix. If, then, the body will not come to life again just such in its attributes as it was when it mingled with the earth, that dead body will not rise again; but on the contrary the earth will be formed into another man. How, then, will the Resurrection affect myself, when instead of me some one else will come to life? Some one else, I say; for how could I recognize myself when, instead of what was once myself, I see some one not myself? It cannot really be I, unless it is in every respect the same as myself. Suppose, for instance, in this life I had in my memory the traits of some one; say he was bald, had prominent lips, a somewhat flat nose, a fair complexion, grey eyes, white hair, wrinkled skin; and then went to look for such an one, and met a young man with a fine head of hair, an aquiline nose, a dark complexion, and in all other respects quite different in his type of countenance; am I likely in seeing the latter to think of the former? But why dwell longer on these the less forcible objections to the Resurrection, and neglect the strongest one of all? For who has not heard that human life is like a stream, moving from birth to death at a certain rate of progress, and then only ceasing from that progressive movement when it ceases also to exist? This movement indeed is not one of spacial change; our bulk never exceeds itself; but it makes this advance by means of internal alteration; and as long as this alteration is that which its name implies, it never remains at the same stage (from moment to moment); for how can that which is being altered be kept in any sameness? The fire on the wick, as far as appearance goes, certainly seems always the same, the continuity of its movement giving it the look of being an uninterrupted and self-centred whole; but in reality it is always passing itself along and never remains the same; the moisture which is extracted by the heat is burnt up and changed into smoke the moment it has burst into flame and this alterative force effects the movement of the flame, working by itself the change of the subject-matter into smoke; just, then, as it is impossible for one who has touched that flame twice on the same place, to touch twice the very same flame165    to touch twice the very same flame. Albert Jahn (quoted by Krabinger) here remarks that Gregory’s comparison rivals that of Heraclitus: and that there is a deliberate intention of improving on the expression of the latter, “you cannot step twice into the same stream.” Above (p. 459), Gregory has used directly Heraclitus’ image, “so that Nature’s stream may not flow on for ever, pouring forward in her successive births,” &c. See also De Hom. Opif. c. 13 (beginning). (for the speed of the alteration is too quick; it does not wait for that second touch, however rapidly it may be effected; the flame is always fresh and new; it is always being produced, always transmitting itself, never remaining at one and the same place), a thing of the same kind is found to be the case with the constitution of our body. There is influx and afflux going on in it in an alterative progress until the moment that it ceases to live; as long as it is living it has no stay; for it is either being replenished, or it is discharging in vapour, or it is being kept in motion by both of these processes combined. If, then, a particular man is not the same even as he was yesterday166    not the same even as he was yesterday. Cf. Gregory’s Oratio de Mortuis, t. III. p. 633 A. “It is not exaggeration to say that death is woven into our life. Practically such an idea will be found by any one to be based on a reality: for experiment would confirm this belief that the man of yesterday is not the same as the man of today in material substance, but that something of him must be alway becoming dead, or be growing, or being destroyed, or ejected:…Wherefore, according to the expression of the mighty Paul, ‘we die daily’: we are not always the same people remaining in the same homes of the body, but each moment we change from what we were by reception and ejectment, altering continually into a fresh body.”, but is made different by this transmutation, when so be that the Resurrection shall restore our body to life again, that single man will become a crowd of human beings, so that with his rising again there will be found the babe, the child, the boy, the youth, the man, the father, the old man, and all the intermediate persons that he once was. But further167    A fresh objection is here started. It is answered (254 A, B).; chastity and profligacy are both carried on in the flesh; those also who endure the most painful tortures for their religion, and those on the other hand who shrink from such, both one class and the other reveal their character in relation to fleshly sensations; how, then, can justice be done at the Judgment168    Which succeeds (and is bound up with) the Resurrection. The argument is, “the flesh has behaved differently in different persons here; how then can it be treated alike in all by being allowed to rise again? Even before the judgment an injustice has been done by all rising in the same way to a new life.”—In what follows, ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῦ νῦν μὲν, κ.τ.λ., the difficulty of different dispositions in the same person is considered.?

Or take the case of one and the same man first sinning and then cleansing himself by repentance, and then, it might so happen, relapsing into his sin; in such a case both the defiled and the undefiled body alike undergoes a change, as his nature changes, and neither of them continue to the end the same; which body, then, is the profligate to be tortured in? In that which is stiffened with old age and is near to death? But this is not the same as that which did the sin. In that, then, which defiled itself by giving way to passion? But where is the old man, in that case? This last, in fact, will not rise again, and the Resurrection will not do a complete work; or else he will rise, while the criminal will escape. Let me say something else also from amongst the objections made by unbelievers to this doctrine. No part, they urge, of the body is made by nature without a function. Some parts, for instance, are the efficient causes within us of our being alive; without them our life in the flesh could not possibly be carried on; such are the heart, liver, brain, lungs, stomach, and the other vitals; others are assigned to the activities of sensation; others to those of handing and walking169    παρεκτικῆς καὶ μεταβατικῆς ἐνεργείας. To the latter expression, which simply means walking, belong the words below, καὶ πρὸς τὸν δρομον οι πόδες (p. 464). Schmidt well remarks that a simpler form than μεταβατικός does not exist, because in all walking the notion of putting one foot in the place of the other (μετά) is implied; and shows that Krabinger’s translation “transeundi officium” makes too much of the word.; others are adapted for the transmission of a posterity. Now if the life to come is to be in exactly the same circumstances as this, the supposed change in us is reduced to nothing; but if the report is true, as indeed it is, which represents marriage as forming no part of the economy of that after-life, and eating and drinking as not then preserving its continuance, what use will there be for the members of our body, when we are no longer to expect in that existence any of the activities for which our members now exist? If, for the sake of marriage, there are now certain organs adapted for marriage, then, whenever the latter ceases to be, we shall not need those organs: the same may be said of the hands for working with, the feet for running with, the mouth for taking food with, the teeth for grinding it with, the organs of the stomach for digesting, the evacuating ducts for getting rid of that which has become superfluous. When therefore, all those operations will be no more how or wherefore will their instruments exist? So that necessarily, if the things that are not going to contribute in any way to that other life are not to surround the body, none of the parts which at present constitute the body would170    Reading ὡς ἄν ἀνάγκην εἶναι, εἰ μὴ εἴη περὶ τὸ σῶμα τὰ πρὸς οὐδὲν, κ.τ.λ. The ἂν seems required by the protasis εἰ μὴ εἴη, and two Codd. supply it. The interrogative sentence ends with ἔσται.—Below (ὥστε παθεῖν ἂν), ἂν is found with the same force with the infinitive; “so that those…might possibly be affected.” exist either. That life171    Reading ἐν ἄλλοις ἄρ᾽ ἡ ζωή, as Schmidt suggests, and as the sense seems to require, although there is no ms. authority except for γὰρ., then, will be carried on by other instruments; and no one could call such a state of things a Resurrection, where the particular members are no longer present in the body, owing to their being useless to that life. But if on the other hand our Resurrection will be represented in every one of these; then the Author of the Resurrection will fashion things in us of no use and advantage to that life. And yet we must believe, not only that there is a Resurrection, but also that it will not be an absurdity. We must, therefore, listen attentively to the explanation of this, so that, for every part of this truth we may have its probability saved to the last172    saved to the last. The word here is διασώζειν; lit. to “preserve through danger,” but it is used by later writers mostly of dialectic battles, and Plato himself uses it so (e.g. Timæus, p. 56, 68, Polit. p. 395) always of “probability.” It is used by Gregory, literally, in his letter to Flavian, “we at last arrived alive in our own district,” and, with a slight difference, On Pilgrimages, “it is impossible for a woman to accomplish so long a journey without a conductor, on account of her natural weakness.” Hence the late word διασώστης, dux itineris..

Γ. Ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦτο, εἶπον ἐγὼ, τὸ ζητούμενον ἦν: τὸ γὰρ ἔσεσθαί ποτε τὴν ἀνάστασιν, καὶ τὸ ὑπαχθήσεσθαι τῇ ἀδεκάστῳ κρίσει τὸν ἄνθρωπον, διά τε τῶν γραφικῶν ἀποδείξεων, καὶ τῶν ἤδη προεξητασμένων, οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀκουόντων συνθήσονται. Ὑπόλοιπον ἂν εἴη σκοπεῖν, φησὶν, εἰ ὥσπερ τὸ νῦν καὶ τὸ ἐλπιζόμενον ἔσται. Ὅπερ εἰ ὄντως εἴη, φευκτὸν εἶπον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς ἀναστάσεως εἶναι. Εἰ γὰρ οἷα γίνεται, ὅταν λήγεται τοῦ ζῇν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα σώματα, τοιαῦτα τῇ ζωῇ πάλιν ἀποκαθίσταται: ἄρα τις ἀτέλεστος συμφορὰ διὰ τῆς ἀναστάσεως τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐλπίζεται. Τί γὰρ ἂν ἐλεεινότερον γένοιτο θέαμα, ἢ ὅταν ἐν ἐσχάτῳ γήρᾳ καταῤῥιγνυθέντα τὰ σώματα μεταποιηθῇ πρὸς τὸ εἰδεχθές τε καὶ ἄμορφον, τῆς μὲν σαρκὸς αὐτῆς ἀναλωθείσης τῷ χρόνῳ, ῥυσοῦ δὲ τοῖς ὀστέοις περιεσκληκότος τοῦ δέρματος; Τῶν δὲ δὴ νεύρων συνεσπασμένων διὰ τὸ μηκέτι τῇ φυσικῇ ἰκμάδι ὑποπιαίνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο παντὸς συνελκομένου τοῦ σώματος, ἄτοπόν τι καὶ ἐλεεινὸν θέαμα γίνεται, τῆς μὲν κεφαλῆς ἐπὶ τὸ γόνυ συγκεκλιμένης: τῆς δὲ χειρὸς ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν πρὸς μὲν τὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἐνέργειαν ἀπρακτούσης, ἐντρομῆς δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἀκούσιον ἀεὶ κραδαινομένης. Οἷα δὲ πάλιν τῶν ταῖς χρονίαις νόσοις ἐκτετηκότων τὰ σώματα; Ἃ τοσοῦτον διαφέρει τῶν γυμνωθέντων ὀστέων, ὅσον ἐπικαλύφθαι δοκεῖ λεπτῷ, καὶ ἐκδεδαπανημένῳ ἤδη τῷ δέρματι. Οἷα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ὑδερικαῖς ἀῤῥωστίαις ἐξῳδηκότων, τῶν δὲ τῇ ἱερᾷ νόσῳ κεκρατημένων τὴν ἀσχήμονα λώβην τίς ἂν ὑπ' ὄψιν ἀγάγοι λόγος, ὡς κατ' ὀλίγον αὐτοῖς πάντα τὰ μέλη τὰ ὀργανικά τε καὶ αἰσθητὰ προσιοῦσα ἡ σηπεδὼν ἐπιβόσκεται; τῶν δὲ ἐν σεισμοῖς, ἢ πολέμοις, ἢ ἐξ ἑτέρας τινὸς αἰτίας ἠκροτηριασμένων, καὶ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου χρόνον τινὰ ἐν τῇ συμφορᾷ ταύτῃ ἐπιβιούντων, ἢ τῶν ἀπὸ γενέσεως λώβῃ τινὶ συναποτελεσθέντων ἐν διαστρόφοις τοῖς μέλεσι, περιὸν, τί ἄν τις λέγοι;
Περὶ τῶν ἀρτιγενῶν νηπίων τῶν τε ἐκτιθεμένων, καὶ τῶν καταπνιγομένων, καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸ αὐτόματον ἀπολλυμένων, τί ἐστι λογίσασθαι, εἰ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάλιν πρὸς τὴν ζωὴν ἐπανάγοιτο, ἄρα ἐναπομένῃ τῇ νηπιότητι, καὶ τί ἀθλιώτερον; ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἄκρον ἥξει τῆς ἡλικίας, καὶ ποίῳ γάλακτι πάλιν ἡ φύσις αὐτὰ τιθηνήσεται; Ὥστε εἰ μὲν διὰ πάντων ταὐτὸν ἡμῖν τὸ σῶμα πάλιν ἀναβιώσεται, συμφορὰ ἔσται τὸ προσδοκώμενον: εἰ δὲ μὴ ταὐτὸν, ἄλλος τις ὁ ἐγειρόμενος ἔσται παρὰ τὸν κείμενον. Εἰ γὰρ πέπτωκε μὲν τὸ παιδίον, ἀνίσταται δὲ τέλειος, ἢ τὸ ἔμπαλιν, πῶς ἔστιν εἰπεῖν αὐτὸν ἀνωρθῶσθαι τὸν κείμενον, ἐν τῇ τῆς ἡλικίας διαφορᾷ τοῦ πεπτωκότος ὑπηλλαγμένου ὄντος: ἀντὶ γὰρ τοῦ παιδίου τέλειον, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου τὸν ἀκμηστὸν τίς ὁρῶν, ἕτερον ἀνθ' ἑτέρου τεθέαται, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ λελωβημένου τὸν ἄρτιον, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐκτετηκότος τὸν εὔσαρκον, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὡσαύτως, ἵνα μὴ, τὰ καθ' ἕκαστόν τις διεξιὼν, ὄχλον ἐπεισάγῃ τῷ λόγῳ; Εἰ μὴ οὖν τοιοῦτον ἀναβιώσῃ τὸ σῶμα πάλιν, οἷον ἦν ὅτε τῇ γῇ κατεμίγνυτο, οὐ τὸ τεθνηκὸς ἀναστήσεται, ἀλλ' εἰς ἄλλον ἄνθρωπον ἡ γῆ διαπλασθήσεται. Τί οὖν πρὸς ἐμὲ ἡ ἀνάστασις, εἰ ἀντ' ἐμοῦ τις ἄλλος ἀναβιώσεται; Πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐπιγνοίην αὐτὸς ἐμαυτὸν, βλέπων ἐν ἐμαυτῷ οὐκ ἐμαυτόν; Οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἴην ἀληθῶς ἐγὼ, εἰ μὴ διὰ πάντων εἴην ὁ αὐτὸς ἐμαυτῷ. Καθάπερ γὰρ κατὰ τὸν παρόντα βίον εἴ τινος ἔχοιμι διὰ μνήμης τὸν χαρακτῆρα, ὑποκείσθω δὲ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ψεδνὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι, προχειλὴς, ὑποσιμὸς, λευκόχρους, γλαυκόμματος, ἐν πολιᾷ τῇ τριχὶ, καὶ ῥυσῷ τῷ σώματι: εἶτα ζητῶν τὸν τοιοῦτον, ἐντύχοιμι νέῳ, κομήτῃ, γρυπῷ, μελανοχροῖ, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα τοῦ κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν χαρακτῆρος ἑτέρως ἔχοντι. Ἆρα τοῦτον εἰδὼς ἐκεῖνον οἰήσομαι; μᾶλλον δὲ τί χρὴ ταῖς ἐλάττοσι τῶν ἐνστάσεων ἐνδιατρίβειν τὸν ἰσχυρότερον ἀφιέμενον; Τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν, ὅτι ῥοῇ τινι προσέοικεν ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις, ἀπὸ γενέσεως εἰς θάνατον ἀεὶ διά τινος κινήσεως προϊοῦσα, τότε τῆς κινήσεως λήγουσα, ὅταν καὶ τοῦ εἶναι παύσεται;
Ἡ δὲ κίνησις αὕτη οὐ τοπική τίς ἐστι μετάστασις (οὐ γὰρ ἐκβαίνει ἑαυτὴν ἡ φύσις), ἀλλὰ δι' ἀλλοιώσεως ἔχει τὴν πρόοδον. Ἡ δὲ ἀλλοίωσις ἕως ἂν ᾖ τοῦτο ὃ λέγεται, οὐδέποτε ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μένει: (πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐν ταὐτότητι φυλαχθείη τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον;) ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς θρυαλλίδος πῦρ, τῷ μὲν δοκεῖν ἀεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεται (τὸ γὰρ συνεχὲς ἀεὶ τῆς κινήσεως ἀδιάσπαστον αὐτὸ καὶ ἡνωμένον πρὸς ἑαυτὸ δείκνυσι), τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ πάντως πάντοτε ἑαυτὸν αὐτὸ διαδεχόμενον, οὐδέποτε αὐτὸ μένει (ἡ γὰρ ἐξελκυσθεῖσα διὰ τῆς θερμότητος ἰκμὰς, ὁμοῦ τε ἐξεφλογώθη καὶ εἰς λίγνην ἐκκαυθεῖσα μετεποιήθη, καὶ ἀεὶ τῇ ἀλλοιωτικῇ δυνάμει ἡ τῆς φλογὸς κίνησις ἐνεργεῖται, εἰς λίγνην δι' ἑαυτῆς ἀλλοιοῦσα τὸ ὑποκείμενον): ὥσπερ τοίνυν δὶς κατὰ ταὐτὸν τῆς φλογὸς θίγοντα, οὐκ ἔστι τῆς αὐτῆς τὸ δὶς ἅψασθαι: (τὸ γὰρ ὀξὺ τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως οὐκ ἀναμένει τὸν ἐκ δευτέρου πάλιν ἐπιθιγγάνοντα, κἂν ὡς τάχιστα τοῦτο ποιῇ), ἀλλ' ἀεὶ καινή τε καὶ πρόσφατός ἐστιν ἡ φλὸξ πάντοτε γινομένη, καὶ ἀεὶ ἑαυτὴν διαδεχομένη, καὶ οὐδέποτε ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μένουσα: τοιοῦτόν τι καὶ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν φύσιν ἐστί. Τὸ γὰρ ἐπίῤῥυτον τῆς φύσεως ἡμῶν, καὶ τὸ ἀπόῤῥυτον διὰ τῆς ἀλλοιωτικῆς κινήσεως ἀεὶ πορευόμενον, τότε κινούμενον ἵσταται, ὅταν καὶ τῆς ζωῆς ἀπολήξῃ: ἕως δ' ἂν ἐν τῷ ζῇν ᾖ, στάσιν οὐκ ἔχει. Ἢ γὰρ πληροῦται, ἢ διαπνέεται, ἢ δι' ἑκατέρων πάντως εἰσαεὶ διεξάγεται. Εἰ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τῷ χθιζῷ τις ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἕτερος τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ γίνεται, ὅταν ἐπαναγάγῃ πάλιν τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν πρὸς τὴν ζωὴν ἡ ἀνάστασις, δῆμός τις ἀνθρώπων πάντως ὁ εἷς γενήσεται, ὡς ἂν μηδὲν ἐλλείποι τοῦ ἀνισταμένου τὸ βρέφος, τὸ νήπιον, ὁ παῖς, τὸ μειράκιον, ὁ ἀνὴρ, ὁ πατὴρ, ὁ πρεσβύτης, καὶ τὰ διὰ μέσου πάντα. Σωφροσύνης δὲ καὶ ἀκολασίας διὰ σαρκὸς ἐνεργουμένης, τῶν δὲ ὑπομενόντων ὑπὲρ τῆς εὐσεβείας τὰς ἀλγεινὰς τῶν κολάσεων, τῶν τε αὖ μαλακιζομένων πρὸς ταῦτα διὰ τῆς σωματικῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἑκατέρων τούτων ἐπιδεικνυμένων, πῶς ἔστι παρὰ τὴν κρίσιν διασωθῆναι τὸ δίκαιον; Ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῦ νῦν μὲν πεπλημμεληκότος, αὖθις δὲ διὰ μεταμελείας ἑαυτὸν ἐκκαθάραντος, κἂν οὕτω τύχῃ πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ πλημμελὲς ὀλισθήσαντος, ὑπαμειφθέντος δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τῆς φύσεως, καὶ τοῦ μεμολυσμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀμολύντου σώματος, καὶ μήθ' ἑτέρου τούτων εἰς τὸ διηνεκὲς ἐξαρκέσαντος, ποῖον τῷ ἀκολάστῳ σῶμα συγκολασθήσεται, τὸ ῥικνωθὲν ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ πρὸς τῷ θανάτῳ; Ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἦν τοῦτο παρὰ τὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν κατειργασμένον, ἀλλ' ὅπερ κατεμολύνθη τῷ πάθει; καὶ ποῦ ὁ πρεσβύτης; Ἢ γὰρ οὐκ ἀναστήσεται οὗτος, καὶ οὐκ ἐνεργὸς ἡ ἀνάστασις: ἢ οὗτος ἐγερθήσεται, καὶ διαφεύξεται τὴν δίκην ὁ ὑποκείμενος.
Εἴπω τι καὶ ἄλλο τῶν προφερομένων ἡμῖν παρὰ τῶν οὐ δεδεγμένων τὸν λόγον. Οὐδὲν, φησὶν, ἄπρακτον τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι μορίων ἡ φύσις ἐποίησε. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν τοῦ ζῇν αἰτίαν καὶ δύναμιν ἐν ἡμῖν ἔχει, ὧν ἄνευ συστῆναι διὰ σαρκὸς ζωὴν ἡμῶν, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, οἷον, καρδία, ἧπαρ, ἐγκέφαλος, πνεύμων, γαστὴρ, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ σπλάγχνα: τὰ δὲ τῇ αἰσθητικῇ κινήσει ἀποκεκλήρωται: τὰ δὲ τῆς παρεκτικῆς καὶ μεταβατικῆς ἐνεργείας ἐστίν: ἄλλα δὲ πρὸς τὴν διαδοχὴν τῶν ἐπιγινομένων ἐπιτηδείως ἔχει. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν ὁ μετὰ ταῦτα βίος ἔσται, πρὸς οὐδὲν ἡ μετάστασις γίνεται: εἰ δὲ ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος (ὥσπερ οὖν ἐστιν ἀληθὴς), ὁ μήτε γάμον ἐμπολιτεύεσθαι τῷ μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν βίῳ διοριζόμενος, μήτε διὰ βρώσεως καὶ πόσεως τὴν τότε διακρατεῖσθαι ζωὴν, τίς ἔσται χρῆσις τῶν μερῶν τοῦ σώματος, οὐκέτι τῶν δι' ἃ νῦν ἐστι τὰ μέλη κατὰ τὴν ζωὴν ἐκείνην ἐλπιζομένων; Εἰ γὰρ τοῦ γάμου χάριν τὰ πρὸς τὸν γάμον ἐστὶ μέλη, ὅταν ἐκεῖνος μὴ ᾖ, οὐδὲ τῶν πρὸς ἐκεῖνον δεόμεθα. Οὕτω πρὸς τὸ ἔργον αἱ χεῖρες, καὶ πρὸς τὸν δρόμον οἱ πόδες, καὶ πρὸς τὴν παραδοχὴν τῶν σιτίων τὸ στόμα, καὶ οἱ ὀδόντες πρὸς τὴν τῆς τροφῆς ὑπηρεσίαν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν πέψιν τὰ σπλάγχνα, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀποβολὴν τῶν ἀχρειωθέντων οἱ ἐξοδικοὶ τῶν πόρων. Ὅταν οὖν ἐκεῖνα μὴ ᾖ, τὰ δι' ἐκεῖνα γινομένα πῶς ἢ ὑπὲρ τίνος ἔσται, ὡς ἀνάγκην εἶναι, εἰ μὲν εἴη περιττὰ τὰ σώματα πρὸς οὐδὲν πρὸς τὴν ζωὴν ἐκείνην συνεργεῖν μέλλοντα, μηδὲ εἶναί τι τῶν νῦν συμπληρούντων ἡμῖν τὸ σῶμα (ἐν ἄλλοις γὰρ ἡ ζωὴ), καὶ οὐκέτι τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάστασιν ὀνομάσειε, τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον μελῶν διὰ τὴν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ζωῇ ἀχρηστίαν οὐ συνανισταμένων τῷ σώματι; Εἰ δὲ διὰ πάντων ἔσται τούτων ἐναργὴς ἡ ἀνάστασις, μάταια ἡμῖν καὶ ἀνόνητα πρὸς τὴν ζωὴν ἐκείνην δημιουργήσει ὁ ἐνεργῶν τὴν ἀνάστασιν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναι πιστεύειν χρὴ τὴν ἀνάστασιν, καὶ μὴ ματαίαν εἶναι. Οὐκοῦν προσεκτέον τῷ λόγῳ, ὅπως ἂν ἡμῖν διὰ πάντων ἐν τῷ δόγματι τὸ εἰκὸς διασώζοιτο.