SANCTI AMBROSII MEDIOLANENSIS EPISCOPI DE OFFICIIS MINISTRORUM LIBRI TRES .

 LIBER PRIMUS.

 1 CAPUT PRIMUM.

 CAPUT II.

 CAPUT III.

 CAPUT IV.

 CAPUT V.

 CAPUT VI.

 8 CAPUT VII.

 CAPUT VIII.

 CAPUT IX.

 CAPUT X.

 CAPUT XI.

 CAPUT XII.

 CAPUT XIII.

 CAPUT XIV.

 CAPUT XV.

 CAPUT XVI.

 CAPUT XVII.

 CAPUT XVIII.

 CAPUT XIX.

 CAPUT XX.

 CAPUT XXI.

 CAPUT XXII.

 CAPUT XXIII.

 CAPUT XXIV.

 CAPUT XXV.

 CAPUT XXVI.

 CAPUT XXVII.

 CAPUT XXVIII.

 37 CAPUT XXIX.

 CAPUT XXX.

 CAPUT XXXI.

 CAPUT XXXII.

 CAPUT XXXIII.

 CAPUT XXXIV.

 CAPUT XXXV.

 CAPUT XXXVI.

 CAPUT XXXVII.

 CAPUT XXXVIII.

 CAPUT XXXIX.

 CAPUT XL.

 CAPUT XLI.

 CAPUT XLII.

 CAPUT XLIII.

 CAPUT XLIV.

 CAPUT XLV.

 CAPUT XLVI.

 CAPUT XLVII.

 CAPUT XLVIII.

 CAPUT XLIX.

 CAPUT L.

 LIBER SECUNDUS.

 69 CAPUT I.

 CAPUT II.

 CAPUT III.

 CAPUT IV.

 CAPUT V.

 76 CAPUT VI.

 CAPUT VII.

 CAPUT VIII.

 CAPUT IX.

 CAPUT X.

 CAPUT XI.

 CAPUT XII.

 85 CAPUT XIII.

 CAPUT XIV.

 CAPUT XV.

 CAPUT XVI.

 91 CAPUT XVII.

 CAPUT XVIII.

 93 CAPUT XIX.

 CAPUT XX.

 CAPUT XXI.

 97 CAPUT XXII.

 98 CAPUT XXIII.

 CAPUT XXIV.

 CAPUT XXV.

 101 CAPUT XXVI.

 CAPUT XXVII.

 CAPUT XXVIII.

 105 CAPUT XXIX.

 CAPUT XXX.

 LIBER TERTIUS.

 107 CAPUT PRIMUM.

 CAPUT II.

 CAPUT III.

 CAPUT IV.

 115 CAPUT V.

 CAPUT VI.

 CAPUT VII.

 CAPUT VIII.

 122 CAPUT IX.

 CAPUT X.

 CAPUT XI.

 CAPUT XII.

 CAPUT XIII.

 CAPUT XIV.

 CAPUT XV.

 CAPUT XVI.

 132 CAPUT XVII.

 CAPUT XVIII.

 135 CAPUT XIX.

 CAPUT XX.

 138 CAPUT XXI.

 CAPUT XXII.

Chapter XXVIII.

A community rests upon justice and good-will. Two parts of the former, revenge and private possession, are not recognized by Christians. What the Stoics say about common property and mutual help has been borrowed from the sacred writings. The greatness of the glory of justice, and what hinders access to it.

130. Justice,164    Cic. de Off. I. I. 7. then, has to do with the society of the human race, and the community at large. For that which holds society together is divided into two parts,—justice and good-will, which also is called liberality and kindness. Justice seems to me the loftier, liberality the more pleasing, of the two. The one gives judgment, the other shows goodness.

131. But that very thing is excluded with us which philosophers think to be the office of justice. For they say that the first expression of justice is, to hurt no one, except when driven to it by wrongs received. This is put aside by the authority of the Gospel. For the Scripture wills that the Spirit of the Son of Man should be in us, Who came to give grace, not to bring harm.165    S. Luke ix. 56.

132. Next they considered it consonant with justice that one should treat common, that is, public property as public, and private as private. But this is not even in accord with nature, for nature has poured forth all things for all men for common use. God has ordered all things to be produced, so that there should be food in common to all, and that the earth should be a common possession for all. Nature, therefore, has produced a common right for all, but greed has made it a right for a few. Here, too, we are told that the Stoics taught that all things which are produced on the earth are created for the use of men, but that men are born for the sake of men, so that mutually one may be of advantage to another.166    Cic. de Off. I. 9.

133. But whence have they got such ideas but out of the holy Scriptures? For Moses wrote that God said: “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness, and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.”167    Gen. i. 26. And David said: “Thou hast put all things under his feet; all sheep and oxen, yea, and the beasts of the field, the fowls of the air, and the fishes of the sea.”168    Ps. viii. 7, 8. So these philosophers have learnt from our writings that all things were made subject to man, and, therefore, they think that all things were produced also for man’s sake.

134. That man was made for the sake of man we find stated also in the books of Moses, when the Lord says: “It is not good that man should be alone, let us make him an helpmeet for him.”169    Gen. ii. 18. Thus the woman was given to the man to help him. She should bear him children, that one man might always be a help to another. Again, before the woman was formed, it was said of Adam: “There was not found an help-meet for him.”170    Gen. ii. 20. For one man could not have proper help but from another. Amongst all the living creatures, therefore, there was none meet for him, or, to put it plainly, none to be his helper. Hence a woman was looked for to help him.

135. Thus, in accordance with the will of God and the union of nature, we ought to be of mutual help one to the other, and to vie with each other in doing duties, to lay all our advantages as it were before all, and (to use the words of Scripture) to bring help one to the other from a feeling of devotion or of duty, by giving money, or by doing something, at any rate in some way or other; so that the charm of human fellowship may ever grow sweeter amongst us, and none may ever be recalled from their duty by the fear of danger, but rather account all things, whether good or evil, as their own concern.171    Cic. de Off. I. 9, § 30. Thus holy Moses feared not to undertake terrible wars for his people’s sake, nor was he afraid of the arms of the mightiest kings, nor yet was he frightened at the savagery of barbarian nations. He put on one side the thought of his own safety so as to give freedom to the people.

136. Great, then, is the glory of justice; for she, existing rather for the good of others than of self, is an aid to the bonds of union and fellowship amongst us. She holds so high a place that she has all things laid under her authority, and further can bring help to others and supply money; nor does she refuse her services, but even undergoes dangers for others.

137. Who would not gladly climb and hold the heights of this virtue, were it not that greed weakens and lessens the power of such a virtue?172    Cic. de Off. I. 7, § 24. For as long as we want to add to our possessions and to heap up money, to take into our possession fresh lands, and to be the richest of all, we have cast aside the form of justice and have lost the blessing of kindness towards all. How can he be just that tries to take from another what he wants for himself?

138. The desire to gain power also enervates173    Cic. de Off. I. 8, § 26. the perfect strength and beauty of justice. For how can he, who attempts to bring others under his own power, come forward on behalf of others? And how can a man help the weak against the strong, when he himself aspires to great power at the cost of liberty?

CAPUT XXVIII.

0061C

Societatem constare justitia et beneficentia: illius partes duas ultionem et privatam possessionem a Christianis non agnosci: quod vero de rerum communitate ac mutuo auxilio tradunt Stoici, hoc eos e Scripturis sacris mutuatos esse. Quantus justitiae splendor, et quinam scopuli accessum ad illam praepediant.

130. Justitia igitur ad societatem generis humani, et ad communitatem refertur. Societatis enim ratio dividitur in duas partes, justitiam et beneficentiam, quam eamdem liberalitatem et benignitatem vocant: justitia mihi excelsior videtur, liberalitas gratior: illa censuram tenet, ista bonitatem.

0062A 131. Sed primum ipsum quod putant philosophi justitiae munus, apud nos excluditur. Dicunt enim illi eam primam esse justitiae formam, ut nemini quis noceat, nisi lacessitus injuria: quod Evangelii auctoritate vacuatur (Luc. IX, 56); vult enim Scriptura, ut sit in nobis spiritus Filii hominis, qui venit conferre gratiam, non inferre injuriam.

132. Deinde formam justitiae putaverunt, ut quis communia, id est, publica pro publicis habeat, privata pro suis. Ne hoc quidem secundum naturam, natura enim omnia omnibus in commune profudit. Sic enim Deus generari jussit omnia ut pastus omnibus communis esset, et terra foret omnium quaedam communis possessio. Natura igitur jus commune generavit, usurpatio jus fecit privatum. 0062B Quo in loco aiunt placuisse Stoicis, quae in terris gignantur, omnia ad usus hominum creari: homines autem hominum causa esse generatos; ut ipsi inter se aliis alii prodesse possint.

133. Unde hoc, nisi de nostris Scripturis dicendum assumpserunt? Moyses enim scripsit, quia dixit Deus: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem nostram et secundum similitudinem, et habeat potestatem piscium maris, et volatilium coeli, et pecorum, 36 et omnium repentium super terram (Gen. I, 26). Et David ait: Omnia subjecisti sub pedibus ejus, oves et boves universas, insuper et pecora campi: volucres coeli, et pisces maris (Psal. VIII, 8, 9). Ergo omnia subjecta esse homini de nostris didicerunt, et ideo censent propter hominem esse generata.

0062C 134. Hominem quoque hominis causa generatum esse in libris Moysi reperimus, dicente Domino: Non est bonum esse hominem solum, faciamus ei adjutorium simile sibi (Gen II, 18). Ad adjumentum ergo mulier data est viro, quae generaret; ut homo homini adjumento foret. Denique antequam mulier formaretur, dictum est de Adam: Non est inventus adjutor similis illi (Ibid., 20); adjumentum enim homo nisi de homine habere non poterat. Ex omnibus igitur animantibus nullum animal simile, et ut absolute dicamus, nullus adjutor hominis inventus est: muliebris igitur sexus adjutor exspectabatur.

135. Ergo secundum Dei voluntatem, vel naturae 0063A copulam, invicem nobis esse auxilio debemus, certare officiis, velut in medio omnes utilitates ponere, et ut verbo Scripturae utar, adjumentum ferre alter alteri, vel studio, vel officio, vel pecunia, vel operibus, vel quolibet modo; ut inter nos societatis augeatur gratia. Nec quisquam ab officio vel periculi terrore revocetur: sed omnia sua ducat, vel adversa vel prospera. Denique sanctus Moyses pro populo patriae bella suscipere gravia non reformidavit, nec regis potentissimi trepidavit arma, nec barbaricae immanitatis expavit ferociam: sed abjecit salutem suam, ut plebi redderet libertatem.

136. Magnus itaque justitiae splendor, quae aliis potius nata quam sibi, communitatem et societatem nostrane adjuvat: excelsitatem tenet; ut suo judicio 0063B omnia subjecta habeat, opem aliis ferat, pecuniam conferat, officia non abnuat, pericula suscipiat aliena.

137. Quis non cuperet hanc virtutis arcem tenere, nisi prima avaritia infirmaret atque inflecteret tantae virtutis vigorem? Etenim dum augere opes, aggregare pecunias, occupare terras possessionibus cupimus, praestare divitiis; justitiae formam exuimus, beneficentiam communem amisimus. Quomodo enim potest justus esse, qui studet eripere alteri, quod sibi quaerat?

138. Potentiae quoque cupiditas, formam justitiae virilem effeminat? Quomodo enim potest pro aliis intervenire, qui alios sibi subjicere conatur: et infirmo adversus potentes opem ferre, qui ipse gravem libertati affectat potentiam?