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are called hypostases, if not of the substance alone. But it is necessary to know that substance itself, as a genus and having a relation to another, is referred to the category of relatives; for a genus is a genus of species and the species are species of a genus and are among the relatives. Further, things said to be relative and correlative have their relation either in things that are self-subsistent, that is, substances, or not in self-subsistent things, that is, accidents. And if it is in self-subsistent things, their relation is either natural, as of father and son, or not natural. And if it is not natural, it is either by chance, as slave and master, or by art, as student and teacher, or by choice, as friend and friend, enemy and enemy. But if it is not in self-subsistent things but in accidents, it is either natural, as the double and the half, or not natural. But it is necessary for a relative to first be referred to another category, as considered in itself, and then, as having a relation to another, to the category of relatives; for it is necessary for something to first exist without relation and then for a relation to be considered in it. 52 Concerning the qualified and quality. Quality is that according to which certain things are named qualified. And again, quality is that according to which the things that partake of it are paronymously named; from prudence the one who has prudence is called prudent, and hot the one who partakes of heat. But it is necessary to know that the qualified is more universal than the quality; for the qualified signifies the quality and that which partakes of it, that is, heat and the hot thing, which has heat; for qualified are those that have the quality, as for instance those that have heat are called hot. The hot things are qualified, but heat is a quality. But often quality itself is also called qualified, and similarly in the case of the quantified and quantity. Of qualities, some exist in animate {and rational} bodies, such as knowledge and virtues, sicknesses and health, and are called states and conditions, and others both in animate and in inanimate things, such as heat, cold, form, shape, capacity and incapacity. And of these, some are potential, and others actual; and if they are potential, they produce capacity and incapacity; and if they are actual, they have either permeated through and through, as heat through the whole of fire and whiteness through the whole of milk and snow, and it produces an affection and an affective quality, or they are on the surface and produce shape and form. There are, therefore, four species of quality: state and condition, capacity and incapacity, affection and affective quality, shape and form. But state differs from condition, because a state is difficult to change and more lasting, as for instance prudence; for one does not quickly change from prudence to imprudence. Likewise also knowledge, when one knows precisely, the knowledge is difficult to change in him, it is a state; and courage and temperance and justice likewise. Conditions, however, are easily moved and quickly changing things, such as heat, cold, sickness, health, and such things; for a person is disposed according to these, but quickly changes from hot becoming cold and from sickness healthy. And these things themselves, such as sickness and health and the like, if they are permanent and difficult to change, are states. But condition is more universal; for both are called conditions, for a person is somehow disposed according to them, but the difficult-to-change condition is called a state, and the easy-to-change one, a condition only. A second species of quality is capacity and incapacity, which are not actual, but possess a natural aptitude and power, or inaptitude, as we say a child is potentially musical, for even if he does not actually have music, yet he has an aptitude for receiving music, but the irrational animal is unmusical as neither having music actually nor being able to receive it; and the hard thing has a capacity of not being quickly divided. A third species is affective quality and affection, such as heat, whiteness, cold, blackness and the like. Now, affection is easily lost like a condition, as when someone becomes pale or blushes from shame or fear, but an affective quality is difficult to move and difficult to change. Of the affective qualities, some have not come from an affection, that is, not from elsewhere, but exist according to substance, as in fire the

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λέγονται ὑποστάσεις, εἰ μὴ τῆς οὐσίας μόνης. Χρὴ δὲ εἰδέναι, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ὡς γένος καὶ σχέσιν ἔχον πρὸς ἕτερον ὑπὸ τὰ πρός τι ἀνάγεται· τὸ γὰρ γένος εἰδῶν ἐστι γένος καὶ τὰ εἴδη γένους εἰσὶν εἴδη καὶ τῶν πρός τί εἰσιν. Ἔτι τὰ πρός τι καὶ πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λεγόμενα ἢ ἐν τοῖς αὐθεδράστοις ἔχουσι τὴν σχέσιν ἤγουν οὐσίαις, ἢ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς αὐθεδράστοις ἤγουν συμβεβηκόσι. Καὶ εἰ ἐν τοῖς αὐθεδράστοις, ἢ φυσικὴ αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἡ σχέσις ὡς πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ, ἢ οὐ φυσική. Εἰ δὲ οὐ φυσική, ἢ τυχικὴ ὡς δοῦλος καὶ δεσπότης ἢ τεχνικὴ ὡς μαθητὴς καὶ διδάσκαλος ἢ προαιρετικὴ ὡς φίλος καὶ φίλος, ἐχθρὸς καὶ ἐχθρός. Εἰ δὲ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς αὐθεδράστοις ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν, ἢ φυσικὴ ὡς τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ, ἢ οὐ φυσική. Χρὴ δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρότερον ὑπ' ἄλλην κατηγορίαν ἀνάγεσθαι ὡς καθ' ἑαυτὸ θεωρούμενον καὶ τότε ὡς σχέσιν ἔχον πρὸς ἕτερον ὑπὸ τὰ πρός τι· δεῖ γὰρ πρότερον εἶναί τι ἀσχέτως καὶ τότε θεωρεῖσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ σχέσιν. 52 Περὶ ποιοῦ καὶ ποιότητος. Ποιότης ἐστί, καθ' ἣν ποιοί τινες ὀνομάζονται. Καὶ πάλιν ποιότης ἐστί, καθ' ἣν παρωνύμως τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῆς λέγεται· ἐκ τῆς φρονήσεως φρόνιμος λέγεται ὁ ἔχων τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ θερμὸς ὁ μετέχων θερμότητος. Χρὴ δὲ εἰδέναι, ὅτι τὸ ποιὸν καθολικώτερόν ἐστι τῆς ποιότητος· τὸ γὰρ ποιὸν σημαίνει τὴν ποιότητα καὶ τὸ μετέχον αὐτῆς ἤγουν τὴν θερμότητα καὶ τὸ θερμόν, τὸ ἔχον τὴν θερμότητα· ποιοὶ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν οἱ ἔχοντες τὴν ποιότητα, οἷον οἱ ἔχοντες θερμότητα θερμοὶ λέγονται. Οἱ μὲν θερμοὶ ποιοί εἰσιν, ἡ δὲ θερμότης ποιότης. Λέγεται δὲ πολλάκις καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ποιότης ποιόν, ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ καὶ τῆς ποσότητος. Τῶν δὲ ποιοτήτων αἱ μὲν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις {καὶ λογικοῖς} ἐνυπάρχουσι σώμασιν ὡς ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ ἀρεταί, νόσοι καὶ ὑγίεια, καὶ λέγονται ἕξεις καὶ διαθέσεις, αἱ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐμψύχοις καὶ τοῖς ἀψύχοις ὡς θερμότης, ψύξις, μορφή, σχῆμα, δύναμις καὶ ἀδυναμία. Τούτων δὲ αἱ μέν εἰσι δυνάμει, αἱ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ· καὶ εἰ μὲν δυνάμει, ποιοῦσι δύναμιν καὶ ἀδυναμίαν· εἰ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ, ἢ διὰ βάθους κεχωρήκασιν, ὡς ἡ θερμότης δι' ὅλου τοῦ πυρὸς καὶ ἡ λευκότης δι' ὅλου τοῦ γάλακτος καὶ τῆς χιόνος καὶ ποιεῖ πάθος καὶ παθητικὴν ποιότητα, ἢ ἐπιπολῆς καὶ ποιοῦσι σχῆμα καὶ μορφήν. Εἰσὶν οὖν τῆς ποιότητος εἴδη τέσσαρα· ἕξις καὶ διάθεσις, δύναμις καὶ ἀδυναμία, πάθος καὶ παθητικὴ ποιότης, σχῆμα καὶ μορφή. ∆ιαφέρει δὲ ἕξις διαθέσεως, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἕξις δυσμετάβλητός ἐστι καὶ χρονιωτέρα οἷον ἡ φρόνησις· οὐ γὰρ ταχὺ μεταβάλλεταί τις τῆς φρονήσεως εἰς ἀφροσύνην. Ὁμοίως καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὅτε ἀκριβῶς τις ἐπίσταται, δυσμετάβλητός ἐστιν ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ γνῶσις, ἕξις ἐστί, καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ὁμοίως. ∆ιαθέσεις δέ εἰσι τὰ εὐκίνητα καὶ ταχέως μεταβάλλοντα οἷον θερμότης, ψύξις, νόσος, ὑγίεια καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· διάκειται μὲν γὰρ κατὰ ταῦτα ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ταχέως δὲ μεταβάλλεται ἐκ θερμοῦ ψυχρὸς γινόμενος καὶ ἐκ νόσου ὑγιής. Καὶ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα οἷον ἡ νόσος καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐὰν ὦσι μόνιμα καὶ δυσμετάβλητα, ἕξεις εἰσί. Καθολικωτέρα δέ ἐστιν ἡ διάθεσις· ἀμφότεραι μὲν γὰρ διαθέσεις λέγονται, διάκειται γάρ πως κατὰ ταύτας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν δυσμετάβλητος διάθεσις ἕξις λέγεται, ἡ δὲ εὐμετάβλητος διάθεσις μόνον. ∆εύτερον εἶδος ποιότητος δύναμις καὶ ἀδυναμία, ἅτινα οὔκ εἰσιν ἐνεργείᾳ, ἔχουσι δὲ ἐπιτηδειότητα καὶ δύναμιν φυσικὴν ἢ ἀνεπιτηδειότητα, ὥς φαμεν τὸν μὲν παῖδα δυνάμει μουσικόν, εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ ἔχει ἐνεργείᾳ τὴν μουσικήν, ἀλλ' ἔχει ἐπιτηδειότητα πρὸς τὸ δέξασθαι τὴν μουσικήν, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον ἄμουσον ὡς μήτε ἐνεργείᾳ ἔχον τὴν μουσικὴν μήτε δυνάμενον αὐτὴν δέξασθαι· καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν δὲ δύναμιν ἔχει τοῦ μὴ ταχέως διαιρεῖσθαι. Τρίτον εἶδος παθητικὴ ποιότης καὶ πάθος οἷον θερμότης, λευκότης, ψύξις, μελανία καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Τὸ μὲν οὖν πάθος εὐαπόβλητόν ἐστιν ὡς ἡ διάθεσις, ὡς ἄν τις ἢ διὰ αἰδὼ ἢ διὰ φόβον ὠχριάσῃ ἢ ἐρυθριάσῃ, ἡ δὲ παθητικὴ ποιότης δυσκίνητος καὶ δυσμετάβλητός ἐστι. Τῶν δὲ παθητικῶν ποιοτήτων τινὲς μὲν ἀπὸ πάθους οὐ γεγένηνται ἤγουν οὐκ ἀλλαχόθεν, ἀλλὰ κατ' οὐσίαν ὑπάρχουσιν ὡς τῷ πυρὶ ἡ