OF SAINT JUSTIN PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR, GREEK QUESTIONS TO THE CHRISTIANS

 of the insoluble problems, which are raised by the stone-hearted, this is also one. 15. For if, he says, the dead must rise whole, how, if it should h

 For it is illogical to make use of the energies of the incorporeal, but to be ignorant of the existence of the incorporeal. Another. There are two pow

 But since substance according to the first division is into body and incorporeal, how is the incorporeal not a substance existing in itself? Another.

 of...having been established, which was made known to us through the foretelling and teaching of both the prophets and of our Lord and Savior Jesus Ch

 How is the soul not independent? Question. How does God differ from the soul? Answer. In the way that being creator and master differs from having a c

 one can have through some need, but no longer unbegottenness for the unbegotten must exist as unbegotten without any necessary cause. Another. If the

 is resolved into the elements from which they were originally composed. Even if the manner of the dissolution of the parts occurs through being eaten

 ...ute the resurrection, those who disbelieve it? But if by the first, the argument is false for the diagonal does not become incommensurable with th

 they are weak. For that a man should become food for fish presents a difficulty, but not a proof. For it is impossible for the same thing to be submit

 of Plato from his being a man into his becoming an ant, for God also to be changed from being what He is. But if Plato is transformed, but God is not

 cast it away, how is it not irrational to disbelieve God as if concerning an impossible thing, when He has promised to make the rest of humanity incor

 40. If it is good for us to be mortal in the present, but better for us to be immortal in the future, how is it not absurd to say that God is able for

OF SAINT JUSTIN PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR, GREEK QUESTIONS TO THE CHRISTIANS

concerning the incorporeal and concerning God and concerning the resurrection of the dead. a. Whence is it clear if there is something incorporeal, and if it is incorporeal? b. Whence is it clear that it is able to exist by itself outside of a body, and if it is by itself incorporeal? c. Whence is it clear if the incorporeal is more beautiful than the body, and if the incorporeal is not more beautiful than the body? d. What is the incorporeal, whether soul or something better than soul, such as God? e. And in what does soul differ from God? . And whence is it clear if there is a God at all? g. And if there is a God, it must be investigated whether he creates or ever created or is going to create that which is whatever it may be? h. And whether he created or creates or will create? i. And what does he create and how does he create, whether with counsel or also without counsel? j. And if with counsel, using an instrument or without an instrument? k. And if without counsel, whether does he create irrationally without thought and consideration or with some judgment? l. And if with judgment, because of a lack of what does he require judgment? But if without judgment, by what reason must it be investigated. m. And if we were to grant that something comes to be from him, is what comes to be imperishable or perishable? And if it is imperishable, we are at a loss if that which is created at all is able to be imperishable and by what reason? And if it perishes, how do the works of the immortal differ from human ones? For indeed, often many of these remain for a much longer time, its maker having perished, being themselves imperishable, as it is possible to see in the case of buildings and such things. n. And if what comes to be from God perishes, by whose fault does it perish, that of the maker or of the thing that has come to be or of some external thing that becomes opposed to the maker? Whichever of these we suppose, it is clear that the fault is the maker's. For whether the thing that has come to be must perish because of some innate fault of its own, the maker is the cause, because he made it such, that some evil is left remaining in it; or whether there is something from without opposed to the maker, so too the fault is of the one who has made, because of not being able to overcome the opponents; or whether the fault is from the maker, it is very clear that he himself is evil. These things, then, concerning these matters, for now are a few out of many; for if we wished, it would have to be investigated also what a body is and from what things the body is, and the difficulties concerning these things. But leaving these things for now, as if containing none of the difficulties, we seek from the more noble things one thing deemed worthy of wonder from the arguments concerning the resurrection; for one thing of the not contemptible

ΤOΥ AΓIOΥ IOΥΣΤIΝOΥ ΦIΛOΣOΦOΥ ΚAI ΜAΡΤΥΡOΣ EΡΩΤHΣEIΣ EΛΛHΝIΚAI ΠΡOΣ ΤOΥΣ ΧΡIΣΤIAΝOΥΣ

περὶ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου καὶ περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως τῶν νεκρῶν. α. Πόθεν δῆλον εἰ ἔστι τι ἀσώματον, καὶ εἰ ἔστιν ἀσώ ματον; β. Πόθεν δῆλον ὅτι αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ δύναται εἶναι ἐκτὸς σώματος, καὶ εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἀσώματον; γ. Πόθεν δῆλον εἰ ἔστι κάλλιον τὸ ἀσώματον τοῦ σώμα τος, καὶ εἰ οὐ κάλλιον τὸ ἀσώματον τοῦ σώματος; δ. Τί ἐστι τὸ ἀσώματον, πότερον ψυχὴ ἢ κρεῖττον ψυ χῆς, οἷον θεός; ε. Καὶ τίνι διαφέρει ψυχὴ θεοῦ; . Καὶ πόθεν δῆλον εἰ ὅλως ἔστι θεός; ζ. Καὶ εἰ ἔστι θεός, ζητητέον εἴτε ποιεῖ εἴτε ἐποίησέ ποτε εἴτε καὶ μέλλει ποιεῖν τὸ ὅ τί ποτε; η. Καὶ εἴτε ἐποίησεν εἴτε ποιεῖ εἴτε ποιήσει; θ. Καὶ τί ποιεῖ καὶ πῶς ποιεῖ, εἴτε μετὰ βουλῆς εἴτε καὶ ἄνευ βουλῆς; ι. Καὶ εἰ μετὰ βουλῆς, ὀργάνῳ κεχρημένος ἢ ἄνευ ὀρ γάνου; ια. Καὶ εἰ ἄνευ βουλῆς, πότερον ἀλόγως ποιεῖ ἄνευ δια νοίας καὶ ἐπισκέψεως ἢ μετά τινος ἐπικρίσεως; ιβ. Καὶ εἰ μετὰ ἐπικρίσεως, τίνος ἐνδείᾳ ἐπικρίσεως δεῖ ται; Eἰ δὲ ἀκρίτως, ποίῳ τῷ λόγῳ διερευνητέον. ιγ. Καὶ εἰ δοίημεν γίνεσθαί τι παρ' αὐτοῦ, πότερον τὸ γινόμενον ἄφθαρτον ἢ φθαρτόν; Καὶ εἰ μὲν ἄφθαρτον, ἀπο ροῦμεν εἰ τὸ ὅλως γενητὸν ἄφθαρτον δύναται εἶναι καὶ ποίῳ τῷ λόγῳ; Καὶ εἰ φθείρεται, τί διαφέρει τὰ τοῦ ἀθανάτου ἔργα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων; Καὶ γὰρ πολλαπλασίονα χρόνον πολ λάκις πολλὰ τούτων διαμένει, τοῦ ποιήσαντος αὐτοῦ φθαρέν τος, αὐτὰ ἄφθαρτα ὄντα, ὡς ἐπ' οἰκοδομῶν ἔστιν ἰδεῖν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. ιδ. Καὶ εἰ φθείρεται τὸ γινόμενον παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, τίνος κακίᾳ φθείρεται, τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἢ τοῦ γεγονότος ἤ τινος ἔξω θεν ὑπεναντίου γινομένου τῷ ποιήσαντι; Ὅ τι δ' ἂν αὐτῶν ὑποθώμεθα, δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἡ κακία. Eἴτε γὰρ τὸ γεγονὸς διά τινα ἔμφυτον ἑαυτοῦ κακίαν ὀφείλει φθαρῆναι, ὁ ποιήσας αἴτιος, ὅτι τοιοῦτον αὐτὸ ἐποίησεν, ὥστε ὑπολιμπά νεσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ κακόν τι· εἴτε ἔξωθέν ἐστί τι ὑπεναντίον τῷ ποιήσαντι, καὶ οὕτως κακίᾳ τοῦ πεποιηκότος, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύ νασθαι κατακρατεῖν τῶν ἐναντίων· εἴτε ἐκ τοῦ ποιήσαντος ἡ κακία, πρόδηλον ὡς αὐτὸς ὁ κακός. Ταῦτα μὲν περὶ τούτων τέως ἐκ πολλῶν ὀλίγα· εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλομεν, ζητητέον καὶ τί ἐστι σῶμα καὶ ἐκ τίνων τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀπορίας. Ταῦτα δὲ τέως ἐάσαντες, ὡς ἐνούντων μηδὲν τῶν ἀπόρων, ζητοῦμεν τῶν γενναιοτέρων ἕν τι θαύματος ἀξιούμενον ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως λόγων· ἓν γάρ τι τῶν οὐκ εὐτε