Tractatus de placitis Manichaeorum

1 The philosophy of the Christians is called simple. And it takes the greatest care for the formation of character, speaking enigmatically about the more precise doctrines concerning God; of which all would rightly accept the main point of the zeal concerning these things, where they posit the efficient cause as most honorable and most ancient and the cause of all beings. Since also in ethics, leaving aside the more difficult matters, such as what moral and rational virtue are, and whatever is said about characters and passions, they dwell on the hypothetical topic, not providing the elements for the attainment of each virtue, but heaping up cruder precepts as it happened, which the common people, upon hearing, as one can learn from experience, make great progress towards decency, and the stamp of piety settles in their characters, rekindling the disposition received from such a habit and gradually leading them to the desire for the good. But when this was divided into many parts by those who came after, more disputes arose, just as among the Eristics, from which it has happened that some have become more astute and more inquisitive than others, as one might say, and some have already become leaders of heresies; from which the unseen formation of character withered away, since those who presumed to lead the heresies did not attain precision in doctrine, and since the great multitude was more seditiously disposed toward itself, and since there was no rule or laws from which to procure a solution to the disputes. And just as in other things ambition, when it falls into excess, ruins everything, 2 so also in these matters, each one striving to surpass his predecessor in the novelty of his opinions, they have cast this simple philosophy into an endless affair; as for example the one called Manichaeus, who is a certain Persian by race, in my opinion surpassing all in saying marvelous things; and his innovation has not spread for long; a certain Pappus by name was the first to come to us as an expounder of the man's opinion, and after him Thomas, and certain others after them, but he himself is said to have lived in the time of Valerian, to have campaigned with Sapor the Persian, and to have perished after having offended him in some way. Such, then, is a report of his opinion that has come to us from the acquaintances of the man. He posited as principles God and matter, and that God is good, but matter is evil; and that God surpasses in good more than matter in evil. And he says matter is not that of Plato, which becomes all things when it receives quality and shape, for which reason he calls it all-receiving and mother and nurse, nor that of Aristotle, the element in which form and privation are found, but something else besides these; for the disorderly motion in each of the beings, this he calls matter. And other powers are arrayed with God, like servants, all good, and others likewise with matter, all evil. And the bright and the light and the above, all these are with God, but the dim and the darkness and the below are with matter. And God also has desires, but these are also good, and likewise matter, but all of them are evil.

3 Therefore, matter once came into a desire to arrive at the place above, and having arrived, it marveled at both the brightness and how much light there was with God, and indeed it wished to seize this dominion, having thrust God aside. And he indeed had wished to punish it, but was at a loss for an evil with which he might punish it; for there was no evil in the house of God. Therefore, he sent a certain power, the one called soul by us,

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Tractatus de placitis Manichaeorum

1 Ἡ Χριστιανῶν φιλοσοφία ἁπλῆ καλεῖται. αὕτη δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἤθους κατασκευὴν τὴν πλείστην ἐπι μέλειαν ποιεῖται αἰνιττομένη περὶ τῶν ἀκριβεστέρων λόγων περὶ θεοῦ· ὧν τὸ κεφάλαιον τῆς περὶ ταῦτα σπουδῆς εἰκότως ἂν ἅπαντες ἀποδέξαιντο, ἔνθα τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον τιμιώτατον τίθενται καὶ πρεσβύτατον καὶ πάντων αἴτιον τῶν ὄντων. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς ἠθικοῖς τὰ ἐργωδέστερα παραλείποντες, οἷον τίς τε ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ καὶ λογική, καὶ ὅσα λέγεται περὶ ἠθῶν καὶ παθῶν, περὶ τὸν ὑποθετικὸν διατρίβουσι τόπον, στοι χεῖα μὲν πρὸς ἑκάστης ἀρετῆς ἀνάληψιν οὐκ ἀποδι δόντες, παραγγέλματα δὲ παχύτερα ὡς ἐτύγχανεν ἐπι σωρεύοντες, ὧν ὁ πολὺς δῆμος ἀκούων ὡς ἐκ τῆς πείρας ἔστι μαθεῖν σφόδρα ἐπιδίδωσιν εἰς ἐπιεί κειαν, καὶ τῆς εὐσεβείας χαρακτὴρ ἐνιζάνει αὐτῶν τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἀναζωπυρῶν τὸ ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης συνηθείας συνειλημμένον ἦθος καὶ κατ' ὀλίγον εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ αὐτοὺς ὄρεξιν ὁδηγῶν. Εἰς πλεῖστα δὲ ταύτης ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιγενομένων μερι σθείσης ζητήσεις συνέστησαν πλείονες καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς, ἀφ' ὧν ἐντρεχεστέρους μὲν ἄλλους ἑτέρων μᾶλλον καὶ ζητητικωτέρους, ὡς ἄν τις εἴποι, γεγονέναι συμβέβηκεν, καί τινες ἤδη καὶ αἱρέσεων προὔστησαν· ἀφ' ὧν ἡ κατὰ τὸ ἦθος ἄδηλος κατασκευὴ ἐμαραίνετο τῆς μὲν κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀκριβείας οὐκ ἐφικνουμένων τούτων ὅσοι τῶν αἱρέσεων ἡγεῖσθαι ἠξίουν, τοῦ δὲ πολλοῦ πλήθους στασιαστικώτερον πρὸς αὑτὸ διατεθέν τος, κανόνος δὲ οὐδενὸς ὑπόντος οὐδὲ νόμων ἀφ' ὧν τῶν ζητήσεων πορίσασθαι λύσιν. καθάπερ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἡ φιλοτιμία εἰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐκπίπτουσα οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι οὐ λυμαίνεται, 2 οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων τῇ καινότητι τῶν δοξῶν ἑκάτερος τὸν πρὸ αὐτοῦ ὑπερ βάλλεσθαι σπουδάζων εἰς ἀνήνυτον πρᾶγμα τὴν ἁπλῆν ταύτην ἐμβεβλήκασιν φιλοσοφίαν· ὥσπερ ὁ λεγόμενος Μανιχαῖος, ὃς Πέρσης μέν τίς ἐστιν τὸ γένος, κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν πάντας ὑπερβαλὼν τῷ θαυμάσια λέγειν· καὶ οὐ πάλαι μὲν ἐπεπόλασεν ἡ τούτου καινο τομία πρῶτός γέ τις Πάπος τοὔνομα πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐγένετο τῆς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δόξης ἐξηγητὴς καὶ μετὰ τοῦ τον Θωμᾶς καί τινες ἕτεροι μετ' αὐτούς , αὐτὸς δὲ ἐπὶ Οὐαλεριανοῦ μὲν γεγονέναι λέγεται, συστρατεῦσαι Σαπώρῳ τῷ Πέρσῃ, προσκρούσας δέ τι τούτῳ ἀπο λωλέναι. Τοιάδε οὖν τις φήμη τῆς ἐκείνου δόξης ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀφίκετο πρὸς ἡμᾶς. ἀρχὰς ἐτί θετο θεὸν καὶ ὕλην, εἶναι δὲ τὸν μὲν θεὸν ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ ὕλην κακόν· ἀγαθῷ δὲ πλείονι τὸν θεὸν ὑπερ βάλλειν ἢ κακῷ τὴν ὕλην. τὴν δὲ ὕλην λέγει οὐχ ἣν Πλάτων, τὴν πάντα γινομένην ὅταν λάβῃ ποιότητα καὶ σχῆμα διὸ πανδεχῆ καὶ μητέρα καὶ τιθήν<ην> καλεῖ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης, τὸ στοιχεῖον περὶ ὃ τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ στέρησις, ἀλλ' ἕτερόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα· τὴν γὰρ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων ἄτακτον κίνησιν, ταύτην ὕλην καλεῖ. συντετάχθαι δὲ τῷ θεῷ δυνάμεις ἑτέρας οἷον ὑπηρέτι δας, ἀγαθὰς πάσας, καὶ ἄλλας τῇ ὕλῃ ὁμοίως, πάσας κακάς. τὸ δὲ λαμπρὸν καὶ τὸ φῶς καὶ τὸ ἄνω, πάντα ταῦτα σὺν τῷ θεῷ εἶναι, τὸ ἀμυδρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ σκότος καὶ τὸ κάτω σὺν τῇ ὕλῃ. εἶναι δὲ καὶ τῷ θεῷ ὀρέξεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταύτας ἀγαθάς, καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ ὁμοίως, ἀλλὰ πάσας κακάς.

3 εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν οὖν ποτε τὴν ὕλην ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὸν ἄνω ἀφικέσθαι τόπον, ἀφικομένην δὲ θαυμάσαι τό τε λαμπρὸν καὶ τὸ φῶς ὅσον ἦν παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, καὶ δὴ θέλειν τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην κατασχεῖν τὸν θεὸν παρωσαμένην. τὸν δὲ καὶ βεβουλῆσθαι μὲν ταύτην τιμωρήσασθαι, ἀπορεῖν δὲ κακοῦ ᾧ δὴ καὶ τιμωρήσηται· μὴ γὰρ εἶναι κακὸν ἐν θεοῦ οἴκῳ. πέμψαι οὖν τινα δύναμιν, τὴν ὑφ' ἡμῶν καλουμένην ψυχήν,

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