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and from this first hymnody to grasp some idea about the subject at hand, how the word, having divided virtue in three parts, attributes blessedness to each part according to some fitting analogy, at one point calling the alienation from evil blessed, as the beginning of the inclination toward the better; and after this, the study of higher and more divine things, as already producing a state of the better. Then, the likeness to the divine that is achieved through these things by those being perfected; for the sake of which the preceding blessings are also mentioned. And it alludes to this by the ever-green tree, to which the life perfected through virtue is likened. 5.27

CHAPTER 2

So that we might understand more accurately the teaching about the virtues, which

the word guides through all the psalmic instruction, it would be well for us first to discuss among ourselves, putting forth a kind of technical discourse in an orderly sequence, how it is possible for the lover of such a life to be in virtue. for thus we might recognize the coherence of the teaching set forth to us. Therefore, it is necessary for the one who intends to look toward virtue first to distinguish with reason the noble life and the blameworthy one, marking each with its own characteristics, so that the account of them may be unconfused, not being obscured by any shared features. Perhaps there are other signs of the property of each of these; but the more general ones, at least in our opinion, are these: the fact that the gladness which arises from them in humans is divided between sense and intellect, with vice pleasing the sense, and virtue gladdening the soul. Following these things, it would be logical through praise and slander to lead the mind of the hearers away from the worse and to accustom it to the better, with the slander of the wicked life bringing hatred toward vice, and the praise of good things drawing desire toward what is more praiseworthy. And after this, so that the encomium of the good life might become more effective and the censure of the worse more vivid, it is fitting to make mention of those who have been admired in virtue and condemned in vice. For the examples of lives, being made manifest, produce a certain intensification and stability of the disposition in the soul, with hope drawing the soul toward the equal honor of the best, 5.28 and with the slander against the condemned training it for the avoidance and alienation of similar practices. And in addition to all these things, it would be necessary to give a certain detailed teaching concerning each of these, which will both point out the better and turn away from the worse, guiding the hearing toward the one with certain precepts and counsels, and restraining it from the worse through dissuasive arguments. But when these things have been thus distinguished, since everything alien to pleasure is difficult for nature to accept (and by pleasure I mean that which is dear to the body; for the gladness of the soul is far removed from irrational and slavish sensual pleasure); and we have previously recognized this as a particular sign of each of the lives, the one in virtue and in vice, that through vice the senses of our flesh are flattered, while virtue becomes a gladness of the soul for those who succeed. But for those who are now being introduced to the higher life, for whom sense still seems to be the criterion of the good, the soul is not yet able to discern the good sufficiently, being still untrained and unaccustomed to such comprehension. And toward everything that is not known, even if it be especially good, our desire remains unmoved; and if desire does not pre-exist, no pleasure could arise from a thing that is not longed for. For longing becomes the way to pleasure. It is necessary to devise something

2

καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς πρώτης ὑμνῳδίας ἔννοιάν τινα περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου λαβεῖν, ὅπως τριχῇ τεμὼν τὴν ἀρετὴν ὁ λόγος ἑκάστῳ τμήματι κατά τινα πρόσφορον ἀναλογίαν προσμαρτυρεῖ τὸ μακάριον, νῦν μὲν τὴν ἀλλοτρίωσιν τοῦ κακοῦ μακαρίζων, ὡς ἀρχὴν γινομένην τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον ῥοπῆς μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τὴν τῶν ὑψηλῶν τε καὶ θειοτέρων μελέτην, ὡς ἕξιν ἐμποιοῦ σαν ἤδη τοῦ κρείττονος. εἶτα τὴν διὰ τούτων τοῖς τελειουμέ νοις κατορθουμένην πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ὁμοίωσιν· ἧς χάριν λέγεται καὶ τὰ προλαβόντα μακάρια. ταύτην δὲ τῷ ἀειθαλεῖ ξύλῳ αἰνίσσεται, ᾧ ἡ τελειωθεῖσα δι' ἀρετῆς ὁμοιοῦται ζωή. 5.27

ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ Βʹ

Ὡς δ' ἂν ἀκριβέστερον ἐπισταίημεν τῇ περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν διδασκαλίᾳ, ἣν

ὑφηγεῖται διὰ πάσης τῆς ψαλμικῆς ὁδηγίας ὁ λόγος, καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι πρότερον ἡμᾶς ἐφ' ἡμῶν αὐτῶν διελέσθαι, οἷόν τινα τεχνικὸν λόγον ἐν τάξει δι' ἀκολούθου προάγοντας, πῶς ἔστιν ἐν ἀρετῇ γενέσθαι τὸν ἐραστὴν τοῦ τοιούτου βίου. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐπιγνοίημεν τῆς προδεικνυμένης διδασκαλίας ἡμῖν τὸ ἀκόλουθον. χρὴ τοίνυν τὸν μέλλοντα πρὸς ἀρετὴν βλέπειν πρότερον μὲν διακρῖναι τῷ λόγῳ τὸν βίον τόν τε ἀστεῖον καὶ τὸν ὑπαίτιον, ἰδίοις ἑκάτερον ἐπισημειωσά μενον γνωρίσμασιν, ὡς ἂν ἀσύγχυτος αὐτῶν ὁ λόγος εἴη μηδενὶ τῶν κοινούντων ἐπιθολούμενος. σημεῖα δὲ τῆς ἑκατέρου τούτων ἰδιότητος ἔστι μὲν ἴσως καὶ ἄλλα τινά· τὰ δὲ γενικώτερα τῶν ἄλλων κατά γε τὴν ἡμετέραν ὑπόληψίν ἐστι ταῦτα· τὸ μεμερίσθαι πρὸς αἴσθησίν τε καὶ διάνοιαν τὴν ἐγγινομένην τοῖς ἀνθρώποις παρ' αὐτῶν εὐφροσύνην τῆς μὲν κακίας ἡδυνούσης τὴν αἴσθησιν, τῆς δὲ ἀρετῆς τὴν ψυχὴν εὐφραινούσης. ἐπὶ τούτοις ἂν εἴη ἀκόλουθον δι' εὐφημίας τε καὶ διαβολῆς τὴν τῶν ἀκουόντων διάνοιαν ἀπάγειν τε τοῦ χείρονος καὶ προσοικειοῦν τῷ βελτίονι τῆς μὲν τοῦ πονηροῦ βίου διαβολῆς τὸ μῖσος πρὸς τὴν κακίαν φερούσης, τοῦ δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπαίνου πρὸς τὸ εὐφημότερον τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἐφελκομένου. μετὰ τοῦτο δὲ ὡς ἂν ἐνεργότερον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βίου τὸ ἐγκώμιον γένοιτο καὶ ἐμψυχότερος ὁ τοῦ χείρονος ψόγος, αὐτῶν προσήκει τῶν ἐν ἀρετῇ θαυ μασθέντων καὶ τῶν ἐν κακίᾳ κατεγνωσμένων τὴν μνήμην ποιήσασθαι. ἐπίτασιν γάρ τινα τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ διαθέσεως ἐμποιεῖ καὶ βεβαιότητα προφανέντα τῶν βίων τὰ ὑποδείγ ματα, πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀρίστων ὁμοτιμίαν τῆς ἐλπίδος τὴν 5.28 ψυχὴν ἐφελκομένης καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν κατεγνωσμένων διαβολῆς πρὸς ἀποφυγήν τε καὶ ἀλλοτρίωσιν τῶν ὁμοίων ἐπιτηδευμάτων παιδοτριβούσης. ἐπὶ πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις ἀναγ καῖον ἂν εἴη πρὸς ἑκάτερον τούτων λεπτομερῆ τινα διδασκα λίαν ποιήσασθαι, ἣ καὶ τὸ κρεῖττον ὑποδείξει καὶ ἀποτρέψει τοῦ χείρονος, πρὸς τοῦτο μὲν ὑποθήκαις τισὶν καὶ συμβουλαῖς ὁδηγοῦσα τὴν ἀκοήν, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν χειρόνων διὰ τῶν ἀπο τρεπτικῶν ἀπείργουσα λόγων. Τούτων δὲ οὕτω διευκρινηθέντων, ἐπειδὴ δυσπαρά δεκτόν ἐστι τῇ φύσει πᾶν τὸ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀλλοτρίως ἔχον (ἡδονὴν δὲ λέγω τὴν τοῦ σώματος φίλην· ἡ γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς εὐφροσύνη πολλῷ τῷ μέσῳ τῆς ἀλόγου τε καὶ ἀνδραποδώδους ἡδυπαθείας ἀπῴκισται)· ἴδιον δὲ σημεῖον ἑκατέρου τῶν βίων, τοῦ ἐν ἀρετῇ τε καὶ κακίᾳ, τοῦτο προλαβόντες ἐπέγνω μεν, ὅτι διὰ μὲν τῆς κακίας κολακεύεται ἡμῶν τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς αἰσθητήρια, ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ ψυχῆς εὐφροσύνη τοῖς κατορθώσασι γίνεται. τοῖς δὲ νῦν εἰσαγομένοις πρὸς τὸν ὑψηλότερον βίον, οἷς ἔτι τοῦ καλοῦ κριτήριον ἡ αἴσθησις εἶναι δοκεῖ, οὔπω ἱκανῶς ἔχει καθορᾶν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡ ψυχή, ἀγύμναστος ἔτι καὶ ἀήθης οὖσα τῆς τοιαύτης κατανοήσεως. πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ γνωριζόμενον ἅπαν, κἂν ὅτι μάλιστα καλὸν ᾖ, ἀκίνητος ἡμῶν ἡ ἐπιθυμία μένει, ἐπιθυμίας δὲ μὴ προϋπαρχούσης, οὐδ' ἂν ἡδονή τις ἐγγένοιτο τοῦ μὴ ποθουμένου πράγματος. ὁδὸς γὰρ εἰς ἡδονὴν ὁ πόθος γίνεται. ἀναγκαίως ἐπινοῆσαί τι χρὴ