of the insoluble problems, which are raised by the stone-hearted, this is also one. 15. For if, he says, the dead must rise whole, how, if it should happen that a man die at sea, and then, having been eaten by fish, is again eaten by other men through the medium of the fish, how could he recover the flesh that was consumed by other men? For either it is necessary for this man to rise without the flesh which the other men ate through the medium of the fish, as has often been said, or for those others, being required to give back parts of their own flesh, to put it aside and become incomplete, in order to restore what was lacking of those unjustly devoured by them. And the stone-hearted say these things as if laughing. But I entreat you to learn a constructive argument for the resurrection, apart from any insoluble problem, one that demonstrates by necessity that there must be a resurrection through certain demonstrative and true arguments. For when the proofs are strengthened by truths, know well that I will make no account of any of the arguments of the insoluble problems; for it is both absurd and contentious to wish to contend against a strengthened proof. Christian answers to the aforementioned questions from the piety of natural reasonings. These arguments are not logical insoluble problems, but unskillful questions. For the argument that constructs logical insoluble problems deduces an absurdity in things that are said with some consequence; for example: only man is capable of laughter, every being capable of laughter is an animal, therefore only man is an animal; which are indeed consequent propositions, but the conclusion is absurd. But in the arguments set forth, nothing absurd was deduced by consequence; therefore they were not reasonably called insoluble problems. Question. From where is it clear if there is anything incorporeal? Answer. If it is impossible for the same thing to be both ignorant of and to know the same things (for in every case either the affirmation or the negation must be true), how does one who is ignorant of whether there is an incorporeal know will and judgment, thought and reflection, mind and reason, which are the activities of the incorporeal? For to know the activities of the incorporeal while in ignorance of the existence of the incorporeal is characteristic of those who do not know what they are saying. Another. To construct an insoluble problem and to solve an insoluble problem, this is not of sense-perception, nor is it of the body. But that which is not of the body, this must necessarily be of the incorporeal. Another. From where do we seek the manifestation of the existence of the incorporeal? For if seeking about something, whether it exists or not, belongs to reason, and reason is an activity of the rational, and the body in itself is irrational, it is clear that there is something incorporeal, to which belongs the property of seeking and judging. Another. For one who does not confess that there is something incorporeal, it is inappropriate to seek and judge by reason whether there is something incorporeal;

λῶν ἀπόρων, τῶν παρὰ τοῖς λιθοκαρδίοις κινουμένων, ἔστι καὶ τοῦτο. ιε. Eἰ γὰρ δεῖ, φησί, σώους ἀνίστασθαι τοὺς τετελευ τηκότας, πῶς, εἰ συμβαίη ἄνθρωπον ἀποθανεῖν εἰς θάλατταν, εἶτα βρωθέντα τοῦτον ὑπὸ ἰχθύων αὖθις ὑπὸ ἄλλων ἀνθρώ πων καταβρωθῆναι διὰ μέσων τῶν ἰχθύων, πῶς ἂν ἀναλάβοι τὰς σάρκας τὰς εἰς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους καταδαπανηθείσας; Ἢ γὰρ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη παρὰ τὰς σάρκας ἀναστῆναι, ἃς ἔφαγον οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι διὰ μέσων τῶν ἰχθύων, καθὼς πολλάκις εἴ ρηται, ἢ ἐκείνους, μέλη τῶν ἑαυτοῦ σαρκῶν ἀπαιτουμένους, ἀποθέσθαι καὶ ἐλλιπεῖς γενέσθαι, ἵνα ἀποπληρώσωσι τὸ ἐλ λεῖπον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀδίκως καταβρωθέντων. Καὶ ταῦτα οἷα γελῶντες οἱ λιθοκάρδιοί φασιν. Ἐγὼ δὲ παρακαλῶ ἐκτὸς ἀπορίας κατασκευαστικὸν λόγον τῆς ἀναστάσεως μαθεῖν, τὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποδεικνύντα ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἀνάστασιν διά τι νων ἀποδεικτικῶν καὶ ἀληθῶν λόγων. Τῶν γὰρ ἀποδείξεων ἐῤῥωμένων ταῖς ἀληθείαις, οὐδένα τῶν ἀποριῶν λόγον εὖ ἴστε ποιήσομαι· καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον καὶ φιλόνεικον πρὸς ἐῤῥωμένην ἀπόδειξιν ἐθέλειν ἐρίζειν. Ἀποκρίσεις χριστιανικαὶ πρὸς τὰς προῤῥηθείσας ἐρωτήσεις ἀπὸ τῆς εὐσεβείας τῶν φυσικῶν λογισμῶν. Oὗτοι οἱ λόγοι οὐκ εἰσὶ λογικαὶ ἀπορίαι, ἀλλ' ἐρωτήσεις ἄτεχνοι. Ὁ γὰρ λόγος, ὁ κατασκευάζων λογικὰς ἀπορίας, ἐν τοῖς ἀκολούθως πως λεγομένοις συνάγει τὸ ἄτοπον· οἷον μόνος ὁ ἄνθρωπος γελαστικόν, πᾶν γελαστικὸν ζῶον, μόνος ἄρα ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶον· αἵπερ εἰσὶν ἀκόλουθοι προτάσεις μέν, ἄτο πον δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς προκειμένοις λόγοις οὐδὲν ἄτοπον κατὰ ἀκολουθίαν συνήχθη· διὸ οὐκ εὐλόγως ἐκλήθη σαν ἀπορίαι. Ἐρώτησις. Πόθεν δῆλον εἰ ἔστι τι ἀσώματον; Ἀπόκρισις. Eἰ ἀδύνατον τὸ αὐτὸ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀγνοεῖν καὶ γινώσκειν (ἐπὶ παντὸς γὰρ ἀληθῆ τὴν κατάφασιν εἶναι δεῖ ἢ τὴν ἀπό φασιν), πῶς ὁ ἀγνοῶν, εἰ ἔστιν ἀσώματον, γινώσκει βούλησίν τε καὶ ἐπίκρισιν, διάνοιάν τε καὶ ἐπίσκεψιν, νοῦν τε καὶ λό γον, ἅτινά ἐστι τοῦ ἀσωμάτου ἐνεργήματα; Τὸ γὰρ ἐν ἀγνωσίᾳ τῆς τοῦ ἀσωμάτου ὑπάρξεως γινώσκειν τοῦ ἀσωμάτου τὰ ἐνερ γήματα τῶν οὐκ εἰδότων ὅ φασίν ἐστιν. Ἄλλο. Τὸ κατασκευάζειν ἀπορίαν καὶ λύειν ἀπορίαν, οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθήσεως τοῦτο, οὐδὲ σώματός ἐστι. Τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν σώματος, τοῦτο ἀνάγκη εἶναι τοῦ ἀσωμάτου. Ἄλλο. Πόθεν ζητοῦμεν τῆς τοῦ ἀσωμάτου ὑπάρξεως τὴν δήλωσιν; Eἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ζητεῖν περί τινος, εἰ ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι, λόγου ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ λόγος τοῦ λογικοῦ ὑπάρχει ἐνέργημα, ἄλογον δὲ τὸ σῶμα καθ' ἑαυτό, δῆλον ὅτι ἔστι τι ἀσώματον, ᾧ ἴδιον ὑπάρχει τὸ ζητεῖν καὶ κρίνειν. Ἄλλο. Τῷ μὴ ὁμολογοῦντι εἶναί τι ἀσώματον ἀνοί κειον ὑπάρχει τὸ λόγῳ ζητεῖν καὶ κρίνειν εἰ ἔστι τι ἀσώματον·