5. As I have said, therefore, the good in God is substance. But in created things it is a certain activity that happens in the external realm and is an accident, being achieved through action or intelligible contemplation and attention. And men, living together with the flesh, achieve the good through action, but the intellectual powers through contemplation and attention. Since, therefore, the good is an accident in created things, being certainly precedes being good in them; for the substrate must exist, in order that the accident might thus be observed in it, whether it be separable or inseparable. But in the case of the uncreated God, God, being eternal, is also eternally good; for He does not have being as one thing and goodness as another, but in His very being He possesses goodness. From what has been said, therefore, it is manifest to all that evil is not the contrary of God, who is good in substance; for nothing at all is contrary to substance. But evil is contrary to the good which is accidental, that which is observed in created things; for coming into being through a wicked action, it is contrary to that which comes into being through a good action. 6. These things having been thus demonstrated, how should one not abominate the Manichaeans who say: There was God and matter, good and evil, in all respects extreme contraries, such that the one had no communion with the other, and both were uncreated and living. It must be said to them, therefore: How is your argument not strange? For if God and matter are extreme contraries according to your nonsense, such that the one has no communion with the other, as you happen to declare according to your opinion, how will they be contraries to each other at all, having communion in nothing? For it is a property of contraries to have communion with one another according to genus, for instance black and white have communion in that each is a color, and again hot and cold in that each is a quality, which you are unwilling to grant in the case of your fabled matter and God, senselessly asserting that they are both contraries and that the one has no communion with the other. Moreover, contraries are destructive of one another and cannot exist together in actuality in the same thing, in the same respect, at the same time. How then do God and matter, as you yourselves mythologize, exist together in actuality in the same creature, for instance in caustic and illuminating fire or in nourishing and suffocating water, according to you, throughout the whole and in the same respect, when you assert to be contraries things that are in no way contraries? 7. Moreover, contraries are either immediate or mediate. Immediate ones do not admit of mixture, but rather are destructive of one another, for instance order and disorder, even number and odd. But mediate ones have another mean between the extremes, for instance black and white; and gray is the mean of these. If, then, matter and God are immediates, how do they admit of mixture and constitute the cosmos according to your mythology? For immediate things are not by nature mixed. But if they say they are mediates, there will be something between them, different from them, and consequently a third uncreated thing will be numbered with the two. 8. But perhaps they will say: and how is it possible for something to have come into being from non-beings? For nothing is seen to come into being from non-beings. To them one must say: You err, not knowing the power of God, but looking only at things that come to be from men, you have supposed the divine to be of such a kind. For man works from existing things, shaping wood and stones as he wishes, and through his own art he imposes on these a form which did not previously exist; for man is a creator of shapes only, imposing by his art a previously non-existent shape upon his creation. And nature likewise works from existing things, but what is fashioned by nature has a workmanship greater than human art. For nature is a creator not only of shapes, working a mixture and composition of the elements, but it also brings into existence the different substances and the forms of things that did not exist before. From

5. Ὃ οὖν ἔφην, τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐπὶ θεοῦ οὐσία τυγχάνει. Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γενητῶν ἐνέργειά τίς ἐστι περὶ τὸ ἐκτὸς γινομένη καὶ συμβεβηκὸς ὑπάρχει, διὰ πράξεως ἢ νοητῆς θεωρίας καὶ προσοχῆς κατορθούμενον. Καὶ διὰ πράξεως μὲν ἄνθρωποι, σαρκὶ συζῶντες, κατορθοῦσι τὸ ἀγαθόν, αἱ δὲ νοεραὶ δυνάμεις διὰ θεωρίας καὶ προσοχῆς. Ἐπεὶ οὖν συμβεβηκός ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐπὶ τῶν γενητῶν, πάντως ἐπὶ τούτων καὶ προτερεύει τὸ εἶναι τοῦ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἵν' οὕτως τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν αὐτῷ θεωρηθείη, εἴτε χωριστὸν ἢ ἀχώριστον εἴη. Ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀγενήτου θεοῦ, ἀεὶ ὢν ὁ θεός, ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν ἀγαθός· οὐ γὰρ ἕτερον ἔχει τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἕτερόν τι τὴν ἀγαθότητα, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ἔχει τὴν ἀγαθότητα. ∆ιὰ τῶν εἰρημένων οὖν πᾶσι προφανὲς ὅτι τὸ πονηρὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐναντίον τῷ θεῷ, οὐσίᾳ ὄντι ἀγαθῷ· τῇ γὰρ οὐσίᾳ οὐδὲν ὅλως ἀντίκειται. Τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἀγαθῷ, τῷ ἐν τοῖς γενητοῖς θεωρουμένῳ, ἀντίκειται τὸ πονηρόν· διὰ γὰρ φαύλης πράξεως γινόμενον ἀντίκειται τῷ διὰ πράξεως ἀγαθῆς γινομένῳ. 6. Τούτων οὕτως ἀποδεδειγμένων, πῶς οὐ βδελυκτέον τοὺς Μανιχαίους οἵ φασιν· Ἦν θεὸς καὶ ὕλη, ἀγαθὸν καὶ πονηρὸν ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν ἄκρως ἐναντία, ὡς κατὰ μηδὲν ἐπικοινω- νεῖν θάτερον θατέρῳ, ἀγένητά τε καὶ ζῶντα ἄμφω. Ῥητέον οὖν πρὸς αὐτούς· Πῶς οὐκ ἀλλόκοτος ὑμῶν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος; Εἰ γὰρ ἄκρως ἐναντία κατὰ τοὺς ὑμῶν φληνάφους θεός τε καὶ ὕλη, ὡς μηδὲν ἐπικοινωνεῖν θάτερον θατέρῳ, κατὰ τὸ δοκοῦν ὑμῖν ὡς ἔτυχεν ἀποφαινόμενοι, πῶς ὅλως ἐναντία ἔσται ἀλλήλοις κοι- νωνοῦντα κατὰ μηδέν; Ἴδιον γὰρ τῶν ἐναντίων κοινωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις κατὰ τὸ γένος, οἷον μέλαν καὶ λευκὸν κοινωνοῦσι τῷ ἑκάτερον εἶναι χρῶμα, καὶ πάλιν θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν τῷ ἑκάτερον εἶναι ποιότητα, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῆς μυθευομένης ὑμῖν ὕλης καὶ θεοῦ διδόναι οὐ βούλεσθε, ἀνοήτως φάσκοντες ἐναντία τε εἶναι καὶ μηδὲν ἐπικοινωνεῖν θάτερον θατέρῳ. Ἄλλως τε τὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλων ἐστὶν ἀναιρετικὰ καὶ οὐ δύνανται κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἅμα συμβῆναι τῷ αὐτῷ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον. Πῶς οὖν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ κτίσματι, οἷον τῷ καυστικῷ καὶ φωτιστικῷ πυρὶ ἢ θρεπτικῷ καὶ πνικτικῷ ὕδατι, καθ' ὑμᾶς ἅμα ὑπάρχουσι κατ' ἐνέργειαν, δι' ὅλου κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ θεός τε καὶ ὕλη, ὡς αὐτοὶ μυθολογεῖτε, ἐναντία φάσκοντες εἶναι τὰ μηδαμῶς ἐναντία τυγχάνοντα; 7. Ἄλλως τε τὰ ἐναντία ἢ ἄμεσά ἐστιν ἢ ἔμμεσα. Τὰ ἄμεσα κρᾶσιν οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀλλήλων ἐστὶν ἀναι- ρετικά, οἷον τάξις καὶ ἀταξία, ἄρτιος ἀριθμὸς καὶ περιττός. Τὰ ἔμμεσα δὲ ἕτερόν τε τὸ μέσον ἔχει παρὰ τὰ ἄκρα, οἷον μέλαν καὶ λευκόν· καὶ τούτων τὸ φαιὸν μέσον ἐστίν. Εἰ οὖν ὕλη καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἄμεσά ἐστι, πῶς κρᾶσιν ἐπιδέχεται καὶ τὸν κόσμον ἀποτελεῖ κατὰ τὴν ὑμῶν μυθολογίαν; Τὰ γὰρ ἄμεσα οὐ πέφυκε κιρνᾶσθαι. Εἰ δὲ ἔμμεσα φήσουσιν, ἔσται τι διὰ μέσου τούτων ἕτερον παρὰ ταῦτα καὶ λοιπὸν τρίτον ἀγένητον τοῖς δύο συναριθμηθήσεται. 8. Ἀλλ' ἴσως φήσουσι· καὶ πῶς οἷόν τε ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων τι γεγονέναι; Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων ὁρᾶται γινόμενον. Πρὸς οὕς ἐστιν εἰπεῖν· Πλανᾶσθε μὴ εἰδότες τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ μόνον τοῖς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γινομένοις ἐνορῶντες τὸ θεῖον εἶναι τοιοῦτον ὑπειλήφατε. Ἄνθρωπος μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ὄντων ἐργάζεται, ξύλα καὶ λίθους σχηματίζων ὡς βούλεται καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐν τούτοις ποτὲ σχῆμα διὰ τῆς οἰκείας τέχνης ἐντίθησιν· μόνον γὰρ σχημάτων ἐστὶ δημιουρ- γὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων τὸ σχῆμα διὰ τῆς τέχνης ἐντιθεὶς τῷ δημιουργήματι. Καὶ φύσις δὲ ὁμοίως ἐξ ὄντων ἐργάζεται, μείζονα δὲ τῆς ἀνθρώπου τέχνης τὸ διὰ τῆς φύσεως τεχνασθὲν ἔχει τὴν ἐργασίαν. Οὐ μόνον γὰρ σχημάτων ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις δημιουργός, κρᾶσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν τῶν στοιχείων ἐργαζομένη, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς διαφόρους οὐσίας καὶ τὰ εἴδη τῶν πραγμάτων ὑφίστησιν οὐ πρότερον ὄντα. Ἐκ