letting out a cry--- it is surely necessary to say one of two things: either that virtue is not contrary to vice, the whole to the whole and the parts to their analogues, or that what fights against the good is not in every way evil. And yet what could be of either of these <παραδοξότερον ἢ> more out of harmony with the nature of things? For vices fight against virtues; and it is clear how they fight both from the rest of human life, in which the unjust are opposed to the just, and the licentious to the temperate, and from the division within souls themselves, if you will; as when in imperfect men reason leads one way, but passion forces another, and with both fighting, the better is defeated by the worse; for what else is in these things than the temperate part of the soul in conflict with the licentious character? --- <τί δὲ ἐν> the other evils, in which we perceive the soul being in conflict? <ὅλως> for the apparent oppositions of the evil to the good are much earlier invisibly within souls themselves; and this is the ultimate ignorance and sickness of the soul, when the better part in us <καὶ οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ λόγοι ἀγαθοὶ ἐνυπάρ- χοντες> is overcome by the earth-born and dishonorable passions. --- But if vices are contrary to virtues, as we said, and evil is <πάντῃ> contrary to the good-for the nature of the good is not itself disposed to be in conflict with itself, but as <οὖσα> an offspring from one unity and one cause, it is held <πρὸς αὐτήν> by similarity and unity and friendship, and the greater goods are preservative of the lesser, and the lesser are ordered by the more perfect; it is surely necessary that the vices be vices not in name only, but that <ἑκάστην> is truly evil; and not a lesser good; for nowhere is the lesser good contrary to the greater, just as the less hot is not to the more hot, nor the less cold to the more. But if the vices of the soul were acknowledged to be of the nature of evil, it would have been shown that evil contributes to the things that are. 5 <Καὶ οὐ ταύτῃ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ> because evil is what is destructive of each thing; ---and the good of each thing is what is preservative of each, <διὸ καὶ> the desire of all is for the good; for to be and to be preserved for all things is <ἐκεῖθεν, ὥσπερ αὖ> while not to be and to be destroyed is through the nature of evil. It is necessary therefore either for evil to exist, or for nothing to be destructive of anything; --- for if there are no destructive things, it is not possible for there to be destruction; and if there is no destruction, there is no generation, since all generation comes about through the destruction of another; and if there is no generation, the entire cosmos will be incomplete; for it will not have mortal kinds of living things in it, but it must, if it is to be sufficiently complete, <φησὶν ὁ Τίμαιος> [Pl. Tim. 41bƒc]. <εἰ ἄρα δεῖ τὸν κόσμον εὐδαίμονα θεὸν [ib. 34b 8] εἶναι, δεῖ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τὴν πρὸς τὸ παντελὲς ζῶον [cf. ib. 31b 1] αὐτὸν τελείως σῴζειν· εἰ τοῦτο, δεῖ καὶ τὰ θνητὰ γένη [ib. 41b 7] συμπληροῦν τὸ πᾶν· εἰ τοῦτο>, there must also be generation <καὶ φθοράν>; if this is so, there must be both destructive and generative things among beings, some of some things, others of others; for neither generation nor destruction comes from the same things for all. And since there are destructive things, which when they arise in those who have received generation destroy their power, evil must also exist. For this was evil, the destructive principle of each of the generated things, in which it is primarily in itself. For the destructive principles of the soul are one kind, and of the body another, and the thing being destroyed is another; and the manner of destruction is not the same, but in one case it is substantial, in another vital? And in one case the substance is led into not-being and destruction, in another the life flees altogether from what is to another not-being. The same argument, therefore, will both preserve the entire cosmos for us as perfect, and will place evil among the things that are; so that not only will evil exist for the sake of the good, but it will also be good by its very existence. This indeed is the most paradoxical thing, which will also become more knowable from what follows. 6 -- - Every good, inasmuch as it admits the distinction of more and less, according to the more is more perfect and is established nearer to its own source, but according to the less, being obscured and becoming more imperfect through deficiency, it stands away towards what is below its <αὑτοῦ ἑνάδος>. --- Therefore is not injustice itself also and the

φωνὴν ἀφείς--- δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα δήπου λέγειν ἀναγκαῖον· ἢ μὴ εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐναν- τίαν τῇ κακίᾳ, τὴν πᾶσαν τῇ ὅλῃ καὶ τὰς ἐν μέρει ταῖς ἀναλόγοις, ἢ τὸ τῷ ἀγαθῷ μαχόμενον μὴ πάντως εἶναι κακόν. καίτοι τί τούτων ἑκατέρου γένοιτ' ἂν <παραδοξότερον ἢ> πρὸς τὴν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀναρ- μοστότερον; αἱ γὰρ κακίαι μάχονται ταῖς ἀρεταῖς· καὶ δῆλον ὡς μάχονται ἐκ τε τῆς ἄλλης ἀνθρωπίνης ζωῆς, καθ' ἣν οἱ μὲν ἄδικοι τοῖς δικαίοις, οἱ δ' ἀκόλαστοι τοῖς σώφροσιν ἠναντίωνται, κἀκ τῆς ἐν αὐταῖς, εἰ βούλει, ταῖς ψυχαῖς διαστάσεως· οἷον ὅταν ἐν τοῖς ἀτελέσιν ἄγῃ μὲν ὁ λόγος ἑτέραν, βιάζηται δὲ τὸ πάθος, μαχομένων δὲ ἀμφοῖν ἡττᾶται μὲν τὸ κρεῖττον ὑπὸ τοῦ χείρονος· τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ σῶφρον τῆς ψυχῆς στασιάζον πρὸς τὸ ἀκόλαστον ἦθος; --- <τί δὲ ἐν> τοῖς ἄλλοις κακοῖς, ἐν οἷς στασιαζούσης τῆς ψυχῆς αἰσθανόμεθα; <ὅλως> γὰρ αἱ φαινόμεναι τῶν κακῶν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἐναντιώσεις πολλῷ πρό- τερον ἐν αὐταῖς εἰσὶν ἀφανῶς ταῖς ψυχαῖς· καὶ αὕτη τῆς ψυχῆς ἀμαθία ἐσχά- τη καὶ νόσος, ὅταν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν κρεῖττον <καὶ οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ λόγοι ἀγαθοὶ ἐνυπάρ- χοντες> κρατῶνται ὑπὸ τῶν γηγενῶν καὶ ἀτίμων παθῶν. --- εἰ δ' ἐναντίαι μέν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ταῖς ἀρεταῖς αἱ κακίαι, τῷ δ' ἀγαθῷ ἐναντίον <πάντῃ> τὸ κακόν-οὐ γὰρ αὐτὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἡ φύσις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πέφυκε στασιάζειν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἑνάδος καὶ ἑνὸς αἰτίου ἔκγονος <οὖσα>, ὁμοιότητί τε καὶ ἑνότητι καὶ φιλίᾳ ἔχεται <πρὸς αὐτήν>, τά τε μείζω τῶν ἀγαθῶν σωστικὰ τῶν ἐλαττόνων εἰσί, καὶ τὰ ἐλάττω κοσμεῖται παρὰ τῶν τελειοτέρων· ἀνάγκη δήπου τὰς κακίας οὐ λόγῳ μόνον εἶναι κακίας, ἀλλ' ὄντως κακὸν <ἑκάστην>· καὶ οὐκ ἔλαττον ἀγαθόν· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ ἐναντίον τῷ μείζονι ἀγαθῷ τὸ ἔλαττον, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῷ μείζονι θερμῷ τὸ ἧττον, οὐδὲ τῷ μᾶλλον ψυχρῷ τὸ ἔλαττον. εἰ δὲ αἱ ψυχῆς κακίαι τῆς τοῦ κακοῦ φύσεως ὁμολογοῖντο, δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη τὸ κακὸν εἰς τὰ ὄντα τελοῦν. 5 <Καὶ οὐ ταύτῃ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ> ὅτι τὸ κακόν ἐστι τὸ ἑκάστου φθαρ- τικόν· ---καὶ τὸ ἑκάστου ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἑκάστου ἐστὶ σωστικόν, <διὸ καὶ> τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πᾶσιν ἡ ἔφεσις· τὸ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ σώζεσθαι πᾶσιν <ἐκεῖθεν, ὥσπερ αὖ> τὸ μὴ εἶναι καὶ φθείρεσθαι διὰ τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ φύσιν. ἀνάγκη οὖν ἢ τὸ κακὸν εἶναι, ἢ μηδὲν εἶναι μηδενὸς φθαρτικόν· --- φθαρτικῶν γὰρ μὴ ὄντων, μηδὲ φθορὰν εἶναι δυνατόν· φθορᾶς δὲ μὴ οὔσης, οὐδὲ γένεσιν, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γένεσις δι' ἄλλου γίνεται φθορᾶς· γενέσεως δὲ οὐκ οὔσης, ἀτελὴς ὁ σύμπας ἔσται κόσμος· θνητὰ γὰρ ἐν αὑτῷ γένη ζώων οὐχ ἕξει, δεῖ δέ, εἰ μέλλει τέλεος ἱκανῶς εἶναι, <φησὶν ὁ Τίμαιος> [Pl. Tim. 41bƒc]. <εἰ ἄρα δεῖ τὸν κόσμον εὐδαίμονα θεὸν [ib. 34b 8] εἶναι, δεῖ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τὴν πρὸς τὸ παντελὲς ζῶον [cf. ib. 31b 1] αὐτὸν τελείως σῴζειν· εἰ τοῦτο, δεῖ καὶ τὰ θνητὰ γένη [ib. 41b 7] συμπληροῦν τὸ πᾶν· εἰ τοῦτο>, δεῖ καὶ γένεσιν εἶναι <καὶ φθοράν>· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δεῖ καὶ τὰ φθαρτικὰ τῶν ὄντων εἶναι καὶ τὰ γεννητικά, τὰ μὲν ἄλλων, τὰ δὲ ἄλλων· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ γένεσις οὔτε ἡ φθορὰ πᾶσιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν. φθαρτικῶν δὲ ὄντων, ἃ ἐγγενόμενα τοῖς λαχοῦσι γένεσιν φθείρει τὴν ἐκείνων δύναμιν, δεῖ εἶναι καὶ τὸ κακόν. τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν τὸ κακόν, τὸ φθαρτικὸν ἑκάστου τῶν γεννητῶν, ἐν ᾧ πρώτως ἐστὶ καθ' αὑτό. καὶ γὰρ ψυχῆς μὲν ἄλλα φθαρτικά, σώματος δὲ ἄλλα, καὶ τὸ φθειρόμενον ἄλλο· καὶ οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῆς φθορᾶς, ἀλλ' οὗ μὲν οὐσιώδης, οὗ δὲ ζωτικός; καὶ οὗ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας ἀγομένης εἴς τε τὸ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὴν φθοράν, οὗ δὲ τῆς ζωῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄντος ὅλως φευγούσης ἐπ' ἄλλο μὴ ὄν. ὁ αὐτὸς ἄρα λόγος τόν τε σύμπαντα κόσμον τέλειον ἡμῖν διασώσεται, καὶ τὸ κακὸν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι θήσεται· ὥστε οὐ μόνον τὸ κακὸν ἔσται διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἔσται αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι. τοῦτο δὴ τὸ παρα- δοξότατον, ὃ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἑξῆς ἔσται γνωριμώτερον. 6 -- - πᾶν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὅσον ἐπιδέχεται τὴν τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον διαφοράν, κατὰ μὲν τὸ μᾶλλον τελεώτερον ἐστὶ καὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πηγῆς ἐγγυτέρω καθίσταται, κατὰ δὲ αὖ τὸ ἧττον ἀμυδρούμενόν τε καὶ ἀτελέστερον διὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν γινόμενον, ἀφίσταται πρὸς τὸ κάτω τῆς <αὑτοῦ ἑνάδος>. --- ἆρ' οὖν οὐχὶ καὶ τὴν ἀδικίαν αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν