Elements of Theology

 as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore

 activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nat

 it desires that also, how most of all the good? or if it does not desire, how does it not desire the cause of all things, having proceeded from it? Bu

 is itself, and the mover and the moved are one and the same. For either it moves in one part and is moved in another part, or as a whole it moves and

 beginning from a monad, it proceeds into a multitude coordinate with the monad, and the multitude of every order is led back to one monad. For the mon

 the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be of all things, but of one. If, therefore, it is both common to those ab

 the thing produced is other than it. Therefore, that which begets is established as unchangeable and undiminished, multiplying itself through a genera

 from something and reverting has a cyclical activity. For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it joins the end to the beginning, and the mot

 procession. For since each occurs through likeness, that which has proceeded immediately from something has also reverted immediately to it (for the l

 has reverted to itself according to nature and is perfect in its reversion to itself, and would have its being from itself for that to which the reve

 the self-subsistent is set apart from things measured by time in respect to its substance. For if the self-subsistent is ungenerated, it would not be

 having received the power to produce from the cause which is superior to it, it has from that cause its being the cause of those things of which it is

 Thus the producer in relation to the produced, taken in relation to each other, but that which is able to do more has a greater and more universal pow

 a cause has pre-contained in itself the effect, being primarily what that is secondarily or in the thing produced the producer (for this too, partici

 suffers from the former) and when the second in turn acts, that also co-acts, because whatever the second does, the more causal also co-begets with i

 being, or needing it somehow in order to be, would be in this respect more imperfect than the effect. But that which is in the result is a co-cause ra

 passible, being in every way divisible, and in every way to infinity. But the incorporeal, being simple, is impassible for the indivisible can neithe

 undiminished it contains in itself. But surely infinity in respect to magnitude and in respect to multitude is a complete privation and a falling away

 set apart and if all things enter into it, yet it has something hidden and incomprehensible to secondary things and if it unfolds the powers within

 but nowhere for thus it would be divided and separate from itself, if indeed one part of it is everywhere and in all things, but the other part nowhe

 all things. For since each thing exists either according to cause or according to existence or according to participation, in the first the rest exist

 a turning back as if through similars, dissimilar <being>. For the one is similar as a particular to a particular, the other is kindred as being of th

 a hypostasis but no longer a henad, it would be assigned to another order on account of the alteration of its property. 115 Every god is supra-essenti

 supra-essential, being nothing other than the one for each is not one thing, and then good, but only good, just as it is not one thing, and then one,

 is and in beings has the power of apprehending truth (for it both grasps thoughts and has its subsistence in acts of intellection) but the gods are b

 having set the same before itself, is most self-sufficient and such is all that is divine. Therefore it needs neither other things, being goodness-it

 is more unified than beings. All divine genera, therefore, are bound together by their proper intermediaries, and the first do not proceed immediately

 of a henad working, with which it is connate. This, then, is that which in itself defines the being that partakes of it and shows essentially the supr

 to the gods so that, while they are present to all things in the same way, all things are not present to them in the same way, but as each is able, i

 For the one, having a most unitive power, sends itself through the entire union and unifies all from above, while remaining in itself. But the mean, s

 proceeds from the infinity of the divine power, multiplying itself and passing through all things, and pre-eminently demonstrating the unfailing in th

 presides over composites and of their order and of their division according to number, and is of the same series as the paternal in more partial produ

 they have intelligible [qualities]. In the same way, therefore, that those, by illuminating Being, are intelligible, so also these, by illuminating th

 and sees itself. But seeing that it is thinking and seeing, it knows that it is Intellect in actuality and knowing this, it knows that it thinks, and

 Therefore it has the causes of all things intellectually. So that every intellect is all things intellectually, both the things before it and the thin

 more akin, contracted in quantity, in power surpasses the things after it and conversely the things further from the one. Therefore, those that are h

 on the one hand, but being only intellectual, is participated by souls that are neither divine nor come to be in a state of change from intellect to u

 by its very being, if the participant is suitable, it immediately becomes ensouled and living, not by the soul reasoning and choosing, nor giving life

 and to the soul that substantiates the essential principles of all things in it for everything that produces by its being, which it is primarily, thi

 of the motions it will also have restorations for every period of the eternal things is restorative. 200 Every period of a soul is measured by time

 the relation to the secondary ones, which the divine has to the intellectual, and this to the psychical and the quantities of the lower ones are grea

 it admits of every kind of change, being moved together with their own ruling causes. But indeed that it is also indivisible, is clear. For everything

as one subsisting, but according to participation not one, the one will be multiplied, just as the multiplicity is unified through the one. Therefore the one has participated in the multiplicity and the multiplicity in the one; and things that come together and in some way participate in each other, if they are brought together by another, that other is before them, but if they bring themselves together, they are not opposed to each other; for opposites do not hasten toward each other. If, therefore, the one and the multiplicity are divided against each other, and the multiplicity as multiplicity is not one, and the one as one is not multiplicity, neither having come to be in the other, it will be one and two at the same time. But if there is something before them that brings them together, it is either one or not one. But if not one, it is either many or nothing. But neither many, lest a multiplicity be before a one; nor nothing; for how will nothing bring things together? Therefore it is one only; for this one is not also many, lest it go on to infinity. Therefore, the one-itself exists; and all multiplicity is from the one-itself. 6 Every multiplicity is composed either of unified things or of henads. For it is clear that each of the many will not itself be only a multiplicity, and of this again each a multiplicity. But if it is not only a multiplicity, it is either a unified thing or a henad. And if it participates in the one, it is a unified thing; but if it is from those things from which the primarily unified is, it is a henad. For if the one-itself exists, there is that which primarily participates in it and is primarily unified. And this is from henads; for if it were from unified things, again the unified things would be from certain things, and so on to infinity. It is necessary, therefore, that the primarily unified be from henads; and we have found the starting-point. 7 Everything that produces another is superior to the nature of the thing produced. For it is either superior or inferior or equal. Let it first be equal. Therefore, what is produced from this either has itself a power productive of something else, or it is entirely barren. But if it should be barren, by this very fact it is diminished from its producer, and is unequal to that which is fertile and has the power of making, being itself inert. But if it too is productive of other things, either it also produces what is equal to itself, and this likewise for all things, and all beings will be equal to one another and nothing superior to another, since the producer always substantiates what follows as equal to itself; or unequal, and it would no longer be equal to that which produced it; for it is the mark of equal powers to make equal things; but the things from these are unequal to one another, if the producer is equal to that which is before it, but that which is after it is unequal to it. Therefore, what is produced must not be equal to the producer. But surely the producer will never be inferior. For if it gives substance to what is produced, it also supplies power to it according to its substance. But if it is productive of all the power in that which is after it, it would be able to make itself such as that is. And if this, it would make itself more powerful. For neither inability prevents it, since the productive power is present; nor unwillingness, for all things by nature desire the good; so that if it is able to perfect another, it would perfect itself before that which is after it. Therefore, what is produced is neither equal to nor superior to the producer. In every way, therefore, the producer is superior to the nature of the thing produced. 8 Of all things that in any way participate in the good, the first good and that which is nothing other than good is the leader. For if all beings desire the good, it is clear that the first good is beyond beings. For if it were identical with one of the beings, either being and the good are identical, and this being would no longer be one that desires the good, since it is itself the good; for that which desires something is in need of what it desires, and [is different from and] alienated from the object of its desire; or the one is different, and the other is different; and the being will participate, while the good will be participated in within it. It is, therefore, a certain good, existing in one of the participants, which the participant alone desires, but not the simply good which all beings desire. For the latter is the common object of desire for all beings; but that which has come to be in something belongs only to that participant. Therefore, the first good is nothing other than good. For if you add anything else, you diminish the good by the addition, making it a certain good instead of the good simply; for the thing added, not being the good but less than it, has diminished the good by its own co-presence. 9 Everything that is self-sufficient is so either according to substance or according to

ὡς ἓν ὑφεστός, κατὰ δὲ τὴν μέθεξιν οὐχ ἕν, πεπληθυσμένον ἔσται τὸ ἕν, ὥσπερ τὸ πλῆθος ἡνωμένον διὰ τὸ ἕν. κεκοινώνηκεν ἄρα τό τε ἓν τῷ πλήθει καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῷ ἑνί· τὰ δὲ συνιόντα καὶ κοινωνοῦντά πῃ ἀλλήλοις εἰ μὲν ὑπ' ἄλλου συνάγεται, ἐκεῖνο πρὸ αὐτῶν ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ αὐτὰ συνάγει ἑαυτά, οὐκ ἀντί κειται ἀλλήλοις· ἀντικείμενα γὰρ οὐ σπεύδει εἰς ἄλληλα. εἰ οὖν τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἀντιδιῄρηται, καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ᾗ πλῆθος οὐχ ἕν, καὶ τὸ ἓν ᾗ ἓν οὐ πλῆθος, οὐδέτερον ἐν θατέρῳ γενόμενον, ἓν ἅμα καὶ δύο ἔσται. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἔσται τι πρὸ αὐτῶν τὸ συν άγον, ἢ ἕν ἐστιν ἢ οὐχ ἕν. ἀλλ' εἰ οὐχ ἕν, ἢ πολλὰ ἢ οὐδέν. οὔτε δὲ πολλά, ἵνα μὴ πλῆθος ᾖ πρὸ ἑνός· οὔτε οὐδέν· πῶς γὰρ συνάξει τὸ οὐδέν; ἓν ἄρα μόνον· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἓν πολλά, ἵνα μὴ εἰς ἄπειρον. ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ αὐτοέν· καὶ πᾶν πλῆθος ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοενός. 6 Πᾶν πλῆθος ἢ ἐξ ἡνωμένων ἐστὶν ἢ ἐξ ἑνάδων. ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν πολλῶν ὅτι μὲν οὐκ ἔσται καὶ αὐτὸ πλῆθος μόνον καὶ τούτου πάλιν ἕκαστον πλῆθος, δῆλον. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι πλῆθος μόνον, ἤτοι ἡνωμένον ἐστὶν ἢ ἑνάς. καὶ εἰ μὲν μετέχον τοῦ ἑνός, ἡνωμένον· εἰ δὲ ἐξ ὧν τὸ πρώτως ἡνωμένον, ἑνάς. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ αὐτοέν, ἔστι τὸ πρώτως αὐτοῦ μετέχον καὶ πρώτως ἡνωμένον. τοῦτο δὲ ἐξ ἑνάδων· εἰ γὰρ ἐξ ἡνωμένων, πάλιν τὰ ἡνωμένα ἔκ τινων, καὶ εἰς ἄπειρον. δεῖ δὴ εἶναι τὸ πρώτως ἡνω μένον ἐξ ἑνάδων· καὶ εὕρομεν τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. 7 Πᾶν τὸ παρακτικὸν ἄλλου κρεῖττόν ἐστι τῆς τοῦ παραγο μένου φύσεως. ἤτοι γὰρ κρεῖττόν ἐστιν ἢ χεῖρον ἢ ἴσον. ἔστω πρότερον ἴσον. τὸ τοίνυν ἀπὸ τούτου παραγόμενον ἢ δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ αὐτὸ παρακτικὴν ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ ἄγονον ὑπάρχει παντελῶς. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἄγονον εἴη, κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοῦ παρ άγοντος ἠλάττωται, καὶ ἔστιν ἄνισον ἐκείνῳ, γονίμῳ ὄντι καὶ δύναμιν ἔχοντι τοῦ ποιεῖν, ἀδρανὲς ὄν. εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ παρακτι κόν ἐστιν ἄλλων, ἢ καὶ αὐτὸ ἴσον ἑαυτῷ παράγει, καὶ τοῦτο ὡσαύτως ἐπὶ πάντων, καὶ ἔσται τὰ ὄντα πάντα ἴσα ἀλλήλοις καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἄλλου κρεῖττον, ἀεὶ τοῦ παράγοντος ἴσον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἐφεξῆς ὑφιστάντος· ἢ ἄνισον, καὶ οὐκέτ' ἂν ἴσον εἴη τῷ αὐτὸ παράγοντι· δυνάμεων γὰρ ἴσων ἐστὶ τὸ τὰ ἴσα ποιεῖν· τὰ δ' ἐκ τούτων ἄνισα ἀλλήλοις, εἴπερ τὸ μὲν παράγον τῷ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἴσον, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ μετ' αὐτὸ ἄνισον. οὐκ ἄρα ἴσον εἶναι δεῖ τῷ παράγοντι τὸ παραγόμενον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἔλαττον ἔσται ποτὲ τὸ παράγον. εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὴν οὐσίαν τῷ παραγομένῳ δίδωσιν, αὐτὸ καὶ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῷ χορηγεῖ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν. εἰ δὲ αὐτὸ παρακτικόν ἐστι τῆς δυνάμεως τῷ μετ' αὐτὸ πάσης, κἂν ἑαυτὸ δύναιτο ποιεῖν τοιοῦτον, οἷον ἐκεῖνο. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ποιήσειεν ἂν ἑαυτὸ δυνατώτερον. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κωλύει, παρούσης τῆς ποιητικῆς δυνάμεως· οὔτε τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι, πάντα γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὀρέγεται κατὰ φύσιν· ὥστε εἰ ἄλλο δύναται τελειότερον ἀπεργάσασθαι, κἂν ἑαυτὸ πρὸ τοῦ μετ' αὐτὸ τελειώσειεν. οὔτε ἴσον ἄρα τῷ παράγοντι τὸ παραγόμενόν ἐστιν οὔτε κρεῖττον. πάντῃ ἄρα τὸ παράγον κρεῖττον τῆς τοῦ παραγο μένου φύσεως. 8 Πάντων τῶν ὁπωσοῦν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μετεχόντων ἡγεῖται τὸ πρώτως ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὃ μηδέν ἐστιν ἄλλο ἢ ἀγαθόν. εἰ γὰρ πάντα τὰ ὄντα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐφίεται, δῆλον ὅτι τὸ πρώτως ἀγαθὸν ἐπέκεινά ἐστι τῶν ὄντων. εἰ γὰρ ταὐτόν τινι τῶν ὄντων, ἢ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ὂν καὶ τἀγαθόν, καὶ τοῦτο τὸ ὂν οὐκέτι ἂν ἐφιέμενον εἴη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, αὐτὸ τἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον· τὸ γὰρ ὀρεγόμενόν του ἐνδεές ἐστιν οὗ ὀρέγεται, καὶ τοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ [ἕτερον καὶ] ἀπεξενωμένον· ἢ τὸ μὲν ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο· καὶ τὸ μὲν μεθέξει, τὸ ὄν, τὸ δὲ ἔσται μετεχόμενον ἐν τούτῳ, τὸ ἀγαθόν. τὶ ἄρα ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἐν τινὶ τῶν μετεχόντων ὄν, καὶ οὗ τὸ μετασχὸν ἐφίεται μόνον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὗ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐφίεται. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ κοινὸν πάντων ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων ἐφετόν· τὸ δὲ ἐν τινὶ γενόμενον ἐκείνου μόνον ἐστὶ τοῦ μετα σχόντος. τὸ ἄρα πρώτως ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ἀγαθόν. ἂν γάρ τι ἄλλο προσθῇς, ἠλάττωσας τῇ προσθέσει τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὶ ἀγαθὸν ποιήσας ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ ἁπλῶς· τὸ γὰρ προστεθέν, οὐκ ὂν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλ' ἔλαττον ἢ ἐκεῖνο, τῇ ἑαυτοῦ συνουσίᾳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἠλάττωσεν. 9 Πᾶν τὸ αὔταρκες ἢ κατ' οὐσίαν ἢ κατ'