a rebellion of matter against God. But I would not say that these things are insufficient to persuade those who approach the argument without examination, seeing that such a deceit of arguments has even drawn some of our fellow students in philosophy over to itself. But now, having submitted myself to an examination of how things stand, I am at a loss as to what to do. For their hypotheses are not based on any customary arguments, so that we might conduct our inquiry according to them, nor are there any first principles of proofs, [and] so that we might see what follows from them. It is truly a godsend for those who are said simply to philosophize, who, taking up their own scriptures, both old and new—assuming them to be divinely inspired—from these derive their own opinions and seem to be refuted only at that point when something inconsistent with these scriptures happens to be said or done by them. And what the first principles of proofs are for the Greek philosophers—the immediate premises—this for them is the voice of the prophets. But here, with all of these things being thrown out, and with the things I mentioned before being said without any proof, and since it is necessary to make a reply with reason, and not just to set forth other more plausible things that are better able to persuade, the attack is more difficult and even more troublesome, because it is necessary to make the arguments varied. For if they are more precise, they might escape the notice of those who have been preoccupied by these things without any proof; but if they are for persuasion, they will fall into the same traps, for they will seem to have been produced from similar sources. Therefore, there is need of much and great care, and of God truly, who will guide the argument.

6 He posits two principles, God and matter. If he separates that which comes to be from that which is, the hypothesis is not so base, so that matter may neither make itself nor admit the principle of opposites, both acting and being acted upon, nor again may other such things be considered concerning the efficient cause, which it is perhaps not right even to mention—although God has no need of matter for his creations, since all things can come into existence by that mind. But if, as he seems rather to say, the disorderly motion of things that are is <the> matter, first, he is unaware that he is positing another efficient cause, a malevolent one at that, and he does not see what follows: that if one must absolutely posit God and matter, another matter will be posited for God, so that for each of the efficient causes there may be an underlying matter. Thus, instead of two, he will be shown to be making four principles for us. And his distinction is also wonderful. For if God for him is the same as the good, and he wishes to posit an opposite to him, why does he not, like some of the Pythagoreans, set evil in opposition to him? At any rate, it is more tolerably said by them that there are two principles, the good and the bad, and that these are continually in conflict, but the good prevails; for if the bad were to gain the upper hand, all things would be destroyed. For matter in itself is neither a body, nor strictly something incorporeal, nor simply a "this," but something indefinite that, upon receiving form, becomes definite, as for example the pyramid becomes fire, the octahedron air, the icosahedron water, and the cube earth. How then is matter the disorderly motion of the elements? In itself, then, it cannot exist, for motion is in that which is moved. But matter does not seem to be such a thing, but rather the primary, unconfigured substrate from which other things come. Since, therefore, matter is disorderly motion, was it always with that which is moved or was it ever separate from it? For if it ever existed by itself, then it would not exist, for there is no motion without that which is moved. But if it was always in that which is moved, then again there would be two principles.

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ὕλης κατὰ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄνταρσιν. ἐγὼ δὲ ὡς μὲν ταῦτα οὐχ ἱκανὰ ψυχαγωγῆσαι τοὺς ἀβασανίστως τὸν λόγον προσιεμένους οὐκ ἂν εἴποιμι, ὅπου γε καί τινας τῶν συνεσχολακότων ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν μετέστησεν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀπάτη τῶν λόγων πρὸς ἑαυτήν· εἰς ἐξέτασιν δὲ ὅπως ἔχει νῦν ἐμαυτὸν καθεὶς ἀπορῶ τί χρήσωμαι. οὔτε γὰρ διά τινων λόγων νενομισμένων εἰσὶν αὐτῶν αἱ ὑποθέσεις, ἵνα κατὰ ταύ τας τὴν ζήτησιν ποιησώμεθα, οὔτε τινὲς ἀρχαὶ ἀπο δείξεων, [καὶ] ἵνα τὸ ταύταις ἑπόμενον θεασώμεθα. ἕρμαιόν τε ἀληθῶς ἐστιν τὸ τῶν ἁπλῶς λεγομένων φιλοσοφεῖν, οἳ τὰς παρ' αὐτοῖς γραφὰς παλαιάς τε καὶ νέας ὑποστησάμενοι-θεοπνεύστους εἶναι ὑπο τιθέμενοι τὰς σφῶν αὐτῶν δόξας ἐντεῦθεν περαί νουσιν καὶ ἐλέγχεσθαι μόνον τηνικαῦτα δοκοῦσιν, ἐάν τι μὴ ταύταις ἀκόλουθον ἢ λέγεσθαι ἢ πράττεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν συμβαίνῃ· καὶ ὅπερ αἱ παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν καθ' Ἕλληνας τῶν ἀποδείξεων ἀρχαί, αἱ προτάσεις αἱ ἄμεσοι, τοῦτο παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐστιν ἡ τῶν προφητῶν φωνή. ἐνταῦθα δὲ τούτων μὲν ἁπάντων ἐκβαλλομένων, λεγο μένων δὲ ὧν πρότερον ἐπεμνήσθην ἄνευ τινὸς ἀπο δείξεως, ἀναγκαίου δὲ ὄντος μετὰ λόγου ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πιθανώτερα ἕτερα παραθεῖναι καὶ μᾶλλον ψυχαγωγεῖν δυνάμενα, χαλεπωτέρα ἡ ἔφο δος καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον δυσκολωτέρα, ὅτι καὶ ποικίλους τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι δεῖ. εἴτε γὰρ ἀκριβέστεροι, τοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων ἄνευ τινὸς πίστεως προκατειλημμένους λάθοιεν ἄν· εἴτε εἰς ψυχαγωγίαν γένοιντο, εἰς τὰς αὐ τὰς λαβὰς ἐμπεσοῦνται, ἐξ ὁμοίων γὰρ γεγονέναι δόξου σιν. διὸ πολλῆς καὶ μεγάλης φροντίδος δεῖ καὶ θεοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς, ὃς τοῦ λόγου ἡγήσεται.

6 ∆ύο ἀρχὰς ὑποτίθεται, θεὸν καὶ ὕλην. εἰ μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενον τοῦ ὄντος ἀποχωρίζων, οὐχ ὁμοίως φαύλη ἡ ὑπόθεσις, ἵνα μήτε ἡ ὕλη ἑαυτὴν ποιῇ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἐναντίων ἀποδέχηται λόγον, ποιοῦσά τε καὶ πάσχουσα, μήτ' αὖ τοιαῦτα πάλιν ἕτερα περὶ τὸ ποι ητικὸν αἴτιον θεωρῆται, ἃ οὐδὲ λέγειν ἴσως θέμις- καίτοι οὐ δεομένου τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς τὰ ἀποτελέσματα ὕλης, ἐν ὑποστάσει δυναμένων γίγνεσθαι πάντων πρὸς ἐκεῖνον τὸν νοῦν. εἰ δέ, ὅπερ μᾶλλον λέγεσθαι δοκεῖ ὑπ' αὐ τοῦ, ἡ ἄτακτος κίνησις τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν <ἡ> ὕλη, πρῶτον μὲν λανθάνει ἑαυτὸν ἕτερον ποιητικὸν αἴτιον ὑφιστάμενος, κακοποιὸν μέντοι, οὐχ ὁρᾷ δὲ καὶ τὸ ἑπόμενον, ὅτι εἰ θεὸν πάντως ὑποστατέον καὶ ὕλην, ἑτέρα τις ὕλη τῷ θεῷ ὑποστήσεται, ἵνα ἑκατέρῳ τῶν ποιητικῶν αἰτίων ἡ ὑποκειμένη ὑπάρχῃ ὕλη. ἀντὶ τοίνυν δύο τέτταρας ἡμῖν ποιῶν ἀρχὰς ἐπιδειχθήσεται. θαυμαστὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀντιδιαίρεσις. εἰ γὰρ θεός ἐστιν παρ' αὐτῷ ὅπερ τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ βούλεται ὑφίστασθαι αὐτῷ ἐναντίον, διὰ τί οὐ καθάπερ τινὲς τῶν Πυθα γορείων τὸ κακὸν αὐτῷ ἀντιτίθησιν; ἀνεκτότερον γοῦν ὑπ' ἐκείνων λέγεται δύο εἶναι ἀρχάς, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν, στασιάζειν δὲ ταύτας συνεχῶς, ἐπικρατεῖν δὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν· εἰ γὰρ τὸ κακὸν ὑπερέχοι, φθαρήσεσθαι πάντα. ὅλως γὰρ καθ' αὑτὴν μὲν ἡ ὕλη οὔτε σῶμά ἐστιν οὔτε ἀκριβῶς ἀσώματόν τι οὔτε ἁπλῶς τόδε τι, ἀλλ' ἀόριστός τις προσλαβοῦσα τὸ εἶδος γίνεται ὡρι σμένη, οἷον τὴν πυραμίδα μὲν πῦρ, τὸ ὀκτάεδρον δὲ ἀήρ, τὸ εἰκοσάεδρον δὲ ὕδωρ, κύβον δὲ γῆ. πῶς οὖν ἐστι τῶν στοιχείων ἡ ἄτακτος κίνησις ἡ ὕλη; καθ' ἑαυτὴν μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ὑποστατή, ἡ γὰρ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ· οὐ δοκεῖ δὲ τοιοῦτον εἶναι ἡ ὕλη, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἀρρύθμιστον καὶ ἀφ' οὗ τὰ ἄλλα. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἡ ἄτακτος κίνησίς ἐστιν ἡ ὕλη, πότερον ἦν ἀεὶ σὺν τῷ κινουμένῳ ἤ ποτε κεχώρισται τούτου; εἰ μὲν γάρ ποτε ἦν καθ' αὑτήν, οὕτω γε οὐκ ἂν ἦν, οὐδεμία γὰρ κίνησις ἄνευ τοῦ κινουμένου· εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ ἦν, πάλιν αὖ δύο ἀρχαὶ οὕτω γε

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