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in every way atemporal and incorruptible, being apprehensive of the things coming after it and from it, and a producer of the powers in which these things participate. If, then, there is being here, there is something that pre-exists; and if there is sensation, there is something pre-perceiving or rather super-perceiving; and if there is intellect here, there is something pre-conceiving or even super-conceiving. For these reasons, God exists; for thus the first being has been named by all. Indeed, it has now been demonstrated to us most simply and by sense-perception, as it were, that God exists; for nothing could ever subsist that did not have some beginning, from which it might be substantiated and partake of power.

6

Since, then, these things have been well said by us, we must go to the difficulty and resolve it. We say there is properly no motion in divine things, but neither is there rest; these are suited to things of our world and under sensation. For since motion is spoken of in six ways—according to generation and corruption, according to increase and decrease, and according to alteration and transition from place to place—we find none of these to be fitting for the pre-eternal being. For divine things are far from generation and the corruption that follows it, nor do divine things increase at all, nor do they suffer decrease, nor are they altered, for these are in every way unalterable, nor do they change from place to place, for they are established beyond place as also beyond time. But the transitive knowledge, by which we have first known being, and then the things from it, this we call motion, and that which does not proceed forward we have called rest. For having first imagined a monad, then, conceiving it not to be sterile, we have moved it, as it were, in our imagination to a dyad. Proceeding from there, we have stopped at a triad, following the oracles concerning these things, not moving the immovable further with our thoughts. For the divine alone is unmoved, and all things are moved by it; for everything moved by the will to be moved, and if this, being a mover, is also moved, it must in turn be moved by another, and we would not stop, positing these things an infinite number of times, unless we arrive at something unmoved, which moves but is not moved. And this is by nature the first being, since nature, which moves bodies, is moved by something else; for soul moves nature, and intellect moves soul, and intellect is moved by the superior powers according to the Greeks, and these are moved by the first cause and that ineffable and all-working power.

7

Since, then, we have clarified as was necessary what is said concerning motion and rest in the divine nature, we must proceed to the other difficulty, which says "that there are times when the one, being in strife, becomes many"; and from here, through the resolution of the saying, it may become known to us how the monad did not stop at a dyad, nor proceed beyond a triad. And first, we must raise the difficulty thus. If there is something that is properly one, not composed from one or more things into some unified appearance but having its substance in the one, how could it, remaining the one that it is, be in strife? And not remaining one, but being numbered as two or three, how could it remain without strife and preserve its own form forever? For the dyad before the triad is a cause of strife. The argument, therefore, seems a riddle and enigmatic, I think, if that which is numbered as two or even three will not be in strife, but the one that is properly one should admit strife, which also preserves and saves from strife those things that have fallen into number through participation in it, as long as they participate in it; but when these fall away from this one, having been in strife, they suffer corruption and deviation from the one.

8

There is, then, as has been precisely determined by all theologians and as has been previously clarified by us, the first being. And by all I mean Chaldeans, Egyptians, Indians, the Greeks themselves, in a word, all who have in any way touched upon theology and wished to discuss God; this being has at least been acknowledged as the creative cause. For all things are from it, both the immaterial forms and the material ones. And the immaterial things are established somewhere very near its nature, even if according to the creative

3

πάντη γε ἄχρονόν τε καὶ ἄφθαρτον, προληπτικὸν ὂν τῶν μετ' αὐτὸ καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ γινομένων καὶ προαγωγὸν τῶν δυνάμεων ὧν ταῦτα μετέχει. εἰ γοῦν ἔστιν ἐνταῦθα ὄν, ἔστι τι τὸ προόν· καὶ εἰ ἔστιν αἴσθησις, ἔστι τι προαισθό μενον ἢ μᾶλλον ὑπεραισθόμενον· καὶ εἰ ἔστιν ἐνταῦθα νοῦς, ἔστι τι τὸ προνοοῦν ἢ καὶ ὑπερνοοῦν. διὰ ταῦτα ἔστι θεός· οὕτω γὰρ τὸ πρώτως ὂν παρὰ πᾶσιν ὠνόμασται. ἤδη γοῦν καὶ ἡμῖν ἁπλουστάτως καὶ αἰσθητικῶς μόνον οὐχὶ ἀποδέδεικται ὡς ἔστι θεός· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε συσταίη τι μὴ ἀρχὴν ἔχον τινά, ἐξ ἧς οὐσιωθείη καὶ μετάσχῃ δυνάμεως.

6 Ἐπεὶ γοῦν ταῦτα καλῶς ἡμῖν εἴρηται, ἰτέον ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπορίαν καὶ διαλυτέον αὐτήν. κίνησιν μὲν κυρίως ἐν τοῖς θείοις οὔ φαμεν, ἀλλ' οὔτε στάσιν· τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς ἁρμόττει ταῦτα καὶ ὑπὸ αἴσθησιν. τῆς γὰρ κινήσεως ἑξαχῆ λεγομένης, κατὰ γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν, κατὰ αὔξησιν καὶ μείωσιν, κατά τε ἀλλοίωσιν καὶ τὴν ἐκ τόπου εἰς τόπον μετάβασιν, οὐδε μίαν ἐκ τούτων εὑρίσκομεν τῷ προαιωνίῳ ὄντι προσήκουσαν. πόρρω γὰρ γενέσεως τὰ θεῖα καὶ τῆς ἑπομένης ταύτῃ φθο ρᾶς, αὔξει τε οὐδαμῶς τὰ θεῖα, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μείωσιν πάσχει, οὔτε μὴν ἀλλοιοῦται, ἀναλλοίωτα γὰρ ταῦτα πάντη, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μεταβάλλει ἐκ τόπου εἰς τόπον, ὑπὲρ τόπον γὰρ ὡς καὶ ὑπὲρ χρόνον καθέστηκεν. ἀλλὰ τὴν μεταβατικὴν γνῶσιν, καθ' ἣν τὸ πρώτως ἐγνώκαμεν ὄν, κᾆτα δὴ τὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ταύτην φαμὲν κίνησιν, καὶ τὴν εἰς τὸ πρόσω μὴ μετα βαίνουσαν εἰρήκαμεν στάσιν. μονάδα γοῦν φαντασθέντες τὸ πρῶτον, εἶτα δὴ οὐκ ἄγονον ἐννοήσαντες, εἰς δυάδα οἷον τῇ φαντασίᾳ ταυτηνὶ κεκινήκαμεν. ἐντεῦθεν προχωρήσαντες εἰς τριάδα ἔστημεν, τοῖς ὑπὲρ τούτων λογίοις ἑπόμενοι, μὴ περαιτέρω κινοῦντες ταῖς νοήσεσι τὰ ἀκίνητα. ἀκίνητον γὰρ μόνως τὸ θεῖον, πάντα δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κινεῖται· ἅπαν γὰρ κινούμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐθέλειν κινεῖσθαι, καὶ τοῦτο εἰ κινοῦν κινεῖται, ὑφ' ἑτέρου πάλιν ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι, καὶ οὐκ ἂν σταίημεν ἀπειράκις ταῦτα ὑποτιθέμενοι, εἰ μὴ εἴς τι ἀκίνητον καταντήσαιμεν, ὃ κινοῦν οὐ κινούμενον. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ πρῶτον πέφυκεν ὄν, ἐπείπερ ἡ φύσις κινοῦσα τὰ σώματα ὑπό του ἄλλου κινεῖται· ψυχὴ γὰρ τὴν φύσιν κινεῖ καὶ ταύτην ὁ νοῦς, τοῦτον δὲ αἱ κρείττους δυνάμεις καθ' Ἕλληνας, ταύτας δὲ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον καὶ ἡ ἄρρητος ἐκείνη καὶ παντουργικὴ δύναμις.

7 Ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ περὶ κινήσεώς τε καὶ στάσεως τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς θείας φύσεως λεγομένων καθ' ὅσον ἔδει διασεσαφήκαμεν, ἐπὶ τὴν ἑτέραν ἀπορίαν ἰτέον ἡμῖν τὴν λέγουσαν «ὡς ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ τὸ ἓν στασιάζον πολλὰ γίνεσθαι»· κἀντεῦθεν διὰ τῆς τοῦ ῥητοῦ λύσεως γνωστὸν ἡμῖν γένοιτο, πῶς ἡ μονὰς οὐ μέχρι δυάδος ἔστη, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τριάδος περαιτέρω προσέβη. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀπορητέον οὕτως. εἴπερ ἔστι τι κυρίως ἕν, μὴ ἔκ τινος ἢ ἔκ τινων εἰς ἑνοειδῆ τινα φαντασίαν συντεθὲν ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχον, πῶς μένον ἓν ὅπερ ἐστὶ στασιάσειε; καὶ μὴ μένον ἕν, εἰς δύο δὲ ἢ τρία ἠριθμημένον, πῶς ἂν ἀστασίαστον μένοι καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐς ἀεὶ διαφυλάξειεν εἶδος; ἡ γὰρ πρὸ τῆς τριάδας δυὰς αἰτία στάσεως. γρῖφος οὖν ὁ λόγος δοκεῖ καὶ αἰνιγματώδης, ὡς οἶμαι, εἴπερ τὸ μὲν εἰς δύο ἢ καὶ τρία ἠριθμημένον οὐ στασιάσει, τὸ δὲ ἓν κυρίως τυγχάνον ἓν προσδέξαιτο στάσιν, ὃ καὶ τὰ εἰς ἀριθμὸν πεσόντα δι' αὐτοῦ μετοχήν, ἔστ' ἂν αὐτοῦ μετέχῃ, ἀστασίαστα διατηρεῖ καὶ σώζει, ἐπὰν δὲ ἐκ σταίη ταῦτα τουτουὶ στασιάσαντα, τὴν φθορὰν πάσχει καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐκτροπήν.

8 Ἔστι μὲν οὖν, ὡς τοῖς πᾶσι θεολόγις ἠκρίβωται καὶ καθὼς ἡμῖν προηγουμένως διασεσάφηται, τὸ πρῶτον ὄν. πᾶσι δὲ λέγω Χαλδαίοις, Αἰγυπτίοις, Ἰνδοῖς, αὐτοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἁπαξαπλῶς τοῖς ὁπωσοῦν ἁψαμένοις θεολογίας καὶ βεβουλημένοις διαλεχθῆναι περὶ θεοῦ τοῦτο γοῦν τὸ ὂν καὶ δημιουργικὸν καθω μολόγηται αἴτιον. πάντα γοῦν ἐξ αὐτοῦ, τά τε ἄυλα εἰδη τά τε ἔνυλα. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄυλα ἔγγιστά που τῆς αὐτῆς καθειστήκει φύσεως, εἰ καὶ κατὰ τὸν δημιουργικὸν