For it is illogical to make use of the energies of the incorporeal, but to be ignorant of the existence of the incorporeal. Another. There are two powers in us for apprehending things, both sensation and intellection; whose energies differ from one another inasmuch as the things apprehended by the one cannot be apprehended by the other. But since all powers are powers of substances, for this reason it is necessary for there to be two substances, of which the property of the one is to sense, and of the other to exercise intellection. But if this is so, then there is some incorporeal substance, whose property it is to exercise intellection, just as it is for the body to sense. Another. If there is something ensouled, it is necessary for the soul to exist; for by participation in the soul the ensouled exists as ensouled. If knowledge does not exist on its own, but in the soul, then it is necessary for the soul to exist on its own, in which knowledge exists. Another. If the body needs the soul in order to live and to sense, but the soul does not need the body, neither for living nor for intellection, then the soul is other than the body. Another. If the soul commands the body, and the body serves the commands of the soul, then the soul is something other than the body. Another. If the soul holds the place of an artisan, and the body that of an instrument, and the instruments are not the same as the artisan, then the body is not the same as the soul. Another. If the principle is first and what is according to the principle is later (for the principle is in the soul, but what is according to the principle is in matter), then matter is something other than the soul. And that which is other than matter, this is also other than body. Another. If that which is not a body is not a substance, how is substance divided into body and incorporeal, when that which is divided must necessarily exist in the things into which it is divided? Question. If there is something incorporeal, whence is it clear that it is able to exist on its own? Answer. That by whose presence the body in itself partakes of life and sensation and thought, and by whose absence again it becomes dead and insensible and unthinking, this must exist on its own, as being incorruptible by its own nature. Another. To construct rationally difficult questions in a scientific manner, and likewise to solve them scientifically, is not the work of sensation; for it is agreed that sensation is not able to attain knowledge of substance and truth. And if this is so, and it is the task of science to attain knowledge of substance and truth, but not of sensation, and that which is not of sensation is not of the body either, then it is necessary for there to be something incorporeal on its own, in which science exists. Another. If substance must exist on its own, it is divided

ἄλογον γὰρ τὸ κεχρῆσθαι μὲν ταῖς τοῦ ἀσωμάτου ἐνεργείαις, ἀγνοεῖν δὲ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου τὴν ὕπαρξιν. Ἄλλο. ∆ύο εἰσὶν ἐν ἡμῖν καταληπτικαὶ τῶν πραγμά των δυνάμεις, ἥ τε αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ νόησις· ὧν αἱ ἐνέργειαι τοσούτῳ ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσιν, ὅσῳ τὰ ὑπὸ θατέρου κατα λαμβανόμενα μὴ δύνανται καταλαμβάνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου. Ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ πᾶσαι δυνάμεις οὐσιῶν εἰσι δυνάμεις, διὰ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη εἶναι οὐσίας δύο, ὧν τῆς μὲν ἴδιον τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τῆς δὲ τὸ νοεῖν. Ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, ἔστιν ἄρα οὐσία τις ἀσώ ματος, ἧς ἴδιον ὑπάρχει τὸ νοεῖν, ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τῷ σώματι. Ἄλλο. Eἰ ἔστι τι ἔμψυχον, ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν· τῇ γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς μετοχῇ τὸ ἔμψυχον ὑπάρχει ἔμψυχον. Eἰ ἡ ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἔστιν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀνάγκη ἄρα εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς, ἐν ᾗ ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐπιστήμη. Ἄλλο. Eἰ τὸ μὲν σῶμα δεῖται τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ζῆν τε καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ οὐ δεῖται τοῦ σώματος, οὔτε πρὸς τὸ ζῆν οὔτε πρὸς τὸ νοεῖν, ἕτερον ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ παρὰ τὸ σῶμα. Ἄλλο. Eἰ ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ προστάττει τῷ σώματι, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ὑπουργεῖ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς προστάγμασιν, ἕτερον ἄρα τι ἡ ψυχὴ παρὰ τὸ σῶμα. Ἄλλο. Eἰ ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ τεχνίτου λόγον ἐπέχει, τὸ δὲ σῶμα ὀργάνου, οὐ ταὐτὸν δὲ ὑπάρχει τῷ τεχνίτῃ τὰ ὄργανα, οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρα τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ σῶμα. Ἄλλο. Eἰ πρῶτος ὁ λόγος καὶ ὕστερον τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον (ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ λόγος, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὕλῃ τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον), ἕτερον ἄρα τι ἡ ὕλη παρὰ τὴν ψυχήν. Τὸ δὲ ὕλης ἕτερον, τοῦτο καὶ σώματος ἕτερον. Ἄλλο. Eἰ τὸ μὴ ὂν σῶμα οὐδὲ οὐσία ἐστί, πῶς διαι ρεῖται ἡ οὐσία εἰς σῶμα καὶ ἀσώματον, τοῦ διαιρουμένου ἀνάγκῃ ὑπάρχοντος ἐν τοῖς εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται; Ἐρώτησις. Eἰ ἔστι τι ἀσώματον, πόθεν δῆλον ὅτι αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ δύναται εἶναι; Ἀπόκρισις. Oὗ τῇ παρουσίᾳ τὸ σῶμα τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ ζωῆς τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας μέτοχον, καὶ τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ πάλιν νε κρόν τε καὶ ἀναίσθητον καὶ ἀδιανόητον γίνεται, τοῦτο ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, ὡς τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει ὑπάρχον ἄφθαρτον. Ἄλλο. Τὸ κατασκευάζειν ἐπιστημόνως τὰς λογικὰς ἀπο ρίας, καὶ ταύτας ὁμοίως ἐπιστημόνως λύειν, οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθή σεως ἔργον· ὡμολόγηται γὰρ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὴν αἴσθησιν οὐσίας τε καὶ ἀληθείας ἐφάπτεσθαι γνώσεως. Eἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ἐπιστήμης μέν ἐστι τὸ ἐφάπτεσθαι οὐσίας τε καὶ ἀληθείας γνώσεως, αἰσθήσεως δὲ οὐκ ἔστι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν τῆς αἰσθήσεως οὐδὲ σώματός ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη ἄρα εἶναί τι ἀσώματον ἐφ' ἑαυ τοῦ, ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐπιστήμη. Ἄλλο. Eἰ δεῖ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς, διαιρεῖται