for a form of the elements produces that of bone and flesh, of veins and nerves, and the countless forms of plants, and the varied differences of colors and juices and metals. 9. If, therefore, nature so much excels the art of men, how is it not necessary for the creation of God to incomparably surpass also the work of nature? Therefore if nature produces forms that do not exist, yet it creates these in a pre-existing substrate, because it is impossible otherwise to display its creative power in them without some pre-existing substrate, it is entirely necessary, if God also creates and brings things into being, for his creation to have something more than that of nature; but it would have nothing more, if it were not able to bring things into being from that which is in no way anywhere existent, but he too should need, just like the human craftsman and nature, some pre-existing substrate in which he will display his creative energy, and he would not even surpass nature by so much as nature surpasses art, being a creator not only of shapes, according to the art of men, but also of different substances. 10. Besides, it is full of all absurdity to make the proofs of the whole through particular things and those that happen in each case. For if, looking at particular creations, they say: "6Since no creator makes without matter, for this reason God also will not make without matter"6, let them know that the matter underlying for every craftsman underlies having been created by a prior providence or art, as wood and iron and stones, underlying for human craftsmen only to be shaped, have sprouted from the earth by an artful | nature, and nature, creating from existing things, creates having found a pre-existing matter from some providence. If therefore the matter also underlies for him who creates the whole, for God, let them say what art brought this into existence beforehand, and thus their wisdom will be refuted; for in any case they will say a divine art brought such a thing into existence beforehand. But indeed also from the things acknowledged among them I will refute their strong argument, as they think it, that it is not right to make the proof of the whole from particulars; for they supposedly embrace astronomy and suppose a motion of the universe. If therefore they make the proof of the whole from particulars and say: Since each of the particulars is seen coming to be from existing things, thus also the universe by God must come to be from something previously existing, it is reasonable for them also to suppose that what follows from the particulars also happens to the universe. And since each of the particulars is moved and the universe is also moved, therefore as the particular is moved, so also will the universe be moved. But their motion is not similar; for the particulars change their place entirely, but the whole does not move from its own place, but revolves around its own center, since there is no other space into which it might ever move. 11. And against one another also, of those who attempt to regulate the generation of the universe from the particulars, and who say that as the particulars come to be from existing things, so also the universe has come to be from existing things, the same things must be said as the argument went through for the refutation of the Manichaeans. And it must be added that it is necessary for the things of the particulars to be considered also in the case of the whole; since the particulars are seen in generation and corruption, therefore the whole also will be subject to generation and corruption and the world will no longer be ungenerated and incorruptible according to the wise men of the Greeks, but at once generated and corruptible; which they cannot bear to confess. And by these arguments it has been demonstrated that matter is not ungenerated. 12. But it must be known that neither will art work without nature and God, nor nature

στοιχείων γὰρ εἶδος ὀστέου ἐργάζεται καὶ σαρκός, φλεβῶν τε καὶ νεύρων, καὶ τῶν φυτῶν τὰς μυρίας ἰδέας, χρωμάτων τε καὶ χυμῶν καὶ μετάλλων τὰς ποικίλας διαφοράς. 9. Εἰ τοίνυν τοσοῦτον ὑπερέχει τῆς ἀνθρώπων τέχνης ἡ φύσις, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δημιουργίαν ἀσυγκρίτως ὑπερβεβηκέναι καὶ τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἐργασίαν; Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἤδη ἡ φύσις τὰ εἴδη μὴ ὄντα παράγει, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέντοι προϋπάρχοντι ταῦτα δημιουργεῖ διὰ τὸ ἀδυνάτως ἔχειν ἄλλως τὴν δημιουργικὴν αὐτοῖς ἐνδείκνυσθαι δύναμιν ἄνευ τινὸς προϋποκειμένου, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ θεὸς δημιουργεῖ καὶ εἰς τὸ εἶναι παράγει τὰ ὄντα, ἔχειν τι πλέον τὴν αὐτοῦ δημιουργίαν τῆς φύσεως· οὐδὲν δὲ ἂν ἔχοι πλέον, εἰ μὴ δύναιτο ἐκ τοῦ μηδαμῇ μηδαμοῦ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι παράγειν τὰ πράγματα, ἀλλὰ δέοιτο καὶ αὐτός, ὥσπερ ὁ τεχνίτης ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἡ φύσις, ὑποκειμένου τινὸς προϋπάρχοντος, ἐν ᾧ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δημιουργικὴν ἐνέργειαν ἐπιδείξεται, καὶ μηδὲ τοσοῦτον ὑπερέχοι τῆς φύσεως, ὅσον ὑπερέχει τῆς τέχνης ἡ φύσις, οὐ σχημάτων μόνον κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τέχνην, ἀλλὰ καὶ διαφόρων οὐσιῶν οὖσα δημιουργός. 10. Ἄλλως τε πάσης ἀτοπίας ἀνάμεστον τὸ διὰ τῶν μερικῶν καὶ παρ' ἕκαστα γινομένων τοῦ ὅλου τὰς ἀποδείξεις ποιεῖσθαι. Εἰ γὰρ τοῖς μερικοῖς δημιουργήμασιν ἐνορῶντές φασιν· "6Ἐπεὶ οὐδεὶς δημιουργὸς ἄνευ ὕλης ποιεῖ, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἄνευ ὕλης οὐ ποιήσει"6, ἴστωσαν ὅτιπερ ἡ παντὶ τεχνίτῃ ὑποκειμένη ὕλη ἐκ προτέρας δημιουργηθεῖσα προνοίας ἢ τέχνης ὑπόκειται, ὡς τὰ ξύλα καὶ σίδηρον καὶ λίθοι, ἀνθρώποις τεχνίταις πρὸς τὸ σχηματίζεσθαι μόνον ὑποκείμενοι, ἐκ φύσεως | τεχνικῆς ἀπὸ γῆς βεβλαστήκασι, καὶ ἡ φύσις δὲ ἐξ ὄντων δημιουργοῦσα, ἐκ προνοίας τινὸς εὑροῦσα προϋπάρχουσαν ὕλην δημιουργεῖ. Εἰ οὖν ἡ ὕλη καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ δημιουργοῦντι τὸ ὅλον ὑπόκειται, τῷ θεῷ, λεγέτωσαν ποία τέχνη ταύτην προϋπεστήσατο, καὶ οὕτω τὸ σοφὸν αὐτῶν ἐλεγχθήσεται· πάντως γὰρ θείαν φήσουσι τοιαύτην προϋποστήσασθαι τέχνην. Ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ ἐκ τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς ὁμολογουμένων ἀπελέγξω τὸν ἰσχυρὸν αὐτῶν, ὡς οἴονται, λόγον, ὡς οὐ δεῖ τοῖς μερικοῖς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ποιεῖσθαι ἀπόδειξιν· ἀστρονομίαν γὰρ δῆθεν ἀσπάζονται καὶ κίνησιν τοῦ παντὸς ὑποτίθενται. Εἰ οὖν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἐκ τῶν μερικῶν τοῦ ὅλου ποιοῦνται καί φασιν· Ἐπείπερ τῶν μερικῶν ἕκαστον ἐξ ὄντων ὁρᾶται γινόμενον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πᾶν ὑπὸ θεοῦ ἔκ τινος πρότερον ὄντος γενέσθαι χρή, εὔλογον αὐτοὺς καὶ τὸ τοῖς μερικοῖς ἑπόμε- νον καὶ τῷ παντὶ συμβαίνειν ὑποτίθεσθαι. Καὶ ἐπειδὴ τῶν μερικῶν ἕκαστον κινεῖται καὶ τὸ πᾶν δὲ κινεῖται, ἄρα ὡς κινεῖται τὸ μερικὸν κινηθήσεται καὶ τὸ πᾶν. Ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοία τούτων ἡ κίνησις· τὰ μὲν γὰρ μερικὰ ἐξ ὅλου τὸν τόπον ἀμείβει, τὸ δὲ ὅλον οὐ μεθίσταται τοῦ οἰκείου τόπου, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὸ ἴδιον κέντρον ἐκπεριέρχεται, ἐπεὶ μὴ ἔστιν ἑτέρα χώρα εἰς ἣν μετασταίη ποτέ. 11. Καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα δὲ καὶ αὐτῶν ἐκ τῶν μερικῶν τὴν τοῦ παντὸς γένεσιν κανονίζειν ἐπιχειρούντων, καὶ ὡς τὰ μερικὰ ἐξ ὄντων γίνεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐξ ὄντων γεγενῆσθαι φασκόντων, τὰ αὐτὰ ῥητέον ὅσα πρὸς ἔλεγχον Μανιχαίων διῆλθεν ὁ λόγος. Προσθετέον δὲ ὅτι ἀνάγκη τὰ τῶν μερικῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὅλου θεωρεῖσθαι· ἐπειδὴ τὰ μερικὰ ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ θεωρεῖται, ἄρα καὶ τὸ ὅλον γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ ὑποκείσεται καὶ οὐκέτι ἀγένητος καὶ ἄφθαρτος ἔσται κατὰ τοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων σοφοὺς ὁ κόσμος, ἀλλὰ γενητὸς ἅμα καὶ φθαρτός· ἅπερ ὁμολογεῖν οὐκ ἀνέχονται. Καὶ τούτοις μὲν τοῖς λόγοις ἀποδέδεικται μὴ ἀγένητον εἶναι τὴν ὕλην. 12. Ἰστέον δὲ ὡς οὐδὲ τέχνη ἄνευ τῆς φύσεως καὶ θεοῦ ἐνεργήσει, οὔτε φύσις