we speak of more or less intemperance, or are all intemperate and unjust in the same way? We shall say, by no means. And what then? Is it not that, insofar as injustice is more and less, the less it is injustice, the less it has departed from the nature of the good, and the more it has the passion of injustice, the more it is without a share in the good? It is necessary, of course, to agree. But we said that all good, both the lesser and the greater, when it increases comes nearer to the first of goods, and the completely good is the same as the most good. But the increase of injustice was in every way a lack of the good; therefore, it is no longer fitting to call injustice good, neither greater nor lesser, but in every way evil. For the lesser good, when it increases, becomes more greatly good, <for both the less hot and the less cold become more so>; but the unjust, when it increases, does not become a greater good. Therefore, since it is opposite to the good, how would it not be among evils? This argument, then, will say and speak freely these things concerning the substance of evils. --- 7 --- If, then, these things too are necessary because of the all-powerful and all-good energy <of the first causes>, neither would the good always be in all beings in the same way, nor would the generation of evil be driven out of beings. For if there is that which is able at one time to partake of the good, and at another time is deprived of a share in it, there will of necessity be a privation of the participation in the good; but privation itself, being unable to exist in and of itself, nor being entirely separated from the nature of which it is the privation, being in a way empowered by it, through its complication with it, is established in the order of things contrary to the good; ---the good, then... also empowers its own privation. For just as the good in all beings begat the first power, so also the good that is everywhere in every way in each of the beings begets its own power, with which the privation of the good, as has been said, being entwined and having strengthened its own feebleness by its power, becomes completely contrary to the good, having been strengthened by its mixture with it and having received power to fight against that which is near; --- for there is no wicked form of life, such that it has completely extinguished the power of reason; for reason remains within, speaking faintly, although all kinds of passions have been poured around it, and understanding does not abandon the soul above. --- 8 --- <and somewhere indeed> unmixed with privation, <but somewhere now> with such a mixture. For that which sometimes partakes of the first good is filled up with the interweaving of the not-good; since also being-itself <and the nature of being above is> truly being and is only being, but in the last <of beings> it is somehow mixed with non-being; for that which in one way is, and in another is not, and at one time is, but countless times is not, and that which is this, but all other things are not; what would one say is more than is not, being entirely filled with non-being; and non-being itself, that which is in no way, but even lacking the last nature, which is according to accident, being able to be neither in itself nor according to accident—for that which is in no way is not in one way, and not in another; but non-being together with being, whether <it is right to call it> privation of being or otherness [Pl. Parm. 160d]; and that which is in every way non-being, but that which is above is no less than being, <as the Eleatic stranger says> [Pl. soph. 258b 1-2], but in those things that sometimes are and sometimes are not, <it is fainter than being>, but is itself also in a way overcome by being. 9 Just as, then, if someone asked about non-being, whether it is or is not, we would say that that which is in every way non-being, having in no way partaken of being, is in no way; but that which is in a way non-being, we would agree with the one asking these things to count among beings. In the same way, then, also evil—since this too is twofold, that which is only evil, and that which is not unmixed with the good— that which is <in no way> being <we shall place beyond> ..., but the other we shall rank among beings; <for neither being through the mediation of the good>, nor the good through being, is able to remain any longer bereft; for at the same time it is being and it is good. And that which is in every way

ἀκολασίαν μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγομεν, ἢ τὸν ἶσον τρόπον ἀκόλαστοι καὶ ἄδικοι πάντες; οὐδαμῶς φήσομεν. τί δέ; οὐ καθὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀδικία, ὅσῳ μὲν ἧττον ἐστὶν ἀδικία, τοσούτῳ τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσεως ἧττον ἀφέστηκεν, ὅσῳ δ' αὖ μᾶλλον μειζόνως ἔχει τὸ τῆς ἀδικίας πάθος, τοσούτῳ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μειζόνως ἐστὶν ἄμοιρος; ἀνάγκη δήπου συγχωρεῖν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν πᾶν, τό τε ἔλαττον καὶ τὸ μεῖζον, αὐξόμενον ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ πρωτίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐλέγομεν γίνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ τελέως ἀγαθὸν ταὐτὸν τῷ μάλιστα ἀγαθῷ. ἡ δὲ τῆς ἀδικίας αὔξησις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πάντως ἔλλειψις ἦν· οὐκ ἄρα ἀγαθὸν ἔτι τὴν ἀδικίαν προσήκει καλεῖν, οὔτε μεῖζον οὔτε ἔλαττον, ἀλλὰ πάντως κακόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔλαττον ἀγαθὸν αὐξόμενον γίνεται μειζόνως ἀγαθόν, <καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον ψυχρὸν μᾶλλον ἑκάτερον>· τὸ δὲ ἄδικον αὐξόμενον οὐ γίνεται μεῖζον ἀγαθόν. ἐναντίως οὖν ἔχον πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν, πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῶν κακῶν; ταῦτα μὲν δὴ καὶ οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐρεῖ καὶ παρρησιάσεται περὶ τῆς τῶν κακῶν ὑποστάσεως. --- 7 --- Εἰ τοίνυν καὶ ταῦτα ἀναγκαίως ἐστὶ διὰ τὴν παντοδύναμον καὶ πανάγα- θον <τῶν πρωτίστων αἰτιῶν> ἐνέργειαν, οὔτ' ἂν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀεὶ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσιν ὡσαύτως εἴη, οὔτ' ἂν ἡ τοῦ κακοῦ γένεσις ἐξελαύνοιτο τῶν ὄντων. εἰ γάρ ἐστι τὸ ποτὲ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μετέχειν δυνάμενον, ποτὲ δὲ αὖ τῆς ἐκείνου μετουσίας στερούμενον, στέρησις μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσται τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μεταλήψεως· ἡ δὲ στέρησις αὐτὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν εἶναι μὴ δυναμένη μηδὲ ἀπολελυμένη πάντῃ τῆς φύσεως, ἧς ἐστι στέρησις, τρόπον τινὰ δυναμουμένη παρ' αὐτῆς, διὰ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὴν ἐπιπλοκὴν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καθίσταται τάξιν· ---τὸ δ' ἄρα ἀγαθὸν ... καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ στέρησιν δυναμοῖ. ὡς γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσι τὴν πρωτίστην ἀπεγέννησε δύναμιν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸ ἑκασταχοῦ πάντως ἀγαθὸν ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων γεννᾷ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν, ᾗτινι ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὡς εἴρηται, στέρησις συμπλεκομένη καὶ τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἀμενηνὸν τῇ ἐκείνου ῥώσασα δυνάμει, γίνεται μὲν ὑπεναντία τῷ ἀγαθῷ, ῥωσθεῖσα τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸ μίξει καὶ λαβοῦσα δύναμιν εἰς τὸ μάχεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἐγγύς· --- οὐ γάρ ἐστι μοχθηρὸν εἶδος ζωῆς, ὡς πάντῃ ἀπεσβηκέναι τὴν τοῦ λόγου δύναμιν· μένει γὰρ ὁ λόγος ἔνδον, ἀμυδρὸν φθεγγόμενος, καίπερ παντοδαπῶν αὐτὸν περικεχυμένων παθῶν καὶ σύνεσις τὴν ἄνω οὐκ ἀπολείπει ψυχήν. --- 8 --- <καί που μὲν> ἀμιγῶς πρὸς τὴν στέρησιν, <ποὺ δὲ ἤδη> μετὰ τῆς τοιαύτης μίξεως. τὸ γὰρ ποτὲ μετέχον τοῦ πρώτως ἀγαθοῦ, ἀναπίμπλαται τῆς παρεμπλοκῆς τοῦ μὴ ἀγαθοῦ· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ αὐτοεῖναι <καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὄντος φύσις ἄνω μὲν> ὄντως ὂν καὶ ὄν ἐστι μόνον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς τελευταίοις <τῶν ὄντων> συγκέκραταί πως τῷ μὴ ὄντι· τὸ γὰρ πῇ μὲν ὄν, πῇ δὲ μὴ ὄν, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ὄν, ἀπειράκις δὲ οὐκ ὄν, καὶ τὸ τοῦτο μὲν ὄν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα μὴ ὄν· τὶ ἂν λέγοι τις εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ εἶναι πάντῃ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος πεπλησμένον· καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν, τὸ μὲν μηδαμῶς ὄν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ἐσχάτης φύσεως, ἥτις κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐστιν, ἀπολειπόμενον, μήτε καθ' αὑτὸ μήτε κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εἶναι δυνάμενον-οὐ γὰρ πῇ μὲν ἔστι, πῇ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν· τὸ δὲ ὁμοῦ τῷ ὄντι μὴ ὄν, εἴτε στέ- ρησιν τοῦ ὄντος εἴτε ἑτεροιότητα [Pl. Parm. 160d] καλεῖν <αὐτὸ θέμις>· καὶ τὸ μὲν πάντῃ μὴ ὄν, τὸ δὲ ἄνω μὲν οὐδὲν ἧττον τοῦ ὄντος ἐστίν, <ὥς φησιν ὁ Ἐλεάτης ξένος> [Pl. soph. 258b 1-2], ἐν δὲ τοῖς ποτὲ μὲν οὖσι, ποτὲ δὲ μὴ οὖσι, <ἀμυδρότερον μὲν τοῦ ὄντος>, τῷ δὲ εἶναι τρόπον τινὰ κρατούμενον καὶ αὐτό. 9 Ὥσπερ οὖν, εἰ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἤρετό τις, πότερον ἐστὶν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι, τὸ μὲν πάντῃ μὴ ὂν οὐδαμόθεν τοῦ εἶναι μετειληχός, ἐλέγομεν οὐδαμῶς ὄν· τὸ δὲ αὖ τρόπον τινὰ μὴ ὂν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι καταλέγειν συνεχωροῦμεν τῷ ταῦτα ἐρομένῳ. κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὴ καὶ τὸ κακόν-ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτο διττόν, τὸ μὲν μόνως κακόν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἀμιγὲς πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν- τὸ μὲν τοῦ <μηδαμῶς> ὄντος <ἐπέκεινα θήσομεν> ..., τὸ δὲ ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τάξομεν· <μήτε γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μεσιτείαν>, μήτε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἔρη- μον ἔτι μένειν δυνάμενον· ἅμα γὰρ ὄν ἐστι καὶ ἀγαθόν ἐστι. καὶ τὸ μὲν πάντῃ