activity is better than that which is not self-sufficient but has the cause of its perfection dependent on another substance. For if all beings by nature desire the good, and one thing is provider of the good for itself, while another is in need of another, and one has the cause of the good present to it, while another has it separate, then by as much as the one is nearer to that which furnishes the object of desire, by so much would it be better than that which is in need of the separate cause and receives the perfection of its existence or its activity from elsewhere. Since, therefore, [that it is both like and diminished] and the self-sufficient is more like the good itself, and diminished by participating in the good and not being the good primarily, it is in a way akin to that, inasmuch as it is able from itself to have the good; but that which participates and participates through another stands at a greater remove from the primary good and that which is nothing other than good. 10 Everything self-sufficient is inferior to the simply good. For what else is the self-sufficient than that which possesses the good from itself and in itself? But this is already full of the good and participating, but not the simply good itself. For that is better than both participating and being full, as has been shown. If, therefore, the self-sufficient has filled itself with the good, that from which it has filled itself would be better than the self-sufficient and beyond self-sufficiency. And the simply good is not in need of anything. For it does not desire another (for it would be lacking in good according to its desire); nor self-sufficient; for it would be full of good, and not the good primarily. 11 All beings proceed from one cause, the first. For either there is a cause of none of the beings, or the causes are in a circle, all things being finite, or the ascent goes on to infinity and one thing is the cause of another and the pre-existence of the cause will nowhere halt. But if there were a cause of none of the beings, there will be no order of secondary and primary things, of perfecting and being perfected, of ordering and being ordered, of begetting and being begotten, of acting and being acted upon; nor will there be knowledge of any of the beings. For the knowledge of causes is the work of science, and we say that we know then when we have come to know the causes of beings. But if the causes go around in a circle, the same things will be prior and posterior, and more powerful and weaker; for everything that produces is better than the nature of what is produced. And it makes no difference whether one connects the cause to its effect and produces from that through more or fewer intermediaries; for it will be better than all the intermediaries of which it is the cause, and the more intermediaries there are, the more greatly it is a cause. But if the addition of causes goes on to infinity, and there is always another before another, again there will be knowledge of nothing. For there is knowledge of no infinite things; and if the causes are unknown, there will be no knowledge of the things that follow from them either. If, therefore, there must be a cause of beings, and the causes are distinct from their effects, and the ascent is not to infinity, there is a first cause of beings from which, as from a root, each thing proceeds, some being near to it, others more distant; for that the principle must be one has been shown, because all multitude subsists secondarily to the one. 12 The first principle and cause of all beings is the good. For if all things proceed from one cause, one must call that cause either the good or better than the good. But if it is better than the good, does something come from it to beings and the nature of beings, or nothing? And if nothing, that is absurd; for we would no longer maintain it in the rank of a cause, since it is necessary that something from the cause be present everywhere to its effects, and especially from the first cause, on which all things depend and through which each of the beings exists. But if there is participation in that cause also by beings, just as in the good, there will be something better than goodness in beings, coming from the first cause; for surely, being better and beyond the good, it does not give to secondary things something inferior to what that which is after it gives. And what could be better than goodness? Since we even say that the better itself is that which has participated in the good more greatly. If, therefore, that which is not good could not be called better, it is in every way secondary to the good. And if all beings also desire the good, how is it still possible for anything to be before this cause? For whether

ἐνέργειαν κρεῖττόν ἐστι τοῦ μὴ αὐτάρκους ἀλλ' εἰς ἄλλην οὐσίαν ἀνηρτημένου τὴν τῆς τελειότητος αἰτίαν. εἰ γὰρ ἅπαντα τὰ ὄντα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ὀρέγεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἑαυτῷ παρεκτικόν ἐστι τοῦ εὖ, τὸ δὲ ἐπιδεὲς ἄλλου, καὶ τὸ μὲν παροῦσαν ἔχει τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ αἰτίαν, τὸ δὲ χωρὶς οὖσαν, ὅσῳ δὴ οὖν ἐγγυτέρω τοῦτο τῆς τὸ ὀρεκτὸν χορηγούσης, τοσούτῳ κρεῖττον ἂν εἴη τοῦ τῆς κεχωρισμένης αἰτίας ἐνδεοῦς ὄντος καὶ ἀλλαχόθεν ὑποδεχομένου τὴν τελειότητα τῆς ὑπάρξεως ἢ τῆς ἐνεργείας. ἐπεὶ οὖν [ὅτι καὶ ὅμοιον καὶ ἠλαττωμένον] καὶ ὁμοιότερόν ἐστιν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸ αὔταρκες καὶ ἠλαττωμένον τῷ μετέχειν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ μὴ αὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν πρώτως, συγγενές πώς ἐστιν ἐκείνῳ, καθόσον παρ' ἑαυτοῦ δύναται τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔχειν· τὸ δὲ μετέχον καὶ δι' ἄλλου μετέχον μειζόνως ἀφέστηκε τοῦ πρώτως ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ὃ μηδέν ἐστιν ἄλλο ἢ ἀγαθόν. 10 Πᾶν τὸ αὔταρκες τοῦ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ καταδεέστερόν ἐστι. τί γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλο τὸ αὔταρκες ἢ τὸ παρ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν κεκτημένον; τοῦτο δὲ ἤδη πλῆρές ἐστι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ μετέχον, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν. ἐκεῖνο γὰρ καὶ τοῦ μετέχειν καὶ τοῦ πλῆρες εἶναι κρεῖττον, ὡς δέδει κται. εἰ οὖν τὸ αὔταρκες πεπλήρωκεν ἑαυτὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἀφ' οὗ πεπλήρωκεν ἑαυτὸ κρεῖττον ἂν εἴη τοῦ αὐτάρκους καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτάρκειαν. καὶ οὔτε ἐνδεές τινος τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν. οὐ γὰρ ἐφίεται ἄλλου (εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἐλλιπὲς ἀγαθοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἔφεσιν)· οὔτε αὔταρκες· εἴη γὰρ ἂν πλῆρες ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ οὐ τἀγαθὸν πρώτως. 11 Πάντα τὰ ὄντα πρόεισιν ἀπὸ μιᾶς αἰτίας, τῆς πρώτης. ἢ γὰρ οὐδενός ἐστιν αἰτία τῶν ὄντων, ἢ κύκλῳ τὰ αἴτια πεπερασμένων τῶν πάντων, ἢ ἐπ' ἄπειρον ἡ ἄνοδος καὶ ἄλλο ἄλλου αἴτιον καὶ οὐδαμοῦ στήσεται ἡ τῆς αἰτίας προϋπόστασις. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μηδενὸς εἴη τῶν ὄντων αἰτία, οὔτε τάξις ἔσται δευτέρων καὶ πρώτων, τελειούντων καὶ τελειουμένων, κοσμούν των καὶ κοσμουμένων, γεννώντων καὶ γεννωμένων, ποιούντων καὶ πασχόντων· οὔτε ἐπιστήμη τῶν ὄντων οὐδενός. ἡ γὰρ τῶν αἰτίων γνῶσις ἐπιστήμης ἐστὶν ἔργον, καὶ τότε λέγομεν ἐπίστα σθαι ὅταν τὰ αἴτια γνωρίσωμεν τῶν ὄντων. εἰ δὲ κύκλῳ περίεισι τὰ αἴτια, τὰ αὐτὰ πρότερα ἔσται καὶ ὕστερα, δυνατώτερά τε καὶ ἀσθενέστερα· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ παράγον κρεῖττόν ἐστι τῆς τοῦ παραγομένου φύσεως. διαφέρει δὲ οὐδὲν τὸ διὰ πλειόνων ἢ δι' ἐλαττόνων μέσων συνάπτειν τῷ αἰτιατῷ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιεῖν ἀπ' ἐκείνου· καὶ γὰρ τῶν μεταξὺ πάντων ἔσται κρεῖττον ὧν ἐστιν αἴτιον, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν πλείω τὰ μέσα, τοσούτῳ μειζόνως αἴτιον. εἰ δ' ἐπ' ἄπειρον ἡ τῶν αἰτίων πρόσθεσις, καὶ ἄλλο πρὸ ἄλλου ἀεί, πάλιν οὐδενὸς ἐπιστήμη ἔσται. τῶν γὰρ ἀπείρων οὐδενός ἐστι γνῶσις· τῶν δὲ αἰτίων ἀγνοουμένων οὐδὲ τῶν ἑξῆς ἐπιστήμη ἔσται. εἰ οὖν καὶ αἰτίαν εἶναι δεῖ τῶν ὄντων, καὶ διώρισται τὰ αἴτια τῶν αἰτιατῶν, καὶ οὐκ εἰς ἄπειρον ἡ ἄνοδος, ἔστιν αἰτία πρώτη τῶν ὄντων ἀφ' ἧς οἷον ἐκ ῥίζης πρόεισιν ἕκαστα, τὰ μὲν ἐγγὺς ὄντα ἐκείνης, τὰ δὲ πορρώτερον· ὅτι γὰρ μίαν εἶναι δεῖ τὴν ἀρχήν, δέδεικται, διότι πᾶν πλῆθος δεύτερον ὑφέστηκε τοῦ ἑνός. 12 Πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία πρωτίστη τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ μιᾶς αἰτίας πάντα πρόεισιν, ἐκείνην τὴν αἰτίαν ἢ τἀγαθὸν χρὴ λέγειν ἢ τἀγαθοῦ κρεῖττον. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν κρείτ των ἐκείνη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, πότερον ἥκει τι καὶ ἀπ' ἐκείνης εἰς τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων, ἢ οὐδέν; καὶ εἰ μὲν μηδέν, ἄτοπον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι φυλάττοιμεν αὐτὴν ἐν αἰτίας τάξει, δέον πανταχοῦ παρεῖναί τι τοῖς αἰτιατοῖς ἐκ τῆς αἰτίας, καὶ διαφερόν τως ἐκ τῆς πρωτίστης, ἧς πάντα ἐξήρτηται καὶ δι' ἣν ἔστιν ἕκαστα τῶν ὄντων. εἰ δέ ἐστι μετουσία κἀκείνης τοῖς οὖσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τἀγαθοῦ, ἔσται τι τῆς ἀγαθότητος κρεῖττον ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, ἐφῆκον ἀπὸ τῆς πρωτίστης αἰτίας· οὐ γάρ που, κρείττων οὖσα καὶ ὑπὲρ τἀγαθόν, καταδεέστερόν τι δίδωσι τοῖς δευτέροις ὧν τὸ μετ' αὐτὴν δίδωσι. καὶ τί ἂν γένοιτο τῆς ἀγαθότητος κρεῖττον; ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ κρεῖττον τὸ μειζόνως ἀγαθοῦ μετ ειληφὸς εἶναι λέγομεν. εἰ οὖν οὐδὲ κρεῖττον ἂν λέγοιτο τὸ μὴ ἀγαθόν, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πάντως δεύτερον. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ ὄντα πάντα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐφίεται, πῶς ἔτι πρὸ τῆς αἰτίας ταύτης εἶναί τι δυνατόν; εἴτε γὰρ