Tractatus de placitis Manichaeorum

 upon matter, which will be mixed with it throughout for the death of matter will be the separation of this power from it at some later time. Thus, th

 a rebellion of matter against God. But I would not say that these things are insufficient to persuade those who approach the argument without examinat

 will subsist, the mover and the moved for which of them, then, does he vote, that we may posit that one first with God?

 will be separated. For there is one place for the heavy, and another for the intermediate, and for the light, for to the one belongs the above, to ano

 to God, when they say he arranged the plot against matter, because it desired the beautiful. With what that he had did God wish to punish matter? For

 13 And what things does he say are evils? For concerning the sun and the moon, he leaves out nothing but concerning the heaven and the stars, if he s

 it requires nourishment. For those living things that were immortal have been set free from decay and growth, such as the sun and moon and stars, alth

 18 For the wise thing said by them is this, that just as we see that when the soul is separated from the body the body itself is destroyed, so too whe

 the divine power, if indeed it is subject to passion and divisible throughout its whole self, and one part of it becomes sun, and another, moon? For t

 is heavy, nor is it possible for it to reach the moon at all. What reason is there for that which first arrives at the moon not to be sent up immediat

 For thus the world is worse than the creator and than the artisans, as many as are their works. If therefore man is the work of matter, he is certainl

 to use a worse way of life, how is it reasonable? and if the divine power is greater in these things, what use are such things for nourishment, since

 the word finds to be altogether, or the last of all things and able with difficulty to arrive at a spurious notion. But is the lightless fire indeed g

will subsist, the mover and the moved; for which of them, then, does he vote, that we may posit that one first with God?

7 Furthermore, the disorderly is a mere appendage to the argument, this being utterly banished; for whenever there is no motion, it would reasonably be said. And what is the matter of the motions? Whether that in a straight line, or the circular, <or> that according to alteration, or that according to generation and according to corruption? But the circular motion is so orderly that it has been assigned to the order of the universe; and not according to these men should one blame this motion in which are the sun and the moon, whom they say are the only gods to be revered. But that in a straight line? But even this has a limit, the attainment of its proper place. For in every way the earthy element ceases moving when it takes hold of earth, and every animal and plant growing when it reaches its own boundary, so that the cessation of these would be a more reasonable death for matter <than> the endless end woven for it by them. But it is not possible even to conceive of motion according to generation and corruption as fitting this hypothesis; for to them matter is ungenerated. But if they assign to it motion according to alteration—for they seem especially to say this, since they say that through matter there are changes of character and evils in the soul—, it is worth considering how they say these things. For always altering itself, it will begin from a beginning and proceeding will take hold of the middle and thus will arrive at the end; but having arrived at the end, it will not stop—if indeed alteration is its essence—, but it will turn back again through the same things to the beginning, and likewise from there to the end, and it will never cease doing this. For example, if AC were to be altered, and B is the middle, the change from A will arrive <at B> and from there at C; then again, turning back from the extremity C to B, it will at some point arrive at A, and this will be forever. Just as the change is from black, and grey is the middle and white the extremity; and again, conversely, from this to grey and likewise to black; and again from white is the beginning of the alteration, the same path. If, then, 8 matter is an evil-producing cause according to alteration, it is thus shown to be no more evil-producing than good-producing. For let the beginning of the alteration be from evil; thus, then, from this through the indifferent things to the good is the alteration; but from the good, then again through the indifferent things is the beginning; whether the motion is to this extremity or to the other, the argument is the same. And these things are said out of abundance; for all motion is concerned with quantity, but the ruling principle of vice and virtue is quality; and we know that these are distinct also in kind. Are God and matter the only principles, or is something else left which is in the middle of these? For if there is nothing, these remain unmixed with respect to themselves; for it is well said that, in order for the extremities to be mixed, there must be something in the middle to bind them together; but if something else exists, it is necessary for it to be either incorporeal or a body, so that a third, episodic principle has come into being. Are God and matter entirely incorporeal, or is one a body and the other incorporeal, or are both bodies? For if both are incorporeal, neither is in the other; unless perhaps as grammar is in a soul; but it is absurd to conceive this in the case of God and matter; or as in a void, as some say the void is poured around the universe, the one is again without subsistence, for the essence of the void is nothing; but if as accidents, first, this is impossible, for being without substance they can be nowhere, for substance is, as it were, a vehicle underlying accidents. But if both are bodies, it is necessary that either both are heavy or both light or intermediate, or one is heavy and the other light or the other intermediate. If, then, both are heavy, they must thus be together with all necessity, and the same things apply in the case of light and intermediate things; but if they should differ, the one in every way of the other

4

ὑποστήσονται, τὸ κινοῦν καὶ τὸ κινούμενον· ποτέρῳ οὖν αὐτῶν ψηφίζεται, ἵνα ἐκεῖνο μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ ὑποστησώμεθα πρῶτον;

7 Προσέτι δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἐφόλκιον τὸ ἄτακτον, ἐξόριστον παντελῶς τοῦτο· ὁπότε γὰρ μὴ κίνησις, εἰκό τως ἂν λέγοιτο. τίς δὲ καὶ τῶν κινήσεων ἡ ὕλη; πό τερον ἡ κατ' εὐθεῖαν ἢ ἡ κυκλοφορητικὴ <ἢ> ἡ κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν ἢ ἡ κατὰ γένεσιν καὶ κατὰ φθοράν; ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν κυκλοφορητικὴ οὕτω κοσμία, ὥστε τῇ τοῦ παντὸς ἀποδέδοται τάξει· οὐ κατὰ τούτους δὲ ταύτην αἰτιᾶσθαι ἐν ᾗ ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ἡ σελήνη, οὓς μόνους θεῶν αἰδεῖσθαί φασιν. ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπ' εὐθείας; ἀλλὰ καὶ ταύτῃ πέρας ἐστίν, ἡ τοῦ ἰδίου τόπου τεῦξις. πάντῃ γὰρ τὸ γήινον πέπαυται κινούμενον ὅταν γῆς ἐπιλάβηται, πᾶν τε ζῷον καὶ φυτὸν αὐξανόμενον ὅταν τοῦ ἰδίου ὅρου ἐφίκηται, ὥστε ἡ τούτων στάσις εὐλογώτερος ἂν θά νατος γένοιτο τῇ ὕλῃ <ἢ> ἡ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ταύτῃ πλεκο μένη ἀνήνυτος τελευτή. τὴν δὲ κατὰ γένεσιν καὶ φθο ρὰν οὐδὲ ἐπινοῆσαι οἷόν τε τῇ ὑποθέσει ταύτῃ προσή κουσαν· ἀγένητος γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐστιν ἡ ὕλη. εἰ δέ γε τὴν κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν κίνησιν ἀποδώσουσιν αὐτῇ-δοκοῦσι γὰρ μάλιστα τοῦτο λέγειν, ἐπεὶ διὰ τῆς ὕλης καὶ μεταβολὰς ἠθῶν καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ κακίας εἶναι λέγου σιν-, σκοπεῖν ἄξιον ὅπως ποτὲ καὶ ταῦτά φασιν. ἀλλοιοῦσα γὰρ αὑτὴν ἀεὶ ἄρξεται ἀπ' ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῦ μέσου προἰοῦσα ἐπιλήψεται καὶ εἰς τὸ τέλος οὕτως ἀφίξεται· ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ τέλος ἀφικομένη οὐ στήσεται- εἴ γε οὐσία ἐστὶν αὐτῆς ἡ ἀλλοίωσις-, ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἀνακάμψει διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ὁμοίως ἐντεῦθεν ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος, καὶ οὔποτε τοῦτο ποιοῦσα παύ σεται. οἷον εἰ ἀλλοιοῖτο ἡ ΑΓ, μέσον δὲ τὸ Β, ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ Α ἡ μεταβολὴ ἀφίξεται <ἐπὶ τὸ Β> καὶ ἐκεῖ θεν ἐπὶ τὸ Γ· πάλιν τοίνυν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄκρου τοῦ Γ ἐπὶ τὸ Β ἀνακάμπτουσα ἀφίξεταί ποτε ἐπὶ τὸ Α, καὶ τοῦτο ἔσται διὰ παντός. ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέλανος ἡ μεταβολή, μέσον δὲ τὸ φαιὸν καὶ ἄκρον τὸ λευκόν· πάλιν δὲ ἀνάπαλιν ἀπὸ τούτου ἐπὶ τὸ φαιὸν καὶ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τὸ μέλαν· πάλιν δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ λευκοῦ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως, ἡ αὐτὴ ἔφοδος. εἰ δὴ 8 κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν κακοποιὸς αἰτία ἐστὶν ἡ ὕλη, οὐ μᾶλλόν τι κακοποιὸς ἢ ἀγαθοποιὸς οὕτω γε δείκνυται. ἔστω γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως ἀπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ, οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀπὸ τούτου διὰ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ἐπὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡ ἀλλοίωσις· ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, πάλιν τοίνυν διὰ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ἡ ἀρχή· εἴτ' ἐπὶ τόδε τὸ ἄκρον, εἴτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον ἡ κίνησις, ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. καὶ ταῦτα ἐκ περιουσίας λέγεται· πᾶσα μὲν γὰρ κίνησις περὶ τὸ ποσόν, κακίας δὲ καὶ ἀρετῆς ἡγεμών ἐστιν ἡ ποιότης· ταῦτα δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῷ γένει διώρισται, ἴσμεν. Πότερον δὲ μόνον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἐστὶν ἀρχαί, ἤ τι ἕτερον ἀπολείπει ὃ τούτων ἐστὶν ἐν μέσῳ; εἰ μὲν γὰρ μηδέν ἐστιν, ἄμικτα ταῦτα ὑπολείπεται πρὸς αὑτά καλῶς γὰρ λέγεται ὅτι, ἵνα τὰ ἄκρα μιχθῇ, δεῖ τι εἶναι ἐν μέσῳ ὅπως ταῦτα συνδέῃ · εἰ δέ τι ἕτερον ὑπάρχει, ἀνάγκη πάλιν εἶναι ἢ ἀσώματον ἢ σῶμα, ὥστε τριττὴ ἀρχὴ ἐπεισόδιος γέγονεν. Πότερον δὲ ὅλως ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἀσώματα, ἢ τὸ μὲν σῶμα τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον, ἢ ἄμφω σώματα; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀσώματα ἑκάτερα, οὐδέτερον ἐν οὐδετέρῳ· πλὴν εἰ μὴ ὡς γραμματικὴ ἐν ψυχῇ τοῦτο δὲ ἄτο πον ἐπὶ θεοῦ καὶ ὕλης ἐπινοεῖν · εἴτε ὡς ἐν κενῷ, ὥς τινες λέγουσιν τὸ κενὸν τῷ παντὶ περικεχύσθαι, τὸ ἕτερον πάλιν ἀνυπόστατον, οὐσία γὰρ τοῦ κενοῦ τὸ μηδέν· εἰ δὲ ὡς συμβεβηκότα, πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον τοῦτο, οὐσίας γὰρ ἄμοιρα ὄντα οὐδαμοῦ εἶναι δύναται, ὄχημα γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐστὶν ὑποβεβλημένον τοῖς συμβεβη κόσιν ἡ οὐσία. εἰ δὲ σώματα ἑκάτερα, ἀνάγκη ἢ ἄμφω βαρέα εἶναι ἢ ἄμφω κοῦφα ἢ μέσα, ἢ τὸ μὲν βαρὺ ἢ τὸ δὲ κοῦφον ἢ τὸ δὲ μέσον. εἴτε οὖν ἑκάτερα βαρέα, σὺν πάσῃ οὕτω γε ἀνάγκη εἶναι, τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κούφων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μέσων· εἴτε παραλλάττοιτο, τὸ ἕτερον πάντως τοῦ ἑτέρου

4