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Therefore, the first and most general genus is substance; for even if substance and accident are divided from being, yet being is not their genus, since they accept the name of being, but they do not accept the definition; for being is defined thus: Being is a thing either self-subsistent and not needing another for its constitution, or that which cannot exist by itself but has its existence in another; and substance is a self-subsistent thing and not needing another for its constitution only, (ῃ. ς. 84-89 ετ-ι. 121-125) and accident is a thing that cannot exist by itself but has its existence in another only. Behold, neither substance accepted the whole definition of being nor did accident, but substance [accepted] the one half and accident the other half. (ῃ. ς. 93-96) (ῃ. ι. 138 ς) But the species wish to accept both the name and the whole definition of the genus completely. So substance is not a species, not having a genus above it, but it is itself the first and most general genus. This substance, therefore, is divided into body and incorporeal; therefore, body and incorporeal are species of substance. Again, body is divided into animate and inanimate; behold, again, body, being a species of substance, is a genus of the animate and the inanimate. The animate is again divided into sensitive and insensitive. The sensitive, therefore, is the animal, which has life and sensation, and the insensitive is the plant; for it does not have sensation. But the plant is called animate because it has a nutritive, augmentative, and generative power. The animal is again divided into rational and irrational, the rational into mortal and immortal, the mortal into man, horse, ox, and such things, which are no longer divided into other species but into individuals, that is, hypostases; for man is divided into Peter, Paul, John and the rest of individual men, who are not species but hypostases. For species, as we have said, do not accept the definition of one another, for example, body does not accept the definition of incorporeal, man does not accept the definition of horse; but Peter and Paul and John accept one definition, that of man, likewise also the rest of individual men, so that they are not species of man but individuals, that is, hypostases. Again, the species, when divided, imparts to those below it both the name and the definition. But Peter, when divided into soul and body, imparts neither to the soul nor to the body the name and the definition; for neither is the soul alone Peter nor the body alone, but the composite of both. Furthermore, every division that proceeds from a genus into species reaches up to two or three, and rarely to four; for it is impossible for a genus to be divided into five species and more. But man is divided into all the individual men, who are infinite in number. For this reason, some say that the [division] from species to individuals is not even called a division but an enumeration. Whence it is clear that Peter and Paul and John are not species but individuals, that is, hypostases. Nor is man the genus of Peter and Paul and John and the other hypostases, but a species. Therefore man is a most specific species; for it is a species of that which is above and a species of that which is below. Likewise also the horse and the dog and such things are most specific species. But those in between the most general genus and the most specific species are subaltern genera and species, species of those above, and genera of those below. And these are the essential and natural differences and qualities, which are called divisive and constitutive, divisive of those above and constitutive of those below; for body and incorporeal divide substance, likewise animate and inanimate divide body, likewise sensitive and insensitive divide animate. These therefore constitute the animal. For I take an animate, sensitive substance and I make the animal; for an animal is an animate, sensitive substance. Again, I take an inanimate, insensitive substance and I make the stone. Again, I take an animate, insensitive substance

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Πρῶτον οὖν καὶ γενικώτατον γένος ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τέμνεται ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστι γένος αὐτῶν τὸ ὄν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μὲν ὄνομα τοῦ ὄντος δέχονται, τὸν δὲ ὁρισμὸν οὐ δέχονται· τὸ γὰρ ὂν οὕτως ὁρίζεται· Ὄν ἐστι πρᾶγμα ἢ αὐθύπαρκτον καὶ μὴ δεόμενον ἑτέρου πρὸς σύστασιν ἢ τὸ μὴ καθ' ἑαυτὸ δυνάμενον εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἔχον τὴν ὕπαρξιν· ἡ δὲ οὐσία πρᾶγμα αὐθύπαρκτον καὶ μὴ δεόμενον ἑτέρου πρὸς σύστασιν μόνον, (ῃ. ς. 84-89 ετ-ι. 121-125) καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς πρᾶγμα τὸ μὴ καθ' ἑαυτὸ δυνάμενον εἶναι ἀλλ' ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἔχον τὴν ὕπαρξιν μόνον. Ἰδοὺ οὔτε ἡ οὐσία ἐδέξατο ὅλον τὸν ὅρον τοῦ ὄντος οὐδὲ τὸ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν οὐσία τὸ ἥμισυ καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ ἄλλο ἥμισυ. (ῃ. ς. 93-96) (ῃ. ι. 138 ς) Τὰ δὲ εἴδη καὶ τὸ ὄνομα καὶ ὅλον τὸν ὅρον τοῦ γένους τέλειον θέλουσι δέχεσθαι. Ὥστε ἡ οὐσία οὐκ ἔστιν εἶδος μὴ ἔχουσα ἐπάνω αὐτῆς γένος, ἀλλ' αὐτή ἐστι πρῶτον καὶ γενικώτατον γένος. Αὕτη οὖν ἡ οὐσία τέμνεται εἰς σῶμα καὶ ἀσώματον· τὸ οὖν σῶμα καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον εἴδη εἰσὶ τῆς οὐσίας. Πάλιν τὸ σῶμα τέμνεται εἰς ἔμψυχον καὶ ἄψυχον· ἰδοὺ πάλιν τὸ σῶμα εἶδος ὂν τῆς οὐσίας γένος ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐμψύχου καὶ τοῦ ἀψύχου. Τὸ ἔμψυχον πάλιν διαιρεῖται εἰς αἰσθητικὸν καὶ ἀναίσθητον. Αἰσθητικὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ ζῷον τὸ ζωὴν καὶ αἴσθησιν ἔχον, ἀναίσθητον δὲ τὸ φυτόν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει αἴσθησιν. Ἔμψυχον δὲ λέγεται τὸ φυτὸν διὰ τὸ ἔχειν θρεπτικὴν καὶ αὐξητικὴν καὶ γεννητικὴν δύναμιν. Τὸ ζῷον πάλιν τέμνεται εἰς λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον, τὸ λογικὸν εἰς θνητὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον, τὸ θνητὸν εἰς ἄνθρωπον, ἵππον, βοῦν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἅτινα οὐκέτι τέμνεται εἰς ἄλλα εἴδη ἀλλ' εἰς ἄτομα ἤγουν ὑποστάσεις· διαιρεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς Πέτρον, Παῦλον, Ἰωάννην καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπους, οἵτινες οὔκ εἰσιν εἴδη ἀλλ' ὑποστάσεις. Τὰ γὰρ εἴδη, ὡς εἴπομεν, οὐ δέχονται τὸν ὁρισμὸν ἀλλήλων, οἷον τὸ σῶμα οὐ δέχεται τὸν ὁρισμὸν τοῦ ἀσωμά του, ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ δέχεται τὸν ὁρισμὸν τοῦ ἵππου· ὁ δὲ Πέτρος καὶ Παῦλος καὶ Ἰωάννης ἕνα ὅρον δέχονται, τὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὁμοίως καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ κατὰ μέρος ἄνθρωποι, ὥστε οὔκ εἰσιν εἴδη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀλλ' ἄτομα ἤγουν ὑποστάσεις. Πάλιν τὸ εἶδος τεμνόμενον μεταδίδωσι τοῖς ὑποκάτω αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦ ὅρου. Ὁ δὲ Πέτρος τεμνόμενος εἰς ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα οὔτε τῇ ψυχῇ οὔτε τῷ σώματι μεταδίδωσι τοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦ ὅρου· οὔτε γὰρ μόνη ἡ ψυχὴ Πέτρος οὔτε μόνον τὸ σῶμα ἀλλὰ τὸ συναμφότερον. Ἔτι πᾶσα διαίρεσις ἀπὸ γένους εἰς εἴδη γινομένη μέχρι δύο ἢ τριῶν σπανίως δὲ τεσσάρων φθάνει· ἀδύνατον γὰρ διαιρεθῆναι γένος εἰς πέντε εἴδη καὶ ἐπάνω. Ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος εἰς πάντας τοὺς κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπους διαιρεῖται, οἵτινες ἄπειροί εἰσι τῷ ἀριθμῷ. ∆ιό τινες οὐδέ φασι λέγεσθαι διαίρεσιν τὴν ἀπὸ εἴδους εἰς ἄτομα ἀλλ' ἀπαρίθμησιν. Ὅθεν δῆλον, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ Πέτρος καὶ Παῦλος καὶ Ἰωάννης εἴδη ἀλλ' ἄτομα ἤγουν ὑποστάσεις. Οὔτε ὁ ἄνθρωπος γένος τοῦ Πέτρου καὶ Παύλου καὶ Ἰωάννου καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑποστάσεων ἀλλ' εἶδος. ∆ιὸ εἰδικώτατον εἶδός ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος· εἶδος γάρ ἐστι τοῦ ἐπάνω καὶ εἶδος τῶν ὑποκάτω. Ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ ἵππος καὶ ὁ κύων καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἴδη εἰσὶν εἰδικώτατα. Τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ τοῦ γενικωτάτου γένους καὶ τῶν εἰδικωτάτων εἰδῶν γένη εἰσὶν ὑπάλληλα καὶ εἴδη, εἴδη μὲν τῶν ἐπάνω γένη δὲ τῶν ὑποκάτω. Καὶ αὗταί εἰσιν αἱ οὐσιώδεις καὶ φυσικαὶ διαφοραὶ καὶ ποιότητες, αἵτινες λέγονται διαιρετικαὶ καὶ συστατικαί, διαιρετικαὶ μὲν τῶν ἐπάνω συστατικαὶ δὲ τῶν ὑποκάτω· τὸ γὰρ σῶμα καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον διαιροῦσι τὴν οὐσίαν, ὁμοίως τὸ ἔμψυχον καὶ τὸ ἄψυχον διαιροῦσι τὸ σῶμα, ὁμοίως τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τὸ ἀναίσθητον διαιροῦσι τὸ ἔμψυχον. Αὗται οὖν συνιστῶσι τὸ ζῷον. Λαμβάνω γὰρ οὐσίαν ἔμψυχον αἰσθητικὴν καὶ ποιῶ τὸ ζῷον· ζῷον γάρ ἐστιν οὐσία ἔμψυχος αἰσθητική. Λαμβάνω πάλιν οὐσίαν ἄψυχον ἀναίσθητον καὶ ποιῶ τὸν λίθον. Πάλιν λαμβάνω οὐσίαν ἔμψυχον ἀναίσθητον