Maximus the Confessor, PG 91A 6

CONCERNING JUDGMENT But neither is choice a kind of judgment, even if many readily think this;

but of judgment; since they say judgment is an internal desire for things in our power, from which choice arises; or a disposition towards things in our power which have been deliberated upon with desire. For when the desire is disposed towards the things decided from deliberation, it has become judgment; after which, or to speak more accurately, from which is choice. Therefore, judgment has the same relation to choice as a state has to an activity.

CONCERNING AUTHORITY

15Α_022 But neither is choice authority. For choice, as I have often said, is a deliberative desire for things in our power that can be done; while authority is a lawful mastery over things in our power that can be done; or an unhindered mastery of the use of things in our power; or an unenslaved desire for things in our power. Therefore authority and choice are not the same; since we choose according to authority, but we do not exercise authority according to choice; and the one only selects, while the other makes use of the things in our power, and the things connected with what is in our power, that is, choice and judgment and deliberation. For we deliberate by authority, 0020 and judge, and choose, and are moved to action, and make use of the things in our power.

CONCERNING OPINION

But neither is choice a kind of opinion. For opinion is twofold: both rational and irrational; but choice is subject to change. They say, then, that irrational opinion is simple and ready knowledge, as when someone puts forward another's opinion, being ignorant of its cause. For instance, saying the soul is immortal, but not giving a demonstrative cause of its immortality. But they say rational opinion is knowledge, being constituted by the completion of a thought process; as when someone, having reasoned something out, also gives its cause scientifically. For thought is that which goes through and operates discursively, beginning from a premise up to a conclusion. For instance, someone proposes to show that the soul is immortal, and says: Since the soul is self-moving; and that which is self-moving is ever-moving; and that which is ever-moving is immortal; therefore the soul is immortal. Or again: Since 15Α_024 the soul is incomposite; and that which is incomposite is indissoluble; and that which is indissoluble is immortal; therefore the soul is immortal. For it is the property of thought to traverse a certain path leading to the knowledge of the matter; and it proceeds from premises through syllogisms to conclusions, and produces rational opinion. And again, opinion is not only of things in our power, but also of things not in our power; but choice is only of things in our power; and we speak of opinion as true and false, but we do not speak of choice as true and false, but as good and bad; and opinion is of universals, while choice is of particulars; for choice is about things to be done, for these are the particulars. Through many points, as I think, it has become clear that choice is not opinion. For if opinion, being constituted by the completion of a thought process, is knowledge, while choice is a deliberative desire for things in our power that can be done, choice is not the same as opinion.

CONCERNING MINDSET, THAT IS, PRUDENCE

But neither is choice mindset, that is, prudence. Since they say that prudence is a theoretical desire for rational and cognitive studies; 0021 or a state opposed to both folly and excessive thinking; but choice, as the account has variously rendered it, is a deliberative desire for things in our power. And they say that prudence comes to be in this manner: for instance, the first movement of the mind, thought

ΠΕΡΙ ΓΝΩΜΗΣ Ἀλλ᾿ οὔτε γνώμη τίς ἐστιν ἡ προαίρεσις, κἄν οἱ πολλοί τοῦτο προχείρως

νομίζωσιν· ἀλλά γνώμης· εἴπερ τήν γνώμην εἶναι φασιν ὄρεξιν ἐνδιάθετον τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν, ἐξ ἧς ἡ προαίρεσις· ἤ διάθεσιν ἐπί τοῖς ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν ὀρεκτικῶς βουλευθεῖσι. ∆ιατεθεῖσα γάρ ἡ ὄρεξις τοῖς κριθεῖσιν ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς, γνώμη γέγονε· μεθ᾿ ἥν, ἤ κυριώτερον εἰπεῖν, ἐξ ἧς ἡ προαίρεσις. Ἕξεως οὖν πρός ἐνέργειαν ἐπέχει λόγον, ἡ γνώμη πρός τήν προαίρεσιν.

ΠΕΡΙ ΕΞΟΥΣΙΑΣ

15Α_022 Ἀλλ᾿ οὔτε ἐξουσία ἐστίν ἡ προαίρεσις. Ἡ μέν γάρ προαίρεσις, ὡς πολλάκις ἔφην, ὄρεξις ἐστι βουλευτική τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν πρακτῶν· ἡ δέ ἐξουσία, κυριότης ἔννομος τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν πρακτῶν· ἤ κυριότης ἀκώλυτος τῆς τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν χρήσεως· ἤ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν ἀδούλωτος. Οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν ταυτόν ἐξουσία καί προαίρεσις· εἴπερ κατ᾿ ἐξουσίαν μέν προαιρούμεθα· οὐκ ἐξουσιάζομεν δέ κατά προαίρεσιν· καί ἡ μέν ἐπιλέγεται μόνον· ἡ δέ χρᾶται τοῖς ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καί τοῖς ἐπί τοῖς ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν, ἤγουν, προαιρέσει καί κρίσει καί βουλῇ. Κατ' ἐξουσίαν γάρ βουλευόμεθα, 0020 καί κρίνομεν, καί προαιρούμεθα, καί ὁρμῶμεν, καί χρώμεθα τοῖς ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν.

ΠΕΡΙ ∆ΟΞΗΣ

Ἀλλ᾿ οὔτε δόξα τίς ἐστιν ἤ προαίρεσις. Ἡ μέν γάρ δόξα διττή· λογική τε, καί ἄλογος· ἡ δέ προαίρεσις τρεπτή. Τήν μέν οὖν ἄλογον δόξαν εἶναί φασιν, ἁπλῆν γνῶσιν καί πρόχειρον· ὡς ὅταν τις προφέρῃ δόξαν ἀλλοτρίαν, ἀγνοῶν τήν αὐτῆς αἰτίαν. Οἷον, ἀθάνατον λέγων τήν ψυχήν, καί μή διδούς ἀποδεικτικήν αἰτίαν τῆς ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς. Τήν δέ λογικήν δόξαν, γνῶσιν εἶναι λέγουσι, κατά ἀποπεράτωσιν τῆς διανοίας συνισταμένην· ὡς ὅταν τις λογισάμενός τι, καί τήν αἰτίαν αὐτοῦ ἐπιστημονικῶς ἀποδίδωσι. ∆ιανοία γάρ ἐστιν, ἡ διήκουσα καί διαστηματικῶς ἐνεργοῦσα, ἀπό προτάσεως ἀρχομένη μέχρι συμπεράσματος. Οἷον, προτίθεταί τις δεῖξαι τήν ψυχήν ἀθάνατον, καί λέγει· Ἐπειδή αὐτοκίνητος ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή· τό δέ αὐτοκίνητον, ἀεικίνητον· τό δέ ἀεικίνητον, ἀθάνατον· ἡ ψυχή ἄρα ἀθάνατος. Ἤ πάλιν· Ἐπειδή 15Α_024 ἀσύνθετός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή· τό δέ ἀσύνθετον, ἀδιάλυτον· τό δέ ἀδιάλυτον, ἀθάνατον· ἡ ψυχή ἄρα ἀθάνατος. ∆ιανοίας γάρ ἴδιον, τό διανύειν τινά ὁδόν ἐπί τήν τοῦ πράγματος γνῶσιν φέρουσαν· ὁδεύει δέ ἀπό τῶν προτάσεων διά τῶν συλλογισμῶν ἐπί τά συμπεράσματα, καί ποιεῖ τήν λογικήν δόξαν. Καί πάλιν, ἡ μέν δόξα οὐ μόνον τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν, ἀλλά καί τῶν οὐκ ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν· ἡ δέ προαίρεσις, μόνον τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν· καί δόξαν μέν ἀληθῆ λέγομεν καί ψευδῆ· προαίρεσιν δέ, οὐ λέγομεν ἀληθῆ καί ψευδῆ· ἀλλά καλήν καί κακήν· καί ἡ μέν δόξα, τῶν καθόλου· ἡ δέ προαίρεσις, τῶν καθέκαστα· περί γάρ τῶν πρακτῶν ἡ προαίρεσις· ταῦτα γάρ τά καθέκαστα. ∆ιά πλειόνων, ὡς οἶμαι, φανερόν γέγονε, μή εἶναι δόξαν, τήν προαίρεσιν. Εἰ γάρ ἡ μέν δόξα κατ᾿ ἀποπεράτωσιν τῆς διανοίας συνισταμένη, γνῶσίς ἐστιν· ἡ δέ προαίρεσις, ὄρεξις βουλευτική τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν πρακτῶν, οὐκ ἔστι τῇ δόξῃ ταυτόν ἡ προαίρεσις.

ΠΕΡΙ ΦΡΟΝΗΜΑΤΟΣ, ΗΓΟΥΝ ΦΡΟΝΗΣΕΩΣ

Ἀλλ᾿ οὔτε φρόνημα ἤγουν φρόνησίς ἐστι ἡ προαίρεσις. Εἴπερ τήν μέν φρόνησιν, ὄρεξιν θεωρητικήν λογικῶν καί γνωστικῶν μαθημάτων φασίν· 0021 ἤ ἔξιν ἀνοίας τε καί ὑπερνοίας ἀντίπαλον· τήν δέ προαίρεσιν, ὡς διαφόρως ἀποδέδωκεν ὁ λόγος, ὄρεξιν βουλευτικήν τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν. Γίνεσθαι δέ τήν φρόνησίν φασι κατά τόν τρόπον τοῦτον· οἶον, τήν μέν πρώτην τοῦ νοῦ κίνησιν, νόησιν