Evil, being a falling away and as it were a departure from the first of goods, is reasonably also deprived of being; for what, being unable to share in the good, could have an entrance into things that are? But that which is not entirely evil, being opposite [Pl. Theaet. 176a] to some good and not to all, is ordered and made good through the superabundance of all goods; and it is evil for those things to which it is opposed, but it depends on other things as goods; for it is not necessary to fight with those things, but for all things to follow according to justice, or not to exist at all. 10 Rightly, then Plato, in the Timaeus, says that according to the creative will all things are good, and nothing is bad [Tim. 30a 2-3]; but in his discourses with the geometer he says that evils are not destroyed, but of necessity [Theaet. 176a] he proposes that it has come to be among the things that are. For all things are made good by the will of the father and nothing is evil in relation to his creation, neither of things that are nor of things that come to be. --- since even darkness, on the one hand, which is completely unmixed ... and devoid of light does not exist, but that which comes to be in the light and is defined by it is everywhere among the things that are. --- Therefore all things are good to the father of all, and evil exists in those things that are not able to stand entirely according to the good. --- How, then, evil exists and how it does not exist is clear from these things. For all, both those who say all things are good and those who do not, in a way speak correctly, and in a way not correctly. For that all things are beings, is true; but non-being also exists, interwoven with being. Therefore all things are good in that no evil is unordered and unmixed; and evil exists, for those for whom it is indeed evil; but there are those whose nature is not constituted to remain unmixedly in the good. 11 In which of the beings evil is, and how and from where it came to subsist, would be the next thing to consider after this, because its nature also has appeared to us to be among the beings. Therefore we must begin from above and observe, if somehow we are able, where evil is. 30 --- One must also speak concerning matter, whether it is evil, or not. For it is in no way possible for evil to be accidental to it, because in itself it is without quality and without form and a substrate, but not in a substrate, and simple, but not one thing in another. But if it is evil at all, as some say, it is evil according to its essence, by which they also say that matter is the first evil and what the gods even detest [Hom. Y 65] making . For what else is evil than lack of measure and indefiniteness and all such things as are privations of the good? For the good is the measure of all things and limit and end and perfection; so that evil is lack of measure and infinity itself and incompleteness and indefiniteness. And all these things are in matter and primarily, not being other things apart from it, but it itself and that which is its being. Therefore, the first evil and the nature of evil and the last of all things is matter. And if the good is twofold, on the one hand, the good-in-itself and nothing other than good, and on the other hand that which is in another and is something good and not primarily good, evil will also be twofold, on the one hand that which is as it were itself and primarily evil and nothing other than evil, and on the other hand that which is in another and is something evil and is evil because of that and is evil by participation in or likeness to that. And just as the good-in-itself is first, so also the evil-in-itself is the last of beings; for it is possible for nothing to be better than the good or worse than evil; for indeed we say all other things are somewhat better and worse because of these. But the last of beings is matter; for all other things are constituted to act or to be acted upon; but it does neither, being deprived of the power for both. Therefore, evil-in-itself and the first evil is matter. 31 And if in bodies that which is contrary to nature is from matter prevailing, as has been said, and in souls evil and weakness ... from their being intoxicated by the indefiniteness concerning it, being made like to it, why, leaving this as the cause, do we seek another principle of evils and a source of their subsistence? But if matter is evil ..., one of two things is necessary: either to make the good the cause of evil, or to make two principles of beings. For it is necessary for everything that in any way subsists either to be a principle of all things or to be from a principle; and for matter, if it is from a principle, to have its own entrance into being from the good, but if it is a principle, it posits for us two principles of beings fighting with each other, both the first good and the first

κακὸν τοῦ πρωτίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπόπτωσις ὂν καὶ οἷον ἔκβα- σις, εἰκότως καὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἐστέρηται· τί γὰρ ἂν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μετασχεῖν μὴ δυνάμενον εἰς τὰ ὄντα πάροδον ἔχοι; τὸ δὲ οὐ πάντῃ κακόν, ὑπεναν- τίον [Pl. Theaet. 176a] μὲν ὂν ἀγαθῷ τινὶ καὶ οὐ παντί, τάττεται δὲ καὶ ἀγαθύνεται διὰ τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἀγαθῶν ὑπερβολήν· καὶ τοῖς μέν ἐστι κακὸν οἷς ἠναντίωται, τῶν δὲ ὡς ἀγαθῶν ἐξήρτηται· μάχεσθαι γὰρ ἐκείνοις οὐ δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἕπεσθαι πάντα κατὰ δίκην ἢ μηδὲ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. 10 <Ὀρθῶς ἄρα> Πλάτων ἐν μὲν τῷ Τιμαίῳ κατὰ τὴν δημιουργικὴν βούλησιν ἀγαθὰ μὲν πάντα, φαῦλον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι φησίν [Tim. 30a 2-3]· ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν γεωμέτρην λόγοις οὔτ' ἀπολέσθαι φησὶν τὰ κακά, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης [Theaet. 176a] <ἐν τοῖς οὖσι γεγονέναι προτείνει. τὰ γὰρ πάντα ἀγαθύνεται τῇ βουλήσει τοῦ πατρὸς> καὶ οὐδὲν πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνου δημιουργίαν κακόν, οὔτε τῶν ὄντων οὔτε τῶν γινο- μένων. --- ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ σκότος τὸ μὲν ἀμιγὲς πάντῃ ... καὶ φωτὸς ἄμοιρον οὐκ ἔστι, τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ φωτὶ γενόμενον καὶ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὁριζόμενον <πανταχοῦ> τῶν ὄντων ἐστίν. --- πάντα οὖν ἀγαθὰ τῷ πάντων πατρί, καὶ ἔστι τὸ κακὸν ἐν τοῖς μὴ πάντῃ κατὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἑστάναι δυναμένοις. --- Πῶς μὲν οὖν ἐστι καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἔστι τὸ κακὸν ἐκ τούτων δῆλον. πάντες γὰρ οἵ τε πάντα λέγοντες ἀγαθὰ καὶ οἱ μή, πῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς λέγουσι, πῇ δὲ οὐκ ὀρθῶς. καὶ γὰρ ὅτι πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐστίν, ἀληθές· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔστι τῷ ὄντι συμπεπλεγμένον. πάντα οὖν ἀγαθὰ τῷ μηδὲν εἶναι κακὸν ἀκόσμητον καὶ ἀμιγές· καὶ τὸ κακόν ἐστιν, οἷς δὴ καὶ ἔστι κακόν· ἔστι δὲ ὧν ἡ φύσις ἀμιγῶς ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ μένειν οὐ πέφυκεν. 11 Ἐν τίσι δὲ τῶν ὄντων τὸ κακὸν καὶ ὅπως ὑπέστη καὶ πόθεν, ἑπόμενον ἂν εἴη μετὰ ταῦτα θεωρῆσαι, διότι τῶν ὄντων ἡμῖν ἐφάνη καὶ ἡ τούτου φύσις. ἄνωθεν οὖν ἀρκτέον καὶ θεατέον, εἴ πως δυνάμεθα, ποῦ τὸ κακόν. 30 --- ῥητέον καὶ περὶ τῆς ὕλης, εἴτε ἔστι κακόν, εἴτε καὶ μή. συμβεβηκέναι μὲν γὰρ αὐτῇ τὸ κακὸν οὐδαμῶς δυνατόν, ὅτι καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἄποιός ἐστι καὶ ἀνείδεος καὶ ὑποκείμενον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ, καὶ ἁπλοῦν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ. εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ὅλως κακόν, ὥς τινές φασι, κατ' οὐσίαν ἐστὶ κακόν, ᾗ καὶ λέγουσιν ἐκεῖνοι, τὴν ὕλην τὸ πρώτως κακὸν καὶ <ὃ στυγέουσι θεοί περ [Hom. Y 65] ποιοῦντες>. τί γὰρ ἄλλο ἐστὶ τὸ κακὸν ἢ ἀμετρία καὶ ἀοριστία καὶ πάντα ὅσα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ στερήσεις; τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν μέτρον ἐστὶ πάντων καὶ ὅρος καὶ πέρας καὶ τελειότης· ὥστε τὸ κακὸν ἀμετρία καὶ αὐτοάπειρον καὶ ἀτελὲς καὶ ἀόριστον. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἐν ὕλῃ καὶ πρώτως, οὐκ ἄλλα ὄντα παρ' ἐκείνην, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ ὅ ἐστιν αὐτῆς τὸ εἶναι. τὸ ἄρα πρώτως κακὸν καὶ ἡ τοῦ κακοῦ φύσις καὶ τὸ πάντων ἔσχατον ἡ ὕλη. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν διττόν ἐστι, τὸ μὲν αὐτοαγαθὸν καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἀγαθόν, <τὸ δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἀγαθόν τι καὶ οὐ πρώτως ἀγαθόν, ἔσται καὶ τὸ κακὸν διττόν, τὸ μὲν οἷον αὐτὸ καὶ πρώτως κακὸν καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ> κακόν, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ κακόν τι καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνο κακὸν καὶ ἐκείνου μεταλήψει ἢ ὁμοιώσει κακόν. καὶ ὥσπερ τὸ αὐτοαγαθὸν πρῶτον, οὕτω καὶ τὸ αὐτοκακὸν ἔσχατον τῶν ὄντων· οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ ἀγα- θοῦ κρεῖττον οὔτε τοῦ κακοῦ χεῖρον εἶναι δυνατὸν οὐδέν· καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα διὰ ταῦτα κρείττω τὶ καὶ χείρω φαμέν. τὸ δὲ τῶν ὄντων ἔσχατον, ὕλη· πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν πέφυκεν· ἡ δὲ οὐδέτερον, τῆς ἀμφοῖν ἐστερημένη δυνάμεως. τὸ ἄρα αὐτοκακὸν καὶ τὸ πρώτως κακὸν ἡ ὕλη. 31 Εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐν σώμασι τὸ παρὰ φύσιν ὕλης κρατούσης, ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν ψυχαῖς τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἡ ἀσθένεια ... τῷ μεθυσθῆναι τῆς περὶ αὐτὴν ἀοριστίας ὁμοιουμέναις πρὸς αὐτήν, τί ταύτην ἀφέντες αἰτιᾶσθαι ἄλλην ἐπιζητοῦμεν ἀρχὴν τῶν κακῶν καὶ πηγὴν τῆς τούτων ὑποστάσεως; <ἀλλ' εἰ> κακὸν ἡ ὕλη ..., δυοῖν θάτερον ἀνάγκη, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ κακοῦ ποιεῖν αἴτιον, ἢ δύο τῶν ὄντων ἀρχάς. ἀνάγκη μὲν γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ὁπωσοῦν ὑφεστὼς ἢ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν ὅλων ἢ ἐξ ἀρχῆς· τὴν δὲ ὕλην ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὖσαν, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ αὐτὴν ἔχειν τὴν εἰς τὸ εἶναι πάρ- οδον, ἀρχὴν δὲ οὖσαν, δύο τῶν ὄντων ἡμῖν ὑποβάλλειν ἀρχὰς μαχο- μένας ἀλλήλαις, τό τε πρώτως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ πρώτως