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and I make a plant. Again, the rational and the irrational divide the animal, the mortal and the immortal divide the rational. I take, therefore, the animal, being a genus, and the rational and the mortal, and I constitute man; for man is a rational, mortal animal. And I take the animal and the irrational and the mortal and I constitute the horse, for instance, or the dog and such things. And they are called essential and natural differentiae, because these make a species differ from another species and a nature and substance from another substance and nature. 3 Concerning the individual. The individual is spoken of in four ways. For an individual is that which is not cut nor divided, like the point and the now and the monad, which are also called non-quantitative. An individual is also called that which is hard to cut, that is, that which is cut with difficulty, like the adamant stone and such things. An individual is also called the species, which is no longer cut into other species, that is, the most specific species, like man, horse and such things. And an individual is properly so called, which is cut, but after the cutting does not preserve its original form, just as Peter is cut into soul and body, but neither is the soul by itself a complete man or a complete Peter, nor is the body. The discussion among the philosophers is about this individual, which in the case of substance signifies the hypostasis. 4 Concerning difference. This is spoken of in three ways, commonly and specifically and most specifically. For it is impossible for any two things not to differ from each other in some respect. Therefore, a species differs from a species in some respects, and a hypostasis from a hypostasis of the same species and substance in others, and a hypostasis from itself in others. For the species of man differs from the species of horse by the rational and irrational. And the rational and irrational is called an essential difference. Likewise, all those things by which a species differs from a species are called a natural and essential and constitutive difference and quality and a natural property, which exists in every species unchangeably, which is called by the philosophers a most specific difference, as being more proper and indicative of the nature. Again, a man differs from a man, or a horse from a horse, or a dog from a dog, that is, an individual from an individual of the same species, in that one is tall, the other short; one is old, the other young; one is snub-nosed, the other hook-nosed; one is prudent, the other foolish. All these are called non-essential differences and qualities, which is the accident, about which we shall speak subsequently. 5 Concerning the accident. An accident is that which comes to be and ceases to be without the destruction of the subject. And again, that which can both be and not be in the same thing; for it is possible for a man both to be white and not to be white, likewise also tall and prudent and snub-nosed. This accident is divided into two, into the commonly called difference and into the specific difference. Therefore, the common difference is the separable accident, for example, someone is sitting and another is standing; it is possible for the one sitting to stand up and the one standing to sit down, for their difference to be separated and for one to take on another in place of the other. And someone is said to differ from himself according to the separable accident; for he differs from himself in sitting and standing up, in being young and growing old, in being sick and being healthy and in such things. But the specific difference is the inseparable accident, for example, someone is snub-nosed; it is impossible for the snub-nosedness to be separated from him, likewise also blue-eyedness and such things. According to these inseparable accidents, therefore, an individual from an individual, that is, a hypostasis from a hypostasis

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καὶ ποιῶ φυτόν. Πάλιν τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διαιροῦσι τὸ ζῷον, τὸ θνητὸν καὶ τὸ ἀθάνατον διαιροῦσι τὸ λογικόν. Λαμβάνω οὖν τὸ ζῷον γένος ὂν καὶ τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τὸ θνητὸν καὶ συνιστῶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον· ἄνθρωπος γάρ ἐστι ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν. Καὶ λαμβάνω τὸ ζῷον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον καὶ τὸ θνητὸν καὶ συνιστῶ τὸν ἵππον τυχὸν ἢ κύνα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. ∆ιαφοραὶ δὲ λέγονται οὐσιώδεις καὶ φυσικαί, ὅτι αὗται ποιοῦσι διαφέρειν εἶδος ἄλλου εἴδους καὶ φύσιν καὶ οὐσίαν ἑτέρας οὐσίας καὶ φύσεως. 3 Περὶ ἀτόμου. Τὸ ἄτομον τετραχῶς λέγεται. Ἄτομον γάρ ἐστι τὸ μὴ τεμνόμενον μηδὲ μεριζόμενον, ὡς ἡ στιγμὴ καὶ τὸ νῦν καὶ ἡ μονάς, ἅτινα καὶ ἄποσα λέγονται. Ἄτομον λέγεται καὶ τὸ δύστμητον τουτέστι τὸ δυσχερῶς τεμνόμενον ὡς ὁ ἀδάμας λίθος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Ἄτομον λέγεται καὶ τὸ εἶδος, ὅπερ οὐκέτι εἰς ἕτερα εἴδη τέμνεται ἤτοι τὸ εἰδικώτατον εἶδος ὡς ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Ἄτομον δὲ κυρίως λέγεται, ὅπερ τέμνεται μέν, οὐ σῴζει δὲ μετὰ τὴν τομὴν τὸ πρῶτον εἶδος, ὥσπερ Πέτρος τέμνεται εἰς ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, ἀλλ' οὔτε ἡ ψυχὴ καθ' αὑτήν ἐστι τέλειος ἄνθρωπος ἢ Πέτρος τέλειος οὔτε τὸ σῶμα. Περὶ τούτου τοῦ ἀτόμου παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὁ λόγος, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας δηλοῖ τὴν ὑπόστασιν. 4 Περὶ διαφορᾶς. Αὕτη δὲ τριχῶς λέγεται, κοινῶς τε καὶ ἰδίως καὶ ἰδιαίτατα. Ἀδύνατον γὰρ μὴ διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων δύο τινὰ κατά τι. Ἄλλοις οὖν διαφέρει εἶδος εἴδους, καὶ ἄλλοις ὑπόστασις τῆς ὁμοειδοῦς καὶ ὁμοουσίου ὑποστάσεως καὶ ἄλλοις ὑπόστασις ἑαυτῆς. ∆ιαφέρει μὲν γὰρ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ εἴδους τοῦ ἵππου κατὰ τὸ λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον. Καὶ λέγεται τὸ λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον οὐσιώδης διαφορά. Ὁμοίως καὶ πάντα, οἷς διαφέρει εἶδος εἴδους, φυσικὴ καὶ οὐσιώδης καὶ συστατικὴ διαφορὰ καὶ ποιότης λέγεται καὶ φυσικὸν ἰδίωμα, ὅπερ παντὶ τῷ εἴδει ἐνυπάρχει ἀπαραλλάκτως, ἥτις καλεῖται παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἰδιαίτατα διαφορὰ ὡς οἰκειοτέρα καὶ τῆς φύσεως παραστατική. Πάλιν διαφέρει ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἵππος ἵππου ἢ κύων κυνός, τουτέστιν ἄτομον ὁμοειδοῦς ἀτόμου, καθὸ ὁ μέν ἐστι μακρὸς ὁ δὲ κολοβός, ὁ μὲν παλαιὸς ὁ δὲ νέος, ὁ μὲν σιμὸς ὁ δὲ γρυπός, ὁ μὲν φρόνιμος ὁ ἕτερος μωρός. Ταῦτα πάντα ἐπουσιώδεις διαφοραὶ καὶ ποιότητες λέγονται, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός, περὶ οὗ ἀκολούθως ἐροῦμεν. 5 Περὶ συμβεβηκότος. Συμβεβηκός ἐστιν, ὃ γίνεται καὶ ἀπογίνεται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φθορᾶς. Καὶ πάλιν, ὃ ἐνδέχεται τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ἄνθρωπον καὶ λευκὸν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι λευκόν, ὁμοίως καὶ μακρὸν καὶ φρόνιμον καὶ σιμόν. Τοῦτο τὸ συμβεβηκὸς διαιρεῖται εἰς δύο, εἰς τὴν κοινῶς λεγομένην διαφορὰν καὶ εἰς τὴν ἰδίως διαφοράν. Κοινῶς μὲν οὖν διαφορά ἐστι τὸ χωριστὸν συμβεβηκός, οἷον κάθηταί τις καὶ ἕτερος ἵσταται· ἐνδέχεται ἐν τῷ ἀναστῆναι τὸν καθήμενον καὶ καθίσαι τὸν ἱστάμενον χωρισθῆναι τὴν διαφορὰν αὐτῶν καὶ λαβεῖν ἄλλην ἀντ' ἄλλης. Καὶ ἑαυτοῦ δέ τις λέγεται διαφέρειν κατὰ τὸ χωριστὸν συμβεβηκός· διαφέρει γὰρ ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῷ καθῆσθαι καὶ ἀνίστασθαι, ἐν τῷ νεάζειν καὶ γηρᾶν, ἐν τῷ νοσεῖν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις. Ἰδίως δὲ διαφορά ἐστι τὸ ἀχώριστον συμβεβηκός, οἷόν ἐστί τις σιμός· ἀδύνατον χωρισθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν σιμότητα, ὁμοίως καὶ τὴν γλαυκότητα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Κατὰ ταῦτα οὖν τὰ ἀχώριστα συμβεβηκότα ἄτομον ἀτόμου τουτέστιν ὑπόστασις ὑποστάσεως