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they call; and the understanding of something, they call a concept; which, having remained and impressed the soul toward that which is understood, is addressed as a thought; and the thought, having remained in the same state and having tested itself, is named prudence; and prudence, having been broadened, makes ratiocination; named the inner word 15Α_026 by those skilled in these things; which, when they describe it, they say is a most complete movement of the soul, occurring in the faculty of reasoning, without any vocal utterance; from which they say the spoken word proceeds.

Again, they say that mindset is the knowledge of what has been thought, which comes to the thinker from prudence; for they speak of prudence, the object of thought, the thinker, and the mindset. And prudence is the relation; the object of thought is that which is thought; the thinker is the one who thinks; and mindset is the knowledge of the thing thought, which has come to the thinker from prudence. If, therefore, this is so, but choice is not so; then choice is not mindset.

It has been shown then, as I think, clearly, that the things proposed are not the same as each other, according to those who think this. But if they should say that they are in every way the same as each other, because appetite, that is, the appetitive power of nature, is predicated of all equally as a genus; let them say that all the species are also the same as each other, both terrestrial, and winged and aquatic, because "animal" is predicated of all equally as a more general genus, the ordering of the universe will vanish for them; being not the substance of different things, but only the manifestation of bare names.

THAT ... THE WILL OF THE SAINTS WILL NOT BE ONE AFTER THE RESURRECTION TOWARDS

EACH OTHER ... GOD Therefore choice, having taken on the impulse and use of things in our power,

is the end of our rational movement 15Α_028 according to appetite. For that which is rational by nature, having the natural power of rational appetite, which they also call the will of the intellectual soul; it has appetite and it reasons; and having reasoned, it wishes. For they say that wish is not simply natural, but of a certain kind; that is, the will for something; 0021 and wishing, it seeks; and seeking, it considers; and considering, it deliberates; and deliberating, it judges; and judging, it chooses; and choosing, it has an impulse; and having an impulse, it makes use of it; and making use of it, it ceases from its appetitive movement towards that thing. For no one makes use of something, without first having an impulse; and no one has an impulse, without choosing; and no one chooses, without judging; and no one judges, without deliberating; and no one deliberates, without considering; and no one considers, without seeking; and no one seeks, without having wished; and no one wishes, without having reasoned; and no one reasons, without having an appetite; and no one has a rational appetite, without being rational by nature. Therefore, man, being by nature a rational animal, is appetitive, and reasoning, and willing, and seeking, and considering, and choosing, and impulsive, and capable of use.

But if man, along with the other things, is also an animal that chooses by nature; and choice is of things in our power, and of things able to be done through us, and of things having an uncertain end; and in our power is also the principle of the virtues, being the law put into effect of the powers according to nature; and the mode of misusing the same powers, introducing the passions contrary to nature; therefore, everyone who chooses by nature is both susceptible to and critical of opposites. But if he is critical of opposites, he also certainly chooses; and if he chooses, since the movement toward both lies under his control, 15Α_030 he is not established by nature as unchangeable(3). Therefore, since counsel and judgment and choice are of things that are uncertain, as being in our power, when there are not the things

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καλοῦσι· τήν δέ περί τινος νόησιν, ἔννοιαν λέγουσι· ἥτις ἐπιμείνασα καί τυπώσασα τήν ψυχήν πρός τό νοούμενον, ἐνθύμησις προσαγορεύεται· ἡ δέ ἐνθύμησις ἐν ταυτῷ μείνασα, καί ἑαυτήν βασανίσασα, φρόνησις ὀνομάζεται· ἡ δέ φρόνησις πλατυνθεῖσα, ποιεῖ τόν διαλογισμόν· ἐνδιάθετον λόγον 15Α_026 παρά τοῖς ταῦτα δεινοῖς ὀνομαζόμενον· ὅν ὑπογράφοντές φασι, κίνημα τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι πληρέστατον ἐν τῷ διαλογιστικῷ γινόμενον, ἄνευ τινός ἐκφωνήσεως· ἐξ οὖ τόν προφορικόν λόγον φασί προϊέναι.

Φρόνημα δέ πάλιν εἶναι λέγουσι, τήν ἐκ τῆς φρονήσεως ἐπιγινομένην τῷ φρονητικῷ γνῶσιν τοῦ φρονηθέντος· φρόνησιν γάρ, καί φρονητόν καί φρονητικόν καί φρόνημά φασι. Καί φρόνησις μέν ἐστιν, ἡ σχέσις· φρονητόν δέ, τό φρονούμενον· φρονητικόν, τό φρονοῦν· καί φρόνημα, ἡ γενομένη ἐκ τῆς φρονήσεως τῷ φρονητικῷ γνῶσις τοῦ φρονηθέντος πράγματος. Εἰ τοίνυν τοῦτο μέν οὕτως· ἡ δέ προαίρεσις οὐχ οὕτως· ἄρα προαίρεσις οὐκ ἔστι τό φρόνημα.

∆έδεικται τοίνυν, ὡς οἶμαι, σαφῶς, οὐκ εἶναι ταυτόν ἀλλήλοις τά προταθέντα, κατά τούς τοῦτο νομίζοντας. Εἰ δέ φαῖεν ἀλλήλοις πάντως εἶναι ταυτόν, διά τό πάντων ἐπίσης, ὡς γένος κατηγορεῖσθαι τήν ὄρεξιν, ἤγουν τήν ὀρεκτικήν τῆς φύσεως δύναμιν· εἰπάτωσαν ἀλλήλοις εἶναι ταυτόν καί πάντα τά εἴδη, τά τε χερσαῖα, καί πτηνά καί ἔνυδρα, διά τό πάντων ἐπίσης ὡς γενικώτερον, κατηγορεῖσθαι γένος τό ζῶον, φροῦδος αὐτοῖς ἡ τοῦ παντός γενήσεται διακόσμησις· πραγμάτων οὐκ οὖσα διαφόρων ὑπόστασις, ἀλλά μόνον ψιλῶν ὀνομάτων ἔκφανσις.

ΟΤΙ ... ΟΥΚ ΕΣΤΑΙ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΑΝΑΣΤΑΣΙΝ ΕΝ ΤΟ ΘΕΛΗΜΑ ΤΩΝ ΑΓΙΩΝ ΠΡΟΣ

ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ ... ΘΕΟΝ Οὐκοῦν ἡ προαίρεσις προσλαβοῦσα τήν ἐπί τοῖς ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν ὁρμήν τε καί χρῆσιν,

πέρας τῆς κατ᾿ ὄρεξιν, ἡμῖν λογικῆς ὑπάρχει 15Α_028 κινήσεως. Τό γάρ φύσει λογικόν, δύναμιν ἔχον φυσικήν τόν λογικήν ὄρεξιν, ἤν καί θέλησιν τῆς νοερᾶς καλοῦσι ψυχῆς· ὀρέγεται καί λογίζεται· καί λογισάμενον βούλεται. Βούλησιν γάρ εἶναί φασιν, οὐ τήν ἁπλῶς φυσικήν, ἀλλά τήν ποιάν· τουτέστι, τήν περί τινος θέλησιν· 0021 καί βουλόμενον ζητεῖ· καί ζητοῦν σκέπτεται· καί σκεπτόμενον βουλεύεται· καί βουλευόμενον κρίνει· και κρίνον προαιρεῖται· καί προαιρούμενον ὁρμᾷ· καί ὁρμῶν, κέχρηται· καί χρώμενον παύεται τῆς ὀρεκτικῆς ἐπ᾿ ἐκεῖνο κινήσεως. Οὐδείς γάρ κέχρηται, μή πρότερον ὁρμήσας· καί οὐδείς ὁρμᾷ, μή προαιρούμενος· καί οὐδείς προαιρεῖται, μή κρίνας· καί οὐδείς κρίνει, μή βουλευσάμενος· καί οὐδείς βουλεύεται, μή σκεψάμενος· καί οὐδείς σκέπτεται, μή ζητήσας· καί οὐδείς ζητεῖ, μή βουληθείς· καί οὐδείς βούλεται, μή λογισάμενος· καί οὐδείς λογίζεται, μή ὀρεγόμενος· καί οὐδείς λογικῶς ὀρέγεται, μή ὑπάρχων φύσει λογικός. Λογικόν οὖν φύσει ζῶον ὑπάρχων ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὀρεκτικός ἐστι, καί λογιστικός, καί βουλητικός, καί ζητητικός, καί σκεπτικός καί προαιρετικός, καί ὁρμητικός καί χρηστικός.

Εἰ δέ μετά τῶν λοιπῶν καί προαιρετικόν φύσει ζῶον ὁ ἄνθρωπος· ἡ δέ προαίρεσις τῶν ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν, καί δι᾿ ἡμῶν γίνεσθαι δυναμένων, καί ἄδηλον ἐχόντων τό τέλος ἐστίν· ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν δέ, καί ὁ τῶν ἀρετῶν λόγος, τῶν κατά φύσιν δυνάμεων ὑπάρχων ἐνεργούμενος νόμος· καί ὁ κατά παράχρησιν τῶν αὐτῶν δυνάμεων τρόπος, τά παρά φύσιν πάθη παρυφιστῶν· ἄρα πᾶς φύσει προαιρετικός, τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἐπιδεκτικός τε καί κριτικός. Εἰ δέ τῶν ἀντικειμένων κριτικός, καί προαιρετικός πάντως· εἰ δέ προαιρετικός, ὡς ὑπ᾿ αὐτῷ κειμένης τῆς ἐπ᾿ ἄμφω κινήσεως, 15Α_030 οὐκ ἄτρεπτος φύσει καθέστηκεν(3). Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδή τῶν ἀμφιβόλων ἐστίν, ὡς ἐφ᾿ ἡμῖν, ἤ τε βουλή καί ἡ κρίσις καί ἡ προαίρεσις, ὅταν οὐκ ἔστι τά