evil; but this is impossible; for there cannot be two first principles; for whence could they come at all, if the monad does not exist? For if each of the two is one, there must be, prior to both, the One by which they are both one, and a single principle. Nor can evil come from the good; for just as the cause of good things is more greatly good, so indeed the generator of evil would be more greatly evil; and the good will no longer have its own nature, if it produces the principle of evil. --- <ὥστε> so that the good will be evil as the cause of evil, and the evil will be good as having been produced from the good. 32 But if matter is necessary for the universe and this all-great and blessed god, the cosmos [Pl. Tim. 34 b 8], would not exist in the absence of matter, how can we still attribute the nature of evil to it? For evil is one thing and the necessary another, and the one is such that it is impossible to exist without it, while the other is a privation of being. If, therefore, it provides its service for the creation of the whole cosmos and has been primarily produced as a receptacle of coming-to-be, and as it were a nurse [Pl. Tim. 49a 6] and mother [ib. 50d 3, 51a 4], how could it still be called evil, and primarily evil? And if we speak of measurelessness and indefiniteness and infinity and each of such things in many ways—for we speak of them as warring against measure and <ὡς ἀπουσίαν> as its absence and negation and as underlying it and as being in need of measure and limit—, but matter is not by nature apt to war against anything nor to do anything at all, since it is not even natural for it to be acted upon, due to a lack of the power of being acted upon, and again it is not a removal of measure and limit, because it is not the same as privation; for privation does not exist when those things are present, but matter both exists and receives their appearance—it is necessary, surely, that its infinity and measurelessness be in need of measure and limit. But how could that which is in need of these things be contrary to them? And how could that which needs the good still be evil? For evil flees the nature of the good, and in general, everything contrary flees the contrary state. But if ... and it conceives generation, and—<ὥς φησιν αὐτός>—as he himself says—it nourishes, and no evil comes from it, being a mother to the things from it, or rather to the things generated in it. 33 --- For what could that which is unable to act do to other things? And how, in turn, will that which is in itself without quality have the power to act? But does matter lead souls to itself or are they led by themselves <καὶ χωρισταὶ γίνονται> and become separate by their own power and weakness? For if they are led by themselves, this was the evil for them, the impulse and desire towards the worse, but not matter; for to every thing the flight from the better is an evil, and much more so the inclination to the worse; and through weakness they suffer what such souls must suffer, having chosen badly. But if they are led by matter, where is the self-moving power and the choices of the soul? --- if matter leads all souls to itself and troubles and compels them--- 34 ---For in the Timaeus, calling it the mother [51a 4] and nurse of generation [52d 4-5] and a co-cause [46c 7] of the creation of the cosmos--- but in the discourses of the Eleatic Stranger, <εἰς ὑποκειμένην φύσιν ἀνίησι, παρὰ μὲν τοῦ συνθέντος πάντα καλὰ κεκτῆσθαι τὸν κόσμον λέγων, παρὰ δὲ τῆς ἔμπροσθεν ἕξεως τὰ ἐναντία τούτων ἐν αὐτῷ γένεσιν ἔχειν [Pl. pol. 273bc]> he attributes the cause of the disorder of the universe to an underlying nature, saying that from its composer the cosmos possesses all good things, but from its former state the opposites of these come to be in it [Pl. pol. 273bc]. And in the Philebus, producing both matter itself and the whole nature of the infinite from the One, and in general <τιθείς> placing the divine cause before the separation of limit and infinite, he concedes that it is divine and good through its participation in God and its generation from God, and in no way evil. For evils, he <φησὶ> says one must seek some other causes, and not God, <ὡς ἐν ἄλλοις [resp. II 379c 6-7] εἴρηται> as has been said elsewhere [resp. II 379c 6-7]. Therefore, disorder and evil are not because of matter, but because of that which moves discordantly and disorderly [Pl. Tim. 30a 4-5]; for this is the corporeal-like, <ὅ φησιν ὁ Ἐλεάτης ξένος> which the Eleatic Stranger says is the cause of disorder [Pl. pol. 273b 4] ... and not possibly matter, ---since matter is immobile in itself. --- for the traces of the different forms, leading to this and that motion, render the whole movement discordant. <τοῦτο οὖν ἐστι ἡ ἔμπροσθεν ἕξις· οὐ γὰρ> This, then, is the former state; for not being able to be controlled by the forms, it shows itself to be disordered and unbeautiful. --- 35 ---That it is not from the

κακόν· ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον· οὔτε γὰρ δύο τὰ πρῶτα· πόθεν γὰρ ὅλως, μονάδος οὐκ οὔσης; εἰ γὰρ ἑκάτερον τοῖν δυοῖν ἕν, δεῖ πρὸ ἀμφοῖν εἶναι τὸ ἕν, ᾧ ταῦτα ἓν ἄμφω, καὶ μίαν ἀρχήν. οὔτ' ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ κακόν· ὡς γὰρ τὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἴτιον μειζόνως ἀγαθόν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸ τοῦ κακοῦ γεννητικὸν μειζόνως ἂν εἴη κακόν· καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἔτι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ἕξει, τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ παράγον ἀρχήν. --- <ὥστε> τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἔσται κακὸν ὡς τοῦ κακοῦ αἴτιον, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἀγαθὸν ὡς ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρηγμένον. 32 Εἰ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἡ ὕλη πρὸς τὸ πᾶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἦν ὁ κόσμος ὁ πάμμεγας οὗτος καὶ εὐδαίμων θεός [Pl. Tim. 34 b 8] ὕλης ἀπούσης, πῶς ἔτι τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ φύσιν ἐπὶ ταύτην ἀνακτέον; ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ κακὸν καὶ ἄλλο τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ τὸ μέν ἐστι τοιοῦτον οὗ χωρὶς εἶναι ἀδύνατον, τὸ δὲ τοῦ εἶναι στέρησις. εἰ τοίνυν καὶ πρὸς τὴν δημιουργίαν τοῦ σύμ- παντος κόσμου τὴν ἑαυτῆς παρέχεται χρείαν καὶ παρῆκται πρώτως ὑποδοχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐσομένη καὶ οἷον τιθήνη [Pl. Tim. 49a 6] καὶ μήτηρ [ib. 50d 3, 51a 4], πῶς ἂν ἔτι λέγοιτο κακὸν καὶ τὸ πρώτως κακόν; εἰ δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀμετρίαν καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων πολλαχῶς λέγομεν-καὶ γὰρ ὡς μαχόμενα μέτρῳ καὶ <ὡς ἀπουσίαν> αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀφαίρεσιν καὶ ὡς ὑποκειμένην αὐτῷ καὶ ἐνδεᾶ μέτρου καὶ ὅρου-, ἡ δὲ ὕλη μάχεσθαι μὲν οὐ πέφυκεν οὐδὲ ποιεῖν ὅλως οὐδέν, ᾗτινι μηδὲ τὸ πάσχειν ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν δι' ἔλλειψιν τῆς τοῦ πάσχειν δυνάμεως, ἄρσις δὲ πάλιν οὐκ ἔστι μέτρου καὶ πέρατος ὅτι μὴ ἔστι στερήσει ταὐτόν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ στέρησις παρόντων ἐκείνων οὐκ ἔστιν, ἡ δὲ ὕλη καὶ ἐστὶ καὶ δέχεται τὴν αὐτῶν ἔμφασιν-ἀνάγκη δήπου τὸ ἄπειρον αὐτῆς καὶ ἄμετρον ἐνδεὲς εἶναι μέτρου καὶ πέρατος. τὸ δὲ ἐνδεὲς τούτων πῶς αὐτοῖς ἐναντίον εἴη; πῶς δὲ ἔτι κακὸν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δεό- μενον; φεύγει γὰρ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν τὸ κακόν, καὶ ὅλως ἅπαν τὸ ἐναντίον τὴν ἐναντίαν ἕξιν. εἰ δὲ ... καὶ κυΐσκει τὴν γένεσιν, καὶ- <ὥς φησιν αὐτός>-τρέφει, κακὸν δὲ οὐδὲν παρ' αὐτῆς μητρὸς οὔσης τοῖς ἐξ αὐτῆς, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ γεννωμένοις. 33 --- Καὶ γὰρ τί ἂν δράσειεν εἰς ἄλλα τὸ ποιεῖν μὴ δυνάμενον; πῶς δὲ αὖ τὸ ποιεῖν ἕξει τὸ ἄποιον καθ' ἑαυτό; πότερον δὲ ἄγει πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἡ ὕλη τὰς ψυχὰς ἢ παρ' ἑαυτῶν ἐκεῖναι ἄγονται <καὶ χωρισταὶ γίνονται> δυνάμει καὶ ἀδυναμίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτῶν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ παρ' ἑαυτῶν ἄγονται, τοῦτο ἦν αὐταῖς τὸ κακόν, ἡ πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ὁρμὴ καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἡ ὕλη· παντὶ γὰρ ἡ φυγὴ τοῦ κρείττονος κακόν, καὶ πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἡ πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον· καὶ δι' ἀσθένειαν πάσχουσιν ἃ πάσχειν τὰς τοιαύτας δεῖ κακῶς ἑλομένας. εἰ δὲ παρὰ τῆς ὕλης ἄγονται, ποῦ τὸ αὐτοκίνητόν ἐστι καὶ αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς αἱρέσεις; --- εἰ πάσας ἄγει πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἡ ὕλη καὶ ἐνοχλεῖ καὶ βιάζεται--- 34 ---Ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ Τιμαίῳ μητέρα [51a 4] καὶ τιθήνην αὐτὴν τῆς γενέσεως [52d 4-5] καλῶν καὶ συναιτίαν [46c 7] τῆς τοῦ κόσμου δημιουργίας--- ἐν δὲ τοῖς τοῦ Ἐλεάτου ξένου λόγοις αἰτίαν τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ἀταξίας <εἰς ὑποκειμένην φύσιν ἀνίησι, παρὰ μὲν τοῦ συνθέντος πάντα καλὰ κεκτῆσθαι τὸν κόσμον λέγων, παρὰ δὲ τῆς ἔμπροσθεν ἕξεως τὰ ἐναντία τούτων ἐν αὐτῷ γένεσιν ἔχειν [Pl. pol. 273bc]>. ἐν δὲ τῷ Φι- λήβῳ καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ὕλην καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσιν ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς παράγων καὶ ὅλως πρὸ τῆς τοῦ πέρατος καὶ ἀπείρου διαστάσεως τὴν θείαν αἰτίαν <τιθείς>, ἔνθεον αὐτὴν καὶ ἀγαθὸν διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ μετάληψιν καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ γένεσιν εἶναι συγχωρεῖ καὶ οὐδαμῶς κακόν. τῶν κακῶν ἄλλ' ἄττα <φησὶ> χρῆναι ζητεῖν τὰ αἴτια, καὶ οὐ θεόν, <ὡς ἐν ἄλλοις [resp. II 379c 6-7] εἴρηται>. οὐκοῦν ἡ ἀταξία καὶ τὸ κακὸν οὐ διὰ τὴν ὕλην, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως κινούμενον [Pl. Tim. 30a 4-5]· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ σωμα- τοειδές, <ὅ φησιν ὁ Ἐλεάτης ξένος> τῆς ἀταξίας αἴτιον [Pl. pol. 273b 4] ... καὶ οὐχὶ τὴν ὕλην εἶναι δυναμένην, ---τῆς ὕλης ἀκινήτου οὔσης καθ' ἑαυτήν. --- τὰ γὰρ ἴχνη τῶν διαφόρων εἰδῶν ἐπ' ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ἄγοντα φοράν, πλημμελῆ τὴν ὅλην ἀποφαίνει κίνησιν. <τοῦτο οὖν ἐστι ἡ ἔμπροσθεν ἕξις· οὐ γὰρ> δυναμένη κρατεῖσθαι τοῖς εἴδεσιν, ἀκόσμητον ἑαυτὴν δείκνυσι καὶ ἀκαλλῆ. --- 35 ---Ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἐκ τῆς