Chapter II.—The Christian Has Sure and Simple Knowledge Concerning the Subject Before Us.
Chapter III.—The Soul’s Origin Defined Out of the Simple Words of Scripture.
Chapter IV.—In Opposition to Plato, the Soul Was Created and Originated at Birth.
Chapter V.—Probable View of the Stoics, that the Soul Has a Corporeal Nature.
Chapter VII.—The Soul’s Corporeality Demonstrated Out of the Gospels.
Chapter VIII.—Other Platonist Arguments Considered.
Chapter IX.—Particulars of the Alleged Communication to a Montanist Sister.
Chapter X.—The Simple Nature of the Soul is Asserted with Plato. The Identity of Spirit and Soul.
Chapter XII.—Difference Between the Mind and the Soul, and the Relation Between Them.
Chapter XIII.—The Soul’s Supremacy.
Chapter XV.—The Soul’s Vitality and Intelligence. Its Character and Seat in Man.
Chapter XVI.—The Soul’s Parts. Elements of the Rational Soul.
Chapter XVII.—The Fidelity of the Senses, Impugned by Plato, Vindicated by Christ Himself.
Chapter XVIII.—Plato Suggested Certain Errors to the Gnostics. Functions of the Soul.
Chapter XXI.—As Free-Will Actuates an Individual So May His Character Change.
Chapter XXII.—Recapitulation. Definition of the Soul.
Chapter XXIII.—The Opinions of Sundry Heretics Which Originate Ultimately with Plato.
Chapter XXVI.—Scripture Alone Offers Clear Knowledge on the Questions We Have Been Controverting.
Chapter XXVII.—Soul and Body Conceived, Formed and Perfected in Element Simultaneously.
Chapter XXVIII.—The Pythagorean Doctrine of Transmigration Sketched and Censured.
Chapter XXX.—Further Refutation of the Pythagorean Theory. The State of Contemporary Civilisation.
Chapter XXXI.—Further Exposure of Transmigration, Its Inextricable Embarrassment.
Chapter XXXIII.—The Judicial Retribution of These Migrations Refuted with Raillery.
Chapter XXXVI.—The Main Points of Our Author’s Subject. On the Sexes of the Human Race.
Chapter XXXIX.—The Evil Spirit Has Marred the Purity of the Soul from the Very Birth.
Chapter XL.—The Body of Man Only Ancillary to the Soul in the Commission of Evil.
Chapter XLII.—Sleep, the Mirror of Death, as Introductory to the Consideration of Death.
Chapter XLV.—Dreams, an Incidental Effect of the Soul’s Activity. Ecstasy.
Chapter XLVIII.—Causes and Circumstances of Dreams. What Best Contributes to Efficient Dreaming.
Chapter XLIX.—No Soul Naturally Exempt from Dreams.
Chapter LI.—Death Entirely Separates the Soul from the Body.
Chapter LVII.—Magic and Sorcery Only Apparent in Their Effects. God Alone Can Raise the Dead.
Chapter IV.—In Opposition to Plato, the Soul Was Created and Originated at Birth.
After settling the origin of the soul, its condition or state comes up next. For when we acknowledge that the soul originates in the breath of God, it follows that we attribute a beginning to it. This Plato, indeed, refuses to assign to it, for he will have the soul to be unborn and unmade.34 See his Phædrus, c. xxiv. We, however, from the very fact of its having had a beginning, as well as from the nature thereof, teach that it had both birth and creation. And when we ascribe both birth and creation to it, we have made no mistake: for being born, indeed, is one thing, and being made is another,—the former being the term which is best suited to living beings. When distinctions, however, have places and times of their own, they occasionally possess also reciprocity of application among themselves. Thus, the being made admits of being taken in the sense of being brought forth;35 Capit itaque et facturam provenisse poni. inasmuch as everything which receives being or existence, in any way whatever, is in fact generated. For the maker may really be called the parent of the thing that is made: in this sense Plato also uses the phraseology. So far, therefore, as concerns our belief in the souls being made or born, the opinion of the philosopher is overthrown by the authority of prophecy36 Or, “inspiration.” even.
CAPUT IV.
0652B Post definitionem census, quaestionem status patitur. Consequens enim est, ut ex Dei flatu animam professi, initium ei deputemus . Hoc Plato excludit, innatam et infectam animam volens; et natam autem docemus, et factam, ex initii constitutione. Nec statim erravimus, utrumque dicentes; quia scilicet aliud sit natum, aliud factum; utpote illud animalibus competens. Differentiae autem, sua habendo loca et tempora, habent aliquando et passivitatis commercia. Capit itaque et facturam dici generari, pro in esse poni, siquidem omne quod quoquo modo accipit esse, generatur. Nam et factor ipse parens facti potest dici; sic et Plato utitur. Igitur quantum ad fidem nostram factae nataeve animae, depulsa est philosophi opinio auctoritate prophetiae 0652C quoque.