Lecture 3. Doctrine of Infallibility Morally Considered

ENOUGH perhaps was said in the last Lecture to show that, however the Church of Rome may profess a reverence for Antiquity, she does not really feel and pay it. There are in fact two elements in operation within her system. As far as it is Catholic and Scriptural, it appeals to the Fathers; as far as it is a corruption, it finds it necessary to supersede them. Viewed in its formal principles and authoritative statements, it professes to be the champion of past times; viewed as an active and political power, as a ruling, grasping, ambitious principle, in a word, as what is expressively called Popery, it exalts the will and pleasure of the existing Church above all authority, whether of Scripture or Antiquity, interpreting the one and disposing of the other by its absolute and arbitrary decree [n. 1 ]. 2. We must take and deal with things as they are, not as they pretend to be. If we are induced to believe the professions of Rome, and make advances towards her as if a sister or a mother Church, which in theory she is, we shall find too late that we are in the arms of a pitiless and unnatural relative, who will but triumph in the arts which have inveigled us within her reach. No; dismissing the dreams which the romance of early Church history and the high doctrines of Catholicism will raise in the inexperienced mind, let us be sure that she is our enemy, and will do us a mischief when she can. In speaking and acting on this conviction, we need not depart from Christian charity towards her. We must deal with her as we would towards a friend who is not himself; in great affliction, with all affectionate tender thoughts, with tearful regret and a broken heart, but still with a steady eye and a firm hand [n. 2 ]. And in saying this, I must not be supposed to deny that there is any real excellence in the religion of Rome even as it is, or that any really excellent men are its adherents. Satan ever acts on a system; various, manifold, and intricate, with parts and instruments of different qualities, some almost purely evil, others so unexceptionable, that in themselves and detached from the end to which all is subservient, they are really "Angels of light," and may be found so to be at the last day. In Romanism there are some things absolutely good, some things only just tainted and sullied, some things corrupted, and some things in themselves sinful; but the system itself so called must be viewed as a whole, and all parts of it as belonging to the whole, and in connexion with their practical working and the end which they subserve. Viewed thus as a practical system, its main tenet, which gives a colour to all its parts, is the Church's infallibility, as on the other hand, the principle of that genuine theology out of which it has arisen, is the authority of Catholic Antiquity [n. 3 ]. In this and the following Lecture, I shall observe upon some of the characteristics of this main error, as we may consider it; viewing it first morally, and then what may be called politically. And the points to which I wish to direct attention, as involved in the doctrine of Infallibility, are such as the following: that Romanism considers unclouded certainty necessary for a Christian's faith and hope [n. 4 ], and doubt incompatible with practical abidance in the truth; that it aims at forming a complete and consistent theology, and in forming it, neglects authority, and rests upon abstract arguments and antecedent grounds: and that it substitutes a technical and formal obedience for the spirit of love. I notice these peculiarities in order to draw intelligible lines of demarcation between members of the Roman Church and ourselves; and first will treat of them in a moral point of view. 3. The doctrine of the Church's Infallibility is made to rest upon the notion, that any degree of doubt about religious truth is incompatible with faith, and that an external infallible assurance is necessary to exclude doubt. "Proof," [n. 5 ] or certainty of the things believed, is secured upon two conditions; if there be a God, "who cannot lie," as the source of Revelation, and if the Church be infallible to convey it. Otherwise, it is urged, what is called faith is merely opinion, as being but partial or probable knowledge. To this statement it is sufficient to reply here, that according to English principles, religious faith has all it needs in having only the former of these two secured to it, in knowing that God is our Creator and Preserver, and that He may, if it so happen, have spoken [n. 6 ]. This indeed is its trial and its praise, so to hang upon the thought of Him and desire Him as not to wait till it knows for certain from infallible informants [n. 7 ] whether or no He has spoken, but to act in the way which seems on the whole most likely to please Him. If we are asked, how Faith differs from Opinion, we reply, in its considering His being, governance, and will as a matter of personal interest and importance to us, not in the degree of light or darkness under which it perceives the truth concerning them. When we are not personally concerned, even the highest evidence does not move us; when we are concerned, the very slightest is enough. Though we knew for certain that the planet Jupiter were in flames, we should go on as usual; whereas even the confused cry of fire at night rouses us from our beds. Action is the criterion of true faith [n. 8 ], as determining accurately whether we connect the thought of God with the thought of ourselves, whether we love Him, or regard Him otherwise than we regard the existence of the solar system. And as well might we say, that the man who acts upon a letter from a friend does not believe his friend, because he is not infallibly sure the letter is not forged [n. 9 ], as deny that such men have real faith as hear the Church and obey, though they have no assurance that in reporting God's words, she cannot err. Nay, doubt in some way or measure may even be said to be implied in a Christian's faith. Not that infallible certainty would take away all trial of our hearts, and force us to obey, nor again as if nothing were clearly told us by Revelation, for much is; but that the greater the uncertainty [n. 10 ], the fuller exercise there is of our earnestness in seeking the truth, and of our moral sagacity in tracing and finding it. As reasonably then might fear, despondency, dulness of mind, or heaviness of spirit be judged inconsistent with faith as doubt [n. 11 ]. Imperfection of every kind, moral and natural, is a trial or temptation, and is met by striving and acting against it. Scripture is full of instances in point as regards Faith. It has been remarked, that our Saviour scarcely once or twice declared to inquirers that He was the Christ; though their impatience on many occasions showed how hard they felt it to flesh and blood to act without an infallible assurance. He left them to gather the great truth for themselves how they could, with whatever degree of certainty, sometimes referring them to His miracles, sometimes to the types or prophecies of the Law, sometimes to His forerunner the Baptist, sometimes urging them to make trial of the truth in practice and so to find it. When St. Thomas doubted of His resurrection, far from justifying his demand for an infallible witness [n. 12 ], He declared that He was but diminishing his blessedness by giving him a higher evidence of the miracle than he had already received. On one occasion, indeed, He did publicly declare Himself to be the Christ, but, as we shall find, it was not in love but in wrath. It was in answer to the adjuration of the High Priest, whom He forthwith by implication consigned to the destiny of those miserable beings, who should "see Him whom they had pierced," [n. 13 ] believe and tremble. And, as is His conduct during His ministry, such is the uniform doctrine of the whole of Scripture, summed up, as it is, in the expressive words of the Prophet, "Who is among you that feareth the Lord, who heareth the voice of His servant, who walketh in darkness and hath no light? Let him hope in the name of the Lord, and stay upon his God." [Isaiah i. 10.] This is only parallel to what we see in the course of nature; the proofs of the being of a God are not written on the sun and sky, nor the precepts of morality spoken from a Urim and Thummim. To require such definite and clear notices of truth [n. 14 ], is to hanker after the Jewish Law, a system of less mysterious information than Christianity, as well as less generous faith. 4. This leads me to notice an important peculiarity of the Roman system, to which such a temper gives rise. According to its theory, the Church professes to know only what the Apostles knew, to have received just what they delivered, neither more nor less. But in fact, she is obliged to profess a complete knowledge of the whole Dispensation, such as the Apostles had not. Unless we know the whole of any subject we must have difficulties somewhere or other; and where they are left, there we cannot possess infallible knowledge. To know some things in any subject infallibly, implies that we know all things [n. 15 ]. Or, to put the matter more clearly, where there is knowledge of only portions of a system, one of those portions will be more plain and certain to us than another, and can be spoken of more confidently; thus the clearness of our view will vary with those portions, but there are no degrees [n. 16 ] in Infallibility. Now partial and incomplete knowledge must surely be an inseparable attendant on a theology which reveals the wonders of heaven. The human mind cannot measure the things of the Spirit. Christianity is a supernatural gift, originating and living in the unseen world and only extending into this. It is a vast scheme running out into width and breadth, encompassing us round about, not embraced by us. No one can see the form of a building but those who are external to it. We are within the Divine Dispensation; we cannot take it in with the eye, ascertain its proportions, pursue its lines, foretell their directions and coincidences, or ascertain their limits. We see enough for practice, but not even as much as this with an equal degree of clearness; but one part more clearly than another. These detached portions of a complicated system necessarily vary in the precision and definiteness with which they come to the mind [n. 17 ]. That which is set before it in many of its relations is more fully understood and grasped than that which is only just revealed. When the mind knows a certain part of a system, it cannot ascertain the limits of its knowledge; as the eye when fixed on any object cannot determine how much it indirectly sees all around it. Surely the Apostles themselves, though infallibly sure of the greater truths, could not determine the limits of their infallibility [n. 18 ]. To know the lesser truths as they knew the main ones, had been to open a fresh field of knowledge beyond, in the way of deduction and implication. It would have been like moving the eye to a new object, which brings it into a new range of vision. Thus, I say, to know all that is revealed with equal clearness, implies that there is nothing not revealed. Agreeably with this anticipation, the Church of Rome is in fact led on to profess to know not only infallibly but completely [n. 19 ]. She begins by claiming the power of infallibly determining throughout the range of the Apostles' knowledge, of accurate delineation in all such lesser matters as they would not be able to realize to themselves as certain, of rendering equally vivid all those marvellous traces of things invisible, which in the first inspired teachers would gradually melt from distinctness in their outlines into dim distance or into minute intricacy of detail. And, in consequence, she is led on from the profession of uniform precision to that of universal knowledge. 5. This, then, is a second and not the least observable peculiarity of Roman theology. It professes to be a complete theology [n. 20 ]. It arranges, adjusts, explains, exhausts every part of the Divine Economy. It may be said to leave no region unexplored, no heights unattempted, rounding off its doctrines with a neatness and finish which are destructive of many of the most noble and most salutary exercises of mind in the individual Christian. That feeling of awe which the mysteriousness of the Gospel should excite, fades away under this fictitious illumination which is poured over the entire Dispensation. Criticism, we know, is commonly considered fatal to poetical fervour and imagination; and in like manner this technical religion destroys the delicacy and reverence of the Christian mind. So little has actually been revealed to us in a systematic way, that the genuine science of theology carried to its furthest limits, has no tendency to foster a spirit of rationalism. But Rome would classify and number all things, she would settle every sort of question, as if resolved to detect and compass by human reason what runs out into the next world or is lost in this. Revelation so melts into Providence that we cannot draw the line between them. Miraculous events shade off into natural coincidences, visions into dreams, types into resemblances; Inspiration has before now spoken among Idolaters and Pagans; the Church itself gradually fades away into the world. Whatever subject in religion we examine accurately, we shall find full of difficulties [n. 21 ]. Whether miracles have ceased, and, if so, at what date? how long Catholic doctrine was preserved from human additions? how far Gospel privileges are extended to separatists? how much must be believed by individuals in order to salvation? what is the state of unbaptized Infants? what amount of temporal punishment must be set against the sins of accepted Christians? what sort of change takes place in the consecration of the Eucharist? all these are questions which man cannot determine, yet such as these Romanists [n. 22 ] delight to handle. Not content with what is revealed, they are ever intruding into things not seen as yet, and growing familiar with mysteries; gazing upon the ark of God over boldly and long, till they venture to put out the hand and touch it. But, not to dwell upon this part of the subject, which is painful, it is sufficiently evident what an opening is given by a theology of so ambitious a character to pride and self-confidence. It has been said that knowledge is power; and at least it creates in us the imagination of possessing it. This is what makes scientific and physical researches so intoxicating: it is the feeling they inspire of perfect acquaintance with the constitution of nature. He who considers himself fully to understand a system, seems to have sway over it. Astronomers can predict the motions of the heavenly bodies, with an accuracy which in their own fancy places them above them. Now religion is the great chastiser of human pride; nor would I say, that however perverted, it ever can cease to be so; yet it is plain that when thus turned into an intellectual science, even polytheism answers such a moral purpose better than it [n. 23 ]. I have been speaking in general language; it will tend to explain my meaning to take an instance of this bold speculativeness in Roman theology to the loss of more reverent, wondering, and expectant thoughts. With this view, let us consider their doctrine of Satisfaction; which I will describe as briefly as the intricate nature of the subject will allow: 6. No questions in religion are more painfully interesting to the awakened mind than those relating to the forgiveness of its sins. Revelation has cleared away some of the main obscurities of the subject, but has left others. It asserts the doctrine of everlasting punishment to the finally impenitent, and it proclaims pardon and salvation to all who repent, believe, and obey. Further it declares that the death of Christ upon the Cross has put away the wrath of God from us, and reconciled Him to us: that this precious Atonement is applied to every individual on his Baptism, and that it is realized in his soul and body in a peculiar way in the Holy Eucharist; lastly, that its virtue flows in various indirect and indefinite ways by means of the ministrations of the Church, to whom these sacraments are also entrusted. But this is nearly all that is told us. We do not know how the death of Christ operates for our salvation; we do not know why it was required, or what is its full design and effect. We do not know what it does for the Angels, or for the heathen; we do not know whether or how it influences the state of Infants dying unbaptized. Coming to questions more nearly interesting us, we do not know what will be the future destiny, whether of happiness or misery, of the mass of baptized persons, who certainly seem to live and die in an unchristian way. We do not know the measure of chastisement due for particular sins, or if there be any measure. We do not know how far sins committed after Baptism are forgiven, that is, what permanent disadvantages remain after forgiveness, what diminution of rewards otherwise attainable, or the like. We do not know what the effect of prior services may be, in those who sin deeply and afterwards repent, but without much subsequent fruit. We do not know how far the Eucharistic Rite avails to their pardon, or to whose pardon it avails, and under what circumstances. We do not know how and when the intercession of others operates towards our repentance and pardon. Nor can we cast the balance between the outward advantages and disadvantages of any one individual and his works or failings, or decide upon his state in God's sight. Nor do we know when it is that forgiveness is formally conveyed to individual Christians who have lapsed into sin, whether it is in this life, or upon death, or during the intermediate state, or at the day of judgment. All these are "secret things with the Lord our God," things not lightly to be spoken of, not dreams of our own, which, as not existing, have no answer, but such as have an answer one way or the other, though we do not know which way, and it is presumptuous to inquire. Now, while impatience of doubt leads the Protestant of this day to treat all such questions as inherently fanciful, creations of the mind, and not questions of fact, the same impatience leads the Romanist to answer them [n. 24 ]. 7. Their answers are of the following kind. They consider with us that Baptism is a plenary and absolute remission of all sin whatever, original and actual, with which the baptized person is laden. Then, as to sin committed after Baptism, they proceed to divide it into two kinds, venial and mortal. Mortal sins are such as throw the soul out of a state of grace, and deserve eternal punishment, such as murder, adultery, or blasphemy. Venial sins deserve a punishment short of eternal, a punishment that is, in time, or before the day of judgment. These are such either in kind or degree ; an idle word, excessive laughter differ in kind from perjury or adultery; but a sudden and passing anger is but in degree different from indulged and lasting wrath, which is mortal. For venial sins there is no normal means of absolution, or Sacrament dispensed by the Church; their punishment, whatever it is, but anyhow at most temporal only, remains to be endured, or to be averted by certain expedients, some of which shall presently be noticed [n. 25 ]. Mortal sin deserves, not a mere temporal retribution, though this it incurs also, but an eternal punishment; in other words, it incurs a punishment both before and after the day of judgment. Upon repentance the eternal punishment is forgiven, and that through the Sacrament of Penance, and then the temporal punishment alone remains, which that Sacrament does not reach. It seems then, that according to the Roman doctrine, a soul in a state of grace, though rescued from all eternal consequences of its sins, or from any hazard in the day of judgment, remains liable to a certain temporal punishment in two ways, for venial sins, and for mortal sins forgiven as to their eternal consequences. This distinction between the temporal and eternal consequences of sin, its advocates illustrate by the case of David, who though expressly forgiven his adultery and murder, so far as not to "die," yet had a heavy temporal chastisement put upon him in this life. And they consider there is a certain fixed correspondence between sins of whatever kind and the punishment of them: so that every Christian will have a definite quantity of punishment to undergo before the coming of Christ to judge the world and to take him to his eternal rest. The time of suffering this punishment, or of expiating his sins in their temporal respects, is the interval between their commission and the day of judgment; and, since each sin has its specific measure of suffering, if he does not exhaust that measure in this life, he must complete it in the intermediate state, and the more he sustains here the less he will have to sustain there. And, since this life is a state of grace, and suffering here is far less severe than suffering in the intermediate state ( i.e . in Purgatory), it is his interest, as far as may be, to expiate his sins here. Hence the utility of penances, either imposed by the Church or voluntary in the offender, with a view of satisfying the punishment due to his sins. Hence too the advantage of abounding in good works, which in the regenerate man, besides availing to eternal life, are considered to have an inherent efficacy in the expiation of sin. A like efficacy, but proceeding immediately from the great Atoning Sacrifice, is considered to lie in the Eucharistic Offering [n. 26 ]. 8. Even this is not the limit to which they carry their systematic account of the pardon of sin. After all appliances, whether by penances, good work, or the Sacrifice of the Altar, it is considered that the multitude of Christians leave this life with a considerable debt of temporal punishment standing against them, and are certainly destined to suffer in Purgatory. On the other hand it is considered that certain great Saints leave this world with an overplus of temporal suffering, whatever their sins may have been. Men like Jeremiah or John the Baptist, sanctified as they were from their mother's womb, singularly holy and fruitful in works, and uniformly suffering until their martyrdom, have more than satisfied divine justice for such venial offences as have overtaken them, and render up to God together with their obedience a store of sufferings which have, as far as they are concerned, answered no purpose. Considering then the virtue and properties of that mysterious Communion which exists between all Christians, that they all are but one body, and have all things common, it is concluded that what is done or suffered over and above by the Saints, may be put to the score of the souls in Purgatory; and that the Church represented in her ministers and especially in the Pope, is the agent in this sacred interchange. To the Pope, then, is committed the key of this treasure-house of the merits of the Saints, together with those of our Lord Jesus Christ; and he dispenses it according to his discretion. This benefit is called an Indulgence, which is an application of the merits of the Saints in lieu of a certain penance in this life or of an equivalent suffering in Purgatory [n. 27 ]. Such is the bold exactness of Roman teaching in determining theological points, and this in consequence of its claim of Infallibility, which obliges it to be positive and complete in its statements on any question, so soon as it is led to entertain it at all. 9. Another and distinct evil, and of a very serious character, which follows from the doctrine of Infallibility, is of the following kind. The practice of systematizing [n. 28 ] necessarily leads to a decision concerning the relative importance of doctrines. Every system has its principal and its secondary parts, and views one part in connexion with another, as bearing together with more or less influence upon the whole, or upon some main portion which it considers essential and supreme. Of course religion has its greater and its lesser truths; but it is one thing to receive them so far as Scripture declares them to be so, quite another to decide about them for ourselves by the help of our own reasonings. However, it is not wonderful that Rome should claim authority over the work of its own hands; it has framed the system and it proceeds to judge of it. But this is not all. They who are resolved that the Divine counsels and appointments should be cognizable by the human intellect, are naturally tempted to assign some visible and intelligible object as the scope of the whole Dispensation; or, in other words, they make in some shape or other, present expediency the measure of its excellence and wisdom. I do not say they are forced, but they are easily betrayed into doing this. They ask what is the use of this doctrine, what the actual harm of that error; as if the experience of results were necessary before condemning the one and sanctioning the other. This, as is obvious, is strikingly instanced in the religion popular among us at the present day, in which only so much of the high doctrines of the Gospel is admitted, as is seen and felt to tend to our moral improvement. According to it, the most striking and persuasive proof of the divine origin of Christianity, lies in the harmonious adjustment and correspondence, and the evident meaning of its parts. One of the ablest defenders of this view, at the close of a popular Essay, even ventures to speak as follows: "It has been my object," he says, "to draw the attention of the reader to the internal structure of the religion of the Bible, first, because I am convinced that no man in the unfettered exercise of his understanding can fully and cordially acquiesce in its pretensions to divine inspiration, until he sees in its substance that which accords both with the character of God and with the wants of man; and secondly, because any admission of its divine original, if unaccompanied with a knowledge of its principles, is absolutely useless." [n. 29 ] Here, unless I am unjust to the writer, it is plainly asserted that the understanding has a right to claim an insight into the meaning and drift of the matter of Revelation; nay, that faith is not available unless accompanied by this knowledge; principles surely which would have justified Abraham when called from his native country, to have refused to go, till he was told whither he was journeying. Yet such principles are now in repute; and much is popularly said about the beauty of the Christian system, the unity of its aim, the simplicity of its contrivance for the conversion of the soul, and the manifestation of the Divine Character contained in it, with little reverence towards things sacred, and great risk of injury to faith. Such is the main subject of the treatise to which I have referred, and the same views are repeated again and again in the sermons [n. 30 ] of a well-known Divine of the Scotch Establishment, who is ever to be mentioned with respect and sympathy. 10. Such is the popular Protestantism of the day. Now one might have hoped that the religion of Rome would have been clear of the fault into which the rival system has been betrayed. One might have trusted beforehand to its very propensity to insist on the mysteries of heaven, as at least a guarantee that no one end, and still less a visible end, would be proposed by its controversialists as a measure of gospel excellence and truth. Yet, strange to say, as if to show the agreement of temper and character between the one and the other creed as actually held and applied, we find one of the latest advocates of Rome claiming the privilege of criticizing and applauding the Gospel as a system . He observes that there is something in Roman teaching "beautifully contrasted to the eye of the philosopher, with the manifest imperfections of" what he calls the Protestant "system. There is a natural and obvious beauty in the simplicity of this basis, which at once gives stability and unity to conviction." In another place he observes, "the end of every rule and law, and consequently of every rule of Faith," is "to bring men into a unity of principle and action;" that "the rule proposed by others is proved by experience to lead to exactly opposite results; in other words, that it removes men farther from that union towards which it must be intended to bring them, for it leads them to the most contradictory opinions, professing to be supported and proved by precisely the same principle of Faith;" whereas "the principle" of the Roman system is "fully equal to those objects for which the rule was given." [n. 31 ] Now, I am far from denying there is soundness and truth in the argument, as used both by the Roman and the Scotch Divine; the process is sound when used under limitations, the conclusion is true in its degree. But both the one party and the other evidently put forth their respective views as convincing and decisive proofs, as independent and substantive evidences; and that they are not such, is shown, if in no other way, at least in this, that they are adduced by their respective advocates in order to prove contradictories. Now what leads to opposite conclusions is no real test of truth. However, we are here concerned merely with the fact of this peculiarity in the religion of Rome, which it has in common with some other modern systems, its subjecting divine truth to the intellect, and professing to take a complete survey and to make a map of it. 11. One more remark shall be made, though, as it is often urged in controversy, a few words on the subject will suffice. Roman teaching by its profession of Infallibility, lowers the standard and quality of Gospel obedience as well as impairs its mysterious and sacred character; and this in various ways. When religion is reduced in all its parts to a system, there is hazard of something earthly being made the chief object of our contemplation instead of our Maker. Now Rome classifies our duties and their rewards, the things to believe, the things to do, the modes of pleasing God, the penalties and the remedies of sin, with such exactness, that an individual knows (so to speak) just where he is upon his journey heavenward, how far he has got, how much he has to pass; and his duties become a matter of calculation. It provides us with a sort of graduated scale of devotion and obedience, and, so far, tends to engross our thoughts with the details of a mere system, to a comparative forgetfulness of its professed Author [n. 32 ]. But it is evident that the purest religious services are those which are done, not by constraint, but voluntarily, as a free offering to Almighty God. There are certain duties which are indispensable in all Christians, but their limits are left undefined, as if to try our faith and love. For instance, what portion of our worldly substance we should devote to charitable uses, or in what way we are to fast, or how we are to dress, or whether we should remain single, or what revenge we should take upon our sins, or what amusements are allowable, or how far we may go into society; these and similar questions are left open by Inspiration. Some of them are determined by the Church, and suitably, with a view to public decency and order, or by way of recommendation and sanction to her members. A command from authority to a certain point acts as a protection to our modesty, though beyond this it would but act as a burden. For instance, at this very time, when the practice of fasting has become so unpopular, in spite of the Church's rule, it would be a great comfort to individuals who wish to observe it, yet dread singularity in so doing, did the custom exist, as I believe it did once, of pastoral letters at the beginning of Lent, enforcing it from authority. But in most matters of the kind, certainly when questions of degree are concerned, the best rule seems to be to leave individuals free, lest what otherwise would be a spontaneous service in the more zealous, should become a compulsory imposition upon all. This is the true Christian liberty, not the prerogative of obeying God, or not, as we please, but the opportunity of obeying Him more strictly without formal commandment. In this way, too, not only is our love tried, but the delicacy and generous simplicity of our obedience consulted also. Christ loves an open-hearted service, done without our contemplating or measuring what we do, from the fulness of affection and reverence, while the mind is fixed on its Great Object without thought of itself. Now express commands lead us to reflect upon and estimate our advances towards perfection, whereas true faith will mainly contemplate its deficiencies, not its poor attainments, whatever they be. It does not like to realize to itself what it does; it throws off the thought of it; it is carried on and reaches forward towards perfection, not counting the steps it has ascended, but keeping the end steadily in its eye, knowing only that it is advancing, and glorying in each sacrifice or service which it is allowed to offer, as it occurs, not remembering it afterwards. But in the Roman system there would seem to be little room for this unconscious devotion. Each deed has it price, every quarter of the land of promise is laid down and described. Roads are carefully marked out, and such as would attain to perfection are constrained to move in certain lines, as if there were a science of gaining heaven. Thus the Saints are cut off from the Christian multitude by certain fixed duties, not rising out of it by the continuous growth and flowing forth of services which in their substance pertain to all men. And Christian holiness, in consequence, loses its freshness, vigour, and comeliness, being frozen (as it were) into certain attitudes, which are not graceful except when they are unstudied [n. 33 ]. 12. The injury resulting to the multitude from the same circumstance, is of a different but not less serious nature. While, of those who aim at the more perfect obedience, some may be made self-satisfied and more are made formal, the mass of Christians are either discouraged from attempting or countenanced in neglecting it. It requires very little knowledge of human nature, to perceive how readily a doctrine will be embraced and followed which sanctions a secondary standard of holiness, or which allows the performance of certain duties to make up for the disregard of others. If, indeed, there is one characteristic which above others attaches to Roman teaching, it is this, its indulging the carnal tastes of the multitude of men [n. 34 ], setting a limit to their necessary obedience, and absolving them from the duty of sacrificing their whole lives to God. And this serious deceit is in no small degree the necessary consequence of that completeness and minuteness in its theology to which the doctrine of Infallibility gives rise. 13. The foregoing remarks are not intended as any sufficient discussion of the subject under consideration, but are made with a view of discriminating between the Roman creed and our own. In the former Lectures it was observed that the abstract and professed principles of both systems were often the same, but that in practice, the question of the Church's Infallibility created a wide and serious difference between them. We now see, in a measure, in what this difference consists, viz. in the Roman Church having adopted a minute, technical, and peremptory [n. 35 ] theology, which is no part of Revelation, and which produces a number of serious moral evils, which is shallow in philosophy, as professing to exclude doubt and imperfection, and dangerous to the Christian spirit, as encouraging us to ask for more than is given us, as fostering irreverence and presumption, confidence in our reason, and a formal or carnal view of Christian obedience. What further evils arise from the political character of these same peculiarities, shall be reserved for a separate Lecture.Notes 1. [Vid. supr . the Preface, § 2. which professes to meet this charge.]2. [This passage, a portion of which is now relegated to the end of Volume II. is illustrated by the following extract from my Apologia: "As a boy of fifteen I had so fully imbibed [the spirit of Protestantism] that I had actually erased in my Gradus ad Parnassum such titles, under the word 'Pope,' as 'Christi-Vicarius,' and substituted epithets so vile that I cannot bring myself to write them down here. The effect of this early persuasion remained as a stain upon my imagination." Vid. supr . p. 43, note.]3. [Here it is said that the claim to infallibility is the bane of the Church; yet in Lecture viii. infallibility in teaching is claimed for her by the author: "her witness of the Christian Faith is a matter of promise as well as of duty; her discernment of it is secured by a heavenly as well as by a human rule ... She not only transmits the faith by human means, but has a supernatural gift for that purpose." ... In Scripture she "is declared to be the great and special support of the Truth, her various functionaries to be means towards the settlement of diversities and uncertainty of doctrine and securing unity of faith and ... the Spirit of Almighty God is expressly pledged to her for the maintenance of the One Faith from generation to generation even to the end." How can a divine gift be a "main" error? Let it be observed that the various evils which form the matter of the Lecture are made to arise out of infallibility as such, not as professed without good grounds and as counterfeit.]4. [If by "unclouded" is meant the absence of all involuntary misgivings, or a sense of imperfection or incompleteness in the argumentative grounds of religion, a certitude so circumstanced is not (according to Catholic teaching) "necessary for a Christian's faith and hope." Nor can real "doubt" be anything short of a deliberate withholding of assent to the Church's teaching.]5. Heb. xi. 1. Bellarm. de Gratiâ, vi. 3.6. [Is it possible that the author here says that faith in Revelation is nothing beyond the thought, "Perhaps after all God may have spoken," "the doctrine of the Holy Trinity perhaps may be, if it so be"? Who would call this an act of faith? Was such Abraham's faith, our father, as described in Rom. iv., "non infirmatus est in fide," "non hæsitavit diffidentiâ"?]7. [At least we have an "infallible informant" in Scripture. St. Paul first distinctly declares that it is "inspired of God," and then that it is " profitable ." How then can the gift, or the teaching, or the belief of infallibility have a bad moral effect? Again, not writings only, the Apostles were infallible.]8. [Not of true faith, but of true earnestness, of love and fear of God. No one would say we believed our house was on fire, because we thought it safest, on a cry of fire, to act as if it was.]9. [This is an altogether different case. I don't believe the cry of fire; I do believe my friend's letter. Here there is a confusion between dimness in faith and a sense of dimness in the evidence on which it is grounded. Evidence is always incomplete, but sometimes it is sufficient for real certitude (as regards my friend), sometimes only for what is called practical certitude, i.e. for what is prudent in action, (as regards the cry of fire.)]10. [I.e. uncertainty of evidence ; if the evidence is not sufficient, then it serves to tax our earnestness in seeking for more.]11. [Faith may follow after doubt, and so far is not inconsistent with it; but the two cannot co-exist.]12. [Infallible witness, that is, infallible evidence . There is always in concrete matters incompleteness in the evidence of a fact, even when there is enough for faith. St. Thomas, had he been captious, might have raised the question, as unbelievers do now, whether our Lord was not taken down from the cross alive. He had not seen Him dead.]13. Cf. Matt. xxvi. 64. with Rev. i. 7.14. [Here is still the same confusion between the incomplete notices of truth, i.e. evidence, and that "generous faith," which, though it might captiously demand more evidence, is contented with what it ought to feel to be enough. Vid. Grammar of Assent, ch. 6 and 9.]15. [Neither the reasoning nor the facts here laid down can be admitted. The Church does not profess to "know the whole dispensation;" such a charge ought to be proved, and not merely asserted. Nor is it axiomatic, just the contrary, that to be infallible in what is revealed, implies a profession of knowing what to the Apostles was not revealed.]16. [No degrees; certain portions are known absolutely, and what remains besides them is more or less probable.]17. [All this is true, but not to the purpose. Where the Church speaks, there is knowledge; where not as yet, there is opinion, and it is opinion that varies.]18. [They knew the limits, for they knew the field, viz. faith and morals; but they would not know the answers to particular questions in that field, till they actually turned their minds to the consideration of each, as it arose.]19. [This is not the case, as is shown by the various conflicting opinions in the schools.]20. [Here is a confusion between the Church and her Schools. Her infallible voice is seldom exercised, and comparatively few dogmas have been promulgated to be accepted de fide . But the subtle and curious intellect of her theologians has investigated and determined innumerable questions, not with infallible accuracy, but each in his own way, and often in opposition to each other, still with incalculable advantage to religion. The result has been a wide knowledge of Revelation and a large freedom of thought, a flood of illustration on existing dogmas, and a store of material which, as human means, are at the service of the Infallible Church, when she is called upon to decide a controversy and to formulate some new definition of faith.]21. [Good, but irrelevant as against Rome.]22. [That is, schoolmen and theologians; not the Catholic populations, whose moral state is simply untouched for good or bad by the Latin treatises which are here supposed to have so deleterious an effect upon them.]23. [It is true of course that polytheism has more of religion in it than the mere exercise of intellect resulting in scientific knowledge; and of course it is possible for a theologian to be indevout and self-trusting; but possibilities are not facts, and it is fair to ask for evidence of the fact, before so serious a charge as this is urged against the Catholic Church.]24. [Hardly any one of these points is determined in Catholic doctrine any more than in Protestant.]25. [Of these various points of doctrine, those which have been made de fide in Catholic teaching, as being determined by the Church's infallibility, are also to be met with and are taught as revealed truths in those writings of the Fathers, which Anglicans call "Antiquity." So they do not serve as specimens of the "bold speculativeness of Romanism."]26. [As I have said, Antiquity, in these respects, is as bold and minute as Catholicity can be said to be. St. Augustine and other Fathers recognize the distinction between mortal and venial sins; determine that mortal sins merit an eternal punishment; that souls are kept in prison till their lesser sins are purged away; that prayers, e.g. the Lord's Prayer, satisfy for light and daily, that is, venial sins; that post-baptismal falls are remitted through Penance, as a raft may save after shipwreck; that after such remission punishment remains due; that this punishment is averted by good works and bodily mortifications, and by the Eucharistic Sacrifice, which, by Apostolic tradition, is profitably offered for the dead.]27. [The main feature in modern Catholic teaching, as distinct from that of Antiquity, is the doctrine of the "Treasure of Merits," but the thing is in the Fathers, though not the phrase. This doctrine is founded on the article of the creed, the Communion of Saints, according to which the Christian body is like an expedition of pilgrims, helping each other with all their powers and in every way by temporal aid and spiritual, with prayers, good works, sufferings, as they go forward towards heaven, and that, up to the hour of death, when each shall stand by himself and "bear his own burden." Beginning with this great doctrine, we teach that the Church has the prerogative of effecting the remission, in whole or part in each case, of such punishments as are still due for venial sin or for forgiven mortal sin, not only by the Eucharistic Sacrifice, etc., but also by setting against them, or rather, pleading with God, that infinite treasure of merits which our Lord has wrought out, first in His own Person, next through the grace which He has given to His saints. I say, "next," for this treasure consists essentially of His own merits, not of His Saints'; and includes theirs, only as it includes also those of good men on earth. Moreover, its benefits cannot be given in any measure, great or small, except in regard of the punishment of past sins, already repented of and forgiven.]28. [What has infallibility to do with systematizing? Scripture is infallible, but it does not systematize; this volume's professed object ( vid. supr . p. 24) is to systematize, yet it does not call itself infallible.]29. Erskine's Internal Evidence.30. Dr. Chalmer's Sermons at the Tron Church.31. Dr. Wiseman's Lectures, vol. i. pp. 17, 76.32. [There is a certain truth in this remark, but a man must have a large knowledge of Catholics and of the effect of their system upon them, to assert with confidence what is here imagined of them.]33. [This is plausible, theoretical, and untrue.]34. [Vid. the Preface, § 2.]35. [It is quite as true to say that Scripture is not dogmatic, as to say, as is said here, that it is not technical and not peremptory; and, if a theology of the latter character is "no part of Revelation," neither is a theology of the former. How then is Anglican teaching more defensible than Roman, if we may argue after this fashion? This, on the admission that Scripture does not countenance minute and strict rules and ordinances; but in the sense in which they attach to Catholic teaching, they attach to St. Paul's. He had a certain number of "ways," which he "taught every where in every church;" and which he thought important enough to make it advisable to send Timothy to recall them to the minds of the Corinthians. And not for the Corinthians only were they advisable. He bids the Thessalonians to "stand fast and hold the traditions they had learned" from him "by word or letter." Does not this imply an Apostolic system of small observances?]