to God, when they say he arranged the plot against matter, because it desired the beautiful. With what that he had did God wish to punish matter? For I think to say that God is simple is more accurate than according to these men, and the explanation of this concept is not as easy as it is concerning other things; for it is not possible simply to demonstrate it by reason, but through much instruction and labor. But this at least we all know, that anger and the desire for punishment against matter are passions that arise in one so disposed; and these passions would not even arise in any virtuous person, much less in the Good itself.

11 The argument, then, comes round again to other points. For since they say that God sent down a power into matter, it is worth considering whether this power was diminished in goodness compared to God or was similar. For if it was diminished, what is the cause? For nothing with God partook of matter, but he introduces only one good, God, and one evil, matter. But if it was similar, for what reason did he, like some king, give orders, while it endured this involuntary labor? And concerning matter, it will also be questioned whether its powers are similar or lesser in evil. For if they are lesser, they are certainly lesser in evil; therefore, they would come to be so by participation in the good, for of two evils, the lesser one has certainly become so by partaking of the good. But they leave nothing good concerning matter. Then again, another difficulty: for if some other power surpasses the ruling matter in evil, this is more ruling, for the greater evil would rule the principle that belongs to it.

12 But the statement "God sent down a power upon matter" is said without any proof, and it is not at all plausible, but it too should receive its proper arguments. For they say the cause of this was that: "in order that there be nothing evil but all things good, it was necessary for the power to be mixed with matter, like athletes who in wrestling overcome their opponents, so that by overpowering evil it might cause it to cease to be." But I think it is much more solemn and worthy of the majesty of God to have annihilated matter altogether with a single thought of the beings. But I think they did not accept this because even now some evil exists, which they say is matter. But things can no more cease to be such, so that one might grant that some things do not change for the worse; but there ought to have been some perception of this, that these things were somehow moderately diminished, so that we might also have better hopes for the future. For it was well said in response to the argument of Zeno of Citium, who, saying "the universe will be consumed by fire," argued "everything that has something burning will burn the whole, and the sun is fire, and will it not burn what it has?" from which it was inferred, as he thought, that the universe would be consumed by fire; to whom one of the wittier men is said to have replied: "But I saw you yesterday and a year ago and a longer time ago, and I see you now likewise, having suffered nothing from the fire of the sun; but this ought to happen little by little over time, so that we might believe that the whole will one day be consumed by fire." And to the argument of Manichaeus—though spoken without any credibility—I think the same answer applies: "But these things have not been diminished at all, but they existed before, in the time of the first man who came to be, where a brother destroys a brother, and now there are still the same wars and more varied desires; but if they have not ceased, they ought at least to have been diminished, so that we might be confident that they will one day cease with time; but since they are the same from the beginning, what is the basis for faith in the future?"

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θεῷ, ὅταν φῶσιν αὐτὸν τὴν ἐπιβουλὴν κατὰ τῆς ὕλης συντάξαι, διότι δὴ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐπεθύμησεν. τίνι δὲ καὶ ὁ θεὸς ὧν εἶχεν ἐβουλήθη τὴν ὕλην τιμωρήσασθαι; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλοῦν φάναι τὸν θεὸν ἀκριβέστερον οἶμαι ἢ κατὰ τούτους ἐστίν, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐννοίας τούτου ἀφήγησις οὐχ ὡς περὶ τῶν ἄλλων εὔκολος· οὐδὲ γὰρ λόγῳ ἁπλῶς ἐνδείξασθαι αὐτὴν δυνατόν, διὰ δὲ πολλῆς παιδεύσεως καὶ πόνου. ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε πάντες ἴσμεν, ὅτι ἡ ὀργὴ καὶ ἡ τῆς τιμωρίας κατὰ τῆς ὕλης ὄρεξις πάθη ἐστὶν περὶ τὸν οὕτω διακείμενον συνιστάμενα· ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ περί τινα σπουδαῖον γένοιτο ἂν τὰ παθήματα, μή τί γε περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό.

11 Ἐφ' ἕτερα τοίνυν ἥκει πάλιν ὁ λόγος περιφε ρόμενος. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ δύναμιν τὸν θεὸν εἰς τὴν ὕλην καταπέμψαι φασίν, σκοπεῖν ἄξιον, πότερον ἡ δύναμις αὕτη κατὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἠλάττωται παρὰ τὸν θεὸν ἢ ὁμοίως εἶχεν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἠλάττωται, τί τὸ αἴτιον; ὕλης μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν μετεῖχεν τῶν παρὰ θεῷ, ἓν δὲ μόνον ἀγαθὸν εἰσάγει, τὸν θεόν, καὶ ἓν κακόν, τὴν ὕλην. εἰ δὲ ὁμοίως εἶχεν, τίνος ἕνεκα ὃς μὲν ὥσπερ τις βασιλεὺς ἐπέταττεν, ἣ δὲ τὸν πόνον τὸν ἀκούσιον ἀνέτλη τοῦτον; καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης δὲ ζητηθήσεται πότε ρον εἰς τὸ κακὸν ὅμοιαι ἢ ἐλάττους δυνάμεις. εἰ γὰρ ἐλάττους, πάντως γε κακίας ἐλάττους· μετοχῇ ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ αὗται ἂν γένοιντο, δύο γὰρ ὄντων κακῶν τὸ ἧττον τοιοῦτον κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πάντως που οὕτως ἔσχηκεν. ἀγαθὸν δὲ οὐδὲν περὶ τὴν ὕλην ἀπολείπουσιν. πάλιν τοίνυν ἀπορία ἑτέρα· εἰ γάρ τις ἄλλη δύναμις τῷ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλει τὴν ἡγεμονεύουσαν ὕλην, αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡγεμονικωτέρα, τὸ γὰρ μᾶλλον κακὸν τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς κατ' αὐτὴν ἡγεῖτο.

12 Τὸ δὲ «κατέπεμψεν ὁ θεὸς δύναμιν ἐπὶ τὴν ὕλην» λέγεται μὲν μετ' οὐδεμιᾶς ἀποδείξεως, ἔστι δὲ πιθανὸν οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν, χρὴ δὲ ὁμοίως καὶ αὐτὸ τυχεῖν τῶν οἰκείων λόγων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἴτιον τούτου ἐκεῖνο εἶναί φασιν· «ὅπως μηδὲν μὲν ᾖ κακὸν ἀγαθὰ δὲ πάντα, ἔδει μιχθῆναι τὴν δύναμιν τῇ ὕλῃ κατὰ τοὺς ἀθλητὰς τοὺς ἐν τῷ συμπλέκεσθαι καταγωνιζο μένους τοὺς ἀντιπάλους, ἵνα κρατήσασα τοῦ κακοῦ παύσῃ αὐτὸ τοῦ εἶναι.» πολὺ δὲ οἶμαι σεμνότερον καὶ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ὑπεροχῆς ἐπάξιον τὸ ὁμοῦ νοήματι τῶν ὄντων ἀφανίσαι τὴν ὕλην. ἀλλ' οἶμαι τοῦτο οὐκ ἀπε δέξαντο διὰ τὸ καὶ νῦν κακόν τι ὑπάρχειν, ὃ τὴν ὕλην εἶναί φασιν. τὰ πράγματα δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον δύνανται παύσασθαι ὄντα τοιαῦτα, ἵνα τις τὸ μὴ μεταβάλλεσθαι εἰς τὰ χείρω ἔνια συγχωρήσῃ· ἔδει δέ τινα αἴσθησιν γενέσθαι τούτου, ὅτι μετρίως ὁπωσδή ποτε ἐμειώθη ταῦτα, ἵνα καὶ τὰς εἰς τὸ μέλλον ἐλπί δας βελτίους ἔχωμεν. καλῶς γὰρ δὴ πρὸς τὸν Ζήνω νος τοῦ Κιτιέως εἴρηται λόγον, ὃς «τὸ πᾶν ἐκπυρωθή σεται» λέγων «πᾶν τὸ καῖον ἔχον καύσῃ ὅλον καύσει, καὶ ὁ ἥλιος πῦρ ἐστιν καὶ ὃ ἔχει οὐ καύσει;» ἐξ οὗ συνήγετο, ὡς ᾤετο, τὸ πᾶν ἐκπυρωθήσεσθαι· πρὸς ὅν τις τῶν χαριεστέρων εἰρηκέναι λέγεται· «ἀλλ' ἐγώ τοι χθὲς καὶ πρὸ ἐνιαυτοῦ καὶ πρὸ πλείονος χρόνου εἶδον καὶ νῦν ὁμοίως ὁρῶ οὐδὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς τοῦ ἡλίου πεπονθώς· χρῆν δὲ σὺν χρόνῳ κατ' ὀλίγον γενέσθαι τοῦτο, ἵνα καὶ ὅτι ποτὲ ἐκπυρωθήσεται τὸ ὅλον πιστεύ σωμεν.» καὶ πρὸς τὸν Μανιχαίου δὴ λόγον-καίτοι σὺν οὐδεμιᾷ πίστει ῥηθέντα ἡ αὐτὴ οἶμαι ἀπόκρι σις ὅτι «ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἐμειώθη ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρότερον ἦν ἐπὶ τοῦ πρώτου γενομένου ἀνθρώπου, ὅπου ἀδελ φὸς ἀδελφὸν ἀπόλλυσιν, καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἔστιν καὶ πόλεμοι οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ποικιλώτεραι ἐπιθυμίαι· χρῆν δὲ εἰ καὶ μὴ πεπαῦσθαι, μεμειῶσθαι γοῦν ταῦτα, ἵνα θαρσήσω μεν ὅτι καὶ παύσεταί ποτε σὺν τῷ χρόνῳ· ὄντων δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκεῖθεν τίς ἡ πίστις τῶν εἰς τὸ μέλλον;»

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