OF SAINT JUSTIN PHILOSOPHER AND MARTYR, GREEK QUESTIONS TO THE CHRISTIANS

 of the insoluble problems, which are raised by the stone-hearted, this is also one. 15. For if, he says, the dead must rise whole, how, if it should h

 For it is illogical to make use of the energies of the incorporeal, but to be ignorant of the existence of the incorporeal. Another. There are two pow

 But since substance according to the first division is into body and incorporeal, how is the incorporeal not a substance existing in itself? Another.

 of...having been established, which was made known to us through the foretelling and teaching of both the prophets and of our Lord and Savior Jesus Ch

 How is the soul not independent? Question. How does God differ from the soul? Answer. In the way that being creator and master differs from having a c

 one can have through some need, but no longer unbegottenness for the unbegotten must exist as unbegotten without any necessary cause. Another. If the

 is resolved into the elements from which they were originally composed. Even if the manner of the dissolution of the parts occurs through being eaten

 ...ute the resurrection, those who disbelieve it? But if by the first, the argument is false for the diagonal does not become incommensurable with th

 they are weak. For that a man should become food for fish presents a difficulty, but not a proof. For it is impossible for the same thing to be submit

 of Plato from his being a man into his becoming an ant, for God also to be changed from being what He is. But if Plato is transformed, but God is not

 cast it away, how is it not irrational to disbelieve God as if concerning an impossible thing, when He has promised to make the rest of humanity incor

 40. If it is good for us to be mortal in the present, but better for us to be immortal in the future, how is it not absurd to say that God is able for

How is the soul not independent? Question. How does God differ from the soul? Answer. In the way that being creator and master differs from having a creator and master, and in the way that which is beyond being differs from that which is. Question. If God creates with counsel, does he use an instrument or without an instrument? Answer. God is in need of nothing outside of his own nature; and just as he counsels without an instrument, so too does he create without an instrument. For if, at the same time he wills something to come into being, it subsists by his will, how is the use of instruments for the things that come into being not superfluous? Question. If God creates without counsel, does he create irrationally, without thought and deliberation, or with some judgment? And if with judgment, due to what lack does he need judgment? But if without judgment, by what reason? Answer. If his works are known to God, and known things are known by reason, how does God not know by reason what he creates? But to create something with thought and deliberation and judgment is a characteristic of artisans among us, who by these means arrive at a better end for the things being made, but God, since he neither gains knowledge nor loses knowledge, has need of none of these things. Question. If that which is wholly created can be incorruptible, by what reason? Answer. Those things whose incorruptibility depends on the will of another cannot be uncreatedly incorruptible; for this reason we say that God alone has immortality, because this belongs to him from his own nature and not from the will of another. Another. If God is above the incorruptibles as their maker, but he is not above the uncreated (for he is not the creator of uncreated things), then the uncreated does not follow from the incorruptible. Another. If God is incorruptible by his own nature, and the soul is also incorruptible by the will of the creator, how in such a great difference of incorruptibility does the uncreated follow from the incorruptible, according to you? Another. If then it accomplishes something toward the constitution of corruptible things, how are not incorruptible things subservient to corruptible things, with the cause of their incorruptibility leading them to such a service? But if this, it is clear that incorruptibility

πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἡ ψυχή; Ἐρώτησις. Τί διαφέρει θεὸς ψυχῆς; Ἀπόκρισις. Ἠι διαφέρει τὸ δημιουργὸν καὶ δεσπότην εἶναι τοῦ δη μιουργὸν καὶ δεσπότην ἔχειν, καὶ ᾗ διαφέρει τὸ ὑπὲρ τὸ ὂν τοῦ ὄντος. Ἐρώτησις. Eἰ μετὰ βουλῆς ποιεῖ ὁ θεός, ὀργάνῳ κεχρημένος ἢ ἄνευ ὀργάνου; Ἀπόκρισις. Ἀνενδεής ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς παντὸς τοῦ ἔξωθεν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ φύσεως· καὶ ὥσπερ ἄνευ ὀργάνου βουλεύεται, οὕτως καὶ ἄνευ ὀργάνου ποιεῖ. Eἰ γὰρ ἅμα τῷ βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν γενέσθαι τι ὑφίσταται βουληθέντος, πῶς οὐ περιττὴ τῶν ὀργάνων ἡ χρῆσις τῶν γινομένων; Ἐρώτησις. Eἰ ἄνευ βουλῆς ποιεῖ ὁ θεός, πότερον ἀλόγως ποιεῖ ἄνευ διανοίας καὶ ἐπισκέψεως ἢ μετά τινος ἐπικρίσεως; Καὶ εἰ μετὰ ἐπικρίσεως, τίνος ἐνδείᾳ ἐπικρίσεως δεῖται; Eἰ δὲ ἀκρίτως, ποίῳ τῷ λόγῳ; Ἀπόκρισις. Eἰ γνωστὰ τῷ θεῷ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ, τὰ δὲ γνωστὰ λόγῳ ἐστὶ γνωστά, πῶς οὐ λόγῳ γινώσκει ὁ θεὸς ἃ ποιεῖ; Τὸ δὲ μετὰ διανοίας καὶ ἐπισκέψεως καὶ ἐπικρίσεως ποιεῖν τι τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν τεχνιτῶν ἐστιν ἴδιον, τῶν τούτοις πρὸς ἄμεινον τέλος τῶν γινομένων ἀφικνουμένων, ὁ δὲ θεός, ἅτε μήτε προσ λαμβάνων γνῶσιν μήτε ἀποβάλλων γνῶσιν, οὐδενὸς τούτων δεῖται. Ἐρώτησις. Eἰ τὸ ὅλως γενητὸν δύναται ἄφθαρτον εἶναι, ποίῳ τῷ λόγῳ; Ἀπόκρισις. Ὧν ἡ ἀφθαρσία ἐκ τῆς ἑτέρου βουλῆς ἐξήρτηται, ταῦτα οὐ δύναται ἀγενήτως ἄφθαρτα εἶναι· διὸ μόνον τὸν θεὸν λέγομεν ἔχειν ἀθανασίαν, ὅτι ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας φύσεως καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἑτέρου βουλῆς πρόσεστιν αὐτῷ ταῦτα. Ἄλλο. Ὁ θεὸς εἰ ὑπὲρ μὲν τοὺς ἀφθάρτους ἐστὶν ὡς τούτων ποιητής, ὑπὲρ δὲ τὸ ἀγένητον οὐκ ἔστιν (οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστιν τῶν ἀγενήτων δημιουργός), οὐκ ἄρα ἕπεται τῷ ἀφθάρτῳ τὸ ἀγένητον. Ἄλλο. Eἰ ἄφθαρτός ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς τῇ αὑτοῦ φύσει, ἄφθαρτος δὲ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τῇ βουλήσει τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, πῶς ἐν τοσαύτῃ ἀφθαρσίας διαφορᾷ ἕπεται καθ' ὑμᾶς τῷ ἀφθάρτῳ τὸ ἀγένητον; Ἄλλο. Eἰ οὖν τελεῖ τι πρὸς σύστασιν τῶν φθαρτῶν, πῶς οὐκ εἰσὶ τῶν φθορίμων πραγμάτων τὰ ἄφθαρτα ὑπουρ γικά, τῆς αἰτίας τῆς ἀφθαρσίας αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἀγούσης αὐτὰ ὑπουργίαν; Ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι ἀφθαρσίαν