to be of the same nature as God; for God alone is unable to do what is truly evil. Wherefore the apostle says that it is impossible for God to lie. For evil is a certain weakness observed in created beings; but in the uncreated, what trace will there be of weakness? But if we were of the same nature as God, we would no longer be His creatures, being gods by nature, just as He is God. But since no one is so deranged as to exalt himself and demand to be God, being a man— for to think such things is characteristic of the lawless Manichaeans, who think our souls are co-eternal with God and similar— the measure of the rational nature must be examined, and thus the argument concerning sinning must be pursued. 19. We say, then, that for every rational creature a certain measure has been established for virtue, and it is perfect and is known, in which nothing is lacking of its proper nature for perfection; it is impossible to surpass such a thing, but to arrive at the established measure is complete virtue. Therefore, one must not require an angelic life from men, who are still mortal and subject to fate, nor, indeed, angels to imitate the power of God which is beyond all mind and comprehension. For to demand from each what is beyond its own power happens to be the mark of a deranged mind. What measure, then, has been established for a man who is striving for virtue? It is clear that they will say the attainment of temperance, justice, courage, and whatever such things there are. But it was not possible to distinguish these things, unless God had first sown the seeds of prudence in nature, so that we might distinguish the nature of their opposites; and just as carpenters straighten the crooked parts of wood with a line, cutting away what is superfluous and outside the straight line, so also men, with respect to the difference of opposite actions, using reason as a kind of plumb line, cleanse away what is not done properly as refuse, setting it far from their own work. 20. And this is the account of prudence <and> for what reason God impressed it upon rational souls; but God created in us the power of temperance and justice and also of courage for attainment, without taking away the power for their opposites. For He wishes that through the free presentation of opposites men be shown to be approved. For if the virtues existed by themselves, they would not be recognized; for the excellence of virtue is not recognized from the inability to do the opposites. For who will praise a temperate stone, for which the opposite is not available to be done? Likewise who will praise a piece of wood not slandering, or a horse or a donkey not lying? And in other cases likewise the same argument holds for all. Virtue, then, is recognized from the ability to do the opposites of praiseworthy actions as well. How then could the temperate man be recognized, if licentiousness were not freely set before him and he were able to practice it if he wished? And how the courageous man, if terrifying things did not rise up against him? And how the just man, if greed also has an opportunity to be practiced by him? 21. Not that it is necessary for evil to be active, so that virtue might be shown by contrast—away with the blasphemy— but so that evil might not occur, when the agent has the power to do it. For come, if some truth were spoken by someone, could not such a person, having hidden this, have published a lie instead of the truth, since he had power over both? But if he refrained from the lie because of virtue, was he for that reason unable to perform the opposite? For he was able to do this, if he had wished. For the nature of men is weak and being weak toward falsehood

αὐτῆς φύσεως εἶναι τῷ θεῷ· μόνος γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἀδυνάτως ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν τὴν ὄντως κακίαν. Ὅθεν φησὶν ὁ ἀπόστολος ἐπεὶ ἀδύνατον ψεύσασθαι θεόν. Ἡ γὰρ κακία ἀσθένειά τίς ἐστιν ἐνθεωρουμένη τοῖς γενητοῖς· παρὰ δὲ τῷ ἀγενήτῳ ποῖον ἴχνος ἔσται τῆς ἀσθενείας; Εἰ δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς ἦμεν φύσεως τῷ θεῷ, οὐκέτι ἦμεν αὐτοῦ δημιουργήματα, ὄντες φύσει θεοί, ὡσπεροῦν ἐκεῖνός ἐστι θεός. Ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ οὐδεὶς τοσοῦτόν ἐστι παραπλὴξ ὡς ὑπεραίρεσθαι καὶ ἀπαιτεῖν ἑαυτὸν εἶναι θεὸν ἄνθρωπος ὤν- τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα φρονεῖν τῶν παρανόμων Μανιχαίων ἴδιον, οἰο- μένων τὰς ἡμῶν ψυχὰς συναϊδίους εἶναι τῷ θεῷ καὶ ὁμοίους- ἐξεταστέον τὸ τῆς λογικῆς φύσεως μέτρον καὶ οὕτω τὸν περὶ τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν λόγον διεξιτέον. 19. Φαμὲν οὖν ὡς παντὶ τῶν λο- γικῶν κτισμάτων μέτρον τι ὥρισται πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τέλειόν ἐστί τε καὶ γνωρίζεται, ᾧ μηδὲν ἐλλείπει τῆς οἰκείας πρὸς τελειότητα φύσεως· τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτο ὑπερβῆναι μὲν ἀδύνατον, ἀφικέσθαι δὲ πρὸς τὸ ὡρισμένον μέτρον ἐντελὴς ἀρετή. Οὔτ' οὖν ἀνθρώπους τοὺς ἔτι θνητοὺς καὶ ἐπικήρους ἀπαιτητέον ἀγγελικὴν ζωήν, οὔτε μὴν ἀγγέλους ἀπομιμεῖσθαι τὴν ὑπὲρ πάντα νοῦν καὶ κατάληψιν τοῦ θεοῦ δύναμιν. Τὸ γὰρ ὑπὲρ δύναμιν ἀπαιτεῖν ἕκαστον τῆς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεως παραφρονοῦντος λογισμοῦ τυγχάνει γνωρί- σματα. Τί τοίνυν μέτρον ὥρισται ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐπειγομένῳ; ∆ῆλον ὡς κατόρθωσιν φήσουσι σωφροσύνης, δικαιοσύνης, ἀνδρείας καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα τυγχάνει. Ταῦτα δὲ διακρίνειν οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν, εἰ μὴ φρονήσεως σπέρματα τῇ φύσει ὁ θεὸς προκατεβάλετο, ὡς διακρίνειν ἡμᾶς τῶν ἐναντίων τὴν φύσιν· καὶ καθάπερ οἱ τέκτονες σπάρτῳ τῶν ξύλων τὰ σκολιὰ διευθύνουσι τὸ περιττὸν καὶ ἔξω τῆς εὐθείας γραμμῆς περικόπτοντες, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωποι τῶν ἐναντίων πράξεων τὸ διάφορον, ὡς μὴν στάθμῃ τινὶ τῷ λόγῳ κεχρημένοι τὸ μὴ δεόντως γινόμενον ὡς ἀπόβλητον ἐκκαθαίρουσι τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἐργασίας πόρρω τιθέμενοι. 20. Καὶ οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος τῆς φρονήσεως <καὶ> δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ταύτην ἐνετύπωσε ταῖς λογικαῖς ψυχαῖς ὁ θεός· σωφροσύνης δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀνδρείας δύναμιν ἡμῖν ἐνεποίησε πρὸς κατόρθωσιν ὁ θεός, οὐ τὴν πρὸς τὰ ἐναντία δύναμιν ἀφελόμενος. Βούλεται γὰρ διὰ τῆς τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ παραθέσεως εὐδοκίμους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀποδείκνυσθαι. Εἰ γὰρ αἱ ἀρεταὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰς ὑπῆρχον, οὐκ ἂν ἐγνωρίζοντο· οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἀδυναμίας τοῦ ποιεῖν τὰ ἐναντία γνωρίζεται τῆς ἀρετῆς ἡ εὐπρέπεια. Τίς γὰρ ἐπαινέσει λίθον σωφρονοῦντα, ᾧ μὴ πάρεστι καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον πρὸς ἐργασίαν; Ὁμοίως τίς ἐπαινέσει ξύλον μὴ συκο- φαντοῦν ἢ ἵππον ἢ ὄνον μὴ ψευδόμενον; Καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ὁ αὐτὸς παρὰ πᾶσι διασῴζεται λόγος. Ἀρετὴ οὖν γνωρίζεται | ἐκ τοῦ δύνασθαι ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν ἐπαινουμένων πράξεων τὰ ἐναντία. Πῶς οὖν ὁ σώφρων γνωρισθείη μὴ κατ' ἐξουσίαν προ- κειμένης τῆς ἀσελγείας καὶ ταύτην πράττειν δυνάμενος εἰ βουληθείη; Πῶς δὲ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, μὴ τῶν πτοούντων ἐπανισταμένων; Πῶς δὲ καὶ δίκαιος, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἡ πλεονεξία χώραν ἔχει γίνεσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦ; 21. Οὐχ ὅτι ἀνάγκῃ δεῖ τὴν κακίαν ἐνεργὸν εἶ- ναι, ἵνα ἡ ἀρετὴ διὰ τῆς ἀντιπαραθέσεως δειχθείῃ, ἄπαγε τῆς δυσφημίας, ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ γίνοιτο ἡ κακία τοῦ πράττοντος ἐπ' ἐξουσίας ἔχοντος ταύτην ἐργάζεσθαι. Φέρε γὰρ εἰ ὑπό τινος ἀλήθειά τις ῥηθείη, ἆρα οὐχ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐδύνατο ταύτην ἀπο- κρυψάμενος ψεῦδος ἀντὶ τῆς ἀληθείας δημοσιεῦσαι, ὡς ἑκάτερον ἔχων ἐπ' ἐξουσίας; Εἰ δὲ τὸ ψεῦδος ἀπεκρύψατο δι' ἀρετήν, οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο τοῦ ἐναντίου τὴν ἐργασίαν ποιεῖν οὐκ ἐδύνατο; Ἴσχυε γὰρ τοῦτο ποιεῖν, εἴπερ ἠβουλήθη. Ἀσθενὴς γάρ ἐστι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡ φύσις καὶ ἀσθενοῦσα πρὸς ψεῦδος