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differs, but never from itself. But these things do not contribute to the definition of nature; for it is possible for a man to be snub-nosed and not to be. And when the gray-eyedness is gone, the man no less remains a man. 6 Concerning the proper. The proper is spoken of in four ways. First, that which belongs to the species alone, but not to all of it, just as being a geometer belongs to man; for only man is a geometer, but not every man is a geometer. Second, that which belongs to all of the species, but not to it alone, such as being two-footed; for every man is two-footed, but not only man is two-footed but also a dove and such things. Third, that which belongs to all and to it alone, but not always, just as growing gray-haired belongs to man; for this fits every man and man alone, but not always, but in old age. Fourth, that which comes from the first three coming together, that is, to all and to it alone and always, which is also convertible, just as being able to laugh belongs to man and being able to neigh belongs to the horse and such things; for only man has the ability to laugh and every man and always, even if he does not always use it. For if something is a man, it is in every way able to laugh, and if something is able to laugh, it is in every way a man. This is what it is to be convertible. The discussion among the philosophers is about this signification. Which we also state in defining it: The proper is that which belongs to all of the species and to it alone and always. And they divide this in three ways: from the organization, that is the formation, such as having broad nails and walking upright belongs to man; from the activity, such as for fire to be carried upwards; from the potentiality, as we say that fire has a heating potentiality surpassing the heats of other bodies. And the proper is said to be non-essential. 7 Concerning the predicates. Every predication is made either of more or of equally, but never of less. And of more, when the more universal are predicated of the more particular; the more universal, then, are those above, and the more particular are those below. The most universal of all, then, is being, wherefore it is predicated of all things; for both substance is called being and accident is called being. But we cannot say that being is substance; for being is not only substance but also accident. Likewise also genera are predicated of species as being more universal, but species are not predicated of their own genera; for species are more particular than genera. Therefore substance is predicated of animal and animal of man; for animal is substance and man is animal. But it is not convertible; for every man is an animal, but not every animal is a man. For the horse and the dog are animals; likewise also every animal is a substance, but not every substance is an animal; for both a stone and wood are substances, which are not animals. Likewise also the species is predicated of the individuals contained by it, that is, hypostases, as being more universal. But the individual, that is, the hypostasis, is not predicated of the species; for the hypostasis is more particular than the species. And so Peter is a man and Paul is a man, but not every man is Peter or Paul; for there are also other hypostases under the species of man. And the differentiae are predicated of the species in which they inhere, and of their individuals. For the differentiae are more universal than the species; for the rational is more universal than the species of man. For every man is rational, but not every rational being is a man; for an angel, being rational, is not a man. And this is the predication of more; but the predication of equally is when it is convertible. For the properties are predicated

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διαφέρει, αὐτὸς δὲ ἑαυτοῦ οὐδέποτε. Ταῦτα δὲ οὐ συντελοῦσιν εἰς τὸν ὁρισμὸν τῆς φύσεως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἄνθρωπον εἶναι σιμὸν καὶ μὴ εἶναι. Καὶ ἀπογινομένης τῆς γλαυκότητος οὐδὲν ἧττον ὁ ἄνθρωπος μένει ἄνθρωπος. 6 Περὶ ἰδίου. Τὸ ἴδιον τετραχῶς λέγεται. Πρῶτον, ὃ μόνῳ μὲν ὑπάρχει τῷ εἴδει, οὐ παντὶ δέ, ὥσπερ τὸ γεωμετρεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· μόνος γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος γεωμέτρης, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος γεωμέτρης. ∆εύτερον, ὅπερ παντὶ μὲν τῷ εἴδει ὑπάρχει, οὐ μόνῳ δέ, ὡς τὸ δίπουν· πᾶς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος δίπους, οὐ μόνον δὲ ἄνθρωπος δίπους ἀλλὰ καὶ περιστερὰ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Τρίτον, ὅπερ παντὶ μὲν καὶ μόνῳ, οὐκ ἀεὶ δέ, ὥσπερ τὸ πολιοῦσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· τοῦτο γὰρ παντὶ μὲν καὶ μόνῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἁρμόζει, οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ. Τέταρτον, ὅπερ γίνεται τῶν τριῶν τῶν πρώτων συνερχομένων, τουτέστι παντὶ καὶ μόνῳ καὶ ἀεί, ὅπερ καὶ ἀντιστρέφει, ὥσπερ τὸ γελαστικὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ χρεμετιστικὸν τῷ ἵππῳ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· μόνος γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τὸ γελαστικὸν καὶ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἀεί, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀεὶ κέχρηται αὐτῷ. Εἴ τι γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, πάντως γελαστικόν, καὶ εἴ τι γελαστικόν, πάντως ἄνθρωπος. Τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἀντιστρέφειν. Περὶ τούτου τοῦ σημαινομένου παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὁ λόγος. Ὃ καὶ ὑπογράφοντές φαμεν· Ἴδιόν ἐστι, ὃ παντὶ καὶ μόνῳ τῷ εἴδει καὶ ἀεὶ ὑπάρχει. Τοῦτο δὲ τριχῶς διαιροῦσιν· ἀπὸ τῆς διοργανώσεως τουτέστι διαπλάσεως, ὡς τὸ πλατυώνυχον καὶ τὸ ὀρθοπεριπατητικὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας, ὡς τῷ πυρὶ τὸ ἀνωτάτω φέρεσθαι· ἀπὸ τῆς δυνάμεως, ὡς λέγομεν τῷ πυρὶ ὑπάρχειν τὴν θερμαντικὴν δύναμιν ὑπερβάλλουσαν τὰς τῶν ἄλλων σωμάτων θερμότητας. Λέγεται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον ἐπουσιῶδες. 7 Περὶ τῶν κατηγορουμένων. Πᾶσα κατηγορία ἢ ἐπὶ πλέον γίνεται ἢ ἐπίσης, ἐπ' ἔλαττον δὲ οὐδέποτε. Καὶ ἐπὶ πλέον μέν, ὅτε τὰ καθολικώτερα κατηγοροῦνται τῶν μερικωτέρων· καθολικώτερα οὖν εἰσι τὰ ἐπάνω, μερικώτερα δὲ τὰ ὑποκάτω. Καθολικώτερον μὲν οὖν ἐστι πάντων τὸ ὄν, διὸ πάντων κατηγορεῖται· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἡ οὐσία ὂν λέγεται καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὂν λέγεται. Οὐ δυνάμεθα δὲ εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τὸ ὂν οὐσία ἐστίν· οὐ μόνον γὰρ οὐσία ἐστὶ τὸ ὂν ἀλλὰ καὶ συμβεβηκός. Ὁμοίως καὶ τὰ γένη κατηγοροῦνται τῶν εἰδῶν ὡς καθολικώτερα, τὰ δὲ εἴδη οὐ κατηγοροῦνται τῶν γενῶν αὐτῶν· τὰ γὰρ εἴδη μερικώτερα τῶν γενῶν εἰσι. Κατηγορεῖται τοίνυν ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ζῴου καὶ τὸ ζῷον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ζῷον οὐσία ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷόν ἐστιν. Οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει δέ· πᾶς μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον, οὐ πᾶν δὲ ζῷον ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ ὁ ἵππος γὰρ καὶ ὁ κύων ζῷά εἰσιν, ὁμοίως καὶ πᾶν ζῷον οὐσία ἐστίν, οὐ πᾶσα δὲ οὐσία ζῷόν ἐστιν· καὶ ὁ λίθος γὰρ καὶ τὸ ξύλον οὐσία ἐστίν, ἅτινα οὔκ εἰσι ζῷα. Ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ εἶδος κατηγορεῖται τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ περιεχομένων ἀτόμων τουτέστιν ὑποστάσεων ὡς καθολικώτερον. Τὸ δὲ ἄτομον ἤγουν ἡ ὑπόστασις οὐ κατηγορεῖται τοῦ εἴδους· μερικωτέρα γάρ ἐστι τοῦ εἴδους ἡ ὑπόστασις. Καὶ Πέτρος τοίνυν ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ Παῦλος ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὐ πᾶς δὲ ἄνθρωπος Πέτρος ἢ Παῦλος· εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ ἄλλαι ὑποστάσεις ὑπὸ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ δὲ κατηγοροῦνται τῶν εἰδῶν, οἷς ἐνυπάρχουσι, καὶ τῶν ἀτόμων αὐτῶν. Καθολικώτεραι γάρ εἰσιν αἱ διαφοραὶ τῶν εἰδῶν· τὸ γὰρ λογικὸν καθολικώτερόν ἐστι τοῦ εἴδους τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Καὶ γὰρ πᾶς μὲν ἄνθρωπος λογικός, οὐ πᾶς δὲ λογικὸς ἄνθρωπος· καὶ ὁ ἄγγελος γὰρ λογικὸς ὢν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ αὕτη μέν ἐστιν ἡ ἐπὶ πλέον κατηγορία· ἡ δὲ ἐπίσης κατηγορία, ὅτε ἀντιστρέφει. Κατηγοροῦνται γὰρ τὰ ἴδια