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in species in no way, and it makes the species—the first, that is, the genus, is like substance; for substance signifies both man and horse and ox. For each of them is both called and is substance, but each exists as a different species. —the second, that is, the species, is like man; for it signifies many, that is, all the particular men, who differ from one another in number (for Peter is one and Paul is another, and they are not one but two) but do not differ in species, that is, in nature (for they are all both called and are men). Therefore, that which is more particular and differs in number, like Peter, is an individual and a person and a hypostasis, which signifies a "certain one". For when asked, "who is this?", we say, "Peter". It also signifies "another"; for Peter is another and Paul is another, and "he" and "this one" and "that one". These and similar things, which subsist in themselves, are taken with reference to the individual. But that which contains the individuals is called species, and is more universal than the individual, because it contains many individuals, like "man". For it contains Peter and Paul and all particular men, which is called nature and substance and form according to the holy fathers. That which contains many species is called genus, like "animal"; for it contains man, ox, horse, and is more universal than the species. The holy fathers called the species and the genus nature and form and substance. But the species, that is, the nature and the substance and the form, does not make another individual, nor one of a different kind, but another thing; for we say man is one thing by nature and horse another, not another individual and another individual. Of the species are predicated "this" and "that" and "the same" and such things, which is predicated in the "what it is". But the difference makes [something] of another kind; for a rational animal is of another kind and an irrational [animal] is of another kind, and "of such a kind" and "of what kind" and "of whatever kind". The non-essential term belongs either to one species or to many. And if to one, it is called a property, as "capable of laughter" belongs only to man, and "capable of neighing" only to a horse. But if it belongs to many species, it makes the accident, like "white"; for this belongs to man and horse and dog and many other species. And these are the five terms, to which every philosophical term is reduced. Therefore, we must know these, what each one signifies and in what they have in common with each other and in what they differ. And they are these: genus, species, difference, property, accident. Genus is that which is predicated in the "what it is" of several things differing in species, that is, what is said and named of them; for to be predicated is to be said of something. Species is that which is predicated in the "what it is" of several things differing in number. Difference is that which is predicated in the "what kind of thing it is" of several things differing in species and is taken in the definition as essential. And this is that which cannot be and not be in the same species, and it is impossible for it not to be in the species to which it belongs, which both preserves when present and destroys when absent. And it is impossible for it and its contrary to be in the same species, for example, it is impossible for "rational" not to be in man; for the irrational is not man. When present, this constitutes the nature of man, and when absent, it destroys it; for the irrational is not man. Therefore, one must know that this is called essential and natural and constitutive and divisive and species-making difference, and essential quality and natural property and property of nature, which is called by the philosophers most proper difference, as being most proper and representative of the very nature that possesses it. Property is that which belongs to one species, and to all of the species, and always, which is also convertible; for every man is capable of laughter, and everything capable of laughter is a man. Accident is that which is predicated in the "what kind of thing it is" of several things differing in species and is not taken in the definition, but is able both to belong and not to belong, which neither preserves when present nor destroys when absent. This is called a non-essential difference and quality. This is either separable or inseparable; separable is that which at one time comes to be and at another time ceases to be in the same hypostasis, like sitting,

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εἴδει οὐδαμῶς, καὶ ποιεῖ τὸ εἶδος-τὸ μὲν πρότερον ἤγουν τὸ γένος οἷον ἡ οὐσία ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ οὐσία σημαίνει καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἵππον καὶ βοῦν. Ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐσία τε λέγεται καὶ ἔστιν, ἄλλο δὲ καὶ ἄλλο εἶδος ὑπάρχει ἕκαστον. -τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἤγουν τὸ εἶδος οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι· σημαίνει γὰρ πολλοὺς ἤγουν πάντας τοὺς κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπους, οἵτινες τῷ μὲν ἀριθμῷ διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων (ἄλλος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ Πέτρος καὶ ἄλλος ὁ Παῦλος καὶ οὔκ εἰσιν εἷς ἀλλὰ δύο) τῷ δὲ εἴδει οὐ διαφέρουσιν ἤγουν τῇ φύσει (πάντες γὰρ ἄνθρωποι καὶ λέγονται καί εἰσιν). Ἔστιν οὖν τὸ μὲν μερικώτερον καὶ ἀριθμῷ διαφέρον οἷον ὁ Πέτρος ἄτομον καὶ πρόσωπον καὶ ὑπόστασις, ὅπερ τὸν τινὰ σημαίνει. Ἐρωτώμενοι γὰρ «τίς ἐστιν οὗτος», λέγομεν «ὁ Πέτρος». Σημαίνει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄλλος· ἄλλος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ Πέτρος καὶ ἄλλος ὁ Παῦλος καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ οὗτος καὶ ἐκεῖνος. Ταῦτα ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀτόμου λαμβάνεται καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἅπερ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑφέστηκε. Τὸ δὲ περιέχον τὰ ἄτομα λέγεται εἶδος, καὶ ἔστι καθολικώτερον τοῦ ἀτόμου, ὅτι πολλὰ ἄτομα περιέχει οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Περιέχει γὰρ καὶ Πέτρον καὶ Παῦλον καὶ πάντας τοὺς κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπους, ὅπερ λέγεται φύσις καὶ οὐσία καὶ μορφὴ κατὰ τοὺς ἁγίους πατέρας. Τὸ δὲ πολλὰ εἴδη περιέχον λέγεται γένος οἷον τὸ ζῷον· περιέχει γὰρ ἄνθρωπον, βοῦν, ἵππον, καὶ ἔστι καθολικώτερον τοῦ εἴδους. Οἱ δὲ ἅγιοι πατέρες τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ γένος ἐκάλεσαν φύσιν καὶ μορφὴν καὶ οὐσίαν. Ποιεῖ δὲ τὸ εἶδος ἤγουν ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ οὐσία καὶ ἡ μορφὴ οὐκ ἄλλον οὐδὲ ἀλλοῖον ἀλλὰ ἄλλο· ἄλλο γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν λέγομεν τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἄλλο τὸν ἵππον, οὐχὶ ἄλλον καὶ ἄλλον. Λέγεται δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἴδους τοῦτο καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐκεῖνο καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορεῖται. Ἡ δὲ διαφορὰ ἀλλοῖον ποιεῖ· ἀλλοῖον γὰρ ζῷον τὸ λογικὸν καὶ ἀλλοῖον τὸ ἄλογον καὶ τοιοῦτον καὶ οἷον καὶ ὁποῖον. Ἡ δὲ ἐπουσιώδης φωνὴ ἢ ἑνὶ εἴδει ὑπάρχει ἢ πολλοῖς. Καὶ εἰ μὲν ἑνί, λέγεται ἴδιον, ὡς τὸ γελαστικὸν μόνῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπάρχον καὶ τὸ χρεμετιστικὸν μόνῳ τῷ ἵππῳ. Εἰ δὲ πολλοῖς εἴδεσιν ὑπάρχει, ποιεῖ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς οἷον τὸ λευκόν· τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπάρχει καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς εἴδεσι. Καὶ αὗταί εἰσιν αἱ πέντε φωναί, ὑφ' ἃς ἀνάγεται πᾶσα φιλόσοφος φωνή. Ταύτας οὖν δεῖ ἡμᾶς γνῶναι, ἑκάστη τις τί σημαίνει καὶ ἐν τίνι κοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλήλαις καὶ ἐν τίνι διαφέρουσιν. Εἰσὶ δὲ αὗται· γένος, εἶδος, διαφορά, ἴδιον, συμβεβηκός. Γένος μὲν τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ εἴδει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον τουτέστι λεγόμενον καὶ κατονομαζόμενον· κατηγορεῖσθαι γάρ ἐστι τὸ κατά τινος λέγεσθαι. Εἶδος δὲ τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόν των τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον. ∆ιαφορὰ δὲ ἡ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ εἴδει ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστι κατηγορουμένη καὶ ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ λαμβανομένη ὡς οὐσιώδης. Αὕτη δέ ἐστι, ὃ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἴδει καὶ ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι ἐν τῷ εἴδει, οὗ ἐστιν, ὃ καὶ παρὸν σῴζει καὶ ἀπὸν φθείρει. Καὶ ἀδύνατον αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον αὐτοῦ εἶναι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἴδει, οἷον τὸ λογικὸν ἀδύνατον μὴ εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· τὸ γὰρ ἄλογον οὐκ ἄνθρωπος. Τοῦτο παρὸν συνιστᾷ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἀπὸν φθείρει· τὸ γὰρ ἄλογον οὐκ ἄνθρωπος. ∆εῖ οὖν γινώσκειν, ὅτι αὕτη λέγεται οὐσιώδης καὶ φυσικὴ καὶ συστατικὴ καὶ διαιρετικὴ καὶ εἰδοποιὸς διαφορὰ καὶ οὐσιώδης ποιότης καὶ φυσικὸν ἰδίωμα καὶ ἰδίωμα φύσεως, ἥτις λέγεται παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἰδιαίτατα διαφορὰ ὡς ἰδιωτάτη καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως παραστατικὴ τῆς ἐχούσης αὐτήν. Ἴδιον δέ ἐστι τὸ ἑνὶ εἴδει ὑπάρχον καὶ παντὶ τῷ εἴδει καὶ ἀεί, ὃ καὶ ἀντιστρέφει· πᾶς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος γελαστικόν, καὶ πᾶν γελαστικὸν ἄνθρωπος. Συμβεβηκὸς δέ ἐστι τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ εἴδει ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον καὶ μὴ λαμβανόμενον ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ, ἀλλὰ δυνάμενον καὶ ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ὃ οὔτε παρὸν σῴζει οὔτε ἀπὸν φθείρει. Τοῦτο λέγεται ἐπουσιώδης διαφορὰ καὶ ποιότης. Τοῦτο ἢ χωριστόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀχώριστον· χωριστὸν μέν, ὃ ποτὲ μὲν γίνεται ποτὲ δὲ ἀπογίνεται ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ὑποστάσει, ὡς κάθισις,